Darius and Homeland Defence

[agesilaos]

As I mentioned to Marcus in the antipodean thread I had some issues with E. E. Garvin’s article in Heckel and Trittle’s ‘Crossroads of History’ now that I have the book back I can expand upon my misgivings. I shall confine myself to the Issos campaign where most errors seem to have crept in .

The first glaring gaff is p101 ‘The ‘foreign mercenaries (a levy of over 8,000 men from Lesbos according to Arrian 2.1. 4-5) were sent to Asia to join the troops under Darius. By this time the only ports left open to the Persians were in Cilicia and farther south. In fact, it was to Tripoli, in Phoenicia, that Pharnabazus took the mercenaries (Arr.2.2.2).’ The first thing is that Garvin has confused a levy of funds for a levy of men; ‘…chremata te eisepaxan tous Mitylenaious ta men biai aphelomenoi tous echontas, ta de es to koinon epibalontes’. ‘…they also exacted money from Mitylene, taking part from the rich citizens by force and the rest by imposing a levy on the community.’ Trans Brunt, Loeb ed.
No mention of levying men in fact the levy is probably to pay the fleet and its mercenaries indicating that the fleet was short of cash. A fact also pointed to by the fact that Pharnabazos agrees to allow the mercenaries sent by Alexander to just leave and makes no attempt to buy them for his own forces: II 1 iv ‘…tous men xenous tous par’Alexandrou sphioi kata symmachian ekontas apelthein’ Nowhere does the figure of 8,000 appear, presumably this is an estimate based upon the number of troops one hundred ships could carry, and an over estimate at that, fifty would be closer the mark than eighty. We might pause to think about the likelihood of Chios being capable of fielding more hoplites than Sparta in her heyday! The troops Pharnabazos loses to Darius are long service marines not recent levies. A fact which bears upon Darius’ strategy; when intending to spread the war to Greece it would be as well to have the military capacity so to do.

Nor does Arrian say that the troops were landed at Tripolis II 13 iii merely says that the ships that brought them from Lesbos were at Tripolis, which is not the same thing at all. Indeed, looking at the map we can see that for a force due to rendezvous with Darius at Thapsacus, as seems to have been the case, by passing the Cilician ports and dropping the troops of in Tripolis with a march of nigh on 300 miles ahead of them would have been insane. Nor would it be a sensible place to land a blocking force to stop up the Assyrian Gates when Myriandros was still safely in Persian hands.

The implications of the withdrawal of the fleet’s troops are two-fold, Darius is staking all on a victory against Alexander and knows that he needs hoplites in order to effect it. That he needs the 5,000 with the fleet shows that he can only have about 10,000 with him not the 25,000 claimed in the sources. The other is that, aware of Alexander’s dismissal of his fleet, Darius sees the opportunity to down size his contrary to Garvin p108, the empty ships were left at Tripolis for Amyntas et al to take II 13 iii. ‘…the Persian ships were empty of troops!’ is true but the ships were not with Pharnabazos at Siphnos! The reduction in naval forces is another indication that the Aegean strategy was not of primary importance.

P103 has the odd assertion that Alexander was in Darius’ rear even though Darius is athwart Alexander’s supply lines with his own, through the Amanus Mountains, clear!

P109 ‘Important to understanding the whole picture are the movements of Agis, Pharnabazus, and Autophradates after learning of the loss at Issos. Not one of the Persian commanders headed for the Levant They all made for Anatolian ports. Nor did the Persian generals who survived Issus head south, but they too headed north back into Anatolia where they were defeated by Antigonus.’ This is disingenuous, the way the Levant fell contentedly into Alexander’s lap is indicative of the mood there. But just where were the fleet commanders? They were in the Aegean and thus a long way from a base in the Levant , a long way, moreover in winter! As for the survivors of Issos, apart from Amyntas’ crew who are conveniently forgotten, they can have had only two options, the Amanus Gates or the Cilician the road south was blocked by the victorious Alexander. Nor is Darius’ choice of retreat to the Euphrates conditioned by his strategy, his army having been shattered any other move would have been suicidal.

Garvin posits that the monies deposited at Damascus were intended to foster unrest in Greece. But, this supposes that Darius was basing his plans on losing to Alexander. Had he won at Issos there was no further need for a Greek insurrection. No, he planned to defeat Alexander in the field, the money was to pay the fleet and the army and probably fund a Royal Progress through the Levant and Anatolia the natural consequence of the victory he expected.

[Paralus]

This is disingenuous, the way the Levant fell contentedly into Alexander’s lap is indicative of the mood there.

It had, in fact, only been "settled" back under Achaemenid control since the early 340s. One could well imagine it - by and large - accommodating the new master.

But just where were the fleet commanders? They were in the Aegean and thus a long way from a base in the Levant , a long way, moreover in winter! As for the survivors of Issos, apart from Amyntas’ crew who are conveniently forgotten, they can have had only two options, the Amanus Gates or the Cilician the road south was blocked by the victorious Alexander.

Little choice indeed. The fleet commanders were in the Aegean and looking to aid Agis in fomenting strife in Greece. The capture and escape of Pharnabazus and other matters aside, the Phoenician contingents readily decamped to Alexander and the rump of the Persian navy removed itself to "safe" harbour in "Spartan" Crete. It is possible that those remnants of the Persian fleet aided escaping mercenaries out of Cilicia to the Peloponnese. Certainly Polyaenus, for what it's worth, states (twice) that the disbanded mercenaries of 324 found their way west via Leosthenes' ferrying of them.