Paralus Which General

[jasonxx]

Michael hail

I know weve sparred with the idea of Roman Alexander face off.

as we discussed private, The BBC produstion of Rome is pretty darned good. Upon watching the series i have reflected that its based in and around Romes arguably greatest Generals and Emperors. I always maintained Caesar the only real Roman General upto taking Alexander.

The second series is focusing on Octavian mark Anthony.its been argued Augustus the best Roman Emperor. In the same tone was Augustus as great a General as julius or more the brilliant politician with great Generals. IE Agrippa who seremoniously put Mark Anthonys lights out.

Who in your opinion and im sure you know other great Roman commanders. Who was most up to the Job of matching Alexander?


I wondered with Scipios idea with hannibal. he really lefyt hannibal un molested and burned himself out basicall a scorched earth policy. Im sure any invadig force faced with an enemy that doesnt fight is on borrowed time.

I reckall Peter Cushings memnon . saying Alexander is like A hungry lion and he needs a quick kill.

So whos the top roman for the job?

kenny

[Efstathios]

I can answer this also.

No Roman General could match Alexander.

[Paralus]

Hi Kenny.

That is a bloody loaded question. The obvious choice is Caesar I suppose but Pompey might be thrown in as well.

The major problem here is comparing different eras and armies. Over time the Roman legionary and its maniples proved a superior armament to the Macedonian phalanx. Argument will, of course, rage over the effectiveness of the phalanx after Alexander but, it should be noted that it was Alexander’s own changes that began this process. He had, by the time of his death, salted the pezhetairoi with the Persian “Successors” with Arrian informing us that there were four Macedonians to twelve Iranians in the new phalanx. Numbers will have altered had Alexander lived and Antipater forced to “bring up the army” from Macedonia.

Either way, in the Diadoch years we have attested Asians, in their multiple thousands, equipped and fighting in the “Macedonian fashion”. All of which is to say that we are never certain when, for instance, Appian describes Antiochus III as fielding a “Macedonian phalanx of 16,000 men, still arrayed after the fashion of Alexander and Phillip” that this is a completely Macedonian phalanx or a mixed phalanx “arrayed after the fashion of Alexander and Philip.

The fellow appointed by Scipio Africanus, Gnaeus Domitius, to advise and mentor his younger brother Lucius At Magnesia should likely be included too. As should Eumenes II who led the decisive cavalry charge in this battle that isolated the phalanx.

Personally, I have a soft spot for Titus Quinctus Flamininus who, at Cynoscephalae in 198, showed the way when the phalanx of Philip IV was having difficulties over “rough ground” (Plut. Flamininus, 8):

With his right wing, then, Philip had the advantage, since from higher ground he threw his entire phalanx upon the Romans, who could not withstand the weight of its interlocking shields and the sharpness of its projecting pikes; but his left wing was broken up and scattered along the hills, and Titus, despairing of his defeated wing, rode swiftly along to the other, and with it fell upon the Macedonians. These were unable to hold their phalanx together and maintain the depth of its formation (which was the main source of their strength), being prevented by the roughness and irregularity of the ground, while for fighting man to man they had armour which was too cumbersome and heavy.

Having thus gotten it onto rough ground, Flamininus and his right wing wreaked slaughter to the tune of 8,000 dead Macedoniands.

Paullus did not miss the lesson and added to it by engaging Perseus at Pydna (168) in separate engagements in different parts of the field. This lead to the phalanx being disrupted and its ranks opening as attacks were made on its flanks. Once the gaps appeared, the slaughter was as inevitable as it was terrible: some 20,000 dead.

One thing is glaringly obvious: these are not phalanxes like Alexander’s or Philip’s no matter the “after the fashion” descriptors. The phalanx bequeathed Alexander was a flexible unit and, whilst it had its difficulties over rough terrain, it was still able to preserve its cohesion when it did so in battles such as Issus, Guagamela and Jehlum. There are, as well, no Silver Shields (hypaspists) in these arrays either. The skill level seems to have fallen off markedly and this cannot be solely put down to down to pike length. Both Philip’s and Alexander’s pezhetairoi and hypaspists were trained “to the minute” with constant drilling and use. Indeed, Hieronymus (via Diodorus) describes Philip’s and Alexander’s hypaspists, the Argyraspids, as men who had “long made war their art”.

[jasonxx]

Michael

i think your spot on with the analasists and periods of Macedonian Roman. units etc.

I think confidently we can narrow periods. I think it fairly easy to assume The Macedonian Force through Philip and Alexander was never bettered ore used so efficiently. We could also cap it with that period of Macedonian Cavalry amongst the greatest cavalry in history, Although Rome had various degrees of cavalry through there long history, They never had a cavalry any where as good as Alexanders who i would say polished the cavalry to be better than Philip he also refined changed and bettered Philips basics into the real deal.

Rome however had ups and downs. Periods of great Generals. Caesar. Pompey. Scipio etc. And its also fair to say they had there share of what I call huray henry dip sticks. Rome had catastrophic defeats lucky for them that the opposition were not as quick as Alexander would have been and finished them off.

To recover from canea was a real get out of jail free card. When you say obviously Julius Caesar. Im not too sure in my view he got bags of good fortune against Pompeye who had him beat.Till the senates pressured him to take caesar quick. Its the same problem and reason why Rome lost battles... Complacency and out of scope arrogance.

Whoever the Roman general. hed have to be on top of his game and make sure he fought as if Rome depended on a victory. With Alexander against you. Nothing less would do or hed be hammering your gates down as soon as hed had a wash a shave and something to eat.

kenny

[dario]

scipio africanus defeated hanibal so there is your answer. he might have ended ATG and his never ending chain of victories

[jasonxx]

Scipio was fantastic and a Roman general different from the norm at that time. arrogant pompous and basically stupid.

He learned from Hannibal as i feel following Roman generals did. Hannibal gave the Romans the biggest trouncing in histories. he also gave them there biggest let off. Hannibal was basically a ruse merchant and ambush man. he was a great winner of battles but not a great user orf victories where as Scipio allowed hannibal to wander around Itally for years he knew he couldnt afford another head on head with Hannibal. He basically drew hannibal out further from home. defeated him at home when the time was right he met Hannibal on equal terms.

Scipio wouldnt have had time to scratch his bottom with Alexander. Alexander would not have gone on a stupid detour round Italy waiting for Rome to surrender. Army for Army and the shear genius of Alexander on the battle field Im sure would have had Scipio sorted. And as Paralus said everything reflects on different eras.

Rome still prefered Legionary formations which Scipio also used. I think Alexander was changing inovative adapting. I really dont think Scipio would ever be able to read Alexander as he learned to read Hannibal. Hannibal became predictable. Roman armies amd generals were almost predictable. Alexander was the most un predictable general ever.

Kenny

[Phoebus]

Man, sorry to resurrect a dead thread, but I'm bored off my gurd and was checking out old topics. I couldn't resist!

How do Pothosians feel about Arrian's description of the new, composite, phalanx Alexander proposed? Both in terms of plausibility and effectiveness, I mean. After all, is Arrian is accurate, Alexander wasn't just proposing enlarging the phalanx by recruiting Asians trained in the Hellene manner or by making ranks 4-15 Asiatic... he was pushing towards making ranks 4-15 ranks of missile troops.

So really we're talking about 3 ranks of Macedonians "armed in the traditional manner" assissted by a barrage of javelins and arrows. There's much debate as to whether sarissae were used in every one of Alexander's battles. By "traditional manner", does Arrian mean panoply and a variety of weapons--sword, spear and sarissa? Would a composite body of infantry and missileers, with or without sarissae, have fared better or worse than the traditional thing? How about the Roman legions?

Personally, I'm not sure. On the one hand, I believe that 3 ranks of well-trained, well-armored Macedonians could be effective even with just the sword if protected by accurate, timely missile fire. On the other, I seriously wonder how one would be able to employ said missile fire well and accurately? Was the idea perhaps to take advantage of the sarissa's ability to fix an opponent (see Pydna, Cynoscephalae) while missile fire disrupted the mid- and rear ranks of the opponent? Would that be an even better setup for the cavalry's "anvil"?

More off the subject, would the Macedonian stationed at rank #16 eventually joined his fellows in ranks #1-3 once the loyalty of the non-Macedonians was guaranteed?

Regarding the other subject, I feel that the Roman victories during the Second and Third Macedonian Wars (not to mention the conflict against Antiochus III) were decided less by one military system's superiority over another and more by tactical decisions.

To begin with, I don't really think it's fair to make the case of maniple vs. phalanx... Flamininus and Paullus alike fielded forces that were close to, if not greater than, 40,000 strong... yet neither marshalled more than two full legions. This means that, even including the Republican-era allied contigents (which numerically equalled actual Roman troops), only 50% of the actual force was (theoretically) in manipular formation.

Conversely, the performance of the phalanx itself is often not the reason for defeat.

Take Cynoscepahale for instance. The phalanx actually acquitted itself wonderfully against the Roman left wing. What actually decided the battle, though, was Phillip's decision to take to the field with only 50% of his phalanx and some accompanying elements. Polybius, who spends great energy in trying to convince us of the phalanx's inferiority (through a loaded comparison), nonetheless tells us that Flamininus was victorious on the right wing because Phillip's follow-on troops weren't even in battle formation, but in marching column. It was, he explains, the effect the charging elephants, along with the absence of officers and leadership at the head of the columns, that decided the battle.

Magnesia and Pydna do nothing more to inspire respect for the Romans' opponents.

Antiochus III famously stationed elephants between his phalanx columns within living memory of Scipio's victory over Hannibal at Zama--which was won precisely by turning the elephants against the Carthaginians! And Antiochus III even had Hannibal in his court!... Nonetheless, if one take's Appian's account of things, the phalanx was able to form a hollow square and retreat from the field in perfect order until the Romans drove the elephants within the square to a frenzy with missile weapons.

Perseus, if anything, is worse; whether due to non-life-threatening wounds or due to outright cowardice, he left the field. Worse, his cavalry is described by Livy as quitting the field with hardly a loss and in good order. How devastating must that had been for the infantry's flanks? Their survivors certainly made their feelings known when they charged them as cowards. To be fair, though, hiis absence might excuse him from the phalanx's rash advance into broken ground (they had already resisted the Roman attack and done frightening damage to the Pelasgian maniples).

And speaking of broken ground, Plutarch mentions it as the reason why the phalanx broke up, but Livy does not... and only conjectures the "many little fights" theory. Interestingly, though, he specifically points to the Roman elephant attack and the subsequent collapse of the Macedonian left as the first point of Roman defeat.

Color me biased, but I have a hard time accepting the idea that the Romans beat the Macedonian phalanx by engaging it only with a percentage of their force, and only in localized areas. An elephant charge leading to a flank's collapse and the subsequent (or simultaneous) departure of one's leadership and cavalry sound like more likely causes, in my humble opinion.

But, hey. History's written by the victors, right? And thus Alexander defeated a million Persians in one day...

[marcus]

The second series is focusing on Octavian mark Anthony.its been argued Augustus the best Roman Emperor. In the same tone was Augustus as great a General as julius or more the brilliant politician with great Generals. IE Agrippa who seremoniously put Mark Anthonys lights out.

Hi Kenny,

I'll answer this bit, although I won't go into whether any Roman general could have taken Alexander. Octavian was most definitely not a military man - as you rightly say, he relied heavily on Agrippa (and later on Tiberius and Drusus) to marshal his armies. Octavian was a politician par excellence, but no general.

ATB

[jasonxx]

Marcus

I agree with your opinions regarding Augustus political brain par excelence.

I guess we sometimes over look Alexanders political cunning also and is somewhat overlooked by his military brilliance.

Now for me its only a theory but believe the Darius death was just as clever. Indeed I would believe Alexander to be confident he was the main man would want darius dead and for me believe he was involved. Now the clever thing and an insight to Alexanders thinking If he had arranged it.

He arranged it in sucha a way that A Persian killed him and therefore the Persians lookeda lot mare favourably at Alexander for bringing Bessus to justice and to cement his position he let the Persians put him to trial and executing him.

Its like the old saying Alexander plunged his arm intoa bucket of manure and still came out smelling of roses.

If my theory is right then its fair to say he was as mindful as you say Augustus was.

Kenny

[Paralus]

To begin with, I don't really think it's fair to make the case of maniple vs. phalanx... Flamininus and Paullus alike fielded forces that were close to, if not greater than, 40,000 strong... yet neither marshalled more than two full legions. This means that, even including the Republican-era allied contigents (which numerically equalled actual Roman troops), only 50% of the actual force was (theoretically) in manipular formation.

Conversely, the performance of the phalanx itself is often not the reason for defeat.

Take Cynoscepahale for instance. The phalanx actually acquitted itself wonderfully against the Roman left wing. What actually decided the battle, though, was Phillip's decision to take to the field with only 50% of his phalanx and some accompanying elements. Polybius, who spends great energy in trying to convince us of the phalanx's inferiority (through a loaded comparison), nonetheless tells us that Flamininus was victorious on the right wing because Phillip's follow-on troops weren't even in battle formation, but in marching column. It was, he explains, the effect the charging elephants, along with the absence of officers and leadership at the head of the columns, that decided the battle.

A fascinating subject and one that has exercised itself on Pothos in several threads.

I’d tend to agree with the sentiments expressed particularly Polybius’ discourse on the - seemingly, in his view - severe limitations of the phalanx as a battle formation. Polybius spent a great deal of his writing life attempting to explain the total subsuming of Greece by a never overly interested but hugely successful Rome. It tasked him almost as much as his exculpation of his father’s (Lycortas) and – a fortiori – his as well as the Achaean League’s policies up to the decision forced at Pydna.

Part of this seems to be the inevitability of it all. Many things contributed to that inevitability and one was the total inflexibility and extremely limited nature of the phalanx. In Polybius’ time there is a reasonable amount of truth to this for – MM Markle aside, who then applies it to Alexander’s phalanx – this was not the phalanx of Philip II or Alexander III. There is evidence that the pike, like Pinocchio’s nose, had grown longer and rendered the phalanx that much more “rigid”. That, though, is not the most important aspect.

The Macedonian armies that took the field at Cynoscephalae and Pydna were not the “professional” levies of Philip II or Alexander III. Those armies, trained and under arms for more than a generation, were superbly drilled and units such as the hypaspists were long practised in the indelicate art of disembowelling and slaughter. In contrast, Livy (33.3) describes Philip V’s army at Cynoscephalae in the following terms:

Owing to the perpetual wars which had for so many generations drained the manhood of Macedonia there was a serious lack of men of military age, and under Philip's own rule vast numbers had perished in the naval battles against the Rhodians and Attalus and in the campaigns against the Romans. Under these circumstances he even enrolled youths of sixteen and recalled to the colours men who had served their time, provided they had any stamina left. After his army was brought up to its proper strength he concentrated the whole of his forces at Dium and formed a standing camp there in which he drilled and exercised his soldiers day by day whilst waiting for the enemy.

The drilling and constant training say much. As does the losses in the campaigns against the Romans. Livy attests to three battles in which the Macedonians were worsted. The arguments will be raised about the ground and flank attacks where protection was lost but, again, this simply demonstrates the vulnerability of the phalanxes of the second century.

Another illuminating excerpt from Livy’s description of the second Macedonian War (31.34) is worth the read:

Philip's men had been accustomed to fighting with Greeks and Illyrians and had only seen wounds inflicted by javelins and arrows and in rare instances by lances. But when they saw bodies dismembered with the Spanish sword, arms cut off from the shoulder, heads struck off from the trunk, bowels exposed and other horrible wounds, they recognised the style of weapon and the kind of man against whom they had to fight, and a shudder of horror ran through the ranks.

Indeed they had not ever seen the gladius in action. Over the ensuing campaign, and in the one that would follow against Perseus, many would not live to tell of the carnage it wrought amongst the phalanx. Philip, indeed, had to exhort his phalangites with excuses as to why the phalanx had been worsted prior to Cynoscephalae. Given the above description one doesn’t have to ask why. One of those engagements is also worth the read (31.35):

The Romans, whose main line was about half a mile distant, sent forward their velites and about two squadrons of cavalry, so that the number of their mounted and unmounted men was equal to that of the enemy. The king's troops expected the style of fighting to be that with which they were familiar; the cavalry would make alternate charges and retirements, at one moment using their missiles, then galloping to the rear; the swift-footed Illyrians would be employed in sudden onsets and rushes; the Cretans would discharge their arrows on the enemy as he dashed forward to attack. But this order of combat was completely upset by the method of the Roman attack, which was as sustained as it was fierce. They fought as steadily as though it had been a regular engagement; the velites after discharging their javelins came to close quarters with their swords; the cavalry, when once they had reached the enemy, halted their horses and fought, some on horseback whilst others dismounted and took their places amongst the infantry. Under these conditions Philip's cavalry, unaccustomed to a stationary combat, were no match for the Roman horse, and his infantry, trained to skirmish in loose order and unprotected by armour, were at the mercy of the velites who with their swords and shields were equally prepared for defence and attack. Incapable of sustaining the conflict and trusting solely to their mobility they fled hack to their camp.

Again, at Cynoscephalae, it might be debated just how and where the battle was won. It is completely true, as the sources agree, that the Macedonian king blundered awfully in not pulling back from the engagement. Committed, with only the right half of the phalanx and the caetrati in battle line, Philip elected to charge the Roman left. This met with initial success and, were his left to have engaged, he may well have carried the day. As it transpired Flamininus, who’d held his right aloof, committed both it and his elephants to the fray. At this stage Philip, who’d reached the top of the hill and caught sight of the action on his right, ordered a certain companion, one Nicanor, “to follow at once with the rest of his force”. Then this rather strange passage:

As soon as he reached the top of the hill and saw a few of the enemy's bodies and weapons lying about, he concluded that there had been a battle there and that the Romans had been repulsed, and when he further saw that fighting was going on near the enemy's camp he was in a state of great exultation. Soon, however, when his men came back in flight and it was his turn to be alarmed, he was for a few moments anxiously debating whether he ought not to recall his troops to camp. Then, as the enemy were approaching, and especially as his own men were being cut down as they fled and could not be saved unless they were defended by fresh troops, and also as retreat was no longer safe, he found himself compelled to take the supreme risk, though half his force had not yet come up. The cavalry and light infantry who had been in action he stationed on his right; the caetrati and the men of the phalanx were ordered to lay aside their spears, the length of which only embarrassed them, and make use of their swords. To prevent his line from being quickly broken he halved the front and gave twice the depth to the files, so that the depth might be greater than the width. He also ordered the ranks to close up so that man might be in touch with man and arms with arms.

Hmmm. Go figure as the Americans say. In any case the decisive action, it seems to me, was taken – on his own initiative – by a military tribune “who suddenly made up his mind what to do, and leaving that part of his line which was undoubtedly winning, wheeled round with twenty maniples and attacked the enemy's right from behind” (33.9). The near victorious Macedonian right, taken completely by surprise in their rear, raised sarisae vertically in abject surrender and were duly slaughtered by Roman troops who did not understand the action, apparently. That was the result of the superior tactical manoeuvrability of the Roman maniple and legion.

The point of all of this is that this phalanx was not that of the “glory age”. Neither was it was likely, aside from those old folk called back to the colours, that of Gonatas so singularly successful at Sellasia a generation earlier. Philip V who – by dint of his spree of rapine, plunder and slaughter – was near friendless at this battle was, aside from his shared appetite for dalliances with either sex, no Philip II either. Indeed his last ally, the Spartan tyrant Nabis, had deserted him. He’d taken the offer of Philip’s girls for his sons and the city of Argos, all of which he likely treated the same, and allied himself with the ever expedient Rome.

The Glory age phalanx had not ever had to come to grips with gladius armed Romans though.

[Phoebus]

Paralus,

Good words! I agree that one should not underestimate the differences in mentality between the Roman legionnaires and the latter Macedonian phalangists.

A question, though (and I'll probably think of some more during my next break):
Given the comparative inexperience of the individual soldier in the phalanx, what do you think of Livius' assertion that Phillip bade his men lay down their sarissas to charge with swords instead? If the "shock and awe" of Roman melee combat was a decisive part of these battles, it strikes me as odd that Phillip's right wing's initial assault would work against the Flamininus' left. You call this passage strange; I didn't know if you still thought it accurate or inaccurate.

One other thing that has worried me about Livius is that I've never been sure that his description of the Macedonians' reaction to the wounds caused by melee combat wasn't an attempt to depict the enemy as effeminate. In a culture/society where wounds defined manliness (and we have ample evidence of important men bragging of their wounds), painting an enemy as being terrified by such things strikes me as post-facto ego-stroking.

That having been said, I will admit I am not familiar enough with Livius to make that claim. I am trying to rectify this by trying to consume as much of his work (and relevant articles) as I can.

Anywho, I will try to elaborate on my post once I get some more time.

Thanks for the thoughts and input!

Quick Edit #1:

While I agree that the action of the "Unknown Tribune" was devastating to Phillip V, I would say that it was more of a "last nail in the coffin" rather than the decisive stroke. Flamininus, I would say, takes credit for that when he scatters the marching columns of the other half of Phillip's force.

[Paralus]

Given the comparative inexperience of the individual soldier in the phalanx, what do you think of Livius' assertion that Phillip bade his men lay down their sarissas to charge with swords instead? If the "shock and awe" of Roman melee combat was a decisive part of these battles, it strikes me as odd that Phillip's right wing's initial assault would work against the Flamininus' left. You call this passage strange; I didn't know if you still thought it accurate or inaccurate…

…One other thing that has worried me about Livius is that I've never been sure that his description of the Macedonians' reaction to the wounds caused by melee combat wasn't an attempt to depict the enemy as effeminate. In a culture/society where wounds defined manliness (and we have ample evidence of important men bragging of their wounds), painting an enemy as being terrified by such things strikes me as post-facto ego-stroking.

Livy, almost entirely, has based this material (that of the “Macedonian Wars”) upon Polybius. This seems clear enough when comparing the two. That is not to say there were not others he may have consulted. He will, of course, have a Roman view of these actions and that might be colouring certain aspects.

With respect to the notion that the sarisa and it its length “embarrassed” the Macedonians I would, on first blush, see this as a comment on the lack of experience or practice with the weapon on behalf of the young and fresh drafts. It would be interesting to know whether Philip had stacked his right with the experienced troops as this was the wing with the caetrati (a corps some have attempted to identify as hypaspists) and the cavalry. If so, this would go some way to explaining the confusion on the left.

I rather suspect that Livy (and to a lesser extent Polybius) has confused the issue somewhat and that, far from there being no officers on the left (why a phalanx, even marching in column, would have not a single officer among them is beyond me), the Macedonian officers present decided that taking on the assaulting Romans hand to hand would bring a better result given the confusion. Plutarch, interestingly, has the left broken and scattered on the hill rather than in column. My view is that the phalanx was not yet in position for the attack and that the sarisa was then useless. That Livy ascribes this to the successfully charging right seems, given the clearer descriptions of Polybius and Plutarch, an error.

The predilection to the display of wounds and their use as a mark of honour are well attested. As noted above, Livy possibly applying his colour is to be expected. He was, like many other early historians, interested in pushing a "moral" point. That, in this case, being framed by the times in which he wrote: the death throes of the Republic and the the early empire. The "decadence" and softening of Roman character by the luxuries of empire are one of his threads. That said, I think that what he notes with respect to both the style of Roman fighting and the butchery occasioned by the gladius is fairly well on the money. Whilst Greek warfare was far from bloodless spears, javelins and sarisae kill and wound in certain ways. The gladius wielding hastati and principes in the maniples of the legion brought death and trauma to the phalanx in a way no xiphos-armed phalangite/hoplite ever had. The numbers are truly horrific.

In short, I do not think that the reference to the Macedonians' reaction to the butchery made possible by the galdius relates to the old Republic's sense of honour at wounds garnered in combat. What he is retailing here is the sense of surprised horror at what this weapon could do.

I’d think the tales drifting around Greece and Macedonia of these aggressive, ferocious and well experienced Romans decapitating, removing limbs from and gutting phalangites will have closely matched Livy’s words. Again, he may well have taken it from Polybius. Unfortunately, the book is lost to us that will have contained those actions under Sulpicius and we’ll likely never know. It would be logical for Polybius to have mentioned something of it for Livy to include it as Polybius has Flamininus address those actions under Sulpicius (Eordaea) wherein Livy makes the observation.

[appietas]

The problem I have with this thread is that we know a good deal about the battle craft and military thought of quite a few of the more exceptional Roman commanders and can observe their command qualities from fairly reliable sources. Examples are Scipiones Africani (both the great cos.205 and Aemilianus cos.147), Aemilius Paullus, Metellus Macedonicus, Marius, Sulla, Lucullus, Sertorius, Caesar and Caesar's greatest "pupil" Ventidius Bassus.

However the same information just doesn't seem to be there for Alexander. We don't seem to see him actually directing a battle until Bactria or even India, and by then his armies were huge and growing huger so that it was more a matter of bringing numbers to bear, a la Pompeius Magnus. Prior to that we see him as a very brave cavalry commander and leader of important/decisive charges, a la Joachim Murat, while it is other senior officers who direct the battles, repair torn battle lines, commit reserves, & etc.
There is a problem with the main sources which are best, and best represented, on the politics of time, while Arrian's famously "reliable" account based on the contemporaries Aristoboulos and Ptolemy is also biased to the point of eulogy, and so pro-Greek and Makedonic that the crucial Illyrian and Thracian forces (up to a third of the early Royal Army), and the entire action of the left wing of the Makedonian battle line are commonly ignored or passed over in a few curt sentences.

So, was Alexander really another Marshal Murat type surrounded by a really significant pool of experienced commanders from whom he learned to be a competent strategos?

I get the feeling that a really talented opponent like a Marius or Sulla, who knew how to innovate and adapt, use fortification works, trenches and terrain, and whatever else was necessary to bring greatest fire-power and fighting strength to bear on enemy weaknesses, would probably have cut the young Alexander to pieces.
But you can only fight the men of your own time, and Alexander very probably did face such an opponent in Memnon, whose illness and death therefore might have been the piece of dumb luck which changed history forever. This doesn't sound as good as representing Alexander as a supremely gifted military commander who could not be beaten, but the latter view seems to be based upon good will and wishful thinking, or a desire to equate the qualities of the man with the awe-inspiring level of achievement gained by the forces under his political control and military command; rather than on really solid information and evidence. The achievement is one thing and tangibly astonishing, but Alexander's command skills are something else and much more difficult to measure from what survives; so perhaps more legendary than historical.

[Paralus]

There is a problem with the main sources which are best, and best represented, on the politics of time, while Arrian's famously "reliable" account based on the contemporaries Aristoboulos and Ptolemy is also biased to the point of eulogy, and so pro-Greek and Makedonic that the crucial Illyrian and Thracian forces (up to a third of the early Royal Army), and the entire action of the left wing of the Makedonian battle line are commonly ignored or passed over in a few curt sentences... .

Very quickly…I’m at the office.

The poisonous tradition against Parmenio, something that began with the earliest historians and which needs to be taken with a mina or two of good Attic salt, has also tainted that which he commanded: the left. Too, the focus is on the actions of the heroic and unbeatable king on the right. The desperate life and death struggles on the left that allowed the Macedonian Achilles to mount his charges on the right are not exactly that which engage the ancient writers.

As well, the Greek writers seem to have taken little interest in the tactical detail of the battles which they relate. This goes for Xenophon as well whose description of the climactic battle of his age (Leuktra) leaves much to be desired.

I get the feeling that a really talented opponent like a Marius or Sulla, who knew how to innovate and adapt, use fortification works, trenches and terrain, and whatever else was necessary to bring greatest fire-power and fighting strength to bear on enemy weaknesses, would probably have cut the young Alexander to pieces….

Comparisons, as they say, are odious. I might, on balance, tend to agree with you though.

But you can only fight the men of your own time, and Alexander very probably did face such an opponent in Memnon, whose illness and death therefore might have been the piece of dumb luck which changed history forever... .

That is a discussion I’ve had many times. Whilst one should not underestimate Memnon’s abilities, the Greek sources overestimate both his position and abilities. He is contrasted against Persian commanders in a very favourable light. In truth, he wound up with command of the cities on the sea and of the islands. The strategy he followed will have been the Great King’s and that was to retake the offshore islands and the coastal cities and annoy the bejesus out of the Macedonian invader whilst the army of, eventually, Issus was assembled to take him from the east

The achievement is one thing and tangibly astonishing, but Alexander's command skills are something else and much more difficult to measure from what survives; so perhaps more legendary than historical.

And I thought I was the only who could be charged with taking the shine off the adulation which occasionally breaks out on this site?! Whilst I might agree somewhat, I think you underplay the invader’s ability. Yes he inherited a decent senior staff. I think, though, that the planning discussions for the major set pieces will have been headed by the king and that the strategy employed was his. All will have had their input but the king will have driven the basics of the plan. Most of these involved the charge on the right and its support by the centre and the left. There is, I think, good evidence of Alexander directing matters at Issus.

That said, there was no field communication as we now know it. Much, if not all, will have been set before the engagement. Communication, once engaged, would be near to impossible. It is for this reason that I believe the message from Parmenio at Gaugamela was pre-arranged as the signal for the king to move. Something along the lines of the left is now heavily engaged and it’s now or very soon rather than an incontinent plea for help as the tradition represents it.

[Phoebus]

A quick caveat ahead of time:
I was rushed in my preparations for my deployment here in Afghanistan, and as such I do not have access to my side-by-side English/Greek texts of Arrian, Plutarch, etc. Hopefully his will be remedied soon enough. If I am inaccurate in my arguments below, I suppose I deserve it--for going by the English translations alone.

The problem I have with this thread is that we know a good deal about the battle craft and military thought of quite a few of the more exceptional Roman commanders and can observe their command qualities from fairly reliable sources.
...
However the same information just doesn't seem to be there for Alexander.

I'm not sure that's a very fair comparison. Unlike many of the of the names you listed, most of the record surrounding Alexander is lost.

We don't seem to see him actually directing a battle ...

I would argue that absence of evidence does not necessarily mean there is an evidence of absence... and would also add that there are enough hints that Alexander did direct. See below.

... until Bactria or even India, and by then his armies were huge and growing huger so that it was more a matter of bringing numbers to bear, a la Pompeius Magnus.

I don't know that this is necessarily true. At least one of the main sources paints Hydaspes as a battle wherein Alexander fights the bulk of the battle with only a fraction of his overall army. Furthermore, his campaigns in the far east often feature two and even three separate columns undertaking their own missions and routes, do they not?

I get the feeling that a really talented opponent like a Marius or Sulla, who knew how to innovate and adapt, use fortification works, trenches and terrain, and whatever else was necessary to bring greatest fire-power and fighting strength to bear on enemy weaknesses, ...

I question why the above traits do not apply to Alexander. Was he not an able sieger of cities? Did he not take an army largely suited to set-piece, level-terrain battles and adapt it over mountain, hilly, forested, and other terrains? He not only engaged a variety of enemies; he brought them into the fold and used them in his own battles.

That said, there was no field communication as we now know it. Much, if not all, will have been set before the engagement. Communication, once engaged, would be near to impossible.

I don't know. We know that, at the least, latter versions of the phalanx included supernumeraries for each 256-man syntagma/spheria, which included ensigns, trumpeters, and heralds. Did Alexander's phalanx? Maybe. Maybe not. The description of the events before the battle of Gaugamela doesn't really reconcile with an army that didn't have the means to effect some sort of communication.

Again, from Arrian:
"Calling a council of the Companions, the Generals, the cavalry officers, and leaders of the Grecian allies and mercenaries, he deliberated with them... Having returned, he called together the same leaders... He told them to take care to obey his orders quickly, and to transmit the orders they had received to the ranks with all rapidity..."

If Arrian is faithfully recounting Ptolemy's account here, I'd say that's a strong hint that Alexander had a means of reaching out to his tactical officers. Had this been directed to lower, company-grade officers, I could accept it as meaning orders passed by already-briefed "local commanders" carrying out a pre-determined plan. Since this is directed to formation commanders, though, the above doesn't make sense unless it is in the context of following real-time commands. Furthermore, Arrian later qualifies between pre-arranged instructions (see Menidas, and the Greek mercenary cavalry for example) and on-the-spot orders.

During the actual battle, Alexander seems to have no problem relaying orders to a variety of units he wasn't posted with. True, one could argue that this prior to the main clash. One could also point that this is only accomplished with units on his right wing. I would counter, though, by saying that, as he was leading with his right wing, and Dareius began his assault with his left, there was no reason for him to issue orders to the left.

It is for this reason that I believe the message from Parmenio at Gaugamela was pre-arranged as the signal for the king to move. Something along the lines of the left is now heavily engaged and it’s now or very soon rather than an incontinent plea for help as the tradition represents it.

But that's still communication. However simple or pre-arranged the message may have been, if it really happened we're still talking about something that needed to get from the left flank to the center of the battle itself. Whether this was via heralds, a series of trumpet calls, or both... it boils down to the same thing.