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Kathleen Toohey has published a postscript to her thesis on the Battle Tactics of Alexander the Great available here https://www.academia.edu/s/e921cc02ca?source=ai_email. In it she summarises the percentage of professional soldiers in Alexander's army on entering Asia (cavalry 75%, infantry 30%), gives an overview of the makeup of the Persian armies, and assesses the changes Alexander, based on Philip's changes, made to the Macedonian army.

Kathy has been at it now for a bit. That just about rounds it out. Downloaded to it to read but have been as sick as the proverbial dog since I did so (why are dogs sick?). She has quite some insights and is very well worth the read.

Hi, Paralus, hope you soon feel better.

There was an interesting digression in the comments about cavalry charging infantry. Kathleen did mention that one of the reasons that Alexander succeeded was the superiority of the Companion Cavalry, almost entirely professional. The comments were entirely off-topic, but it is a question I've felt confused on for a while. If cavalry and infantry never interacted, why have both? Why not just a cavalry or infantry battle? I can imagine that cavalry would never charge the sarissa phalanx head on, but would the cavalry wedge formation break through hoplite, spear-wielding infantry? They would from the side or the rear, so was the role of the cavalry to stop the opposing cavalry getting at the unprotected sides of the infantry, and open up the way for their own infantry?

I may have answered my own question here, or I'm being dumb and missing the obvious, and doubtless there were many different permutations such as lighter armed infantry running between the cavalry, but does anyone have any thoughts?

There were interesting digressions in the comments on most sections as I recall! I may or may not have been a part of those on the cavalry - I think not.

Cavalry and infantry did indeed interact. Just exactly how that happened is still debated. Carolyn Wilkes, with whom I'd not argue when it comes to horses and riding same, argues that Alexander attacked the Thebans at Chaironeia on horseback. She argues a well trained war horse would indeed attack a hoplite phalanx. While I'm not any sort of equine expert (aside from those taking my money at Royal Randwick), I believe this comes down to the discipline of the infantry being attacked. One has to imagine a hoplite phalanx standing firm and unbroken in the face of a cavalry charge. Any tresantes - shakers as the Spartans called them - would lead to a local collapse in that discipline readily exploited by a professional cavalry. The sources give no indication of that at Chaironeia.Still, the idea is the same: a resolute wall of spears (or fighting squares at Waterloo) is not something any horse is willingly going to charge. Even more so a sarissa phalanx with a hedge of spears.

On the other side, these riders are not medieval knights firmly anchored to their saddles and stirrups. These are bare back riders whose only secure connection to their mounts are their thighs and reigns. Such a rider is not to be imagined charging full pelt into infantry with his spear leading the way like some medieval jouster. The weapons of the Companion cavalry were the xyston and the kopis. Both do specific jobs: the xyston is a thrusting weapon; the kopis a murderous "weight forward" hacking blade. The former is readily described by Arrian both at Granikos and, again, at Gaugamela. A reading of "Chaironeia 338: Topographies of Commemoration" by John Ma will bluntly illustrate the effects of the kopis. So the members of the Companion cavalry fought hand to hand as did their constant companions in pitched battle, the agema of the hypaspists who acted, essentially, as their hammipoi.

What we do see in the Alexander sources is Alexander doing one of two things in pitched battle: attacking the enemy's flank, generally his flank cavalry; probing for or creating a gap in the enemy formation to attack. Hydaspes illustrates the former and the classic illustration of the latter is Guagamela.Attacking the enemy flank via his cavalry sees horseman on horseman in close quarters conflict, a description Diodorus 19.83.3-5 provides for us (Gaza). Alexander "charging" the gap as at Guagamela facilitates getting his cavalry into the line so as to drive their xysta into the faces and other exposed areas of the enemy - cavalry or otherwise. Once their xysta were no longer useful, the cavalry resorted to the kopis. Again, all close quarter fighting.

All while the phalanx turned their opposition into pin cushions.

Thanks for this, Paralus.