Luck Lucky

[jasonxx]

How often do we read about luck in military Histories. I would say there is a tremendous amount of luck etc in war. war aint an exact science nor does it do by some definate formula.

As Mickeal correctly says about Alexander having elements of luck at Issus and Gaugamela some pundits argue Alexander was lucky full stop. Yea he and other great generals have had there share of luck some more than others. But it still dont take away how an element of luck can be capitalised.

But for suck a long and diverse career Alexander didnt rely on luck. Ok you get luck and make the most of it he always did. He had bad luck initially at Issus by been outflanked before the battle he had bad and good luck crossing the river to meet Porus.

Wellington got the greatest luck at waterloo.William the Conqueror was lucky Harold was away fighting the Vikings when he invaded. The Americans were lucky those carriers were not at Pearl Harbour. Etc etc

I like Napoleons arguement. great generals make there own luck and mostly Alexander did again and again.

kenny

[Vergina Sun]

War is an odd thing. I agree that there is little that can be said about the exact science in war. So many things could happen, so many actions could fall apart. It depends a lot on yourself and your enemy. And where does luck come in? In many battles, luck is key. Luck happens - sudden deaths, changes in the weather. Alexander, I believe, didn't rely too heavily on luck. Yes, his father was conveniently assassinated (but that is for a different thread), but why did Alexander's men follow him? I think it was because Alexander was an extraordinary man. He was powerful, he was intelligent, and he put up a bloody good fight. I admit, he was reckless at times, yet he pulled through, didn't he? He didn't go in to a battle and rely solely on the gods to help him. He had confidence in himself and his men. I recall a legend that before the Battle of Gaugamela, Alexander overslept because he was so confident. As Kenny said, Alexander created his own luck, and it served him well.

[jasonxx]

VIRGINA kail

I really like a Quote from Napoleon regarding luck.

He once said.


Envious men s would label Genius Luck..... And Im pretty sure Napoleon said Great gnerals make there own luck..... He was a great reader of Alexander and been a great General himself Im sure he understood the ways of Luck and Genius.


kenny

[Paralus]

So many things could happen, so many actions could fall apart. It depends a lot on yourself and your enemy. And where does luck come in? In many battles, luck is key. Luck happens - sudden deaths, changes in the weather. Alexander, I believe, didn't rely too heavily on luck.

Alexander entered no battle, I suspect, trusting to luck. Decent commanders would not do so; brilliant commanders wouldn’t even consider it. Decent commanders plan as best as circumstances allow and stick to that plan; brilliant commanders as best as circumstances allow with the uncanny ability to alter it as battle circumstances facilitate it. Alexander was the later. Indeed his only big failure – as the history comes down to us – was the Persian Gates. This due to a lapse brought on by impatience and a certain post-Gaugamela hubris one suspects.

That is not to say that luck or tyche does not obtrude. Clearly in Alexander’s case it does. Gaugamela is very good example.

As I stated on the other thread, the descriptions of this important battle read like the king’s battle plan – filled out after the event. The intent is clear: drift to the right and slightly forward. The left of the line is echeloned back and around so as to hold the expected – wished for – flank attack. As Alexander moved rightwards he would feed contingents of light infantry and cavalry out to the van and around so as to hold the Persian left’s flanking movements. The weakening of the cavalry screen in front of the middle-right of the Persian line would just have to come. And it did.

Alexander with the Royal Squadron under Cleitus and the Companion cavalry under Philotas wheel left and make for the Persian line. They are followed by the agema of the hypaspists under Hephaestion, the hypaspists under Nicanor, light infantry and allied cavalry.

Interesting that this is reasonably shown in Stone’s film – not well, reasonably – though it is difficult to make out just what troops he has behind him: Agrianes I suspect (more on the Agrianes thread later).

It is here that things for the Macedonians become desperate and luck intervenes. The Right is doing fine as it engages the Persians. The hypaspists, led on by the king’s attack and having dispatched their share of charioteers, follow suit and the phalanx brigades to their immediate left do so as well. On the left Parmenio and the Thessalian cavalry, along with Craterus’ and Simmias’ (commanding for the absent Attalus) battalions were rooted to the spot in a life and death struggle and thus unable to “link up with Alexander”. There opened a gap. Into this gap poured some of the Persian and Indian cavalry.

The gap should have proved decisive. The rear phalanx had, seemingly, no idea these horsemen had worked their way through the Macedonian lines – most likely due to the dust – until they appear in the baggage. It is only then that they about face and engage them. Had they wheeled left they may well have taken the victorious Macedonian centre-right in the rea and changed the state of play. They did not.

Nor did any other force, apparently, find its way into this gap. The question must be why?

Tyche.

[jasonxx]

Paralus

Indeed your right. Basically the only breakthrough the Persians got was what you say. Its still guarenteed the Persians would have won had they done what you quite rightly said Hitthe macedonians from the rear. As you stated as Alexander was the latter inovative commander. Indeed he would have had to be and we cant say he wouldnt have rectified the Break.

Alas going back to the breach and other Scholars have pucked it up. Its also been disputable about the baggage train raid and indeed what baggage train it was that this force attacked. Scholars argue that the baggage train IE. The main one consisting Darius folks etc etc. Would have been way behind the Macedonian army. Some sholars arge in Excess of 14 miles. Some argue if it was the case the returning army would have had to traveled hours to get there and back.

I would argue that the purpose of this force was primarily to go for the baggage and Darius family. Or as you say massive incompetence not to use the breakthrough.

The question is were they going for the baggage or were they idiotic. an Arguement can be made for both either way Ill agree Alexander had a stroke of luck. Ive watched the Stone Gaugamella Battle and if im not sure the break youmentioned does seem to be shown.

Upon reflection threy must have been going for the baggage if not then it would have follwed military practice once through attack the rear. darius must have picked up that little nugget fron the Hammer and Anvil lesson Alexander dished out at Issus.
ill definately agree the Persian gates were a stroke of luck.

We could Also say that the Persians not hiolding the Cilician gates was blunder luck whatever.

Even without luck Im pretty sure the shrood Macedonian would have worked it out... He was kinda like that.

kenny

[Fiona]

[quote="Paralus"]
The gap should have proved decisive. The rear phalanx had, seemingly, no idea these horsemen had worked their way through the Macedonian lines – most likely due to the dust – until they appear in the baggage. It is only then that they about face and engage them. Had they wheeled left they may well have taken the victorious Macedonian centre-right in the rea and changed the state of play. They did not.

Nor did any other force, apparently, find its way into this gap. The question must be why?[quote]

What do you think of Robin Lane Fox's idea, that Mazaeus may not have been trying as hard as he could?
"...and on the left Parmenion had somehow repulsed an opposing mass of cavalry, despite their overwhelming numbers and positioning. One dissenting voice maintained that he and his Thessalian horsemen had indeed fought brilliantly, whereas others accused him of sloth and incompetence; the brilliance may be true, and news of Darius' retreat may have helped him, as may the presence of Mazaeus, who could well have remembered his contacts with Hephaistion a mere month before at the Euphrates. Commander of the entire Persian right, he was not slow to ignore Darius and ride away to Babylon, where he surrendered withing weeks and gained his reinstatement. He knew, most suspiciously, where his advantage lay."

I guess it doesn't take away from the presence of Tyche, though, as even if true, Mazaeus' behaving like that was not something Alexander could have counted on.

Fiona

[jasonxx]

I watched a very disturbing item on a TV Programe about historical. facts etc.

Nothing to do with Alexander but of the Ancient days of warfare.

The narrative related to Napoleons Quote that an army marches on Its Stomach. As a relative point the narrater relayed it with Hannibals army aparently marching on Stomachs. Arms Legs heads Etc etc.

The narrative was basically making reference to the Carthaginians been Caniibals and as such Ate the defeated dead as food when none was abundant.

I am aware that somewhere in the Alexander histories reference is indeed made to the Carthaginians been Canibals. If so then are we to assume that the Phonecians relative to Carthage also had canibalistic behaviours.

Maybe its all a byth That Hannibals Boys were cannibals but as Ive said Im sure Ive read reference to this in Alexander Literature. Does anyone else in Pothos have any info regarding Carthaginian Canibalism?

Kenny

[jasonxx]

Sorry I meant for this to be a new Post about canibalism.

Kenny

[Paralus]

What do you think of Robin Lane Fox's idea, that Mazaeus may not have been trying as hard as he could?

About as much, I'd think, as his assertion that the Macedonians, before their march into India, abandoned their sarissae because they were useless in Indian conditions.

This sits rather uncomfortably with Diodorus' account of the battle of the Hydaspes:

Nevertheless the Macedonians faced the frightening experience manfully. They used their long spears to good effect against the Indians stationed beside the elephants, and kept the battle even...(17.88.2)

Mazaeus was close to the Great King - a kinsman. As commander of the right there is little chance that he will have sabotaged the battle there. Until Gaugamela Darius was still Great King and firmly in control. The orders follwed by Mazaeus to bring Alexander to battle north of Arbela do not speak of a bloke about to "turn it up".

Regardless of any "meetings" between Hephaestion and Mazaaeus, the latter will not have decided to abandon his king until the decisive engagement had been lost - utterly.

Darius will have hoped for a delaying action by Mazaeus and thus will have appointed him satrap of Babylonia after the defeat at Guagamela (Bupares commanded the Babylonian levies at Guagamela and is not heard of after). He will have expected the same from Abulites (in Susa). Mazaeus' sons were - seemingly - of Babylonian heritage (their names are Babylonian) and thus Mazaeus will have been well connected within both the city and satrapy. For this reason and to remove the threat of delay by siege, Alexander will have been in contact with both Abulites and Mazaeus after Gaugamela. Abilutes is attested, Mazaeus only by the references in a Babylonian tablet that Alexander was in contact with Babylon or its people.

I think one can reasonably suppose that Alexander put much work into Mazaeus after the battle. The defection of such a "Friend and Kinsman" of the king and the surrender of such important satrapies signalled the end for Darius. Others, with the Great King attempting to muster and army at their back , would continue to resist (the Persian Gates) but the body blow had been delivered.

[Fiona]

Mazaeus was close to the Great King - a kinsman. As commander of the right there is little chance that he will have sabotaged the battle there. Until Gaugamela Darius was still Great King and firmly in control. The orders follwed by Mazaeus to bring Alexander to battle north of Arbela do not speak of a bloke about to "turn it up".

Regardless of any "meetings" between Hephaestion and Mazaaeus, the latter will not have decided to abandon his king until the decisive engagement had been lost - utterly.

Darius will have hoped for a delaying action by Mazaeus and thus will have appointed him satrap of Babylonia after the defeat at Guagamela (Bupares commanded the Babylonian levies at Guagamela and is not heard of after). He will have expected the same from Abulites (in Susa). Mazaeus' sons were - seemingly - of Babylonian heritage (their names are Babylonian) and thus Mazaeus will have been well connected within both the city and satrapy. For this reason and to remove the threat of delay by siege, Alexander will have been in contact with both Abulites and Mazaeus after Gaugamela. Abilutes is attested, Mazaeus only by the references in a Babylonian tablet that Alexander was in contact with Babylon or its people.

I think one can reasonably suppose that Alexander put much work into Mazaeus after the battle. The defection of such a "Friend and Kinsman" of the king and the surrender of such important satrapies signalled the end for Darius. Others, with the Great King attempting to muster and army at their back , would continue to resist (the Persian Gates) but the body blow had been delivered.

That all sounds convincing. I wouldn't argue with it. But if Mazaeus is a kinsman to Darius, but his sons have Babylonian names (didn't know that, very interesting, thanks) then that might possibly argue in favour of divided loyalties, or at least a great concern for the people of Babylon, greater than his concern for the fate of Darius.
Maybe it was the news that Darius had fled the field that tipped the balance. Maybe he fought whole-heartedly up till that point, but then, his other concerns made him seek an accommodation with the victor earlier than Darius might have hoped.

Fiona