Paralus wrote:The Great King is likely in Ecbatana and in control of the strategy that saw Granicus fought and any scorched earth tactic refused – Persians had used this in the past. That a Persian force was defeated in Asia Minor was not new; that a foreign force would besiege the walls of Sardes was nothing new but that Sardes would fall and the whole of eastern Asia Minor as well (several coastal cities aside) was not something faced since Cyrus the Younger’s anabasis. Darius had every reason to expect – as it had before – Sardes to prove inviolate whilst he set about assembling a royal army to deal with the invader.
By the time Memnon had received his naval commission – including defending the coastal cities – he was likely at Halicarnassus, in the face of Alexander’s relentless march, with what remained of the Persian forces that had not fallen back to Darius. And it was in no way the melodramatic decision that “Sardis TOO? Damn! Get me Memnon!” would imply. It was more likely part of a strategy, the aim of which was, for the Persian navy – in command of the sea – regain the Asia Minor coast and the Hellespont whilst the Great King prepared land forces.
Thus resistance was to settle around the navy and its coastal activity as well as Sardes holding out. Focal points for a resistance that did indeed fester after Issus.
Meep! I think I'm about to run into a lion's den in order to express the views of another rather than my own. First of all, E. Edward Garvin in his article, Darius III and Homeland Defense,
Crossroads of History is of the opinion that at the Granicus it was Memnon’s mission to
contain the invading force, not necessarily to defeat them. He refers to Justin's remarks (in conjunction with Diodorus and Arrian) that Darius believed in a policy of decisive battle, and that he lured Alexander deep into the empire believing that he could better defeat Alexander there. As the Granicus is hardly
deep into the empire, Garvin opines that the intent there was to engage/contain Alexander whilst other forces were still being gathered. (Garvin notes that most Greek mercenaries, for example, prior to Alexander's crossing were
"either still in Egypt or, more likely, in the eastern satrapies for they do not show up in any large numbers until the summer of 334 and not in full strength until the fall of 333."
Further to this, Garvin notes that the satraps had
"begun to enroll their levies and prepare a massive defense as early as 335." He points to the gathering of Arsimes, Rheomithres, Petenes and Niphrates who
"were at Zeleia with Spithradates and Arsites even before Alexander crossed," and that Mithrobouzanes of Cappadocia was on his way and was in the theatre by the Battle of Granicus. Thus this council of war indicates that
"the orders to levy troops and combine forces must have come from Darius and been put into action in the summer of 335 or earlier." In essence, this infers that Darius was in no way as unprepared for Alexander as is commonly believed. Which brings me to Memnon's withdrawal to Halicarnasus after the Granicus where the large garrison, complete with warships, was part of preparations
"according to Arrian (1.20.3) ‘made a long time previously.'" Garvin interprets this as meaning that the plan to counterattack in the Aegean must have been made long before the Granicus. And although Spithridates should have been de facto commander of the western armies, he died at the Granicus leaving the military post open, hence the appointment (at Halicarnasus) of Memnon who, according to Garvin, we might be correct in seeing as
"a representative of Darius authority and manager of his strategy."
Well, that's my humble contribution to this debate – or, more accurately, E. Edward Garvin's contribution by proxy. As it disagrees with both sides of the current debate on some points I think I should probably duck now.
).