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Hello all,
In thinking about Alexander's tactics one had to wonder how he was able to lengthen his line in the center. At some point he had to open it up after his lightening dash to the right, but in the meantime, he stretched the line a long way. Either, additional phalanxes were brought up from the rear and drifted to the left(or advanced to the right) as the main line opened, or the main line phalanx at the front brought ranks up from their deep rear to lengthen as needed to prevent gaps from forming between the soldiers. Either way, it required deep formations to deplete into thinned out wide front formations. If this was not done, then the shoulder to shoulder distance of each individual soldier would inevitably open gaps...suicide to a phalanx. The maneuverability of Alexander's phalangytes was first rate, and I'm sure he would have utilized it to the fullest advantage in this battle. The question is how was it done...would it be more advantageous to bring up a set of complete, cohesive, rear phalanxes into gaps between the main line and maintain unit phalanx tightness (even if temporary gaps were opened between individual phalanx battalions), or better to maintain the front integrity completely by rolling up individual men from ranks into the front line as length was needed(thus giving up unit cohesion...dangerous). In the latter, the unit integrity would be destabilized, but gaps would be filled immediately as space alloted. Also, these soldiers in the rear would have to be armed with a sarissa. This shouldn't have posed too much trouble for Alexander's phalangytes. Once they were sufficiently depleted of rear armed phalangytes it would signify the need to separate at the shoulders between the 6 units on the front. I just checked Hammond, and it looks like we were thinking along the same lines..."the commanders of the flank guards were to be prepared either to fall back and close the gap between the two infantry lines or to swing forward and so extend the length of the front line." cont'd

...cont'd,
If this can be taken as true, then it seems that ATG thought it better to maintain unit integrity at all cost than to fiddle with rolling up rear rows and side ranks. I can't find fault with this, particularly during a battle where things can and will go wrong in the mayhem. Besides, this gives compelling testimony as to the reason for the double phalanx. Not to be used as a ramming force from the rear (as Epaminondas did with his 120 men deep line, but as a mobile force used for flank protection, rear protection, and front line lengthening...nice!
Just babbling...Yours Nicator

Well Nick, I suppose that it could work either way. Either to thin the front phalanx line and extend it or bring the second line to the frond to cover the gaps.
The reserves were mainly Greek hoplites bearing the standard hoplite gear so the armament of the first line would differ, from sarissas to spears at some point. I don't think that would have made any difference thought. The main mission of the foot soldiers was defensive and I guess they would be able to hold back the Persians just as well (if they avoided gaps in the line).
One thought that comes now to mind is the armament of the back lines of the phalangites. They were supposed not to be armed with the same quality of equipment as the frond line ones so if they were to be used to cover gaps in the line they wouldn't be adequately equipped to perform their role. So the scenario that the reserve troops were used sounds more plausible to my ears.Regards,
Yiannis

As I recall the batlle line was formed as a sort of box which proceeded to march to its right and threatened to leave the area of levelled ground thus forcing Darius to attack. It did not as at Issos extend its frontage. The second phalanx was to deal with breakthroughs and more particularly to secure the rear of the Macedonian phalanx in the event of a sucessful Persian turning movement; which Alexander feared most.This manouevre also had the benefit of leaving half the enemy with too far to advance to become involved in the battle which Alexander wins by threatening to turn a flank drawing troops from Darius' centre which, depleted is then smashed.

In brief: (I've a bad habit of overrunning on things like this)
The idea wasn't to elastically stretch the line so much as it was to move en-bloc across the field. To that end, phalanx units were not being asked to spread, but to keep pace with the Right as it moved further flankward. Evidence of this is to be found in the reported split in the battle line after the battle proper commences - it's not that A's Phalanxes aren't thinning and fanning efficiently; they just haven't kept pace with their horse.The exact purpose of the second line has exercised the faculties of quite a few of the pundits. Whatever about the particulars, I think we can be safe in assuming they were reserved as a multi-contingency utility unit.Yiannis is correct in pointing out they would have been armed differently from the preferred front line troopers. If, however, they were intended as a reserve to shore up possible front line gaps, their lighter hoplite weaponry would have been very suitable. Why? One could reasonably expect Persians to penetrate the gaps, and in the resultant milling fray the sarissa would have been useless - with a long spear the intention was to hold the opposition at bay and push them backwards, rather than to bodily fight them.No, no. Definitely not the thing for the close up stuff when the line is breached; much better, at that stage, to shunt and shove with short weapons and broader shields. It's worth remembering that this was the equipment of the Hypaspyst, himself an integral front line link between offensive horse and backbone phalanx.Could warble on at length. Life's to short, though, isn't it? Everyone elses' that is, whatever about how I waste mine.Tirra lirra. A.

...Ahhh! That is a very good point. Obviously, the phalanx could not move as fast as the cavalry. Yiannis is also right, in pointing out that they would be armed differently. Since they were, according to Hammond, probably Illeryians, Greek mercenaries, and Thracians. All this I knew, but the critical point that you bring up is how well suited they were for close quarter fighting. A true complimentary arrangement if ever there was one. Again, very elegant. What genius this guy was! I actually took the time to write out the dispositions of the phalanx to try to figure out how he prevented the gaps while the line lengthened, and came to the conclusion that Hammond is right in his interpretation. As a side note, Hammond is surprisingly good with the military analysis of Alexander. The more I read his book, the more respect I have for him and his insight. later Nicator

The King, with his usual brilliance in battle, was well aware Darius was going to try and surround him which was the great danger of the long Persian line, so what he did was curve his front line, making a partial side barrier (as a rule Alexander kept his most mobile and lightly armed troops to the outside where they could move up and down the ranks, throwing stones, shooting arrows and whatever to make coming around the outside a most unsavory prospect - too bad Philip V forgot about this several hundred years later and Macedon fell to the Romans, even then barely) and he moved right and forward, with staggered lines of cavalry behind him, not leaving any decent opening on his right and at the same time not allowing the confused Persians to properly circle behind as those to the rear of the first line could have swung around to engage the Persians head on if they managed to circle around the ever lengthening right side and come from behind. Think of it as an accordion ready to snap shut if someone tried to come between Or a Slinky allowed to snap shut. The left and center would have remained solid as it was the right side, the King's side that was to engage the enemy first. It was imperative that Paremenion hold the left solid to prevent an attack on the camp, which was goal #2 of Darius (hence, for all of you who wonder why Hephaistion was allowed to battle in this particular engagement-it was too dangerous to leave him in charge of the camp) but the line broke up eventually under pressure, but Alexander would have anticipated that and come around to help Parmenion after routing Darius. What he didn't anticipate, was that Darius would flee the battle a second time, as that would have been something even Alexander would not have expected a King to do - not just once, but twice would be unheard of. Buf of course, like Hannibal, Darius knew that he who lives and runs away, lives to fight another day. He didn't anticipate Bessus however, alas. The best laid plans of mice and men...Regards,Tre