Insights into Alexander or Philip

[Nicator]

Hello All,
In reference to the story about a very young Alexander when the Persian Ambassadors visited the Pella court. Some have said that Alexander had some prodigious battle insights as he questioned the ambassadors about their king's character, his troop strength, and the traveling distances into the Asian realm. I guess it could be interpreted that he was really truly gifted for battle with such insights, but my guess would be, that if there be any veracity to the account, that Alexander was merely repeating Philips daily dialogue. So I would pose a counter-question...Was Philip actively engaging in plans to invade Persia at this early stage? Or was it perhaps, that Alexander was fielding typical questions posed by his father before every campaign?

[marcus]

Hello All,
In reference to the story about a very young Alexander when the Persian Ambassadors visited the Pella court. Some have said that Alexander had some prodigious battle insights as he questioned the ambassadors about their king's character, his troop strength, and the traveling distances into the Asian realm. I guess it could be interpreted that he was really truly gifted for battle with such insights, but my guess would be, that if there be any veracity to the account, that Alexander was merely repeating Philips daily dialogue. So I would pose a counter-question...Was Philip actively engaging in plans to invade Persia at this early stage? Or was it perhaps, that Alexander was fielding typical questions posed by his father before every campaign?

Ah, well, that's a very difficult question to answer, because for me it hinges on whether the event ever actually happened. I suppose hypothesis would be fine, except that I can't really see where it would end - I mean if it didn't happen, then what exactly are we hypothesising about?

Sorry, not really being very lucid, or helpful - I'm about to jump in the car to go away for a couple of days, and am not thinking as clearly as I might ... I'll get my coat ...

ATB

[Aspasia]

I always thought that at the time of Philips murder, the wheels were already in motion for the full invasion of Persia. As to the young Alexander story...who will ever know if it true. Maybe he was parroting what he heard around him, as children tend to do, or he was gifted, or both. We can assume from his accomplishments that Alexander was an intelligent individual. This would probably have been evident in childhood. The fact that Philip judged him capable to go into battle at 16 is pretty amazing. I think this shows that Philip had confidence in the abilities of his son to perform on the battlefield.

[Nicator]

I always thought that at the time of Philips murder, the wheels were already in motion for the full invasion of Persia. As to the young Alexander story...who will ever know if it true. Maybe he was parroting what he heard around him, as children tend to do, or he was gifted, or both. We can assume from his accomplishments that Alexander was an intelligent individual. This would probably have been evident in childhood. The fact that Philip judged him capable to go into battle at 16 is pretty amazing. I think this shows that Philip had confidence in the abilities of his son to perform on the battlefield.

Greetings Aspasia,
Certainly at the time of Philips undoing, a beach-head had already been formed in Asia Minor. That's not my question. I'm trying to get a consensus as to whether or not Philip may have been contemplating the invasion of Persia as early on as say the 350's b.c.e. The question refers more to an amazing planning mind that thought out his campaigns well in advance of actually beginning them. Alexander's genius for battle is not in question. If anything, it shows that Alexander was thought highly enough to be trusted to greet the Persian ambassadors, on his own, while Philip finished with whatever it was that was detaining him. Philip obviously encouraged Alexander from a very young age to start thinking in terms of running a country, and if there be any veracity to this story, it elucidates Philip's broad based future thinking...even further. It is a snippet, and I believe, only covered in one source (not sure which). At the time of the meeting, Persia was in turmoil. Artexerxes Ochus came to power and had the entire royal family executed. To further secure his position, he ordered the satrapies to disband their mercenary forces to prevent a possible coalition against him. Perhaps, Philip saw an opportunity at this time and began behind the scenes preparations on at least a small scale...perhaps not.

[ruthaki]

And remember that there had been Persian ambassadors in the court at Pella during Alexander's childhood so he would be familiar with them and knowing his keen and inquisitive mind (and apparant precociousness) I wouldn't doubt he would ask a lot of questions.

[karen]

Launching a panHellenic campaign against Persia both to remove the threat of the empire and for revenge would have been an obvious grand undertaking to any power in the area that was powerful enough. How long was Isokrates bugging Philip to do it? (I'd look it up but maybe someone else knows off the top of his/her head.)

As for Alexander's asking questions... maybe Philip put him up to it . If he, Philip, had asked such questions of the ambassadors, it would have suggested hostile intentions, at worst a giveaway, at best, rude. The same questions coming from a precocious child prince would have seemed just like... curiosity about the sorts of things he'd be handling in the, em, distant future.

I can see Philip being that devious, Alexander being smart enough to remember all the questions dad wanted answered and report the answers accurately... and Alexander delighted to be given the responsibility.

[Paralus]

I'm trying to get a consensus as to whether or not Philip may have been contemplating the invasion of Persia as early on as say the 350's b.c.e. The question refers more to an amazing planning mind that thought out his campaigns well in advance of actually beginning them...

At the time of the meeting, Persia was in turmoil. Artexerxes Ochus came to power and had the entire royal family executed. To further secure his position, he ordered the satrapies to disband their mercenary forces to prevent a possible coalition against him. Perhaps, Philip saw an opportunity at this time and began behind the scenes preparations on at least a small scale...perhaps not.

G'day Nicator.

I'm at the office and am about to pull up stumps. I don't really have the time or resources to go through the lot so, just a "quickie".

Philip contemplating a Persian expedition in the 350's? Not likely. He was indeed a long term thinker - indeed the first such since Epaminondas - and may have harboured an ambition, by the 350's, to eventually move against Persia. He was, though, in no position to do so.

At this time he was engaged in serious political and military matters in Greece GÇô not least against the Athenian Confederacy. This mostly centered on Athen's ongoing fixation on Amphipolis and was not "resolved" until 346. It did not take long to start over GÇô especially when Philip's rather duplicitous diplomacy was uncovered and led to the war being continued throughout the northern Aegean.

It has occasionally been suggested that Philip's subsequent moves in Thrace, the Hellespont and Byzantium were aimed toward Persia. Whilst that may have been an enjoyable side benefit (and Philip ran that same duplicitous diplomatic line with Persia to stem the King's gold flow to Greece), the Hellespont and Byzantium campaigns were GÇô I think GÇô aimed fairly and squarely at Athens. Thrace again was two-fold: cut Athens off from Thracian harbours and pick up what was to be had in terms of metals.

Isocrates' "letter" to Philip was in 346 Karen, after the "peace" with Athens. The old bugger had, though, been at it since King's Peace of 387/6, when he urged Sparta to get the proverbial Laconian lead out. It appears Isocrates had a thing about truces: append each "peace" with a Panegyric.

I think the ambassador story is just that. Not to say that Pella did not play host to such, just that I'm sure the Alexander "dialogue" is apocryphal.

[amyntoros]

It has occasionally been suggested that Philip's subsequent moves in Thrace, the Hellespont and Byzantium were aimed toward Persia. Whilst that may have been an enjoyable side benefit (and Philip ran that same duplicitous diplomatic line with Persia to stem the King's gold flow to Greece), the Hellespont and Byzantium campaigns were GÇô I think GÇô aimed fairly and squarely at Athens. Thrace again was two-fold: cut Athens off from Thracian harbours and pick up what was to be had in terms of metals.

Winthrop Lindsay Adams (Alexander the Great: Legacy of a Conqueror) views most of PhilipGÇÖs conquests as intentional internal expansion GÇô Thrace in particular. I quote from page 27 which refers to events after the alliance with the Chalcidic League and PhilipGÇÖs Thessalian marriage:

GÇ£Any time that he had a free hand, that is, no threats from the surrounding tribes or entanglements with southern Greek affairs, Philip moved east into Thrace. The recently founded city of Crenides opened its gates to him. Philip renamed it Philippi, fortified it and settled a mixed population of Thracians, Macedonians, and Greeks into it. He incorporated it directly into his kingdom. This also secured a steady source of gold and silver from the mines of the region and Mount Pangeion. PhilipGÇÖs policies of development were costly, as was his diplomacy, and this became his primary source of seed money.

But this was not mere conquest. Philip was serious about incorporating the people as well as the region into the Macedonian kingdom itself. A decree from early in Alexander the GreatGÇÖs reign shows how far this integration into the kingdom went. In 336 B.C.E., some Thracian farmers had petitioned Alexander over a land dispute with Greek townsmen around Philippi and referred to a previous ruling in court from Philip which had found in their favor. Alexander reaffirmed this ruling in the decree. The interesting point was that the Thracians sought redress through the Macedonian legal system as a regular matter, expecting and receiving justice as Macedonian citizens. This will later be echoed in Alexander the GreatGÇÖs policies in the East as well.GÇ¥

ThereGÇÖs much more throughout AdamGÇÖs book about the incorporation of both lands and people into Macedonia, as in the settling of 20,000 Scythians into the heartland region of Macedonia which was becoming gradually depopulated. GÇ£By giving them land and making them liable for recruitment, Philip was in fact making Macedonians of them. Indeed, our source for this, Justin, says that it was precisely in this manner than Philip GÇÿfrom many peoples and tribes made one kingdom and one people.GÇÖGÇ¥

Viewing it this way, it seems too much of a simplification to say that the Hellespont and Byzantium campaigns were aimed fairly and squarely at Athens. Adams sees Philip as doing what we call GÇ£state buildingGÇ¥ and that when moving towards the east, Athens became a threat to PhilipGÇÖs plans. Hence the conflicts with the Athenians were a consequence of continued Macedonian expansion, rather than being simply intentional conquests aimed at reducing Athenian influence in the regions.

Best regards,

[marcus]

Philip contemplating a Persian expedition in the 350's? Not likely. He was indeed a long term thinker - indeed the first such since Epaminondas - and may have harboured an ambition, by the 350's, to eventually move against Persia. He was, though, in no position to do so.

Hi Paralus, et al.

I agree that Philip was not planning a Persian expedition in the 350s. Personally, I don't think he was even contemplating it - in 359/8 he was only just setting Macedonia on the path of becoming a stable kingdom again, and for the first few years after that, as he began his expansion, things were still too precarious.

It is quite possible that he was contemplating the expedition before Isocrates wrote to him - he probably knew that Isocatrates had already approached others (including Jason of Pherae), and so must have considered the possibilities. But he couldn't have even begun to plan anything until he knew what the story was in Greece - so in 346, after the Peace of Philocrates, he might have started thinking about it ... but the peace broke down pretty quickly. The next chance came in 338, when he was in a position to dictate terms and so form the League. Before that time, there was no point in his planning anything.

ATB

[Paralus]

Viewing it this way, it seems too much of a simplification to say that the Hellespont and Byzantium campaigns were aimed fairly and squarely at Athens. Adams sees Philip as doing what we call GÇ£state buildingGÇ¥ and that when moving towards the east, Athens became a threat to PhilipGÇÖs plans. Hence the conflicts with the Athenians were a consequence of continued Macedonian expansion, rather than being simply intentional conquests aimed at reducing Athenian influence in the regions.

G'day Amyntoros.

Are you seeking a point of departure? To paraphrase that particular Python with the outrageous accent-a: "You daughter of a picky person!"

Again, I am caught for time (having to bolt to a site meeting regarding a third party warehouse contract - fun, fun, fun to quote a prancing Mike Love), so another quickie.

The original (rushed) post should have noted the Hellespont/Byzantium campaign as separate from the Thracian/Thraceward campaigns - of which there are more than the one. The first - the "Thraceward" campaign - was aimed at the Thermaic Gulf and the Chalcidian League. This was not aimed at Athens as much as securing Macedonian frontiers and the resources - metals (gold/silver) and lumber - of the area GÇô resources long seen by Athens as hers by right. Indeed, it was the fixation that drove what foreign policy her body politic still exercised itself with. Philip knew well the results of meddling with the muse of an Athens never quite awakeneded from imperial daydreaming.

The Campaigns in Thrace itself GÇô then and over the next dozen years GÇô had similar aims and were framed with Athens in mind. Thracian resources were GÇô as always GÇô the king's to exploit but, so were Thracian strategic assets. Athenian animosity GÇô at one level or another GÇô could be counted on after the duplicity over Amphipolis and Potidea. Keeping Athens from those ports and removing the possibility of alliances with same were a part of that.

The Hellespont and Byzantium campaign from about 341 on were aimed squarely at Macedonian naval control of the corn and commerce routes of the northeastern Aegean GÇô the jugular vein of Athens. A cursory glance at history will have informed Philip that there would only ever be one response to a Macedonian military excursus in that region: war and the sailing of strong Athenian armament to address the threat. That indeed was the result. Had Philip succeeded in taking control of the Hellespont/Bosphorus region, he may well have starved Athens into the alliance which may have totally averted Chaeronea.

I don't disagree with Mr Adams. Macedonian "imperial" aims and "lebensraum" are subjects entirely relevant here. Philip set the Macedonian state on a path first of consolidation and then expansion. His reforms go a long way to what Mr Adams is suggesting. I promise to do something in this direction tonight when I get home!

[Paralus]

G'day Amyntoros.

I've wrestled with this now for some days. Aside from lack of time, and a head feeling like an over inflated soccer ball, this raises all sorts of issues. Any attempt I've made to address the issues raised necessarily winds up in a discourse on the career of Philip. The Thrace-ward and Thracian campaigns, as well as those Philip engaged in to the south, are all intertwined. There are two overarching common threads. The first is Macedonian security; the second is the policy pursued to address the first.

No reading of Philip can fail to be influenced by the parlous nature of the state he found himself lumbered with. At the end of the 360's, Macedonia was GÇô literally GÇô surrounded by hostile neighbours. Greece to the south had, for a century, used it as a playing piece in a perceived greater game; the Federal Chalcidian League was far stronger politically and in manpower terms; "Upper Macedonia" was independent with Illyria currently occupying several lowland Macedonian towns. Such a dire situation was to have something of heavy influence on Philip's world view.

Having belted Bardylis and the Illyrians in the field, Philip set about putting things to rights. This entailed the process of defining his borders as much as securing them. These Macedonian borders were to become a rather fluid concept in Philip's mind as GÇô ever the opportunist GÇô they seemed never to rest in one place overly long. Hence the policy Philip pursued was "expansion". It was applied at every available opportunity. It was, though, not quite multi directional GÇô at first. Having secured the "home cantons" the gaze continued northwest and then turned east (Chacidice and Thrace). This was accompanied by a deliberate policy of destabilisation aimed at the major players in Greece: Athens, Thessaly, Thebes and the increasingly aggressive Phocians. It is against that backdrop that the actions taken by Philip need to be judged.

My opinion is that what began with securing the kingdom and strengthening its defences became, as a consequence of the course followed to acheive same, Macedonian imperialism, latent in the beginning and unbridled by Philip's last decade or so.

I've not read Mr. Adam's book and so can only comment on that which you've quoted. I'm always interested in the varied ways in which individuals choose to see conquest or, its euphemism, expansion. To describe Philip's actions as "not mere conquest" is not quite correct. It depends on the examples given. For instance, the incorporation of the tribes of "upper Macedonia" (Lyncus, Pelagonia and areas further north and west) into the Macedonian state was just that: they became "Macedones" and liable for service in the army as with those Macedones of the plains. The same will have applied to those areas around the Thermaic Gulf (Pydna for example) that were considered "ancestrally" Macedonian.

Methone, though, is a different case. Here the population was deported with the one garment (one supposes to allow decent pillage for the troops) and then the city was razed and the land then made over to the "Macedones". Similar occurred elsewhere, notably Oesyme. In essence, the land is taken from the population, given to the "Macedones" and the original population is left to work it for them.

Crenides too is a different circumstance. Here the city asked for Philip's help. Having access to excellent gold and silver mines, Philip didn't need to be asked twice. Having fortified the town and added to the population, he then gave some land to the newly named Philipi to possess, some to cultivate and yet more to Thracians to cultivate. These people were not ever Macedones and had no right of citizenship other than the right of appeal to the king. The right that Adams describes them using. In fact, Philipi paid rent on the land it cultivated and the Thracians continued to farm land they once owned and paid a tythe to the king (Hammond, Philip of Macedon)

It is tempting to rationalise Philip's expansionist/imperialist policies with such examples but, they are seen somewhat out of context. The army continued to be Macedones and the Guards of the pezhetaitoi were strictly from the old kingdom. Other states'/cities' forces were deployed as allies or mercenaries. In Hammond's words:

There was no attempt to impose a universal language, religion or legal system. The King with his deputies and the assembly of the Macedones conducted the foreign policy and passed regulations for all persons in the kingdom, whose universal prerogative was a right of appeal to the king.

So the quoted Thracians were making their appeal GÇô as was their right GÇô as subject persons, not Macedones (citizens). I would, then, find little to disagree with Adams' assertion that "Philip was serious about incorporating the people as well as the region into the Macedonian kingdom itself". Not all, though, as equals or "citizens" but as subject peoples of the kingdom.

Later in his reign Philip did indeed supplement the population of some cities GÇô both with the mentioned Scythians and Illyrians ("Sarnousii") GÇô the Scythians near the end of the 340s. There existed no slave labour as in the Greek states and two decades of war have a way of persuading one of the exigencies of necessity. This was not the case though during the 350s.

This has become something of a none too well constructed undergraduate essay. That being the case I believe I shall address the goading and pacifying of Athens at another time. I will say, though, on the subject of Philip's marriage to Philinna (ostensibly from the aristocratic Aleuadae) in Thessaly, that he married for her for her great set national assests: excellent hoplites and cavalry. And, possibly looks?

Time for another codral/aspirin/nasal decongestant.

[Nicator]

Paralus (and the rest of you fine Pothosians),
The comments received on this post have been of exceptional quality and depth. This is much appreciated. I would add that the overall quality of Pothos has been elevated to a whole new level of late.

I suppose I would like to have seen Philip in action on the drawing board, thinking things through. Perhaps using rocks and pebbles in the field on a dirt floor. Perhaps weighing and counter-weighing scenarios before a campaign. Did he bounce his ideas off of his engineers, generals, and advisors? If so to what extent? I guess the breadth of Philips character is interesting. He must have planned, planned, and replanned. From what little I've read on the old boy, it seemed like every move was calculated to achieve multiple purposes. How often did the brilliant son fall upon doubly advantageous situations? Perhaps Alexander's situation was so different that the availability of such a scenario was not an issue. Certainly, there was a small business that grew into a big business phenomenon relationship in regards to the subduing of Eruope and the rest of the world. In a small business it would be easy to see how significant a good plan could be in the every day affairs. For instance, I'll fly to New York to meet with a prospective client, and while I'm there, I'll check out my competitors latest line of widgets (and in Philips case) I'll firebomb my competitors main headquarters then hire all of his employees, and steal his technology. For Alexander, after quelling the European rebellion, it was just a matter of how fast and far can we push. Strategy was important on geograpical terms. Certainly, there were situations where taking a stronghold would be doubly advantageous. Such as the sacking of Tyre. It would bring the fortress into his hands to be used as a base. It would also close the loop of Persian aggression into Europe proper. It was a good and necessary military decision. It was a strategic initiative with few parallels in the war. But it was solely a military initiative. There can be a decent argument made for Alexander's effective handling of the satraps and his intricate web of political checks and counterchecks. In this, Alexander proved himself to be more than adept at producing the doubly edged sword. Getting a bit off topic here, but the initial post was partially aimed at Alexaner's ability to plan as well as Philips.

[jan]

I like this question, and I am on the side that Alexander demonstrated his own peculiar insights into the discussion and was not just parroting something his father had said. As this story is presented in the books that I have read it always reminded me of the time that the Jewish priests at the Temple were so impressed with Jesus when he was only 12. I think that it is Alexander, not his father, who is the one who impressed the visitors.