KALLISTHENES AND POLYBIOS

[agesilaos]

Polybios XII 17-22 gives a critique, as he sees it, of KallisthenesGÇÖ account of the battle of Issos. We should be grateful that Polybios sought to justify his disparagement as he preserves one of the few interesting pieces of KallisthenesGÇÖ work, albeit more by way of testimonium than fragment.
Before discussing the critique let us first assess the similarities between Kallisthenes and Arrian (II 6ff) and note that this is really a case of similarities between Kallisthenes and Ptolemy, since Arrian does not appear to have used the former.
Polybios starts by giving a description of the relative positions and the routes taken by the two armies; Alexander has passed the Cilician Gates, Darius has entered Cilicia by the Gates of Amanus. This is what we find in Arrian 6 I (Alexander, though the Gates are not named but are by implication the Assyrian) and 7 I (Darius as Kallisthenes).
Arrian omits the description of the ground. Kallisthenes goes on to describe the Persian deployment. According to him the whole force deployed first in front of the camp then the cavalry(30,000) were told of to the right and the seashore while the mercenaries(30,000) occupied the centre and the GÇÿpeltastsGÇÖ the left. Then, on the approach of the enemy he called the mercenaries from the wing to come to him Lastly the right wing cavalry charged and became embroiled in a stubborn contest. Somewhere he must have mentioned that Darius wished to oppose himself to Alexander and then thought better of it.
Polybios treats AlexanderGÇÖs deployment more cursorily noting that he started off in a column, infantry in the van, next the cavalry and the baggage bringing up the rear. As they reached more open ground the phalanx formed thirty-two deep and then sixteen and finally eight as the plain broadened once again Alexander sought to put himself opposite Darius.
Remembering that Polybios is paraphrasing and suppressing much that is not pertinent to his demonstration of Kallisthenes incompetence, we can compare this with Arrian.
Arrian is somewhat fuller, II 8 details the Persian line of battle; 30,000 cavalry are initially sent across the Pinarus to cover the deployment, along with 20,000 light troops (psiloi) the mercenaries, also 30,000, are opposed to the Macedonian Phalanx and are flanked by two detachments of Kardakes, whom he describes as GÇÿhoplitesGÇÖ, 20,000 are off in the foothills and the great mass are to the rear of the mercenaries GÇÿin a phalanx formationGÇÖ.
The cavalry is recal

[agesilaos]

The cavalry is recalled and posted on the right, a move to which Alexander replies by transferring the Thessalians to his left. Battle is joined initially by right wing, which is successful, and the left of the phalanx whilst the centre is sluggardly, causing a gap to appear into which the Greek mercenaries charge only to be outflanked by the victorious Macedonian right. The Persian cavalry charge and a stubborn battle ensues. In their flight the Persian dead choke the rifts that cross the plain.
It would seem that Polybios, overcome with the preposterous notion that the Persian army could fit into the space allocated it has opted for outrage rather than the obvious answer that the numbers have been hopelessly inflated. The course of the battle and the dispositions are compatible, and indeed complimentary.
It seems to me that the Persians initial set up was as Kallisthenes has it, cavalry, mercenaries, Kardakes (his GÇÿpeltophoroiGÇÖ), but that as Alexander switched his Thessalians to the left the phalanx inclined right taking its centre to the junction between the Mercenaries and the Kardakes, where Darius was stationed. He summons the Greeks to him and we arrive at ArrianGÇÖs arrangement, viz. the Greeks flanked by the Kardakes. Darius was more anxious that the Greeks oppose the phalanx than that he oppose Alexander, but personal combat with the enemy leader seems to have been a recurrent theme in AlexanderGÇÖs spin machine.
Kallisthenes differs from Arrian in that he has the Greeks, rather than the Persians, bear the initial Macedonian attack, although this may owe as much to ArrianGÇÖs Alexander centric view than the actual chronology of the action.
The cavalry battle is described in the same terms and both Kallisthenes and Ptolemy (Arrian 11 viii) mention the Persian fugitives perishing in fissures.
Given the differing editorial criteria these seem pretty syncretic account to me.Now what of PolybiosGÇÖ actual criticisms? Well the arguments over the length of the Persian line are fine since it is obvious that DariusGÇÖ numbers were hopelessly exaggerated, as was the difficulty of the ground. Arrian I 14 iv answers his quibble about the commanders knowing each otherGÇÖs respective whereabouts.
Which leaves the excursus on the length of the Macedonian line. Polybios here displays a crassness that would whet the appetite of anyone involved in the nip and tuck of Hellenistic History these days for not only has he erred the holes are large enough to drive a scy

[agesilaos]

Which leaves the excursus on the length of the Macedonian line. Polybios here displays a crassness that would whet the appetite of anyone involved in the nip and tuck of Hellenistic History these days for not only has he erred the holes are large enough to drive a scythed chariot through and he stands accuser to himself!
PolybiosGÇÖ calculations are seriously flawed; first he assumes that all of the Macedonian foot comprise the battle line when it is quite clear that only the phalanx and the hypaspists do nor can I believe this was unclear in KallisthenesGÇÖ original, but Polybios is an expert and he has arrived at a strength of 42,000 foot and so it must stand; despite the fact that reality demands only 12,000 (three chiliarchies of 1,000 and six phalanges of 1,500) the other foot was deployed in the hills or in advance of the main line or even, in the case of the league troops in the rear. But this is not the end of his folly.
He insists that each man has six feet frontage and proceeds to demonstrate that the 14 stadia of the plain (8498 ft or 2832 2/3 yds) will not accommodate 42,000 men on this frontage eight deep, indeed on this frontage and depth our true 12,000 will over fill the plain (12,000 x 6ft =72,000ft /8 = 9000ft). However, Asclepiodotos, in his GÇÿTaktikeGÇÖ 4 I-iii, describes three intervals; the normal, which is six feet or four cubits; the compact (pyknosis) of three feet or two cubits; and the locked shields (synapsismos) of eighteen inches or one cubit. Further he states that the phalanx advances in pyknosis but receives a charge in synapsismos. Fi! But the word of an academician who had never seen a sarissa levelled in anger Polybios was the general of the Achaean League at a time when they fought in the Macedonian manner he surely knows best; indeed he does, at XVIII 29 I he states GÇÿ When the phalanx is closed up for action, each man with his arms occupies a space of three feet.GÇÖ! Alexander deploys his men GÇÿclosed up for actionGÇÖ since the enemy is close and his cavalry are across the river, to deploy in a loose marching order would be folly indeed. But a phalanx cannot advance in any order across the broken ground Kallisthenes describes avers Polybios, hence the frequent halts attested by Arrian, to redress the line II 10 I GÇÿGǪAlexander led them on for some time with halts, so that their advance seemed quite a leisurely affair.GÇÖ
Taking 12,000 men and a three-foot frontage we find an eight deep phalanx occupies 1490 ft roughly half the avai

[agesilaos]

Taking 12,000 men and a three-foot frontage we find an eight deep phalanx occupies 1490 ft roughly half the available ground. And Arrian supports the notion that only 12,000 men formed the main battle line as the Hypaspists and the phalanges of Koinos and Perdikkas stretch to its centre, II 8 iii; and they comprise 6,000 men.
So, is there room for the cavalry, assuming the Companions form eight deep wedges arranged as a wedge themselves then there are thirty men on a two yard frontage plus fifteen yards manoeuvre room for each of seven eiles which is 305 yards, plus the basilike eile say 100yds to accommodate its larger strength and there remain 900yds for the Thessalians, allied and mercenary cavalry and any gaps.
Throughout this section Arrian refers to the Macedonian heavy infantry as GÇÿhoplitesGÇÖ to me this signals PtolemyGÇÖs copying Kallisthenes so Polybios has no excuse since the accounts must be broadly similar if not identical, (my preferred theory) they are complimentary and consistent with one another. Polybios has been carried away with self-righteous anger and failed to read carefully, or has merely leapt on the fallacies which prove his so-called point. Of course the Persian army is too big to fit the ground the numbers given are propaganda even the Greek mercenaries may only have numbered 10,000 or so, which has major implications for the numbers at the Granikos; and the Macedonians will not fit either unless one looks at the units in the front line rather than the paper strength of the armyGÇÖs foot.
His last point brings to mind the famous quote of HitlerGÇÖs to Dr Heinkel, to paraphrase; Polybios: GÇÿThe phalanx cannot have crossed such a river.GÇÖ Posterity: GÇÿAnd yet I observe that it did.GÇÖ

[amyntoros]

Karl, this is absolutely fabulous! Thank you so much for taking the time to do this - my limited understanding of strategy and tactics would never have allowed me to properly approach this topic, although I must admit that even I had thought that six feet of space per man seemed rather excessive frontage for a battle line. :-)So. . . if Ptolemy's account is very similar or even identical to that of Callisthenes it must mean that Callisthenes was *told* what to write, surely? An historian and philosopher would not have had sufficient military knowledge to compile a description of the events by simply interviewing those involved. Or am I mistaken here?Best regards,Amyntoros

[agesilaos]

To a certain extent I doubt that anyone could write an accurate description of an ancient battle without being told how it was meant to go, too much dust and confusion. I think Ptolemy just copied Kallisthenes verbatim, but this is not a popular view and, indeed two writers describing the same events from the same perspective ought to produce similar versions. I really need to have another look at Curtius' version as this more than likely stems from Kleitarchos although he did use Ptolemy and put a good amount of his own colour to his sources. However, I do think Alexander told Kallisthenes what to write he was not an advocate of a free press Kallisthenes was not so much an embedded journalist as the briefing officer. IMHO

[beausefaless]

Deleted

[marcus]

I tend more to the idea that Alexander didn't need to tell Callisthenes what to write, because Callisthenes knew what was required. I assume, however, that Alexander had to sign it all off, so there might have been some redrafting at times ...All the bestMarcus

[agesilaos]

OK the dust may not have been a problem but the confusion and the limited viewpoint off one observer, since they lacked optical aids like telescopes, I regret I have not visited Turkey so cannot comment authoritively. Certainly any participant would be unlikely to have any clear chronology outside their own limited personal experience, and psychological factors would blur even that; modern battle is stressful ancient battle must have been even more traumatic.It is possible that it was only edited after Kallisthenes death but I think that a rolling revision would be more likely with the almost Stalinist writing down or even out of political enemies.