Oh dear !! Agesilaos' post contains so much that it is hard to know where to begin. I feel I must address them bit by bit - though I feel a full discussion of hoplite phalanx drill is rather 'off-topic'.
Aha! I seem to have bowled you a googlie, old boy; it was not the speculation on the relative value of the tactical systems that piqued me, but the long explication of drill, which aside from a couple of actual slips, I would not call them errrors, is a presentation of how you see things but not necessarily how things are generally interpreted; for the unaware I will make the case for the traditional view. Then I will address the worth of the two systems, anyway!
A googly indeed! I had thought that the subject of hoplite phalanx drill, well known for many years now, was also uncontroversial.
This was not a presentation of just my personal view. The system of files closing up to half-files is described, with variations, a number of times in Xenophon's works - not just the 'Constitution of the Lacedaemonians' but also in detail in the 'Cyropaedia', and in the 'Anabasis' Xenophon tells us that four deep was the hoplites "customary battle order" - evidently a closing up of files from 'normal' order 8 deep. By putting together all Xenophon's 'bits' of information in his works it is possible to deduce how hoplite phalanx drill generally worked. This was first described , a.f.i.k, by J. K. Anderson in "Military theory & practice in the age of Xenophon" [1970]; P. Connolly "Greek Armies" [1977]; and myself in Warry's "Warfare in the Classical World" [1980]. (over 40 years ago!!.....should be long enough now to be called the 'traditional' view! ). Again, so far as I know, that view has not been seriously challenged by anyone in all that time and may be said to be the 'communis opinio'.
Just a little note that originally it would seem that only the Hastati seem to have been armed with pila and they may have been fewer in number than Livy states, as they were described as ‘picked men’ by Dionysios of Halikarnassos, I think, I will have to check that one and edit in the reference. It is possible that the change to 4/5 pila armed from 2/5 (taking Livy’s numbers, 60 hastati, 60 principes and 30 triarii to a cohort) occurred after the Romans fought Pyrrhos and encountered the sarissa.
Clearly,the Roman army constantly evolved over it's thousand or so years of existence. Following the expulsion of the Etruscans and the abandonment of the hoplite phalanx - probably more of a social change than a deliberate choice of a native Italian 'system', it is possible that only the Hastati were 'pila' armed, but for the missile armed 'system' to work properly requires both Hastati and Principes to be so armed. Moreover we have only 3 descriptions, or 'snapshots' of the Roman army of the Early and Middle Republic -two in Livy - The Etrusco-Roman army c.500 BC and the Latin-Roman army c.340 BC - and Polybius' description of c.200 BC, so that supposing only Hastati were armed with 'pila' is speculative. Livy's description of the army c. 340 BC clearly implies that Hastati and Principes were armed in the same fashion, for only the third line is described as spear armed. Speculation that this came about as a result of meeting Pyrrhus ( in the 270's BC) is therefore highly unlikely.
I don’t find modern riots a particularly good analogy to ancient warfare; the typical situation is one of a professional force, the police, attempting to hold a line and a minority of untrained, and frequently unarmed, protesters attempting to disrupt them. An ancient battle would generally consist of two well-motivated and armed sides intent on killing each other. I do take on board the criticism of ‘Men Against Fire’ though; I wonder if you could reference the critical essay or books, then I can read them and get up to date.
You have referred to one particular type of riot, or perhaps more appropriately "demonstration". A search on YouTube will reveal footage of many different types of real riots, including what can only be described as battles between large mobs, fully armed with helmets and hand weapons, engaging one another in lines which necessarily draw apart spontaneously after a few minutes combat. These battles often even include many injured casualties, and sometimes fatalities. There could be no closer modern analogy to an ancient battle.
Search online for criticism of "Men against Fire" - there is far too much to list here.
My main issue, though is with your reconstruction of the way hoplites deploy for battle.
Xenophon wrote:The next thing we need to bear in mind is that Greek hoplites, Macedonians and their successors, and Romans all employed 'drill', whereby they could change formation, extend their line etc. From Xenophon's writings it is possible to reconstruct hoplite drill, which was fairly simple. A column of hoplites would deploy for battle by files, let us say of typically eight deep. Each file marched up beside the one to its right, occupying 3 ft or so frontage and leaving a 3 ft gap. Once the phalanx formed, they sang a 'battle hymn' ( paean), took up their shields and then advanced. When they reached 100-200 yards from the enemy, skirmishing light troops were recalled, and filtered through the phalanx, still in open order. Once this was done, the half-file leaders led the rear half up to form close order 4 ranks deep, each man occupying 3 ft frontage, and the line went forward. When contact with the enemy was imminent, an ululating battle-cry went up, and with courage steeled, the phalanx attacked, often at the run. In the Greek system, the strongest and bravest and best-equipped men formed the front line, who were all file-leaders and half-file leaders. In this system it would not be advantageous to swap over the less brave and less well-equipped for the front line (promachoi).
Xenophon ‘Constitution of the Lakedaimonians’ xi 4ff discusses the Spartan method of deploying from column of march into line of battle. It is clear that deployment is by section or ‘enomotia’ rather than file and that they ‘wheel’ into place once formed in the chosen depth. Xenophon envisages depths of six, twelve or eighteen (assuming an enomotia of 36, though actual strength varied with the age bands called –up) and corresponding frontages of six, three, or two (or possibly one and a depth of thirty-six, though this is not seen in action ever and the textual lacuna is better supplied with ‘two’ than ‘one’ IMHO).
The fundamental system was to lead files up side by side ( See Xenophon "Cyropaedia"II.3.21), but obviously if a column was marching up a road two, three or more files abreast, the phalanx could save time by deploying in twos/double files or threes etc.and Xenophon refers to this.The final stage of the half-files closing up into 'close order/pyknosis' is described thus:
"And when he judged it proper, he gave the order for each 'lochos'/company [previously 8 deep] to form fours. And thereupon the 'half-file leaders/pampadarchs' led up by the side to form fours" ( i.e. four deep).
For the half-file leaders to be able to do this it is self-evident that when the file stood eight deep, it must have been in 'open' (usually called 'normal') order. Note that Xenophon ( Anabasis) calls four deep the hoplites "customary battle order".
(B.T.W. I agree with you about the textual lacuna)
Your description of the "Constitution" passage is not clear as to what you envisage happening as actual drill movements. What Xenophon says is [XI.4] :
"...they are drawn up at the word of command in single file, sometimes in threes and sometimes in sixes.....and the orders to lead up the files are given verbally by the 'enomotarch/platoon leader', as though by a Herald and the depth of the phalanx is increased or diminished."
[note:not ranks or frontage] What is being described is as before, the depth halving (into close order) or doubling (back into open order)
...and also...
"...instructions for the paragogai/file leaders generally are given out by word of mouth by the Enomotarch, as though by a Herald, and the phalanx becomes thinner or deeper..."
Anyone with experience of military drill will recognise what is happening here. Let us take an Enomotia of 36 formed up in 'open'/normal order, three abreast and twelve deep. They close up to six deep by the simple expedient of the rear half-files marching up alongside the front halves, on the command "Close order, march! " or similar and return to normal order by "Open order, march!" or the like.
It is likely that other troops also marched in blocks which equated to their normal depth with the officers to the fore of each block. These would form up in their battle formation not the open order used for marching; when Thukydides says that the Spartans were eight deep ‘on average’ at Mantinea (V 68) he means that that was the depth they fought in not that they subsequently halved their depth.
This is simply speculative supposition because Thucydides does NOT say whether the eight deep 'on average' is in normal/open order or close order. He simply does not say what depth they actually fought in, [ and no need to, everybody would know the phalanx closed up just before contact] and the meaning you ascribe is simply your interpretation and inconsistent with other evidence. Nor was normal/open order just used on the march - again that is just supposition.( and see elsewhere in this post for examples of its use on the battlefield). In any event this ambiguity hardly negates Xenophon's repeated specifics.
Moreover, over years I have been checking known battlefield widths, and all I have examined are more consistent with phalanxes being drawn up initially in open order than close order. ( A phalanx would occupy only half the frontage were it to stand, say, eight deep in close order.)
This does mean that there could be little or no skirmishing in front of the hoplite lines, as those in the centre would be unlikely to clear the front before the hoplites met by moving to the flanks. But we do not hear of psiloi skirmishing in front of the hoplites, rather they harass armies on the march from rough ground. This is sometimes said to just be an artefact of the ‘hoplite-class’ historians ignoring their poorer bretheren, however, if one considers Plataia, it is clearly the Spartan hoplites who are subjected to the Persian arrow storm, despite the presence of a light infantry force of helots three times the Persian numbers who should have been shielding them!
You seem to be suggesting that light troops/'psiloi' took little or no part in pitched battle? Or that light troops never screened the phalanx? There are examples of them fighting in battle and doing just that - Sphacteria and Lechaeum for just two famous examples where light troops even played the prominent part, though hoplites were present. For the later phalanx we are specifically told that they are deployed in front of the phalanx e.g. Aelian 15.0:
"
The General is to post them so that they will be prepared for the enemy, sometimes stationed in front of the phalanx, sometimes on the right and on the left, sometimes posted in rear of the phalanx, as circumstances require."
Incidently, how do they get from in front of to behind the phalanx if they do not move through whilst the phalanx stands in 'normal' order ?
In addition, one might expect that perhaps the most important function of light troops was to screen the phalanx whilst it deployed.
As you point out, we cannot tell exactly what part they
generally played since they are rarely mentioned, save in exceptional circumstances such as the two examples I gave.....
At Plataea, it is extremely unlikely that each Spartan hoplite was accompanied by seven helots - more likely one each, or less.( there isn't room on the battlefield for 42,000 or more light troops for a start) That they played some active part in the battle is certain however. Herodotus describes how the Helots who fell in the battle were buried separately, even though he doesn't mention their actions.Nor is it likely that unshielded javelin-throwers, even in the unlikely numbers you suggest, would stand up for long against an army of Persian archers - they would perhaps have been lucky to have even got into javelin range! Once they had withdrawn/been driven back, the Persians, as described, could bring their archery to bear on the perhaps now closed up Spartan phalanx, who patiently crouched/sat behind their shields awaiting a favourable sacrifice.
At Delion the Thebans are able to charge the Athenian hoplite line directly and the same goes for the many battle sin the ‘Hellenika’ of Xenophon. Nor would it be a sound move to risk being caught in anything but close order, Thukydides is clear that the Spartans, who unlike us knew a thing or two about hoplite warfare at first hand, preferred to advance steadily to the strains of the flute rather than risk losing cohesion by charging at the run or jog as other states did; this urge to run is a pointer to the tensions of hoplite warfare, where the urge to run, into combat or away from it, was the only way to release it for basically untrained troops.
This seems like a form of special pleading.That hoplites were able to charge one another directly, I would suggest, proves nothing for once the phalanxes closed, or when light troops had expended their missiles, they would withdraw through the open order phalanxes, leaving the hoplites face to face. At Delion, we are told that the Theban phalanx, 7,000 strong was accompanied by 1,000 cavalry and 10,000 light troops.[Thuc IV.93] The Athenian light troops had already withdrawn and were on the march to Athens, so the Theban cavalry and light troops were employed on the flanks - obviously to attack the undefended flanks of the Athenian phalanx, though as usual, we are not told exactly what they did, other than that when two squadrons of cavalry appeared in the Athenian rear, panic ensued. Thucydides exceptionally describes this 'flank' deployment because it was unusual - in this instance the absence of Athenian light troops meant they were not needed to 'screen' the front of the phalanx from these stinging gadflies.
Your point about "risk" by being in open order is not really valid.There was no risk of being caught in 'normal' order whatsoever, for to close up was the work of a few seconds - even a foe running full tilt from only 50 metres away would not catch a phalanx in 'normal/open' order.
One further point about only closing up immediately before meeting the enemy is the very practical one of a phalanx in line a kilometre or more long advancing across a battlefield. Whilst battles were generally fought on plains, these were not smooth playing fields. There were trees, rocks, ponds shrubs etc to be negotiated, and spreading out to flow round such obstacles during the advance to contact is much easier done in normal/open order than the jostling that would inevitably force people out of line in close order.
Despite Xenophon’s praise for the flexibility of the Spartan army, we do not actually find it performing many of the manoeuvres he describes, for armies were rarely caught on the march and forced to fight to the flank or rear; I can only think of the Achaian League’s forces being surprised by Kleomenes III, an action for which we have few details as Polybios was as biased in favour of Achaia as Xenophon was towards Sparta!
It is certainly true that pre-battle manouevres are seldom described ( though they are on occasion - e.g. Spartan attempts to extend their line at Leuktra or fill a 'hole' in the line at Mantinea - both incidently unsuccessful! Still, that's two of just eight battles of the classical Spartan phalanx that we have accounts of ), but we don't have descriptions of even a fraction of the battles that took place. However, I would agree that complex manouevres of a precautionary nature from the parade ground would be risky, and hence rarely performed, on a battlefield.
Which leads on to those countermarches; first, the little slip: military bands do not perform Lakonian countermarches: in a Lakonian countermarch the rear rank about faces and then the file leaders march through the formation followed by their file until the formation is re-established to the rear a unit depth in advance of their former position. In a Macedonian countermarch the file leaders ‘about face’ and their files march to take up their positions behind them, a retreat by a depth in effect. The closest approximation to the marching band is the so-called Persian or Kretan countermarch where the whole file moves and the formation reforms on the same ground (Asklepiodotos X 13ff).
I mentioned it so that the reader could envisage how this manouevre was carried out. Since we are being 'picky', I'd point out that the Cretan/Persian counter-march does not really approximate what a marching band does, for the band does not end up in the same place. Rather, the band reverses direction ( by virtue of its 'open' order)....as in the Laconian counter-march. Incidently, since this counter-marching of the phalanx ( of whichever type) can only be carried out in open order, and its purpose was to ensure that the 'cutting edge' of the phalanx faced the enemy, it is proof that the phalanx drew up and manouevred in open order on the battlefield.
Again we do not hear of these evolutions in any battle narratives, with the possible exception of Alexander’s show during the retreat from Pelion. At Kynoskephalai the Macedonian peltasts DO contract their frontage by doubling their depth and closing to the right but they probably marched up eight deep, rather than forming up sixteen deep and then interjecting their half files and resuming standard spacing.
Again, I would agree that these manouevres were rare, for the reason given above - but they are performed on occasion when needed. As another example, the Seleucid phalanx forming hollow square at Magnesia ?
Asklepiodotos, who records the complicated evolutions places no emphasis on half-file leaders, who would be as important as the file-leaders in your system. III 5 is quite explicit file-leaders need to be x, those behind them y and file closers z. No mention of the qualities required by half-file leaders. It is clear that such a position did exist but it was equally clearly only important in circumstances where there was too much ground for a phalanx in normal depth to cover, as at Issos and the opening stage of Kynoskephalai .
Firstly,the term 'file leaders' when being applied generically to a phalanx in close order would include the half-file leaders who now formed half the front rank. Secondly there would be no need to emphasise qualities of a half-file leader who essentially had but one simple task - and hence nothing like the responsibilities of the actual file-leader. Asclepiodotus ( as well as Arrian and Aelian) specifically refers to half-file AND quarter-file leaders - the latter necessary in a Macedonian style phalanx to form 'locked shields/synaspismos'.
In your hypothesis, where phalanxes deploy in close order and fight as many as 16 deep, what function do these half-file and quarter-file leaders have ? Not to mention that any phalanx would always form up on as minimal a depth as possible, and as large a front so as not to be outflanked ( subject also to the other major governing factor as to depth, namely terrain).....
Furthermore, once we get to the ultimate evolution of the phalanx as described in the three versions of the Hellenistic drill manual including Asclepiodotus, there is absolutely no doubt that the phalanx formed up initially in normal/open order, for we are specifically told so ! See e.g. Aelian 11.2 "
..a man occupies 4 cubits drawn up in normal order.." and 11.6 "
Therefore since there are 1,024 file leaders drawn up along the front of the phalanx, it is evident that deployed they occupy 4,096 cubits in length, that is 10 stades and 96 cubits." ( The phalanx at this point is drawn up in files 16 deep)
That close order was formed only at the last minute is also stated at Aelian 14.2
"For a man with his arms on the point of engaging occupies 2 cubits."( compact or close order/pyknosis)
Re the relative value of the systems; the phalanx could not win without cavalry support, nor could it operate in broken terrain; roman legions could. Neither Pydna nor Kynoskephalai were long hard fought battles, Pydna was only an hour long allegedly and only 100 Romans died allegedly. After Magnesia both the Seleukids and the Ptolemies began to raise infantry of Roman type, an unlikely investment were it not felt that it would confer a significant advantage, and they would not be influenced by Roman propaganda only the evidence of their own experience. One should also bear in mind that it was not the legions that defeated the phalanx at Magnesia but the light troops and their missiles which maddened the foolishly placed elephants.
The legion was the superior system for me.
I don't think any of this last is true. Roman Legions were just as vulnerable to flank attacks as a phalanx, and needed cavalry support just as much.......Hannibal would have laughed at such a statement since better cavalry support was what won him all his battles in Italy against the Legions, and the lack of superior cavalry lost him Zama...........
Despite Polybius' famous passage, a Macedonian phalanx was quite capable of fighting in rough terrain - consider the battle along the mountain ridges at Sellasia for example. One doesn't usually think of a phalanx as 'mountain troops', but Xenophon's hoplites also fought in mountainous terrain.
It is not uncommon in warfare for a defeated power to adopt the arms of its successful foe - making the mistake of thinking that it was the 'system' that beat them. In fact, neither Seleucids nor Ptolemies had any more success with their 'imitation legionaries' than they had with their phalanxes ( and they didn't entirely change over anyway). The reasons for Rome's inexorable rise was not to be found in any military 'system' - after all, the Legions were beaten as often as not down the years, by all sorts of different foes and 'systems'.
That is why debates such as "Legion v Phalanx" are a complete waste of time. Which would be more likely to win if it were newly enrolled legions v Alexander's veteran phalanx ? Scipio's veterans v a newly called up militia phalanx? What of the key factor of flank support ? Terrain advantages? Ability of the respective Commanders? Morale?.....the list goes on and on and the weapons and tactics of the P.B.I ( poor bloody infantry) are generally but a minor factor.....one simply can't say "system A was better than System B" because each battle was unique and it all depends on the circumstances. I can certainly think of a number of scenarios where having a phalanx would be a distinct advantage !!
Whew !! Did I overlook anything ? Oh well, too bad if I did, this post is really quite long enough !!
Really, the only satisfaction pro-macedonian factions have is the fact that Pyrrhus beat the romans in two major battles and held is own during the third one at Beneventum which basically ended in a draw. Not bad statistics.. not bad at all. What is interesting in those battles is how he used a hybrid between the macedonian style and the Italic maniple system. Now, that was clever thinking. Jeff Champion, author of the excellent book, "Pyrrhus of Epirus", said to me in a letter: "Just quickly, i do believe that Magnesia is one of those great examples of drawing the wrong lessons from history. The phalanx should have charged!" Touché... 
)
... I'm just having a hard time fathoming this.