I do indeed remember - Alzheimer's has as yet not found me.
Well now, there are two questions which might occasion rivers of ink. Second first. Hannibal is not attested at the battle and there is scant reference to him before it. He is last heard of having been defeated by the Rhodians and Romans at sea and is bottled up in Lycia / Pamphylia (Liv 37.22.2-24.13; App.
Syrr. 22). Hannibal's constant advice to Anticohos was that, should he be bent on taking on Rome, to do so in Italy (how unsurprising App.
Syrr. 7-8). This comes twice: before the invasion of Greece and during it. One suspects that will have been as successful as Hannibal's original invasion. Antiochos was no dill. Were Hannibal available to him, any advice on the Roman army and tactics will have been valuable - particularly Africanus. Both Livy and Appian preserve the story that Scipio was a member of a delegation sent to Antiochos to assess his intentions and strength. This story tells of Scipio and the Romans drviving a wedge between Antiochos and Hannibal (Liv 35.14.1-4; App.
Syrr. 9-10). The common source of this is near certainly Polybius who presents a summary out of context (3.11).
To the first question, given the accounts of the battle it is difficult to say. There is a strong Polybian tone of condemnation in Appian and Livy regarding Antiochos' use of scythe bearing chariots and his deployment of his phalanx. Overlaying this is - to me - a strong Attalid influence in the source tradition relied upon by the common source, Polybius. Reading both Appian and Livy one gets the strong impression that were it not for the perspicacious actions of Eumenes, the day will have been lost to Rome. It is Eumenes that destroys Antiochos' left wing and takes out his "sham" chariots. It is also Attalos, Eumenes' brother stationed with him, who brilliantly surmises the severe trouble (rout) the Roman left is in and rallies to its rescue. Michael Taylor is surely on the money with his paper (Anatolian Studies 66 (2016): 81–90) on the Pergamon Plaque commemorating this. This was Pergamon's "Marathon".
I cannot see the benefit in the deployment of two (or 22) elephants between the ten units of the phalanx deployed 32 deep and 50 wide. This only invites disaster and was surely Polybius' criticism leading to the echoes of such in Livy (37.42.3-5) and, especially, Appian (
Syrr.35). Polybius was also dismissive of Antiochos' use of chariots and other "sham" troops on the left given the flavour of Livy and Appian. Still, the main criticism is in the use of his phalanx.
All that said, Antiochos executed the perfect charge on the Roman left. It is often said that he repeated his failure at Raphia but the two have much in common. The Lagid camp was close in the Lagid left rear at Raphia preventing a roll up. So too here: the Roman camp is in close proximity to its battle line. Livy's language is clear that Antiochos was not engaged in some endless direct pursuit straight ahead. Livy describes Antiochos' charge as:
"nec a fronte tantum instabat, sed circumito a flumine cornu iam ab latere urgebat" / "nor did he charge from the front alone, but encircling them from the river was already pressing on from the flank". Antiochos was rolling up the Roman left, a process of driving forward and from the flank. A great discussion can be found in Galili's Raphia, 217 BCE, Revisited in
Scripta Classica Israelica. Vol 3, 1977.