Paralus Which General

[Paralus]

Again, from Arrian:
"Calling a council of the Companions, the Generals, the cavalry officers, and leaders of the Grecian allies and mercenaries, he deliberated with them... Having returned, he called together the same leaders... He told them to take care to obey his orders quickly, and to transmit the orders they had received to the ranks with all rapidity..."

If Arrian is faithfully recounting Ptolemy's account here, I'd say that's a strong hint that Alexander had a means of reaching out to his tactical officers…

Furthermore, Arrian later qualifies between pre-arranged instructions (see Menidas, and the Greek mercenary cavalry for example) and on-the-spot orders.

To clarify: there was no field communications as we now have them available. That is not to say there was no communication. What there was will have, by necessity, been basic. I’d argue that the orders, given to the officers above, were prior to battle. These men were to follow them and pass them on – as and when directed to – as the trumpets and other signals denoted.

Without reading Arrian, I’m assuming this is Gaugamela you’re referring to? If so then Menidas was posted with Alexander on the right and will not have been at any far remove. It may well have been something Alexander alerted the cavalry commander to prior to the engagement as the one thing that is clear is Alexander’s drift to the right and forward to thin the opposing front.

But that's still communication. However simple or pre-arranged the message may have been, if it really happened we're still talking about something that needed to get from the left flank to the center of the battle itself. Whether this was via heralds, a series of trumpet calls, or both... it boils down to the same thing.

Agreed. As I say, communication was basic and difficult not non-existent. Eumenes’ instructions – initially via trumpet and later direct and via (one suspects) a runner on horse – are described by Hieronymus. Again, almost all will have been decided and mapped out prior to engagement. The din of battle and the sheer distance battle lines covered will have dictated this.

Although not directly germane, you might find might find The Great War (by Les Carlyon)a great read. I am half way through and it is as well written a tome as I’ve read in years. What constantly comes through is the utter difficulty with communication and only across fronts of a few thousand yards. Obviously Alexander had no artillery to deal with but the point remains: with the dust, the noise and the distances it will have been similar.

[Phoebus]

To clarify: there was no field communications as we now have them available. That is not to say there was no communication. What there was will have, by necessity, been basic.

Oh, well I can certainly agree with that.

Without muddling the field by addressing points from two different posters, I guess this is what I was looking at:

On a "system" level, assuming that Alexander's phalanx had a similar system of supernumeraries (and I believe they did), I don't really see the Republican legions under Marius, Caesar, etc., as necessarily enjoying a superior system of communications--cornicens, signifers, etc.

Where appietas' points are concerned, on a command/leadership level, I feel that Alexander had a greater feel for the shaping of the battle and the decisive moment than the generals appietas mentioned. I don't think that his charges were haphazardous or impulsive affairs. Whether directed against Dareius or a time-transplanted Marius, I don't believe that Alexander's assault would have been delivered until he believed he had achieved a tactical situation that could be decided there (the point of his assault) and then.

It's that sort of instinct that I believe was absent not only from most of the Hellenistic rulers, Pyrrhus included, but from the majority of the generals in our history. Anyways, I ramble!

I’d argue that the orders, given to the officers above, were prior to battle. These men were to follow them and pass them on – as and when directed to – as the trumpets and other signals denoted.

I'm sure that there were certain pre-planned orders, as Arrian specifically mentions them. I'm also reasonably convinced by the picture he paints that certain orders were delivered as needed. I think it's rather clear from the language when units act on predetermined tasks (Agrianians, Menidas & cavalry; repelling chariots and riding to protect the flank initially, respectively) and when it is told to (subsequent cavalry attacks on the right wing).

Without reading Arrian, I’m assuming this is Gaugamela you’re referring to? If so then Menidas was posted with Alexander on the right and will not have been at any far remove.

True, he was not far--comparatively speaking. He was, however, on the extreme right of the flank (if I recall correctly), and thus separated by Alexander by 2-3 foot and cavalry formations. It's a moot point, nonetheless, since we both accept that his was a pre-arranged task.

Where the others are concerned, again, I feel that Alexander's oblique with the right leading made the need for communications to the left unnecessary. By the time Parmenion was feeling the heat, the assault on the right had been blunted, and the center was being assailed. Nonetheless, Parmenion was able to get his message through to Alexander.

The one thing I gain out of this is that Alexander obviously wasn't always in the midst of the melee even if part of that assault.

Again, almost all will have been decided and mapped out prior to engagement.

Also agreed. I guess we simply disagree (?) as to how malleable said plan could be once things were in place. One of the problems with Alexander is that his plans were seemingly good enough as to not merit much modification...

The din of battle and the sheer distance battle lines covered will have dictated this.

Hmmm, on a basic level I agree. Ultimately, though, I think it really depends on the situation. I also think that even the best writers in the field are too quick to jump to absolutes without necessarily being very informed on the subject matter. How many of Alexander's biographers have actually arrayed 100,000+ people on Arbela, for example?

Prior to the separation between Simmias and the rest of the phalanx, Alexander was fielding a fairly impenetrable front. Assuming 16 man-deep spheirae, the phalanx would have, what, roughly 2,000 feet of frontage? Add to it the frontage of the hypaspists and the units between Parmenion and the phalanx, and modify it for a diagonal order (which would make the phalanx look oddly like a staircase), but I still don't think you'd be looking at a total frontage greater than a mile. A proper runner should be able to make the course in less than 6 minutes; a rider in even less time. With an ensign at the rear of each spheira, I doubt a herald would have much trouble identifying specific units (especially individual brigades and cavalry commands).

What I have always found far more troubling was the idea that the commander of each individual spheira was located at the front right of the formation, and that the ouragos at the rear, with the supernumeraries, was only a sub-officer. How far up the chain did this go? Was Craterus, for example, at the very front right of his brigade at Gaugamela? Or did individual brigade commanders sit in the rear with their own supernumeraries?

I'm looking forward to ordering that book, by the way!

[Paralus]

Without reading Arrian, I’m assuming this is Gaugamela you’re referring to? If so then Menidas was posted with Alexander on the right and will not have been at any far remove.

True, he was not far--comparatively speaking. He was, however, on the extreme right of the flank (if I recall correctly), and thus separated by Alexander by 2-3 foot and cavalry formations. It's a moot point, nonetheless, since we both accept that his was a pre-arranged task.

And this will come down to how one pictures that flank. Arrian’s description is lucid and clear:

Next to the royal squadron on the right wing, half of the Agrianians, under the command of Attalus, in conjunction with the Macedonian archers under Briso’s command, were posted angular-wise in case they should be seized anyhow by the necessity of deepening the phalanx, or of closing up the ranks. Next to the archers were the men called the veteran mercenaries, whose commander was Cleander. In front of the Agrianians and archers were posted the light cavalry used for skirmishing, and the Paeonians, under the command of Aretes and Aristo. In front of all had been posted the Grecian mercenary cavalry under the direction of Menidas; and in front of the royal squadron of cavalry and the other Companions had been posted half of the Agrianians and archers, and the javelin-men of Balacrus who had been ranged opposite the scythe-bearing chariots. Instructions had been given to Menidas and the troops under him to wheel round and attack the enemy in flank, if they should ride round their wing.

This, then, is no lateral wing. It is rather a wing comprising three rows: the rear occupied by the Agrianes, archers and “veteran” mercenaries; the next forward being the Paeonians and light cavalry and finally, in the “front row” Menidas’ mercenary cavalry. The ensuing description of the battle’s opening sequences clearly shows Alexander, at no great remove, directing Menidas to engage the Persians attempting to encircle the Macedonian right. That will be because the companion cavalry abutted this three tiered, angled right wing.

As is generally agreed, the Macedonian infantry advanced at an oblique designed to refuse the left. Arrian’s account makes it fairly plain that the “angled” Macedonian right wing was parallel to the Persian line as he describes how “the Scythian cavalry rode along the line, and came into conflict with the front men of Alexander’s array…”. This can only then apply to his leading right wing. This is a case made strongly by Marsden and which I’ve always found logical.

It is also a neat piece of deception: the Persians see only cavalry and the other Agrianes, Thracian javeleneers and archers as a screen. What they do not readily see is the punch behind the cavalry in the form of the “veteran” mercenaries, archers and Agrianes. These last most likely acting in the role of hamippoi

Where the others are concerned, again, I feel that Alexander's oblique with the right leading made the need for communications to the left unnecessary. By the time Parmenion was feeling the heat, the assault on the right had been blunted, and the center was being assailed. Nonetheless, Parmenion was able to get his message through to Alexander.

The one thing I gain out of this is that Alexander obviously wasn't always in the midst of the melee even if part of that assault. .

I’d largely agree with that. Whilst Alexander will have led the assault, prior to that he will have directed matters as necessary from horseback. My point re Parmenion is that given how far in advance of the left Alexander will have become – particularly as the hypaspists led the infantry right and forward – a message from the left denoting when a critical juncture had been reached makes sense. This would mean that, given Alexander will have had his view masked by dust, if the assault hadn’t as yet occurred it had best happen pretty soon. The tradition that sprang up, most likely after Parmenio’s murder, has since presented this as an incontinent old man whose courage had deserted him begging for help.

Prior to the separation between Simmias and the rest of the phalanx, Alexander was fielding a fairly impenetrable front. Assuming 16 man-deep spheirae, the phalanx would have, what, roughly 2,000 feet of frontage? Add to it the frontage of the hypaspists and the units between Parmenion and the phalanx.

Yes indeed, about that long. The taxies of the phalanx and the hypaspists will have totalled some 12,000. Given they would be advancing in the pyknosis or compact/closed (three feet per man) formation, they would cover some 752 or so yards. What then must be allowed for are the Greek and Thessalian cavalry that filled the line out to the refused left wing.

Even so, I do not think it difficult that a predetermined signal from Parmenio to Alexander could be sent – at least prior to the committing of the companion cavalry and the hypaspists to the charge into the Persian line. That one would expect to find Alexander after the assault was underway (as it is represented) is, to my thinking, quite pie-in-the-sky.

What I have always found far more troubling was the idea that the commander of each individual spheira was located at the front right of the formation, and that the ouragos at the rear, with the supernumeraries, was only a sub-officer. How far up the chain did this go? Was Craterus, for example, at the very front right of his brigade at Gaugamela? Or did individual brigade commanders sit in the rear with their own supernumeraries?

I'm looking forward to ordering that book, by the way!

Commanders will have been located in the front or “double pay” ranks. Infantry generals such as Craterus, Perdiccas and so on – Macedonian nobility all – will most likely have commanded from horseback. I see no reason why they would be on foot with their commands as Stone represents it. It is from horseback that Simmias likely decided that a gap was always going to appear and that it would be best stay rooted to the spot and help reduce the carnage on the left. It is difficult to see how a Parmenio or Craterus could direct the action from within the melee.

It is an excellent book. Written from an Australian view point as it traces the Australian divisions through the Western front battles that they, the Brits and Canadians were massacred in (Poziers, Somme, Ypres etc). Carlyon is extremely even handed in his treatment and assessment of the leading officers involved. It makes for stark and confronting reading at times. I’m about, in the absence of my wife (out with her sister), to take it to bed with me!

[Phoebus]

And this will come down to how one pictures that flank. Arrian’s description is lucid and clear:
...
This, then, is no lateral wing.

I probably didn't do a very good job conveying myself. My only point here is to illustrate that Menidas and the other init commanders were not "next" to Alexander as in a stone's throw away.

The ensuing description of the battle’s opening sequences clearly shows Alexander, at no great remove, ...

Again, comparatively speaking.

As is generally agreed, the Macedonian infantry advanced at an oblique designed to refuse the left. Arrian’s account makes it fairly plain that the “angled” Macedonian right wing was parallel to the Persian line as he describes how “the Scythian cavalry rode along the line, and came into conflict with the front men of Alexander’s array…”. This can only then apply to his leading right wing. This is a case made strongly by Marsden and which I’ve always found logical.

For myself, I find that Arrian is lacking enough in detail that either argument can be made. What does " came in conflict mean", for example? Obviously not sustained combat, since none is described and the Macedonian host continues its advance to the front and right.

Additionally, if that right-most echelon of Agrianians, archers, and Greek mercenaries was parallel to the Persian lines, it serves no purpose as a counter-flanking force. It neither possesses the numbers to repel the foe nor does it have the frontage to force the enemy to extend his lines outward. As an angled force, though, it does serve a purpose. It funnels the enemy into executing a longer hook.

I’d largely agree with that. Whilst Alexander will have led the assault, prior to that he will have directed matters as necessary from horseback. My point re Parmenion is that given how far in advance of the left Alexander will have become – particularly as the hypaspists led the infantry right and forward – a message from the left denoting when a critical juncture had been reached makes sense. This would mean that, given Alexander will have had his view masked by dust, if the assault hadn’t as yet occurred it had best happen pretty soon. The tradition that sprang up, most likely after Parmenio’s murder, has since presented this as an incontinent old man whose courage had deserted him begging for help.

I'm not sure I'm tracking you here. Of course a message denoting a critical juncture would make sense, and Parmenion sent it as was proper. This part confuses me, though:

"This would mean that, given Alexander will have had his view masked by dust, if the assault hadn’t as yet occurred it had best happen pretty soon."

Did you mean that, given that Alexander and his echelons would have been obscured by the dust, Parmenion would have hoped they would get on with their act (given the hard fight he was in)? That would make sense and would play in with the accusations leveled against him.

Even so, I do not think it difficult that a predetermined signal from Parmenio to Alexander could be sent – at least prior to the committing of the companion cavalry and the hypaspists to the charge into the Persian line. That one would expect to find Alexander after the assault was underway (as it is represented) is, to my thinking, quite pie-in-the-sky.

Again, if you accept that Alexander was always in the thick of the fight. If he wasn't always there, I'd say that the king and his somatophylakes were likely something that could plausibly be found by someone looking for the right ensigns and such. I seem to even remember reading about theories that the Companions would even have replaced wounded mounts with fresh ones during rotations in the fight and such.

Commanders will have been located in the front or “double pay” ranks. Infantry generals such as Craterus, Perdiccas and so on – Macedonian nobility all – will most likely have commanded from horseback.

As I thought.

It is an excellent book. Written from an Australian view point as it traces the Australian divisions through the Western front battles that they, the Brits and Canadians were massacred in (Poziers, Somme, Ypres etc). Carlyon is extremely even handed in his treatment and assessment of the leading officers involved. It makes for stark and confronting reading at times. I’m about, in the absence of my wife (out with her sister), to take it to bed with me!

I think I'm sold. I have a lot of time to burn, and books make the time go by swiftly!

[Paralus]

For myself, I find that Arrian is lacking enough in detail that either argument can be made. What does “came in conflict mean", for example? Obviously not sustained combat, since none is described and the Macedonian host continues its advance to the front and right.

Additionally, if that right-most echelon of Agrianians, archers, and Greek mercenaries was parallel to the Persian lines, it serves no purpose as a counter-flanking force. It neither possesses the numbers to repel the foe nor does it have the frontage to force the enemy to extend his lines outward. As an angled force, though, it does serve a purpose. It funnels the enemy into executing a longer hook.

There is detail there even though it can be frustrating. It may well be a little boring for others but perhaps a quote of the passage will help:

Next to the royal squadron on the right wing, half of the Agrianians, under the command of Attalus, in conjunction with the Macedonian archers under Briso’s command, were posted angular-wise in case they should be seized anyhow by the necessity of deepening the phalanx, or of closing up the ranks. Next to the archers were the men called the veteran mercenaries, whose commander was Cleander.

So we have line one of the right wing. This is the rear line.

In front of the Agrianians and archers were posted the light cavalry used for skirmishing, and the Paeonians, under the command of Aretes and Aristo.

And there we have line two – in front of the above described line…

In front of all had been posted the Grecian mercenary cavalry under the direction of Menidas; and in front of the royal squadron of cavalry and the other Companions had been posted half of the Agrianians and archers, and the javelin-men of Balacrus who had been ranged opposite the scythe-bearing chariots.

This then is the front line of that wing – screened (as were the companion cavalry) by the remaining light troops as described. Thus, if it were rounded away to the rear as is often drawn, three lines are difficult to imagine. Further though:

Instructions had been given to Menidas and the troops under him to wheel round and attack the enemy in flank, if they should ride round their wing.

Here we have the front line of that wing given instructions to “wheel around” so as to take a Persian flanking movement in its flank. If the right is angled back this is unnecessary. To wheel around would result in attacking to the rear.

It makes far more sense that the main Macedonian line was angled back to the left and that the right was parallel to the Persian line – and thus angled with respect to the Macedonian line. Then, after the armies drew near to one another:

Alexander led his own army more towards the right, and the Persians marched along parallel with him, far outflanking him upon their left. Then the Scythian cavalry rode along the [Persian] line, and came into conflict with the front men of Alexander’s array; but he nevertheless still continued to march towards the right, and almost entirely got beyond the ground which had been cleared and leveled by the Persians.

Thus the Scythian cavalry rode along the lines eventually coming into contact with Alexander’s lead troops: the men of Menidas and the light infantry who were advancing to the right. “Came into conflict” would mean exactly that: the Scythians and the forward right of Alexander’s line began skirmishing as the advance continued to the right.

As far as a counter flanking force, the instructions were clear: wheel around and take the Persians in their flank as they attempted to get past the right. This is, in fact, what transpired. One after another Menidas, Aristo and Arestes were ordered to take on the flanking movement as it was being executed by turning to their right and, likely somewhat rearwards, as Alexander advanced awaiting his moment to charge.

It did indeed serve its purpose and it was enough, just, to hold until the vital charge.

"This would mean that, given Alexander will have had his view masked by dust, if the assault hadn’t as yet occurred it had best happen pretty soon."

Did you mean that, given that Alexander and his echelons would have been obscured by the dust, Parmenion would have hoped they would get on with their act (given the hard fight he was in)? That would make sense and would play in with the accusations leveled against him.

No, I’m in the camp that suggests that this was a pre-arranged signal. Given the nature of both the advance and the dusty plain, Alexander was most unlikely to know or to see what was going on across to his far left flank. The signal will have been that the left was now heavily engaged as planned: time to go the clock is definitely ticking. Alexander had planned that his left was to be a holding force and will have known that there was a limited time that it would hold. Thus the signal.