rjones2818 wrote:Well, if it came down to it, I'm of the opinion that the Macedonian Phalanx would have been able to beat the Spartans straight up. Yes, it'd be bloody, but I'd take the sarissas in that case as opposed to the regular spear.
It would, eventually, come down to a matter of the better armament. At the time, the Lakonians were the masters of hoplite warfare and hoplite warfare ruled. That said, had a Macedonian phalanx – of Philip or Alexander – pressed Thermopylae, I believe that it will have prevailed by virtue of casualties inflicted, eventually. Whether its commander will have stood for the losses he too will have endured is another thing entirely.
That stated, the point to remember here is that Alexander attacked the Persian Gates front on with, in the absence of any cavalry action described, the pahalanx and suffered, as Arrian states "severely". And this against a rabble remnant of a Persian polyglot "horde" (see below).
Time and again a well trained and commanded Macedonian phalanx proves itself over the Greek hoplite. It is only when the Macedonian phalanx is discombobulated – such as Issus where it was fractured over the river and the line broken by Alexander’s headlong charge – that it is vulnerable.
rjones2818 wrote:The other point is that he did pass the Persian Gates, he did turn the pass into Thessaly, he did get through the pass to the north on his way to the Isther/Danube. While there may have been times that he chose not to turn a pass, when he chose to, he did.
All of which are different passes and different actions. At the Persian Gates Alexander misjudged terribly. He attempted what you propose for Thermopylae and suffered severely. He turned that pass by, as Kenny says, getting behind the Persian forces with the help of “Persian prisoners”. Having trapped them between himself and Craterus, he annihilated them. If Arrian’s account is correct, almost to a man. In fact, Alexander seems to have planned it this way for, as Arrian reports:
…the Macedonians were all around them, on one side Alexander pressing his attack, on the other Craterus and his men rapidly thrusting forward, so that most of them had no option but to turn back to the inner defences in the hope of saving themselves there. But these defences too were in the hands of the Macedonians, for Alexander, having foreseen how things would go, had left Ptolemy there with 3,000 infantrymen, who in some close fighting cut the greater part of the enemy to pieces.
One hell of a way to make up for the error of a frontal assault gone pear shaped.
rjones2818 wrote:I'm not trying to denigrate Spartan valor at all. They were, overall, the best heavy infantry up until the time of Alexander, with the Sacred Band being great, also. I'm just of the opinon that Alexander would have found a way to force the pass, and I agree that he wouldn't be above using Ephialtes to do it.
We’re in the realms of “what if” anyway so I don’t s’pose it matters much if I indulge. The Spartan army – and by which I mean the
homoioi – were in serious decline during the second half of the fifth century. In essence, Sparta’s heyday was ebbing – if not gone. Spartan invincibility in the field took a severe battering at Pylos. Indeed, if one reads Thucydides – and between the lines of idolatry that clouds Xenophon’s Spartan apologia, sorry, Hellenica, the decline is visible. The Spartans, who marched with “their whole army” (as well they would) to Mantinea in 418, only just held that field. Had they lost Laconia was wide open to – of all states – Argos. They didn’t. Just. During the “Arcananian war” in the west of central Greece during 428-425, Spartan hoplites did not fare well. The real door knocker, though, did not involve Sparta. Athens marched a force to Delium in Boeotia in 424. It was to meet a force led by Demosthenes. That did not occur. They did meet an army of Thebans who eventually prevailed on the field with “a massed wing”.
By the time of the Corinthian War (390s), Sparta was a mere shadow of its former self. Pushed, it could likely amass some 2,000 – 3,000 hoplites; more if the old men were counted. By Leuktra that was down to some 1,700. By then the pugnacious, recidivist and Theban hating Agesilaos had drilled the Thebans in every conceivable Spartan tactical move. I’ve often wondered why it was not he that the Ephors chose to die that day.
In short, I believe that the Spartans were one of the best heavy infantry armies prior to Philip’s Army (never forget, it was
Philip’s that executed those marvellous manoeuvrers for Glaucias’ benefit before Pelium). The Thebans though were without peer for some decades. Just ask the Athenians and the Spartans. Pity Epaminondas and Pelopidas taught Philip but never met him on the field.
