keroro wrote:With a small shield they should have been vulnerable, but I don't believe that any of the sources mention excessive Macedonian casualties from missile fire. Considering that the persians were so fond of carrying bows this seems a bit strange.
Hi Keroro.
I believe they were more vulnerable to missile fire than, in fact, the sources state. Generally, in ancient engagements, the archers let fly when the enemy formations were within effective killing range of the bows used. This was not – as is often portrayed in films – thousands of yards distant. It was more likely some 120 yards, though some have argued 200. Either way, with a closing phalanx (and cavalry), they will have needed to loose those arrows, make way for the slingers to volley and then both retire well out of the way of the fast approaching horizontal hell of the hedgehog. In this, I think Stone’s rendering of the missile fire is close. As well, I don’t think I’d like to rely for arrow protection on the phalangites behind waving their vertical sarissas as Hammond has suggested.
The amount of casualties may reflect the amount of ordinance able to be let fly in the time in range.
keroro wrote:A general observation from all of this - the Macedonians under Alexander were very, very flexible, and able to adapt to just about any situation. The common modern picture of the Phalanx is that it was rigid and inflexible, but this seems to be very far from the truth, at least in Alexander's reign.
The picture to which you refer might be that of the post Alexander phalanx. By the time of his death Alexander was well under way with plans to not only replace his superannuated Macedonians with Asian units, he was also inserting Asians into his phalanx battalions. Given that Antipater did not ever arrive with the expected Macedonians, the effectiveness of the mixed phalanx was far reduced. Indeed the Diadochoi took to separating the Asians from the Macedonians who were, by now, in both short supply and serious demand.
The phalangites of both Alexander, and his father, were well trained. They were the professional army of the Balkans when Alexander inherited them. They did not learn the moves displayed at Pellium (in 335) in the short time Alexander commanded them.
The effectiveness and skill of the experienced Macedonian phalanx is amply demonstrated by the Argyraspids (Alexander’s Hypaspists and not a few Philip’s as well) at both Paraetecene and, more so, at Gabiene. Against those “trained and armed in the Macedonian fashion” at Paraetecene, the Argyraspids charged the Antigonid line and pushing back and disjointing the opposing phalanx were, in large part, responsible for the deaths of 3,700 and 4,000 casualties.
At Gabiene, Diodorus describes them as causing disarray amongst the Antigonid line with repeated charges that drove their opponents back, taking the rest of the phalanx with them, and greatly helping to occasion some 5,000 deaths. At this time, Eumenes’ left had been put to flight and with Eumenes himself under severe duress from one wing of Antigonus’ cavalry, the other Antigonid cavalry got in behind the Argyraspids who, in quick fashion, formed up in a square and battled their way back off he field by dusk. Just in time for dinner followed by recriminations and to hand Eumenes over to Antigonus for desert - which happened to be their wives and belongings.
Such a level of skill was to much harder to find in the Diadoch period and that of their inheritors. The Macedonian phalanx suffered something of a severe de-skilling. It resembleled the inverse square law: as the pike grew the skill flew.
The Battle of Magnesia (189) stands in stark contrast. There Antiochus’ phalanx – 16,000 strong and in brigades 32 deep – were left stranded after Antiochus’ headlong charge through the Roman lines. Thus denuded of cavalry at the flanks they stood their ground. As Appian describes it:
The Macedonian phalanx, which had been stationed between the two bodies of horse in a narrow space in the form of a square, when denuded of cavalry on either side, had opened to receive the light-armed troops, who had been skirmishing in front, and closed again. Thus crowded together, Domitius easily enclosed them with his numerous light cavalry. Having no opportunity to charge or even to deploy their dense mass, they began to suffer severely; and they were indignant that military experience availed them nothing, exposed as they were on all sides to the weapons of the enemy. Nevertheless, they presented their thick-set pikes on all four sides.
They challenged the Romans to close combat and preserved at all times the appearance of being about to charge. Yet they did not advance, because they were foot-soldiers and heavily armed, and saw that the enemy were mounted. Most of all they feared to relax their close formation lest they might not readily bring it together again.
The Romans did not come to close quarters nor approach them because they feared the discipline, the solidity, and the desperation of this veteran corps; but circled around them and assailed them with javelins and arrows, none of which missed their mark in the dense mass, who could neither turn the missiles aside nor dodge them.
After suffering severely in this way they yielded to necessity and fell back step by step, but with a bold front, in perfect order and still formidable to the Romans. The latter kept their distance and continued to circle around and wound them, until the elephants inside the Macedonian phalanx became excited and unmanageable. Then the phalanx broke into disorderly flight.
One really must ask the question why elephants were within the phalanx? Interesting also that, in a last ditch defence of the Seleucid Empire – larger at this stage than that which was left to Darius in 331 at Gaugamela – Antiochus “The Great” could amass a paltry 70,000.