Thracian Loyalty

[kennyxx]

With Reference to the Thracian Forces particullay the Thracian Horse who many consider equal if not better than the Companion Cavalry.

I wonder with the Thracian Forces why they were more faithful and trustworthy than the Southern Greeks. THe were so well trusted they were in the front line with Parmenio Covering Alexanders left wing. I read somewhere that the Thracians were basically excellent raiding merecenaries only in the game for plunder? Even if they were what was it made them totaly layal and dependable by Alexander and Philip. Wheres the southern Greek forces were only held at the back in reserve duties.

Just as a Final footnote. Many different Scholars talk about various Cavalries. Attila the Huns. The Khan and even the Cavalry with hanibal get called the finest Cavalry in history. But I think it can be argued that the Cavalry Alexander had were indeed as any cavalry that could be called the Greatest Cavalries ever.

Kenny

[Paralus]

G'day Kenny.

You sure you're not referring to the Thessalian cavalry which held the main station on the left under Parmenio? I know Thracian "horse", "scouts" and "skirmishers" or "javelin men" are reported on the left at various times for the main engagements, but the Thessalians were the cavalry force of the left.

I'm sure the Thracians were there for two reasons: they were told to be and after Issus their variously reported rapacious nature got the better of them.

[kennyxx]

Paralus Hail

Thanks for puttimg me right. Thassalian Cavalry. I done too many late shifts

Cheers

Kenny

[Paralus]

G'day Kenny.

The Thessalian loyalty goes back a long way. Back to Philip's first intervention at the invitation of the "Thessalian League" GÇô essentially Larissa GÇô in 358, when he took Philinna as a bride. Apparently he just adored her Cavalry and excellent hoplites.

By the time he'd "settled" the Thessalian issue (Phocians and Athens in the "Sacred War" at Crocus Field) and married Necesipolis of Pherae (to reconcile the tyrants and their supporters) in 353/2, he'd essentially unified the Thessalian state. As a result he was elected "Archon" of the league for life (Alexander, too, inherited this as king of Macedon). As well, the League "entrusted" him the revenues of its harbours GÇô not at all inconsequential GÇô which Philip, putting modesty aside, duly pocketed. And finally, never one to look a Greek gift horse bearing gifts in the mouth, Philip proceeded to appropriate both Magnesia and Perrhaebia as his own possessions.

One entertains the suspicion the Medici had little to teach this bloke.

As archon, the Macedonian king GÇô Philip and later, Alexander GÇô commanded the resources of the Thessalian League. Macedonian manpower and resources had, to all intents and purposes, doubled.

The league remained resolutely in favour of Macedonia and, especially, Philip. That same League was still supplying troops to his son throughout the Asian expedition.

[kennyxx]

Gday Cobber.

Thanks for the education with that part of the contingents.Would you agree with the opinions about Alexanders Cavalry as a whole. As equal to any Cavalry through history and on par would it be correct that the Thesalian Cavalry were every bit as good as the companions. They sure put those Roman Cavalry in the shade.

Kenny

[Paralus]

G'day Kenny.

The Thessalian cavalry were without peer in the Greek world - these were - to borrow from Lord Of The Rings - the Greek version of the Riders of Rohan. They were "heavy" cavalry and on a par with Macedonian units and an extremely welcome addition to Philip's military resources. Far better that than the opposite.

Yes, Philip's and Alexander's cavalry were the best of the ancient world as far as they were testsed. As with the myopic Greeks, it takes the right commander to use it properly no matter how good.

The Roman cavalry of the fourth and third centuries (and even after it might be argued) was its weakest arm. Then again, it wasn't exactly the Roman way to win via the cavalry. In that sense they were similar to the Greeks. Amongst the assets of Rome were a beligerance and aggression beyond even the beligerent Greeks and that ability to keep coming - no matter how bad it looked. They were - untill their later decline into indolence (as with all before them) - the most bombastic and aggressive bastards of their time. They weren't prone to making threats; they were prone to carrying them out. It took them a long way.

I would have been interested to see how the Macedonians performed against the heavy North African cavalry of Carthage. Ali v Frazier?

[kennyxx]

Paralus Hail

Compliments on your remarks about the Roman war Machine. Yesterday I watched a programe about Spartans. Indeed the word Spartan is apropriare. From early childhood these boys were groomed and hard hammered into tough warriors. I cans recall a system as harsh and selective of the warrior.

Yet such tough hard Warriors were hammered at Leuctra by the Thebans then in linear the Thebans got rolled by the Macedonians. Would you say the macedonians were leaps and bounds above the tough hardened Spartans. Or as I believe it takes more than Tough to win. Iike your Ali Frazier analasis. Yet Foreman rolled Frazier twice both by KO then Ali Rolled Foreman.

Everything is about game plan and tactics. The Carthaginian Cavalry as you say were exellent. As I recall Agranain Cavalry. I never reall comprehended how the Romans were so succesful with the sole dependency of mass infantry tactics. A useful Cavalry offers flexibility range and speed.Any comander with half a brain and great cavalry would chase off the Roman Cavalry and surely hit it from the back.

Further more it has been argued the Macedonian Phalanx was too rigid with having long sarisas. I would argue they were as wee know they were very well drilled as Alexanders demonstration showed in the Balkhan Campaigns. I see no reason why the Macedonians cant just lift the Sraissas Horizontal and turn jus at easily as a Roman Legionary.

Cheers

Kenny

[amyntoros]

I see no reason why the Macedonians cant just lift the Sraissas Horizontal and turn jus at easily as a Roman Legionary.

While admitting that I know little about practical warfare, IGÇÖm still fascinated by the phalanx. The lack of tactical flexibility lies in the traditional battle formation. While the width of the phalanx consisted of hundreds (or even thousands) of men, it was only what GÇô 16 men deep? When attacked from the side, even if the men raised their sarissae and then turned and lowered them, the new front would have a maximum width of 16 men GÇô and the hundreds of men now in their rear would be virtually useless. ThatGÇÖs why the brilliant Alexander formed the phalanx into GÇ£wingsGÇ¥ in one of his battles GÇô Paralus or Marcus is sure to know which one.

Then thereGÇÖs the fact that the phalanx was much less useful on uneven ground GÇô those long sarissae had to be held at even levels for full effectiveness.

Best regards,

[marcus]

ThatGÇÖs why the brilliant Alexander formed the phalanx into GÇ£wingsGÇ¥ in one of his battles GÇô Paralus or Marcus is sure to know which one.

Actually, I'm not sure off the top of my head which one you're thinking of. That's a bit rubbish of me, isn't it? I shall have to check all the diagrams in JFC Fuller, when I get a chance - unless Paralus can provide an answer in the meantime.

<hanging head in shame, but pleading too many other things rattling about in head at moment>

ATB

[Paralus]

ThatGÇÖs why the brilliant Alexander formed the phalanx into GÇ£wingsGÇ¥ in one of his battles GÇô Paralus or Marcus is sure to know which one.

Oh, good on you Amyntoros! Thrown in at the deep end!

I've a vague recollection such may have occurred - but can't (over lunch at the office desk) pin it down. Certainly not ever in a pitched battle to my knowledge. For all his tactical acuity, Alexander rarely strayed from a variant of the orthodoxy of his father Philip who, in turn, developed and expanded Epaminondas' tactics for the Theban armies.

If it happened it most likely occurred in Bactria-Sogdia/India prior to Hydaspes or the troubles after his accession. Thus, most likely, it involved smaller numbers than the average "pitched battle" and a not quite "average" battlefield scenario.

I'll have a squizz when I get home tonight - as I'm curious to see if this is "implanted suggestion" or real memory! Although, recently, my time and resources seems to have been abducted by numeracy .

[amyntoros]

Oops! No wonder neither of you are familiar with this, as it looks like I gave misinformation. I have a distinct memory of a battlefield map - not one of Fuller's - that showed phalanx wings, but looking through The Generalship of Alexander the Great I find nothing that compares. Hmm, maybe I saw it on an internet site that was incorrect with its information. That certainly wouldn't be unusual and it was a long time ago. Ah well. Sorry about that guys, but at least I sent you back to your books!

Best regards,

[Paralus]

Ah huh! Misdirected by Amyntoros - cheeky girl. Distracted me from my numeracy classes you have.

It may well have been Jhelum. I have seen, drawn or written somwhere , Coenus leading his battalion around behind the Macedonian phalanx to attack the Indian flank and rear. Have no idea where that was.

In any case, the person who propounded the notion failed to realise that Coenus was commanding a cavalry regiment as opposed to infantry (which he had done since crossing the Hellespont). Possibly confusion with the infantry in the rear commanded by Craterus?

Just on which, I find it interesting that the Macedonian "chief of staff" - Craterus - was left at the rear to make nothing much more than a good show and racket. Surely a lesser commander could have acheived similar results, thus allowing the second in command to take his part in the battle?

[Efstathios]

Kennyx:

The Spartans at the hellenistic era were not as powerfull as in the classical era.And one of the main reasons that they lost from the Thebeans was that they wouldnt adapt their fighting style and armors to the new style that was being used in the rest of Greece.Meaning that they still insisted on having the heavy Phallanx only,with the heavy armor and the same tactics,while others like the Thebeans started using lighter armors (or at least a part of their troops had lighter armors) and different tactics that were not face to face "we march,charge and bash".

That was one of the reasons they lost.The other reasons are that Sparta was on a constant military decay since the peloponesean war.Sparta was a strict society that wouldnt let other cultures influence their own.But the persian gold brought corruption and slowly Sparta opened to new ideas and cultures and in comparisson with bad leadership their war machine decayed.

[Paralus]

Yet such tough hard Warriors were hammered at Leuctra by the Thebans then in linear the Thebans got rolled by the Macedonians.

G'day Kenny.

The Spartan homoioi hoplite was, indeed, the peerless hoplite of Greece for a time. How long that time lasted is debatable but, by the time of Leuctra, it is safe to assume he is not quite the hoplite of Plataea. Contrary to what occasionally passes for popular opinion, Leuctra was not the first Spartan hoplite defeat. Whilst Sphacteria can be discounted due to circumstances, Pelopidas' defeat of a Laconian hoplite force at Tegyra (375) cannot be so lightly dismissed. Even in their "pomp", the Peloponnesian army was fought to a standstill at Tanagra by Athens in 458/7. Details are not precise, the rather telling factor being the Spartan's immediate removal of themselves home, leaving Athens to keep her control over central Greece for some nine or so years.

There's little point in comparing the Macedonian phalanx to the Spartans in their heyday. Different formation and tactics.

Amyntoros has addressed the issue of mobility. I'd add that well drilled and experienced phalangites were able to perform a range of battlefield manoeuvres, those manoeuvres though were limited. Most of these seem to revolve around the loosening or closing of formation or GÇô as at Magnesia GÇô forming a square in retreat (that didn't actually save it though). The movements described (by Arrian if I recall) in the Illyrian highlands seemed to involve much noise and the reversal of direction. One assumes these to be the Guards GÇô well drilled and experienced. It is the tactical movement to the side and what to do if the "wall" is breached that more mobile armies exploited.

.And one of the main reasons that they lost from the Thebeans was that they wouldnt adapt their fighting style and armors to the new style that was being used in the rest of Greece.Meaning that they still insisted on having the heavy Phallanx only,with the heavy armor...

That was one of the reasons they lost.The other reasons are that Sparta was on a constant military decay since the peloponesean war.Sparta was a strict society that wouldnt let other cultures influence their own.But the persian gold brought corruption and slowly Sparta opened to new ideas and cultures and in comparisson with bad leadership their war machine decayed.

To a certain extent, the adaptation critique is true. The Spartans failed to learn the lessons from the disaster that was Lechaeum, during the "Corinthian War", where Ihpicrates annihilated a Spartan morai with infantry resembling a hybrid peltast/hoplite.

It also didn't help to have a king with a hate of all things Theban who seemed resolutely determined to "coach" the Thebans in Spartan tactics.

Also the "military decay" is rather spot on. The overwhelming reason for that decay, though, had little to with Persian gold and much to do with numbers.Homoioi numbers or, more precisely, the distinct lack thereof.

Aristotle pegged it in one when he put the decay of Sparta down to oliganthropy or, the decline of citizen numbers. This was a direct result of the "Lycurgan" system which strictly limited the franchise on a very narrow basis. The end result GÇô which was plain for all to see at Spahcteria in 425 GÇô was a declining birth rate and subsequent decline in citizenry. Which citizenry should be preserved and - in the case of the "Sphacterians" - restored (eventually). Such would never have occurred in 480.

Persian gold had been about for ages but, to the Spartan, real wealth GÇô wealth that paid your mess dues and secured your social position lay in property. This tendency to aggregate property left the average Spartan little inclined to split or divide his wealth by sprouting half a dozen sons.

The end result was Aristotle's observation that the property in Sparta (in his time) was accreted into a small number of hands and, the greater percentages of those hands were female. The third and part of the second century would see a succession of Spartan kings promising agrarian reform and land re-distributions. Pity it was some 200 years or so too late.

[marcus]

Oops! No wonder neither of you are familiar with this, as it looks like I gave misinformation. I have a distinct memory of a battlefield map - not one of Fuller's - that showed phalanx wings, but looking through The Generalship of Alexander the Great I find nothing that compares. Hmm, maybe I saw it on an internet site that was incorrect with its information. That certainly wouldn't be unusual and it was a long time ago. Ah well. Sorry about that guys, but at least I sent you back to your books!

Aha! That'll be why I couldn't think of an occasion!

I still haven't actually looked in any books, but I have a recollection (unless it was just a bit of gloss when I was writing a description of Gaugamela) that when the left wing of the army was so hard pressed by Mazaeus, it was turned almost in on itself, and so the phalanx battalion on the extreme left was pushed round so that it was nearly back-to-back with its neighbour. I shall have to exert myself to check what Arrian says about that.

Of course, the other thing that Alexander did at Gaugamela, which was a bit of a departure from the normal tactics, was to place an addition phalanx behind the army (of Greek hoplites, in this case). It meant that, when the Persians broke through his phalanx, they couldn't risk turning on the rear of the Macedonian phalanx, because the hoplites would then be able to take them in rear. I wonder whether Alexander, seeing the size of Darius' army (even at less than 0.5 million men! ), reckoned there was a good chance of his phalanx being breached; and, knowing how unwieldy the sarissa-bearers actually were, realised he had to place a reserve there to protect his Macedonians' backs?

ATB