Alexander the Great Failure- John D Grainger

[Paralus]

This behavior pattern had been visible even at the start of his kingship, in 336, when he had refused to marry and produce an heir in the two years before the start of the campaign. He was good at fighting, and clearly enjoyed it more than anything else, but he used it to evade responsibility. This was a failure to grow up. Antipater, coming fresh to him, might have been the man, if Alexander would listen. But neither got the chance.

What’s to argue with? I am no expert in what constitutes “grown-up” but, that phrase aside, the rest is surely beyond gainsaying.

The absence of an incontestable heir – as far as that term ever applied to the Macedonian monarchy – left a power vacuum that was not ever filled. In a situation where the nebulous (in terms of its real powers) assembly of the Macedones was now split amongst three courts – at Pella, Cyinda and Babylon – it was the spark that found the ethanol leak.

When Philip was murdered there was a such a candidate for Antipater to promote and Parmenio to come to terms with. Were there to be an eleven or twelve year old under Antipater’s care the machinations that began in Babylon will have been that much more difficult to mount.

The administrative problems of the empire were longstanding. Under the Acahemenids these satrapies were managed by relations to or “friends” of the Great King. Their power and position derived from the relationship they had with the King. Alexander sought to mollify Iranian unrest by retaining or promoting those who he imagined would return the trust. In some instances this worked well: these “grandees” sought to continue their positions under the new “King” and hence Babylon was surrendered and Susa for example. All this obscured the resentment of the former ruling class and the outstanding examples are well known to us. Alexander needed – whilst he was alive – more people like Antigonus who had done him such sterling service in greater Phrygia. Unfortunately, he murdered the other – Parmenio – and the others were required for further conquests of peoples far away who were yet to submit.

That he was about to set off for months on end – with the best forces at his disposal – to subdue the Arabs and others whilst Thrace, Armenia and Cappadocia were either in revolt or yet to be subjugated (not to mention a more that hesitant Antipater sitting pat in Pella) would indicate that his attitude had altered not one whit. A free people beckoned and the day to day cleaning up and running of empire would be left to the satraps. One could quite feasibly suggest that another round of satrapal insubordination was, on the whole, much more likely than not. Instead, he died leaving no direct heir and a cabal of ambitious and ruthless marshals, tired of world tours of duty and whose gaze settled fixedly on the empire already gained.

Combine all ingredients and bring to the boil.

The money problem: Philip was no more careful with his funds than Alexander. Did Philip never grow up either?

The comparison is not that simple. Whilst the attitude may well betray the father’s genes, Philip spent (pardon the pun) a generation in reconstructing the Macedonian state. A part of that required what has come to be seen as the first professional army in Europe. Whilst I’d agree with Peter Green that both father and son demonstrated a “robber baron” attitude to financial matters, Philip’s programmes of war, diplomacy and bribery (the last two being rather inseparable) and the inordinate sums of coin it will have demanded were generally targeted to a strategic end.

It sounds as if Grainger is calling Alexander a failiure because of his failure to do things that he wasn't even trying to do, viz act in a totally grown-up and boring way, always do the sensible, cautious, rational thing...

You might as well call Mick Jagger a failure for never having had a 'steady job'.

“Boring” has little meaning here I’d suggest. There is little point in conquering an empire to fritter it away or have it turmoil because one does not want to act “totally grown-up” or in any manner that might be “boring”. The empire, conquered in short time, presented administrative problems that, at the time of Alexander’s mooted departure to Arabia and points beyond, had yet to be settled. Alexander, before his death, spent about eighteen months in the old Persian centres of empire. This was largely spent dealing with his army problems, preparations for Arabia, the weddings, exercising his grief upon the Cossaeans and consuming serious quantities of alcohol. There is little evidence of any meaningful attempt to organise the affairs of empire before his departure unless one sees the marriages as such.

Far from it appearing as Mick Jagger being “a failure for never having had a steady job”, it would rather be Mick Jagger recording all those years and never bothering with the copyright to his music or what was done with the money it earned.

This doesn't, of course, mean that the remainder of book isn't worth reading - or that there are not many further references to Alexander - and I will definitely tackle it at a later date, especially as I've been told by a fellow Pothosian that I need to expand my horizons somewhat!

A message for a wider distribution there.

[Paralus]

This behavior pattern had been visible even at the start of his kingship, in 336, when he had refused to marry and produce an heir in the two years before the start of the campaign. He was good at fighting, and clearly enjoyed it more than anything else, but he used it to evade responsibility. This was a failure to grow up. Antipater, coming fresh to him, might have been the man, if Alexander would listen. But neither got the chance.

What’s to argue with? I am no expert in what constitutes “grown-up” but, that phrase aside, the rest is surely beyond gainsaying.

The absence of an incontestable heir – as far as that term ever applied to the Macedonian monarchy – left a power vacuum that was not ever filled. In a situation where the nebulous (in terms of its real powers) assembly of the Macedones was now split amongst three courts – at Pella, Cyinda and Babylon – it was the spark that found the ethanol leak.

When Philip was murdered there was a such a candidate for Antipater to promote and Parmenio to come to terms with. Were there to be an eleven or twelve year old under Antipater’s care the machinations that began in Babylon will have been that much more difficult to mount.

The administrative problems of the empire were longstanding. Under the Acahemenids these satrapies were managed by relations to or “friends” of the Great King. Their power and position derived from the relationship they had with the King. Alexander sought to mollify Iranian unrest by retaining or promoting those who he imagined would return the trust. In some instances this worked well: these “grandees” sought to continue their positions under the new “King” and hence Babylon was surrendered and Susa for example. All this obscured the resentment of the former ruling class and the outstanding examples are well known to us. Alexander needed – whilst he was alive – more people like Antigonus who had done him such sterling service in greater Phrygia. Unfortunately, he murdered the other – Parmenio – and the others were required for further conquests of peoples far away who were yet to submit.

That he was about to set off for months on end – with the best forces at his disposal – to subdue the Arabs and others whilst Thrace, Armenia and Cappadocia were either in revolt or yet to be subjugated (not to mention a more that hesitant Antipater sitting pat in Pella) would indicate that his attitude had altered not one whit. A free people beckoned and the day to day cleaning up and running of empire would be left to the satraps. One could quite feasibly suggest that another round of satrapal insubordination was, on the whole, much more likely than not. Instead, he died leaving no direct heir and a cabal of ambitious and ruthless marshals, tired of world tours of duty and whose gaze settled fixedly on the empire already gained.

Combine all ingredients and bring to the boil.

The money problem: Philip was no more careful with his funds than Alexander. Did Philip never grow up either?

The comparison is not that simple. Whilst the attitude may well betray the father’s genes, Philip spent a generation in reconstructing the Macedonian state. A part of that required what has come to be seen as the first professional army in Europe. Whilst I’d agree with Peter Green that both father and son demonstrated a “robber baron” attitude to financial matters, Philip’s programmes of war, diplomacy and bribery (the last two being rather inseparable) and the inordinate sums of coin it will have demanded were generally targeted to a strategic end.

It sounds as if Grainger is calling Alexander a failiure because of his failure to do things that he wasn't even trying to do, viz act in a totally grown-up and boring way, always do the sensible, cautious, rational thing...

You might as well call Mick Jagger a failure for never having had a 'steady job'.

“Boring” has little meaning here I’d suggest. There is little point in conquering an empire to fritter it away or have it in turmoil because one does not want to act “totally grown-up” or in any manner that might be “boring”. The empire, conquered in short time, presented administrative problems that, at the time of Alexander’s mooted departure to Arabia and points beyond, had yet to be settled. Alexander, before his death, spent about eighteen months in the old Persian centres of empire. This was largely spent dealing with his army problems, preparations for Arabia, the weddings, exercising his grief upon the Cossaeans and consuming serious quantities of alcohol. There is little evidence of any meaningful attempt to organise the affairs of empire before his departure unless one sees the marriages as such.

Far from it appearing as Mick Jagger being “a failure for never having had a steady job”, it would rather be Mick Jagger recording all those years and never bothering with the copyright to his music or what was done with the money it earned.

This doesn't, of course, mean that the remainder of book isn't worth reading - or that there are not many further references to Alexander - and I will definitely tackle it at a later date, especially as I've been told by a fellow Pothosian that I need to expand my horizons somewhat!

A message for a wider distribution there.

[Fiona]

The administrative problems of the empire were longstanding. Under the Acahemenids these satrapies were managed by relations to or “friends” of the Great King. Their power and position derived from the relationship they had with the King. Alexander sought to mollify Iranian unrest by retaining or promoting those who he imagined would return the trust. In some instances this worked well: these “grandees” sought to continue their positions under the new “King” and hence Babylon was surrendered and Susa for example. All this obscured the resentment of the former ruling class and the outstanding examples are well known to us. Alexander needed – whilst he was alive – more people like Antigonus who had done him such sterling service in greater Phrygia. Unfortunately, he murdered the other – Parmenio – and the others were required for further conquests of peoples far away who were yet to submit.

That he was about to set off for months on end – with the best forces at his disposal – to subdue the Arabs and others whilst Thrace, Armenia and Cappadocia were either in revolt or yet to be subjugated (not to mention a more that hesitant Antipater sitting pat in Pella) would indicate that his attitude had altered not one whit. A free people beckoned and the day to day cleaning up and running of empire would be left to the satraps. One could quite feasibly suggest that another round of satrapal insubordination was, on the whole, much more likely than not. Instead, he died leaving no direct heir and a cabal of ambitious and ruthless marshals, tired of world tours of duty and whose gaze settled fixedly on the empire already gained.

Combine all ingredients and bring to the boil.

The question seems to be whether or not Alexander made any serious attempt to govern his empire. I think the evidence shows that he did, but not by staying at the centre of power and taking a hands-on approach. Yes, he inherited the satrapal system, but his use of it shows that he had grasped the principles of delegation, and surely delegation was the only way to manage such a vast area with communication as slow as it then was. I think his much-critised harshness with the satraps he summoned after Gedrosia, like Abulites, shows how seriously he took their roles, and that he was sending out a firm message that he expected very high moral standards of those he entrusted with power. If they behaved well, then they had a free hand, but if they did not behave well, then retribution would find them. This may have been an optimistic policy, but it was a policy, and shows that he'd decided how to tackle the problem of governing. I should imagine that then, as now, there were people urging him to consolidate, but his mind was set upon further conquests, and it's clear that this is where he saw his own role as lying - not sitting in some capital city - or not for long - but out at the edges, expanding. The day-to-day running of the various regions, the raising of taxes and overseeing courts of law, these he could and would delegate. It's interesting, though, that wherever he was, he would take a more hands-on approach than your average ruler - for example in Babylonia, when he happened to be there and they happened to be having trouble dredging the river, he was out there in a boat, seeing what the problem was.
Fiona

[Paralus]

Yes, he inherited the satrapal system, but his use of it shows that he had grasped the principles of delegation, and surely delegation was the only way to manage such a vast area with communication as slow as it then was.

Rubbish. What it did show was his adoption of that which allowed him to move on as quickly as possible. In Asia Minor he simply replaced the Persian “treasury” with his own. Everything remained the same other than the purse into which the goodies flowed.

The Achaemenids had made delegation an art form. It is how empire ran. It might be well argued that it was not an empire in the modern sense. The King’s men – the satraps – were Persian and related or near enough to be called so. And it devolved down from there. The Persian “Diaspora” ran empire. Alexander never stopped in one spot long enough for any Macedonian “Diaspora” to occur. Nor could he afford for it to happen. Macedonians, in a military sense, were too precious to be leaving behind when further free peoples were in need of subjugation.

I think his much-critised harshness with the satraps he summoned after Gedrosia, like Abulites, shows how seriously he took their roles, and that he was sending out a firm message that he expected very high moral standards of those he entrusted with power. If they behaved well, then they had a free hand, but if they did not behave well, then retribution would find them.

A morality he so amply demonstrated by spitting his son, Oxathres, with a sarisa. He expected absolute loyalty. Nothing more; nothing less. By this time the army was commanded by “Alexander’s men” and the last of the “old men” was about to be sent home to replace Antipater

Any preoccupation with morality is, I’d argue, a modern overlay. Many reasons were given for the murders that followed the survival of Gedrosia but the fact remains that some of the first were those entrusted with the judicial murder of Parmenio. Alexander – and his army – would be better off without those men around. Absolute loyalty rather than morality was Alexander’s coin at this time.

[marcus]

By this time the army was commanded by “Alexander’s men” and the last of the “old men” was about to be sent home to replace Antipater.

I would argue that Craterus was very definitely "Alexander's man". He was able finally to flourish once Philotas and Parmenion had been disposed of - and appears to have played a not insignificant part in ensuring that Philotas was got rid of (although there is no evidence to suggest that the decision to get rid of Parmenion was anyone's but Alexander's).

Therefore, surely, Craterus was going home to replace Antipater, the last of the "old men"?

ATB

[Paralus]

Depends on how you read it. Craterus was an "old" Macedonian in the recalcitrant mold. He was one about whom the the "traditional" Macedonians gathered.

Yes he flourished after Philotas' (and his father's) death. He was well on the rise prior to that.

his popularity with the troops is attested and so he seemed best to lead tham home - for obvious reasons. Hence he was also best to replace that "Old Rope" of Antipater who would come east to meet Parmenio's fate.

Craterus' actions after Alexander's death indicate he didn't really want to fight for the lot. He may well have been happy as regent of Europe.

Alexander might well have known his man.

[Phoebus]

When Philip was murdered there was a such a candidate for Antipater to promote and Parmenio to come to terms with. Were there to be an eleven or twelve year old under Antipater’s care the machinations that began in Babylon will have been that much more difficult to mount.

I don't really see how; and I really see this as an unfair argument (not yours, per se, but the overall topic) against Alexander.

So Antipater trots out an underaged child. What happens now? Antipater somehow is universally acclaimed Regent until the youth grows up? What a novel idea! How is Antipater exactly going to get everyone to stay in line? I wonder if there would be any issues with geographically separated generals in charge of thousands of troops and vast sums of money either trying to secure said position for themselves or to gain independence for their personal demi-empire?

Of course that would have happened. It happened to Perdiccas, and the idea that Alexander IV being older would have made any difference flies in the face of the fact that the various sides DID agree in recognition of the heir(s) initially, and STILL decided to turn against one another. We're not talking about a mistake on Alexander's part; we're talking about problems that were inherent in Macedon and its would-be power players. Saying that Alexander failed to address those problems ignores the fact that he suffered no revolts instigated by Macedonians themselves. What, everyone was coily waiting for him to die childless to spring their master plans?

Why, then, would everyone eventually agree to sit back and relax while Roxanne went through her pregnancy? Why even the charade, if not to simply play through the motions? And if that was the case, then why pretend that a 10-12 year old boy would have fared any better?

Alexander's "great failure" was that he died young, plain and simple. An argument against his alcoholism or his penchant for being in the thick of the melee so often is a far more effective argument, IMHO.

That he was about to set off for months on end – with the best forces at his disposal – to subdue the Arabs and others whilst Thrace, Armenia and Cappadocia were either in revolt or yet to be subjugated (not to mention a more that hesitant Antipater sitting pat in Pella) would indicate that his attitude had altered not one whit.

Well, hold on now... let's put things in the right timeline, shall we?

The invasion of Arabia could not have been undertaken until the new fleet in question was built. How long exactly would it take to construct 1,000 triremes? What would he have been doing during this time?

Rebellions? Unrest? Lack of armies? He was already in the midst of both enrolling Asian Pezhetairoi and infusing his phalanx with natively-equipped troops. I'd also argue for the potential of further diffusing the popular base for a rebellion via the planned colonization of Arabia and N. Africa, but I admit that--sans more evidence--it's a stretch.

One could quite feasibly suggest that another round of satrapal insubordination was, on the whole, much more likely than not.

I'd argue the reverse--that, with Alexander alive, there would have been far less revolt than there was with him dead. I don't see how that's illogical; there would certainly have been less internal strife with him among the living than there was with 3-5 different potential Successors rampaging throughout the land.

The comparison is not that simple. Whilst the attitude may well betray the father’s genes, Philip spent (pardon the pun) a generation in reconstructing the Macedonian state. A part of that required what has come to be seen as the first professional army in Europe. Whilst I’d agree with Peter Green that both father and son demonstrated a “robber baron” attitude to financial matters, Philip’s programmes of war, diplomacy and bribery (the last two being rather inseparable) and the inordinate sums of coin it will have demanded were generally targeted to a strategic end.

I'll agree that, whilst on campaign Alexander was more cavalier than his father had been. He likely realized that there would be hefty price if he was going to be able to drag tens of thousands of professional fighting men around the world willingly.

Having said that, what about his non-military spending? There's Babylonian harbors, and new or re-made cities that as well. We can call them whatever we want (frontier towns, outposts, points-of-no-return, military prisons), but I doubt Alexander was so sarcastic as to call no-hope hovels after himself. I don't see why he doesn't get to have credit for the eventual success those cities did have--despite starting off under perhaps the worst case scenario. Had Alexander lived and the Successor Wars averted, is it really a stretch to believe that those cities would have developed and prospered more swiftly?

Alexander, before his death, spent about eighteen months in the old Persian centres of empire. This was largely spent dealing with his army problems, preparations for Arabia, the weddings, exercising his grief upon the Cossaeans and consuming serious quantities of alcohol. There is little evidence of any meaningful attempt to organise the affairs of empire before his departure unless one sees the marriages as such.

Like father, like son, I'd say then.

Phillip, before his death, spent even less time watching his treasury count down to nil, was consuming serious quantities of alcohol, and making his own questionable decisions. Was appointing a man to be one's own bodyguard after letting his rapists and their boss go scott free a smart move? How was Phillip any better than Alexander in the sector of "throne inheritance"? Phillip alienated his only real option for succession to the point where, following his murder, the idea that Alexander was behind it wasn't even that preposterous! As for the affairs of his own, considerably smaller empire, the city states that meant a damn didn't waste much time in rebelling, did they?

Rubbish. What it did show was his adoption of that which allowed him to move on as quickly as possible.

And what was the alternative? Sit down, consolidate, and wait for Dareius to have a chance to raise even more, better-prepared armies?

The Achaemenids had made delegation an art form. It is how empire ran. It might be well argued that it was not an empire in the modern sense. The King’s men – the satraps – were Persian and related or near enough to be called so. And it devolved down from there. The Persian “Diaspora” ran empire. Alexander never stopped in one spot long enough for any Macedonian “Diaspora” to occur.

Not during the invasion, he didn't. What about after it, though? Look, I have no doubt the initial diaspora--of both Asians and Macedonians--would have caused a fit initially among his Greek-speaking subjects. Of course it would have--and it did. Alexandria happened, though, as did Antioch, as did other places... and in a situation worse than if Alexander had lived.

Nor could he afford for it to happen. Macedonians, in a military sense, were too precious to be leaving behind when further free peoples were in need of subjugation.

Isn't this contradicted by the enrollment of 50,000+ Asian infantry alone--both in native and Macedonian arms--and by the thousands of non-Macedonian cavalry enrolled? And that was just upon his return to the core of the empire. If anything, I believe Alexander was on the edge of getting rid of that limitation altogether.

[amyntoros]

Any preoccupation with morality is, I'd argue, a modern overlay. Many reasons were given for the murders that followed the survival of Gedrosia but the fact remains that some of the first were those entrusted with the judicial murder of Parmenio. Alexander – and his army – would be better off without those men around. Absolute loyalty rather than morality was Alexander's coin at this time.

Grainger makes much the same observation, noting that those men involved in the killing of Parmenion had "reaped much unpopularity." Although he doesn't say it in so many words, this could be read as an implication that some of the catalogue of crimes of which they were charged may have been fabricated. Or perhaps he's thinking that there would not have been any charges raised had they NOT been involved in Parmenion's death. All of which is quite interesting considering that it was Alexander who was ultimately responsible for Parmenion's execution.

Grainger also observes that although Orxines was executed for his presumption in assuming power without permission when the satrap Phrasaortes died, "he may have simply been operating the Akhaimenid system" given that Alexander "was out of touch and there was no alternative source of authority." More than this, he compares Alexander's actions in this instance with his treatment of Kleomenes in Egypt who "had used his position in Egypt to establish control over the whole government machine, and became extremely rich as well." Although noting that Alexander was perhaps unable to remove Kleomenes from a distance and may also have been pleased that he was continuing the work on Alexandria, Grainger says that:

Orxines was executed for taking emergency control of a vital satrapy; Kleomenes was promoted for usurping authority; this was a travesty of justice.

It IS food for thought, whether one agrees with Grainger or not, which is why I enjoy reading books by authors with differing viewpoints on Alexander. It prevents me from getting complacent.

Best regards,

[marcus]

Depends on how you read it. Craterus was an "old" Macedonian in the recalcitrant mold. He was one about whom the the "traditional" Macedonians gathered.

Yes he flourished after Philotas' (and his father's) death. He was well on the rise prior to that.

his popularity with the troops is attested and so he seemed best to lead tham home - for obvious reasons. Hence he was also best to replace that "Old Rope" of Antipater who would come east to meet Parmenio's fate.

Craterus' actions after Alexander's death indicate he didn't really want to fight for the lot. He may well have been happy as regent of Europe.

Alexander might well have known his man.

Well, yes, Craterus was certainly a Macedonian of the "traditional" mode; but there is no doubt as to his loyalty to Alexander ("philbasileus") ... hence "not" an "Old Man" of the same ilk as Antipater, Cleitus, Parmenion ... and maybe even Coenus?

ATB

[Fiona]

Rubbish. What it did show was his adoption of that which allowed him to move on as quickly as possible. In Asia Minor he simply replaced the Persian “treasury” with his own. Everything remained the same other than the purse into which the goodies flowed.

I'm sorry, but it's not rubbish. Yes, he moved on as quickly as possible – that was his role as he saw it, and in Asia Minor he'd barely started, he could hardly sit down and govern an empire he'd not yet won. He did delegate, he left people he thought competent in charge at every place he left behind – Calas, Ada and Abdalonymus to name a few – all very different, and showing that he gave thought to finding the right man or woman for the job. Sometimes he left garrisons, sometimes he didn't. Sometimes he levied tribute, sometimes he remitted it – it all goes to show that he did far more than just change the destination of the 'goodies' as you call them. Right from the start, he was thinking about how the conquered places could best be governed, and he acted accordingly so that this could be achieved without holding him up.

The Achaemenids had made delegation an art form. It is how empire ran. It might be well argued that it was not an empire in the modern sense. The King’s men – the satraps – were Persian and related or near enough to be called so. And it devolved down from there. The Persian “Diaspora” ran empire. Alexander never stopped in one spot long enough for any Macedonian “Diaspora” to occur. Nor could he afford for it to happen. Macedonians, in a military sense, were too precious to be leaving behind when further free peoples were in need of subjugation.

I'm not saying Alexander slavishly copied the Persian system. He used its patterns, but he seems to have been more interested in finding the right person for the job than copying the Persian way of reserving top posts for the monarch's friends and relations. He wisely kept the administrative infrastructure, and appointed locals like Mazaeus when it was appropriate. The fact that he never stayed in one spot for long does not diminish the effectiveness of his arrangements.
'Diaspora' would seem to suggest the relocation of entire communities. I don't think this happened in the context of Persian satrapal government. The satrap would have taken his family and a large entourage, but not the entire population of his district. A true Macedonian diaspora would have had to include all sections of the population, and as the army only included men this may have proved a little difficult.

A morality he so amply demonstrated by spitting his son, Oxathres, with a sarisa. He expected absolute loyalty. Nothing more; nothing less. By this time the army was commanded by “Alexander’s men” and the last of the “old men” was about to be sent home to replace Antipater
Any preoccupation with morality is, I’d argue, a modern overlay. Many reasons were given for the murders that followed the survival of Gedrosia but the fact remains that some of the first were those entrusted with the judicial murder of Parmenio. Alexander – and his army – would be better off without those men around. Absolute loyalty rather than morality was Alexander’s coin at this time.

How can you call the question of morality a modern overlay, when even Curtius expressly says that Cleander was a lust-crazed rapist? Alexander's message was clear – no matter how well a man had served in the past, once you were entrusted with a position in the government, high standards were expected, and abuse of the local population would not be tolerated. Sounds like good government to me. If loyalty to himself was all he cared about, only the rebellious satraps would have been punsihed, but it wasn't so – he also punished those who had abused their positions.
Fiona

[karen]

The idea of Alexander as eternal adolescent to me is nothing more than another example of amateur psychologists pretending they can go back in time and put him on the couch. By every actual measurable factor -- successes, promotions, opinions of people around him -- he was mature and responsible far beyond his years. Even his dad thought so, to appoint him regent and Companion Cavalry commander at ages 16 and 18 respectively -- when he really was an adolescent.

So why didn't he marry before the campaign as Antipater and Parmenion advised? There are perfectly valid possible reasons, the likeliest of which in my opinion is that his plan was to marry Stateira and Parysatis, linking himself to both branches of the Achaemenid line, as he eventually did, as part of his entire game plan -- and sire three or more brothers & cousins, the younger of which could take over for the older if they got killed, just as his grandfather had done with great success, without setting the stage for an eventual war of succession between powerful Makedonian and Persian houses. Sound ambitious? Sure -- but that's one personality trait no one argues about. The precedent of marrying foreign princesses to cement alliances came solid from his father and grandfather. Note also that Philip's first aristocratic Makedonian wife was #7.

Incidentally, it always seems odd to me when people cite the two elder generals' advice to Alexander as if it were selflessly intended for nothing but the good of the kingdom, with no element of social climbing. Does anyone really imagine that each of them said this without having a girl of his own house in mind, so that he could die happy in the knowledge that his grandson (or grandnephew, or whatever) would be king? And that Alexander didn't know it?

I'd like to see any substantiation at all of the idea that he was financially reckless, and by this I don't mean modern-day opinions of the extravagance of the weddings or his paying off his army's debts, but true substantiation, such as signs that his finances were in the red or close to it (other than shortly after he inherited them from Philip), evidence that he had to stint on any necessaries such as army supplies or equipment due to unnecessary extravagances, slow-downs of any of his construction projects due to cash flow problems, etc. I have never read of such things. Buying things you can afford is not reckless, and in those days extravagance in hosting and generosity to one's friends were themselves status symbols and thus reputation-enhancers -- something you have to account for in the calculations.

Just for the record, I don't think Alexander could do no wrong, and I'm not even arguing that he was a good administrator -- I'd have to do a lot more research and thought before I took a definite position on that -- I am only rebutting arguments I think are specious here. I request that no one read any meanings into the above -- or indeed into any of each others' posts -- that are not actually there.

Karen

[jasonxx]

Karen

I would agree your pretty much spot on. Alexander The failure. Some people just spout rubbish to be noticed or to try be controvertial.

I once remember a British Chat show hot called michael Parkinson. He once said Elvis Presley was the most overated performer he ever saw. Yet you would watch his Chat Show on a Saturday night groveling to Robbie Williams and the Spice Girls.

Need I say more, As you say these idiots of today trying to place Alexander in the Shrinks chair give me a break. To comment and ridicule Alexander and his days of destruction. Need only look around at wholesale distruction Via Consumerism.

Todays society and people are causing more wholesale destruction and turbulance than Alexander 40 000 plus Macedonians.

Kenny

[Phoebus]

I'd like to see any substantiation at all of the idea that he was financially reckless, and by this I don't mean modern-day opinions of the extravagance of the weddings or his paying off his army's debts, but true substantiation, such as signs that his finances were in the red or close to it (other than shortly after he inherited them from Philip), evidence that he had to stint on any necessaries such as army supplies or equipment due to unnecessary extravagances, slow-downs of any of his construction projects due to cash flow problems, etc. I have never read of such things.

Given the fact that no one raised the specter of fiscal limitations when Alexander called for a whopping thousand triremes... or when he went about raising a new army... or when he built a new harbor comples... I find it hard to believe that he had any reason to feel like he was short of cash.

Where extravagance is concerned, isn't calling Alexander on this a bit of a double standard if not accompanied by some sort of qualifier? No other Greek-speaker ever had access to such wealth, so I don't see a precedent he may be judged against. Where the Achamaenids are concerned, where was their fiscal sense when Dareius III was travelling with a portable palace and more wealth than Macedon could have spent in a year?

Obviously being able to do something doesn't necessarily make it right, but I would argue that much of Alexander's spending was centered on making what he saw as a necessary evil possible. That is, the continuation and fruition of the military campaigns that made the conquest of his empire possible. This, as I mentioned earlier, is adequately contrasted by his city-planning and building, and other projects as well.

[amyntoros]

So much interesting debate and valid arguments going on this thread but I have just a small amount of time right now so I'll only address one comment about Philip.

Phillip, before his death, spent even less time watching his treasury count down to nil, was consuming serious quantities of alcohol, and making his own questionable decisions. Was appointing a man to be one's own bodyguard after letting his rapists and their boss go scott free a smart move? How was Phillip any better than Alexander in the sector of "throne inheritance"? Phillip alienated his only real option for succession to the point where, following his murder, the idea that Alexander was behind it wasn't even that preposterous! As for the affairs of his own, considerably smaller empire, the city states that meant a damn didn't waste much time in rebelling, did they?

Now, it wasn't as if Philip hadn't tried to produce heirs, what with having taken seven wives and the last one possibly pregnant at the time of marriage! Plus there was Amyntas who had been allowed to live by Philip and who remained a legitimate heir to the throne. Further to that, Daniel Ogden notes in his Polygamy, Prostitutes and Death that "It has recently been suggested that Philip, in despair at the small number of his usable sons, married Cynna/Cyane, his daughter by Audata, to Amyntas (IV) son of Perdiccas in order to manufacture another possible heir."

I will, however, add my voice to those who don't see Alexander's reluctance to marry before departing for Asia as a "failure" on his part. Both Parmenion and Antipater had daughters to offer Alexander in marriage and that was probably the main reason for their, ummm, encouragement. But a marriage to either daughter would have been interpreted as favoring one noble family above the other, thereby putting one of them in a more powerful/influential position. Or at least they would have thought so, IMO. I think it was wise of Alexander not to marry at this juncture in time.

Best regards,

[Paralus]

I'm sorry…

I’m not certain you’ve anything to be sorry for.

It’s late; just in from a dinner with Singaporean relatives and so, bottle of red under the belt, I’ll keep it short(er)…

Yes, he moved on as quickly as possible – that was his role as he saw it, and in Asia Minor he'd barely started, he could hardly sit down and govern an empire he'd not yet won.

Not to mention the rather desperate need for a decisive showdown that would net him the victory he so needed to stabilise his campaign politically and financially.

You read an argument not made. At no stage did I suggest Alexander should have sat on his behind after Granicus or Issus and watched the public service grow.

He did delegate, he left people he thought competent in charge at every place he left behind – Calas, Ada and Abdalonymus to name a few – all very different, and showing that he gave thought to finding the right man or woman for the job. Sometimes he left garrisons, sometimes he didn't. Sometimes he levied tribute, sometimes he remitted it – it all goes to show that he did far more than just change the destination of the 'goodies' as you call them. Right from the start, he was thinking about how the conquered places could best be governed, and he acted accordingly so that this could be achieved without holding him up.

I disagree. Right from the start he was thinking of that glorious victory in the field against the King that would secure his objectives. All else followed. His actions in Asia Minor give a clear indication that his thinking was based on confrontation with and defeat of Darius in the field – one which would be totally decisive. On the way to that confrontation he needed to deal with coastal cities, Memnon’s Aegean war and the administration of what he’d won.

Within that mix were the Greek cities. These were, almost to a city, relieved of their “tribute”. That is not to say they weren’t “asked” to “contribute” to the war’s cost. It was, after all, being waged for their “liberation”. And, it wouldn't do to exact tribute from the liberated would it. Nor to place garrisons...unless it was for "their protection".

Alexander’s appointments at this stage (satrapal) were, almost to a man, military. This will be because the territory needed defence. The military nature of these satraps would soon pay dividends - particularly Antigonus, Calas and Balacrus. What also is notable is the appointment – alongside these satraps – of officials whose job it was to look after the collection of tribute. Nicias in Lydia (Arr. 1.17.7) is one as was Philoxenus in southwest Asia Minor, Coeranus in Phoenicia and Asclepiodorus in Babylonia.

The other cities, with few exceptions it seems, simply changed “Persia” to “Macedonia” on their remittance slips. This is shown by his first appointment, in Hellespontine Phrygia (Calas), with the caveat that the level of tribute would remain the same.

The system was in place and he placed Macedonians in charge rather than Persians.

He used its patterns, but he seems to have been more interested in finding the right person for the job than copying the Persian way of reserving top posts for the monarch's friends and relations. He wisely kept the administrative infrastructure, and appointed locals like Mazaeus when it was appropriate.

Mazaeus is a particular case. Alexander would dearly have loved the Persian elite to come over without a fight. Up until the result at Gaugamela that had proved singularly fruitless – Mithrines the citadel commander at Sardis and Mazacus momentary satrap of an isolated Egypt aside. Babylon and Susa though were different. There is evidence of negotiation prior to Mazaeus riding out to welcome Alexander. He was well “in” with the locals as the names (Babylonian) of his sons attest.

This was a case of the right man for the job.

As far as appointing relatives, he didn’t have that many to choose from. He did appoint friends and he did appoint companions – even if Balacrus was, likely, Philip’s man.

'Diaspora' would seem to suggest the relocation of entire communities. I don't think this happened in the context of Persian satrapal government. The satrap would have taken his family and a large entourage, but not the entire population of his district.

You’ve got the bull by the horns. By the time Alexander arrived, the Persian Empire had been around for over two centuries. The Persians had not sat pat in Persis. The ruling class had dispersed among the satrapies and Persian “enclaves” existed throughout empire. Lands were granted and service in war was expected. This class of individual, the top of which were the King’s “Friends” and even relatives, ran the empire.

In fact, there were “implanted” peoples from Hyrcania who were levied from Asia Minor and fought at Granicus.

How can you call the question of morality a modern overlay, when even Curtius expressly says that Cleander was a lust-crazed rapist? Alexander's message was clear – no matter how well a man had served in the past, once you were entrusted with a position in the government, high standards were expected, and abuse of the local population would not be tolerated. Sounds like good government to me.

And Parmenio was a traitorous mongrel plotting the murder of Alexander. Curtius says many things. Whether he was a lust crazed rapist or not Alexander, and the army, could well do without him. The charges may or may not have been true. Either way it is a better than fair bet that the army will not have disagreed with his – and the others’ – removal.

Alexander had no such qualms with Cleomenes’. This fellow, appointed to look after the tribute from Egypt, ran his own grain racket – and essentially the satrapy – to his immense profit. Restricting grain exports during the famine of the 320s he reaped a fortune from the duties and taxes as well as buying up the resultant surplus and on selling it at triple the price. He was smart enough to realise that some of that profit should also accrue to the king and so, far from being upbraided for his maladministration and abuse of the population, he was promoted to satrap.

The right man for the job apparently. One also of demonstrably high standards.

Having said that, what about his non-military spending? There's Babylonian harbors, and new or re-made cities that as well. We can call them whatever we want (frontier towns, outposts, points-of-no-return, military prisons), but I doubt Alexander was so sarcastic as to call no-hope hovels after himself. I don't see why he doesn't get to have credit for the eventual success those cities did have--despite starting off under perhaps the worst case scenario. Had Alexander lived and the Successor Wars averted, is it really a stretch to believe that those cities would have developed and prospered more swiftly?

We’ve been here before about these “cities”. Ai Khanum (most likely Alexander on the Oxus) clearly displays all the hallmarks of a Greek implant. The town was already well established – indeed some of the prior Achaemenid traces remain. One can wax lyrical about the gymnasium, theatre and agora but it was for the elite, not the local serfs transferred to serve it or the prior residents forced to serve their military masters.

It is no coincidence that most of these – in fact the great bulk – are implanted throughout the difficult frontiers of Bactria, Sogdia and India. That is because they were garrison towns. The scenario is always the same: a fifteen hundred to a few thousand retired or unfit mercenaries, Greeks or even Macedonians, a dispossessed local population and others populations transferred to it. These were no Athens in Arachosia. They were a hardship and imposition on the locals and resented by the Greeks settled there who lost no time in leaving once they thought Alexander dead.

Indeed, it would appear that these towns were just what Craterus and Antipater had in mind for the Aetolians 321 (Diod 18.25.5)

Alexandria in Egypt was the exception that proves the rule. There was no attested garrison here and it seems to have been designed (at the behest of Greeks dreaming of drachmas to be made) as an expression of the king’s greatness. An everlasting monument, so to speak, which it has indeed become. It is well to remember though that, as elsewhere, the locals were the service staff upon whose back the Macedonians and Greeks grazed.

That this was ever intended for Alexandria Eschata, Ai Khanum, Nicea or Alexandria in Caucaso for example is rather fanciful in my opinion.