Hello everyone. I am an avid student of this great subject, and would like to delve in by sharing a recent dissertation of mine.
"I had arrived at this result, for no other hypothesis would meet the facts."
- Sherlock Holmes, in A Study in Scarlet
"...Such was the end of Philip, who had made himself the greatest of the kings in Europe in his time, and because of the extent of his kingdom had made himself a throned companion of the twelve gods. He had ruled 24 years. He is known to fame as one who with but the slenderest resources to support his claim to a throne won for himself the greatest empire in the Greek world, while the growth of his position was not due so much to his prowess in arms as to his adroitness and cordiality in diplomacy. Philip himself is said to have been prouder of his grasp of strategy and his diplomatic successes than of his valor in actual battle. Every member of his army shared in the successes which were won in the field but he alone got credit for victories won through negotiation.
Now that we have come to the death of Philip, we shall conclude this book here according to our original statement. Beginning the next one with Alexander's accession as king we shall try to include all of his career in one book..."
- Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca Historica, Book 16.95
Greetings all
Just about two years have passed since this thread, one I have always wished to return to so some issues of disagreement etc. could be addressed. Forgive my 'ambitious' attitude, but I have been a little frustrated since due to lack of time to work on this (a little impediment called 'life'
), hence any overt 'frustration' regarding my pressed opinions on this fantastic subject.I initiate here discussions about Philip II of Macedon, whose broad legacy involved the formation of a new political organization in the form of a Greek monarchy in 337 B.C. Basically, and from a modern perspective, this was not conducive to the effectuated ideal of 'rule of the people' (kratos > demos), but far more so for the direction of a new military instrument for conquest from a single will. This condition was, of course, for better or worse depending on one's values resting on an immense study of Philip II against 'liberty and equality'. He didn't 'unite Greece' in the sense they could decide their own future with added 'security' as part of a common community; the League of Corinth (anachronistically described), or Community of the Greeks (to koinon ton Hellenon) instituted by Philip as the largest representative body in Greek history, was essentially based on a constitutional standing which prevented, in theory, any future civil strife and internecine war among the Greeks (the 'league' was an enforced peace). The glue that held the League intact was not so much Philip's military power but the deterrent of possible isolation which he established.
For the most part, Philip failed in any 'realignment' of Greek political thought, in terms of an attempted reconciliation of local 'nationalism' with a true Greek national unity, evidenced by the strife amid much of Greece against Macedonian rule immediately after his and Alexander's death. The failure to keep the peace at home and gain enthusiasm for a campaign against the Achaemenid Persian Empire abroad was not caused merely by any lack of time for his policies to work themselves out, but the fact that his power came far more on the battlefields than in any of the diplomatic circles, thus those who 'accepted' his terms could not really risk facing the alternative. Philip had designed a standing army which could campaign just about anywhere, thus anyone who had hitherto been relatively safe (eg, the Aetolians against Athenian invaders in 426 B.C.) due to natural bounds etc. were now compelled to accept what Philip wanted. The Common Peace he established was not only based on his military power, but on Greek diplomatic practices and inter-state conciliation, both of which were commonly acceptable to most of them. Alexander and the diadochi would renew many of the agreed conditions.
Forgive me in advance, as there may be redundant comments, information and discourse out of order, terseness, and an overall 'rough' syntax upcoming: this has been compiled piecemeal from various scattered writings I have jotted down impromptu from time to time. I had a bit of chip on my shoulder in response to an irascible though scholarly poster (I'm guilty of a little sensitivity
). They don't behave like that here on pothos, where the scholarship is seemingly too high for uncivil behavior. Anyway, this project belonged on a site such as this initially. But most of all - the upcoming is loooooooong (perhaps this topic should be broken up?), thus I don't expect anyone to get to it anytime soon. There's no hurry. Take your time; it isn't going anywhere. You all seem terrific to correspond with Open up enthusiasts! I hope this came out OK: I just don't have time to revise it, and I want to share it here on pothos. All the quotes henceforth - without being identified as the poster - are from various threads on twcenter.net, all relevant to the great king of Macedon Philip II, not to mention the father of arguably the most overall famous man of action in military history - Alexander the Great.
Perhaps an over-simplification, but yes - well opined (IMHO). That Alexander is 'overrated' is, of course, a matter of private conviction, not to mention entailing criterion, not a verdict resting on any 'objective basis' - an interpretation which could be argued as a subjective claim (people do that often - 'I look at the facts' talk), in an interpretative context, in itself (arguably). What is less well know than Philip's time as a hostage in Thebes (probably between 368-365 B.C.) is that Philip was also a hostage in Illyria (Diodorus, Historica Bibliotheca, Book 16.2.2; Justin, Historiarum Philippicarum Libri XLIV, Book 7.5.1), although the surviving accounts don't agree completely on specifics: Diodorus has Amyntas III, soon after his defeat at the hands of the Illyrians in 383 B.C. (for the second time in a decade), impelled to hand over his infant son Philip to them as a hostage as part of their exacted tribute; Justin, however, states that Philip was ransomed not until at least fourteen years later, by Amyntas' successor Alexander II, and sent by him to 'the Illyrians' as a hostage (part of a 'purchase of peace'), and then thereafter ('some time later’) sending the boy to Thebes. Information from Plutarch seems to indicate what modern historians have extrapolated, that Philip was 'received as a hostage' by Pelopidas in Thebes through the political machinations of Ptolemy of Alorus, a monarchical regent of Macedon (the scarce evidence prevents clarity here) until 364 B.C. (Life of Pelopidas, Ch. 26.4)....From what I've learned about Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great, it seems Alexander's achievements are overrated. Firstly, I'll begin with the Macedonian army. It was Philip of Macedon who made the important military reforms. He introduced a proffessional army, which was not a new concept in the Hellenistic world, but still a concept only known to the Spartans (the size of the Spartiate army was never more than 8000 at any battle though). Philip's levies, armed with a sarrissa, a 5 meter pike, compared to the 2 and a half meter doru, the spear of the hoplites. It was Philip who developed the "Western" style of combat - heavy infantry and heavy cavalry…
Regardless, Philip's 'rudiments of education' on his path to being a master of political and military science etc. could very well have been affected, too, by his time in Illyria (if not too young); he would have eyed things invaluable among his 'captors' in aiding his understanding on how to tackle them in 358 B.C. (though we don’t know if he was captive of the Dardanians, specifically), where his first victory over them revealed maturity and tactical genius, and the dawn of Macedonian military greatness. However, that theory is based on an assumption that he was housed with similar conciliation as he was in Thebes, something we can ever know. But he was royalty, hence almost certainly wouldn’t have been 'afflicted' in any manner by the neighboring Illyrians.
I don't fell Philip ever really 'suffered' as the prime target of Demosthenes' wrath, whose genius was basically more blinkered than that of the great Macedonian; Philip proved every bit as masterly in artfully dressed diplomacy, prevaricated politics, and particularly the human quality of eloquence (invaluable to effect action in the Greek world) as much as any figure of his age. Demosthenes was a complex, controversial, ambiguous, and influential giant of his time. He was indeed an incorruptible patriot who kept himself at the head of affairs because, mainly, he was too strong for his opponents in the Assembly, including the more, in my opinion, admirable and no less patriotic Aeschines. I don't have the right to lay down compulsory parametric standards, but Demosthenes' exhortations should be taken with 'caution' depending on what one wishes to make of them; his authoritative arguments were lain with brilliant cogeneration, and he did indeed travel to places to gain more for verisimilitude for his cause than mere hearsay. But his persuasions in establishing the final coalition against Philip was not solely due to his persuasive oratory; plenty of Greeks warred against Philip who carried no deep affection for Athens. The growth of Philip's organized power simply held many contrasting interests of those who decided to oppose him in the final clash. For all in all, Demosthenes, not benefiting from any past precedent to gauge the severity with what he had to deal with, failed to fully grasp what Philip was all about - which was far more than any dubitable elements of northern 'barbarism', corruption, and bribery. Perhaps it was a lost cause, though - how to unite within Greece what was needed to face up to the military power of a new national state, lead by a master of war and politics. As it were that simple...…Demosthenes was not a disinterested scholar at the Lyceum writing about the nature of the Macedonian state, and its leaders.
Demosthenes was an Athenian patriot, nationalist, supporter of democracy and political leader; who had identified Philip as the single greatest threat to Athenian interests, friends, and continued existence as a free state of the first order. For much of his earlier career however, a fair section of the Athenian population and other political leaders, a majority in fact did not agree with his view. Thus one needs to consider that Demosthenes very much needed to draw the darkest picture of Philip he could in order to motivate the Athenians to his pint of view. Secret promises of traded cities are rather far fetched – but they served Demosthenes need to suggest that Athens could only trust Philip when a spear was at his throat.
The point of my scenario was not what was; but rather to simply note that if Demosthenes saw Persia and not Macedonia as the greatest threat to Athens - the Great King and not Philip would surly have suffered the wrath of his oratorical talent…
Peter Green aptly, though perhaps a little too tersely, wrote in his terrific study, Alexander of Macedon, 356-323 B.C., Pg. 33,
"…The shifty Athenian demagogues who lied and shuffled would find that they had met a more charmingly persuasive liar than themselves. The hotheads who prated of patriotism and liberty would see both cut down to size by troops trained on deeds rather than rhetoric…"
I have drawn the links from Demosthenes' Speeches etc. from perseus.tufts.edu (the link may not stay available on this post after some time).
That Philip II was an exceptional army creator was exuded by Demosthenes, tacitly revealing the composite and balanced nature of Philip's aggregate army amid his forensic requirements as a patriot to his state; it is from the oratorical energy of Demosthenes we see that a precious surviving glimpse from a contemporary that Philip had developed the most formidable army Greece had ever seen by the early 350s B.C. The upcoming quotes are taken out of context for my own 'forensic' purposes, of which those of Demosthenes are with an overlying derisiveness of Philip (I have provided the url links). But separating that from the gains of insight on the building stages of Philip's work, they ring true, as they are in agreement with other surviving fragments and passages from the times. The famous speeches began in 351 B.C., and throughout his admonitions to his Athenian audiences (he soon was admitted into the Amphictyonic Council), Demosthenes made references to Philip's capacity to 'seize an opportunity' (First Olynthiac, Speech 3), his 'restless activity' (First Olynthiac, Speech 14), and his 'insatiable ambition' (Second Olynthiac, Speech 18, albeit proclaiming this attribute being 'among his many faults')
Demosthenes, Second Olynthiac, Speech 15, c. 349 B.C., in as close as the great orator comes in a favorable comment on Philip,
"For indeed Philip by all that might be deemed to constitute his greatness, by his wars and his campaigns, has only reduced his country below its natural level of insecurity. You must not imagine, men of Athens, that his subjects share his tastes. No: glory is his sole object and ambition; in action and in danger he has elected to suffer whatever may befall him putting before a life of safety the distinction of achieving what no other king of Macedonia ever achieved."
Demosthenes, Second Olynthiac, Speech 17, c. 349 B.C.,
"...it is not difficult to see how the majority of the Macedonians regard Philip. As for his household troops and foot-guards*, they have indeed the name of admirable soldiers, well grounded in the science of war; but one who has lived on the spot, a man incapable of falsehood, has informed me that they are no better than other soldiers."
*Demosthenes voiced the term pezhetairoi, but in his context he was not pertaining to Philip's infantry as a whole; even though Demosthenes didn't seem to have a clear idea what the term denoted exactly, he knew of their existence. His connotative way of describing them appears more apposite to the hetairoi (Companion Cavalry), who made up more so the king's circle of intimates as well as being 'well grounded in the science of war'. But there existed the agema (the King's Bodyguard, which could comprise elements of both horse and foot), which included the most privileged of the hypaspistai, who were indeed the 'foot-guards', not the regular phalangitae (the exact nature of the restructuring and dated nomenclature are obscure). The hypaspistai in function, though perhaps not yet in name, are clearly present in Philip's victory over Bardylis:Diodorus relates this in the battle as Philip commanded the right wing 'which consisted of the flower of the Macedonians serving under him' (Bibliotheca Historica, Book 16.4.5), and in their tactical conjugation Philip used his cavalry for flank and rear attacks, hence this comment from this great thread bites the dust:
This is demonstrably false, containing no gray upcoming. The first part of this retort was not in connection to anything specified about Chaeronea, to which there exists no direct supporting evidence from the surviving ancient records. This is exactly what was written here which was quoted and responded to:Did he exploit wing cavalry – what the evidence?…
...Overall cavalry simply does not figure that much in Philips battles. Alexander looks like the one on really elevated the decisive cavalry charge to the pride of place in the Macedonian system.
That's a succinctly accurate assessment, from my view. Philip most certainly did redesign the Macedonian phalanx with sarissai and indeed exploit winged cavalry. It is clear from ancient military writers that he introduced the wedge formation to his mounted tactical doctrine, which facilitates wheeling, thus employed for flank and rear attacks on the enemy lines - like a 'flight of cranes' (Asclepiodotus, Techne Tactica, Book 7.3, from whom we get the earliest treatise on tactics of Greek warfare before the 1st century B.C.) I'll get to much of this. Diodorus clearly states what the underlying entailment of Philip's tactics were (the veritable 'hammer and anvil' maneuver), in describing Philip's military prowess in his first major battle:I think that one of the most overlooked contribution to the greatness of Alexander was his army. An army that his father, not he, created. It was his father that trained sheep herders into hardened soldiers. It was his father that redesigned the Macedonian phalanx with Sarissas and exploited wing cavalry. It was King Philip that crushed the Greek city-states and made the League of Corinth (with his sons help). In no way am I implying that he was a greater commander, he wasnt, but he did plenty. And Alexanders army was very well trained, without them I dont know if he could have got as far as he did. Then again, even when he mixed his Macedonian troops with Persians the army still did well. Makes me think Alexander could have won with any army, eh?
Diodorus, Bibliotheca Historica, Book 16.4.5,
"...Philip, commanding the right wing, which consisted of the flower of the Macedonians serving under him, ordered his cavalry to ride past the ranks of the barbarians and attack them on the flank, while he himself falling on the enemy in a frontal assault began bitter combat..."
Demosthenes, On the Chersonese, Speech 11, c. 342 B.C.
"For I need not tell you that Philip owes his successes to nothing in the world more than to his being the first in the field. For the man who always keeps a standing army by him, and who knows beforehand what he wants to do, is ready in an instant for anyone that he chooses to attack..."
Demosthenes, Third Philippic, Speech 47, c. 341 B.C.
"…while practically all the arts have made a great advance and we are living today in a very different world from the old one, I consider that nothing has been more revolutionized and improved than the art of war."
Demosthenes, Third Philippic, Speech 49, c. 341 B.C.
"...most disasters are due to traitors, and none are the result of a regular pitched battle. On the other hand you hear of Philip marching unchecked, not because he leads a phalanx of heavy infantry, but because he is accompanied by skirmishers, cavalry, archers, mercenaries, and similar troops."
On whole, we see scattered data expressed by Demosthenes illustrating that by 340 B.C. Philip had developed a standing army which included the tactical use of diverse units which could be coordinated on the battlefield, pivoting on the phalanx as the tactical base of variegated action of the specialized functions of each arm (that this was not eulogistic on the part of Demosthenes doesn't diminish whatsoever the capacity of the of the army he is describing), not to mention a developing siege train which included new advances in artillery equipment and methods.
Part of Philip's military innovations was the creation of a standing force of infantry out of native materials, hitherto a comparative weak arm in Macedon. But all this alone wouldn't suffice - it took superior fighting skills within that tandem along with a supreme engineer of its potential. This is where the intense drill administered into his troops by Philip, as soon as he gained the reins of power, come into effect. Hence, on the plain at Chaeronea, although deprived of the variable to flank the army of the Greek coalition, it is inconceivable that the upcoming occurred, other than bloody:
The Greek line was deployed obliquely with the Athenians, on the left, ascended along higher ground and thrust forward. Both flanks were secure, abundant water supply for both ensured, and communications to the south solid. Philip could win this only through subtlety.…a bloody infantry slugging match that Philip and Alexander finally won…
To cite a tactical example, this wasn't at all akin to the Battle of Coronea, fought in 394 B.C. amid the Corinthian War, which involved some Theban hoplites bursting through their Spartan enemies in a 'forward retreat' (Xenophon, Hellenica, Book 4.3.19), not unlike, though much less numerous, than the 'forward retreat' of the 10,000 or so Roman legionnaires against Hannibal at the River Trebbia, fought in 218 B.C. Philip II rethought his army, state, and foreign policy with a means far removed from the 'hoplite slugfests'. He devised the phalanx to be a veritable human mobile fortress - a stable base from which his other arms, primarily his cavalry, delivered tactical offensives. The phalangitae ('phalangites') of his devised phalanx were not geared to fight at close quarters individually, but rather drilled to act in unison to a higher degree than previous hoplite tactics, the main advantage in that their sarissai could keep hoplites in check: drawn up sarissai in close order presented a wider killing zone with a dense array of spear-points impenetrable for an enemy to breach. But it couldn't be just ignored, thus the enemy had to try to fight it. Moreover, Philip anchored his strike arm, the hetairoi, to the phalanx with the specialized hypaspistai (singular for hypaspist, a term probably applied later, but it seems not their basic function), elite infantrymen who were basically a cross between a hoplite and a peltast. With that said, however, he certainly envisioned flexibility and balance to face multiple strategic and tactical challenges.
In a conventional hoplite manner, the sarissa would otherwise not only be useless, but counter-productive. It was unsuited for sieges, ambushes, mountaineering action, urban clashes, and skirmishing. Philip defeated the Illyrian enemy infantry in a defensive formation with cavalry as a striking arm, but not from striking upon their front as being the paramount assault - this is where some proponents of the 'no Macedonian cavalry at Chaeronea' argue from the wrong angle, in that they stress that cavalry could never break a steady infantry line, which is quite true. Philip used the wedge formation, and 'gaps' opened up at Chaeronea, where he had 2,000 of his cavalry. However, not every situation is the same, and here Philip was prepared to rely less on the cavalry, as this point in Boeotia didn't afford what those he fought on in Thessaly (he led 3,000 cavalry with 20,000 infantry at the Crocus Plain, a proportion more prominent with cavalry) and Dobruja did, as well as more difficult lines to keep open. As was a feature of the grand tactical maneuvering of Hannibal over a century later, Philip designed his cavalry tactics to effectuate strikes against infantry flanks and rear, hence his introduction of the wedge formation into his cavalry doctrine; think of the gaps opening up in the allied line mentioned by Diodorus, whose account is based on points of fact; it is the brevity, not inaccuracy, of our lone continuous narrative on Chaeronea which causes the equivocal problem. But tenable scenarios can and have been constructed. For example, Diodorus, who didn’t know he would survive and the voluminous works from which he drew on eventually would not, tells us of the longevity of the fight before a tipping point favored the Macedonians, hence Philip's stratagem wasn't necessarily expected to be paramount from the beginning. Very likely, initial harassing measures were attempted with his hypaspistai and lighter cavalry etc., meant to entice the allied right down before his battle line, came to no effect, other than getting them 'hotfooted'.
The sarissai Philip provided for his phalangitae were their primary weapons to stymie an enemy in front from responding effectively to his striking units pivoting around his phalanx. But it's even more flexible than that, with a variety of battle contingents in mind. Though no details survive, other than the raw fact that Philip did defeat the Scythians of Dobruja in 339 B.C. (or the Saka tyaiy Paradraya, the Scythians of 'Europe; Skudra to the Achaemenid rulers who held some previous sway here); Justin, Historiarum Philippicarum Libri XLIV, Book 9.2, and an anecdote from Sextus Julius Frontinus, Strategemata, Book 2.8.14), it can be inferred that he did so with an amalgam of infantry and cavalry. Somehow he compelled the Scythians, who fought mainly as horse archers, to stand and fight rather than move with their mobile methods they thrived on, probably exploiting probably the topography and perhaps some strategic guile (Justin mentions his 'subtlety' in defeating them, for whatever that's worth), as he did to the 10,000 Athenian led mercenaries the following year at the Pass of Gravia.
Justin, Historiarum Philippicarum Libri XLIV, Book 9.2,
"...Philip...broke up the siege of Byzantium, and entered upon a war with the Scythians, first sending ambassadors to lull them into security, by telling Atheas that 'while he was besieging Byzantium, he had vowed a statue to Hercules, which he was going to erect at the mouth of the Ister [the Danube], requesting an unobstructed passage to pay his vow to the god, since he was coming as a friend to the Scythians.' Atheas desired him, 'if his object was merely to fulfill his vow, to let the statue be sent to him,' promising that 'it should not only be erected, but should remain uninjured,' but refusing 'to allow an army to enter his territories,' and adding that, 'if he should set up the statue in spite of the Scythians, he would take it down when he was gone, and turn the brass of it into heads for arrows.' With feelings thus irritated on both sides, a battle was fought. Though the Scythians were superior in courage and numbers, they were defeated by the subtlety of Philip. 20,000 young men and women were taken, and a vast number of cattle, but no gold or silver. This was the first proof which they had of the poverty of Scythia. 20,000 fine mares were sent into Macedonia to raise a breed..."
That we read from Justin that Philip was 'subtle', effectively 'luring them into security' somewhat correlates with one of the suggested methods in facing the 'Scythians' in the famous Byzantine military manual of the late 6th century A.D., the Strategicon of Maurice; to the Byzantines of the 6th century, the reference to the 'Scythians' denotes more broadly the various nomadic tribes north of the Black Sea and through to the central Asian steppes whom they were aware of. Notably, the Avars were arriving on the Danube by this time. However, Justin's comment that the Scythians were superior in 'courage' to Philip (numbers, yes) cannot be blatantly true, relatively, given the supreme valor of the Macedonian army by this time (see the footnotes on pg. 153 of Robert E Gaebel's fine Cavalry Operations in the Ancient Greek World).
Frontinus, Stratagemata, Book 2.8.14,
"Philip, on one occasion, fearing that his troops would not withstand the onset of the Scythians, stationed the trustiest of his cavalry in the rear, and commanded them to permit no one of their comrades to quit the battle, but to kill them if they persisted in retreating. This proclamation induced even the most timid to prefer to be killed by the enemy rather than by their own comrades, and enabled Philip to win the day"
At the risk on my part of 'picking and choosing', Frontinus perhaps misunderstood, or purposely misrepresented. a tactical condition undertaken by Philip to fit into his chapter on 'restoring morale and firmness'. Remember, the imperfections of the writers of the 'stratagem genre' (Frontinus, Hermogenes, Polyaenus, Clement of Alexandria, and Julius Africanus) do not necessarily reflect historical fiction with their examples of past generals' actions they provided to illustrate their didactic examples; how they presented them as models of a categorized chapter may not be fully based on fact, but we can extract some of their snippets amid their probable historical inaccuracies to extrapolate a veracious scenario (still not concrete, though). Here with Frontinus, his overlying reason for the example of Philip's battle dispositions appears too far removed from Philip's ultra-harmonious relations with his men (after all, right after this event, they forsook all their spoils from this successful campaign to get him to safety after he had been seriously injured against a clash with the Thracian Triballi), but there's no reason to discard the tactical arrangement as described by Frontinus, just as Polyaenus' clues to Philip's tactics at Chaeronea do not lack credibility, though absent from the only continuous narrative on the great battle, but very general, narrative from Diodorus.
Philip's arranging of his cavalry behind his infantry to face the Scythians can again be equated to another viable tactic presented in the Strategikon, in which it suggests when facing 'Scythian nations' in battle, a tactical mixture of infantry and cavalry, with the cavalry placed behind the infantry, should be carried out. The Strategicon is commonly considered the premier treatise on combined-arms approach to war before the modern age. Thus this is sharply applicable to what we briefly read about Philip's engagement with the Scythians, which we know he won. Hypothetically, Philip's wide and deep advancing battalions of pezhetairoi, which could deflect missiles with the various angles of sarissai being held by the rear ranks (from the fifth of sixth rank back)over the front ranks (though this would hardly be like a solid kevlar umbrella!) ranks would be supported by auxiliary specialists both defending the vulnerable points of the mobile fortresses and applying pressure on the Scythians, giving the horse-archers little recourse. Philip somehow must have been able to compel on them a fight on terrain which diminished their mobility, perhaps at some point rupturing their circle of archery fire with swift shock action (cavalry against cavalry) piecemeal, presuming they carried that very tactic of theirs out; whatever truly occurred, his tactics brought them to bay. It can be assumed many Scythians simply rode away in controlled flight. It is no coincidence that, eleven years later, Alexander employed a tactical coordination of various troop types to defeat a Scythian force on the banks of the Jaxartes (Tanais) River, in which the descriptions from Arrian (Anabasis Alexandri, Book 4.4) and Quintus Curtius Rufus, (Historiae Alexandri Magni, Book 7.9) reveal a mastery of combined arms (see also John Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander the Great, Pgs. 236-241). It must be kept in mind, of course, that though the concept is analogous, the enemies described by the Byzantines were not exactly the same as those Philip faced over nine centuries earlier. But the term 'Scythian' remained, albeit more generically placed.
Maurice's Strategikon, Book 11.2, Dealing with the Scythians, That is, Avars, Turks, and Others Whose Way of Life Resembles That of the Hunnish Peoples, Pgs. 117-118 (translated edition by George T. Dennis, 1984), Pgs. 117-118
"…They are fickle…in the event of battle, when opposed by an infantry force in close formation, they stay in their horse and do not dismount, for they do not last long fighting on foot…Level, unobstructed ground should be chosen, and a cavalry force should advance against them in a dense, unbroken mass to engage them in hand-to-hand fighting…If an infantry force is present [that which is opposing the 'Scythians'], it should be stationed in the front line in the customary manner of the nation to which it belongs. The force should be drawn up according to the method…with the cavalry posted behind the infantry…Post a numerous and capable force on the flanks…"
The first judgment reflects the same political bias Ammianus Marcellinus displayed in describing the Huns, but aside from that, we are availed good data here; such tactical potentialities would have been perfectly suited to Philip's army in 340 B.C., greatly enhanced with his fertile military mind at the helm. Revising Frontinus and Justin, coupled with the snippets from the Strategikon on how to fight the 'Scythians', we are availed a cogent hypothesis, and we know he defeated the Scythians handily.
Above: Scythian warriors characteristic of the 4th century B.C. (Alexander the Great at War, edited by Ruth Sheppard, Pg. 180).
Regarding the almost certain controlled retirement that Philip effected to break the articulation of the enemy phalanxes of the Greek coalition's army at Chaeronea, hence the Macedonian left was able to exploit the gaps which began to occur in the Greek ranks (remember, Philip's battle line was refused with his own wing thrust forward, and the Greeks' alignment was also en echelon with their left thrust forward. Thus Philip and the Athenians, hypothetically, came into contact with each other before those did on the other two sides of each side. Moreover, something to think about it - Diodorus neither mentions the word 'cavalry' in his few sentences concerning Pelopidas' tactical victory over Alexander of Pherae in 364 B.C., yet we know the cavalry were there. We'll get to that):
Fiddlesticks. Literally, Philip was indeed brilliant and the Greeks ignorant to what he was devising, but trying to sell that they were 'stupid', thus coming across 'presumptuous' on the 'apologist of Philip' is a misrepresentation - a twisting forensic tactic the likes of Demosthenes may use with his skillful way with words. What 'it' requires is merely the simple understanding of part of what Diodorus flatly states (Bibliotheca Historica, Book 16.85) - something indubitable: Philip II had the advantage in generalship, as well as a more seasoned force; if any of the 10,000 or so Athenians, of which about 6,000 were hoplites, had any battle experience, it would have been a small amount among the mercenaries swiftly mauled by Philip while under the command of the Athenian-backed pretender Argaeus (Phocion was not here, hence his small elite force which saw action in Euboea and Megara may or may not have been at Chaeronea; if they were, their impact may have helped, presumably, in keeping the Athenians standing fast in the face of Philip's probable and initial attempts to entice them from their stout position), over two decades prior in 359 B.C. (Bibliotheca Historica, Book 16.3), and, more so in the case of set battle experience, those who fought three years before at Mantinea against Epaminondas, where about 6,000 Athenian hoplites were present. Chares and Charidemus were sent mercenary troops (what and whom they already commanded is unknown) in the Chalcidice and Chersonese, respectively, within 349-348 B.C. (2,000 peltastai to Chares with 30 ships, 4,000 peltastai and 150 cavalry to the latter with 18 ships) - all peltastai, revealed in the works of the famed atthidographer Philochorus (Felix Jacoby, Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker, Ch. 328 Fr. 49-50; a partial and brief mention occurs in Diodorus, Book 52.9). On the same events, Demosthenes voiced that the 4,000 troops were 'citizen troops' among '10,000 mercenaries' (instead of the 6,000) etc sent to the Chalcidice (On the False Embassy, Speech 266). Chares' troops who were victorious under him on land six years earlier in Phrygia were almost entirely mercenaries, and Demosthenes, in presenting his First Philippic (351 B.C.), in reference to mustering citizen troops to oppose Philip, only 2,050 Athenians are proposed (Speech 21)....Umm no or at best that what might of could of happened but it requires an assumption of brilliance by Philip and ignorance by the Greeks…
Above: A cavalryman of the prodromoi, or 'Scouts' (alternatively termed sarissophoroi, or 'Lancers', who wielded a slightly longer cavalry lance than the xyston of the Companion Cavalry, though this image doesn't help in gauging that aspect). The social and local origin of the prodromoi is unknown. Perhaps they were drawn from the least affluent of the Macedonian gentry, if so most likely Upper Macedonia (cf. Guy Griffith, A History of Macedonia, Volume II, Pg. 412). They disappear from historical record as of 330 B.C. The two men on foot in the image are a couple of Foot Companions (presumably) in hunting fatigues (Sheppard, Pg. 108).
Diodorus' claim that Philip had the advantage in numbers at Chaeronea probably reflects the source material (all of which he seemingly followed and compressed uncritically) on this section of Philip's career, that of the Athenian historian Diyllus, probably a bias source favoring Athens (cf. Nicholas Hammond, Studies In Greek History: A Companion Volume to A History of Greece to 322 B.C., Pg. 536; but certainty should never be pressed). This is contradicted by Justin (Historiarum Philippicarum Libri XLIV, Book 9.3), who epitomized Gnaeus Pompeius Trogus, a major source for Philip II, thus his title Historiae Philippicae, which consisted of 44 books. Trogus, it seems, followed the works of Theopompus, whose historical work was centered around Philip II (the Philippica needed to be abridged from 58 to 16 books by Philip V of Macedon a few generations later, in order to remove the content not involving Macedon).
The allies (mainly one of Thebes and Athens) were content with a stout blocking position, with their phalanxes on higher ground with flanks and rear secure by natural obstacles. Thus the only way for Philip to win was to breach the articulation of their battle line: enticing them off and rendering them enfiladed, with his drilled army to carry out a balanced tactical strategy, is more than sensible. Diodorus' undetailed account necessitates revision (mainly filling in some gaps, forgive the pun!), however conservative one wishes to be about it.
There were no serious defects, let alone any ineptitude, displayed by the Greek coalition which faced Philip at the onset of the battle. They were guilty merely of not being under the command of a single authority, a handicap under these conditions against a martially ingenious monarch. Apart from his mastery as a general and the supreme capacity of his army, Philip possessed an astuteness on human nature which aided all his successes. In the final campaign, he knew that a mixed yet combined force of citizens from two large and several small Greek states, to which mercenaries were added, was very unlikely going to be under the tight control of a command structure that could match his, hence almost surely not going to exercise equal caution and foresight with the tactics to stop him (their field strategy was adeptly carried out, but with no significant adaptive recourse). Phocion and Timoleon were not here, and Chares had proven his prior inability to cooperate viably with other generals. Moreover, Demosthenes himself implied a lack of good generalship on the battlefield at Chaeronea (On the Crown, Speeches 94 and 245. However, the newly discovered Hyperides speeches, revealed that this prominent Attic orator defied some of his colleagues in the Assembly, particularly those who sanctioned the execution of Lysicles, the Athenian general at Chaeronea:
Hyperides, in defending the loss as Chaeronea, revealed besmirched in the famous Archimedes Palimpsest in the 2006 findings,
"For we chose the noblest policy and we believed it necessary to free the Greeks by taking on the risks ourselves, just like before...
...One must assign the start and the suggestion of every risk to those who make the motion, but the outcome of these things is to be assigned to chance...
...Diondas proposes the opposite happened: not that Demosthenes be praised for his policy but that I give a defense because of chance..."
Thus his audience hears the historically common line of defense for a military failure with 'chance' and 'circumstance', which is never actually without merit, and in this case effulgent when delivered by a forensic artist.
The result of the Battle of Chaeronea, one of unquestioned decisiveness (Lysicles was executed for the loss, and the stipulations of the upcoming League of Corinth were imposed to Philip's likening due to the battle's result), shows that the Athenians didn't remain where they were initially deployed. The 'rupture of the solid Boeotian front', to their right, described by Diodorus, can only have come from the superior sarissai armed Macedonian infantry (in tactical unity) against the Boeotian hoplites formed en echelon, perhaps deeper in the Theban tradition (though probably not 25 deep, as they needed a high degree of extension); Plutarch tells us of the fate of the Theban Sacred Band, that 'the 300 were lying, all where they had faced the long spears of his [Philip's] phalanx'. Of course, one can be cynical and try to claim that a 'phalanx' could signify a generic battle line and not necessarily the close order infantrymen (cf. the untenable proclamation, specifically, in the otherwise fine thought-provoking articles by Minor M. Markle III). But here that would be untenable, IMHO; the Macedonian phalanx, devised by Philip II, contains no other definition than that of a compact order of infantrymen constituting a mobile fortress, serving as the stable base of the offensive pivot and maneuver for his cavalry and lighter troops (Demosthenes said he even used archers).
Above: the plain of Chaeronea looking directly east at Mt. Parnassus. No major silting of the ground has occurred since, thus this photograph shows the viability for cavalry maneuvering on the battlefield 2,347 years ago. The image comes from livius.org.
Again, great site for Alexander!
Continued...
James
