POLYBIOS, KALLISTHENES AND MILITARY INCAPACITY
?By Karl Soundy?
Polybios XII 17-22 gives a critique, as he sees it, of Kallisthenes' account of the battle of Issos. We should be grateful that Polybios sought to justify his disparagement as he preserves one of the few interesting pieces of Kallisthenes' work, albeit more by way of testimonium than fragment.
Before discussing the critique let us first assess the similarities between Kallisthenes and Arrian (II 6ff) and note that this is really a case of similarities between Kallisthenes and Ptolemy, since Arrian does not appear to have used the former.
Polybios starts by giving a description of the relative positions and the routes taken by the two armies; Alexander has passed the Cilician Gates, Darius has entered Cilicia by the Gates of Amanus. This is what we find in Arrian 6 I (Alexander, though the Gates are not named but are by implication the Assyrian) and 7 I (Darius as Kallisthenes).
Arrian omits the description of the ground. Kallisthenes goes on to describe the Persian deployment. According to him the whole force deployed first in front of the camp then the cavalry(30,000) were told of to the right and the seashore while the mercenaries(30,000) occupied the centre and the 'peltasts' the left. Then, on the approach of the enemy he called the mercenaries from the wing to come to him Lastly the right wing cavalry charged and became embroiled in a stubborn contest. Somewhere he must have mentioned that Darius wished to oppose himself to Alexander and then thought better of it.
Polybios treats Alexander's deployment more cursorily noting that he started off in a column, infantry in the van, next the cavalry and the baggage bringing up the rear. As they reached more open ground the phalanx formed thirty-two deep and then sixteen and finally eight as the plain broadened once again Alexander sought to put himself opposite Darius.
Remembering that Polybios is paraphrasing and suppressing much that is not pertinent to his demonstration of Kallisthenes incompetence, we can compare this with Arrian.
Arrian is somewhat fuller, II 8 details the Persian line of battle; 30,000 cavalry are initially sent across the Pinarus to cover the deployment, along with 20,000 light troops (psiloi) the mercenaries, also 30,000, are opposed to the Macedonian Phalanx and are flanked by two detachments of Kardakes, whom he describes as 'hoplites', 20,000 are off in the foothills and the great mass are to the rear of the mercenaries 'in a phalanx formation'.
The cavalry is recalled and posted on the right, a move to which Alexander replies by transferring the Thessalians to his left. Battle is joined initially by right wing, which is successful, and the left of the phalanx whilst the centre is sluggardly, causing a gap to appear into which the Greek mercenaries charge only to be outflanked by the victorious Macedonian right. The Persian cavalry charge and a stubborn battle ensues. In their flight the Persian dead choke the rifts that cross the plain.
It would seem that Polybios, overcome with the preposterous notion that the Persian army could fit into the space allocated it has opted for outrage rather than the obvious answer that the numbers have been hopelessly inflated. The course of the battle and the dispositions are compatible, and indeed complimentary.
It seems to me that the Persians initial set up was as Kallisthenes has it, cavalry, mercenaries, Kardakes (his 'peltophoroi'), but that as Alexander switched his Thessalians to the left the phalanx inclined right taking its centre to the junction between the Mercenaries and the Kardakes, where Darius was stationed. He summons the Greeks to him and we arrive at Arrian's arrangement, viz. the Greeks flanked by the Kardakes. Darius was more anxious that the Greeks oppose the phalanx than that he oppose Alexander, but personal combat with the enemy leader seems to have been a recurrent theme in Alexander's spin machine.
Kallisthenes differs from Arrian in that he has the Greeks, rather than the Persians, bear the initial Macedonian attack, although this may owe as much to Arrian's Alexander centric view than the actual chronology of the action.
The cavalry battle is described in the same terms and both Kallisthenes and Ptolemy (Arrian 11 viii) mention the Persian fugitives perishing in fissures.
Given the differing editorial criteria these seem pretty syncretic account to me.
Now what of Polybios' actual criticisms? Well the arguments over the length of the Persian line are fine since it is obvious that Darius' numbers were hopelessly exaggerated, as was the difficulty of the ground. Arrian I 14 iv answers his quibble about the commanders knowing each other's respective whereabouts.
Which leaves the excursus on the length of the Macedonian line. Polybios here displays a crassness that would whet the appetite of anyone involved in the nip and tuck of Hellenistic History these days for not only has he erred the holes are large enough to drive a scythed chariot through and he stands accuser to himself!
Polybios' calculations are seriously flawed; first he assumes that all of the Macedonian foot comprise the battle line when it is quite clear that only the phalanx and the hypaspists do nor can I believe this was unclear in Kallisthenes' original, but Polybios is an expert and he has arrived at a strength of 42,000 foot and so it must stand; despite the fact that reality demands only 12,000 (three chiliarchies of 1,000 and six phalanges of 1,500) the other foot was deployed in the hills or in advance of the main line or even, in the case of the league troops in the rear. But this is not the end of his folly.
He insists that each man has six feet frontage and proceeds to demonstrate that the 14 stadia of the plain (8498 ft or 2832 2/3 yds) will not accommodate 42,000 men on this frontage eight deep, indeed on this frontage and depth our true 12,000 will over fill the plain (12,000 x 6ft =72,000ft /8 = 9000ft). However, Asclepiodotos, in his 'Taktike' 4 I-iii, describes three intervals; the normal, which is six feet or four cubits; the compact (pyknosis) of three feet or two cubits; and the locked shields (synapsismos) of eighteen inches or one cubit. Further he states that the phalanx advances in pyknosis but receives a charge in synapsismos. Fi! But the word of an academician who had never seen a sarissa levelled in anger Polybios was the general of the Achaean League at a time when they fought in the Macedonian manner he surely knows best; indeed he does, at XVIII 29 I he states ' When the phalanx is closed up for action, each man with his arms occupies a space of three feet.'! Alexander deploys his men 'closed up for action' since the enemy is close and his cavalry are across the river, to deploy in a loose marching order would be folly indeed. But a phalanx cannot advance in any order across the broken ground Kallisthenes describes avers Polybios, hence the frequent halts attested by Arrian, to redress the line II 10 I '…Alexander led them on for some time with halts, so that their advance seemed quite a leisurely affair.'
Taking 12,000 men and a three-foot frontage we find an eight deep phalanx occupies 1490 ft roughly half the available ground. And Arrian supports the notion that only 12,000 men formed the main battle line as the Hypaspists and the phalanges of Koinos and Perdikkas stretch to its centre, II 8 iii; and they comprise 6,000 men.
So, is there room for the cavalry, assuming the Companions form eight deep wedges arranged as a wedge themselves then there are thirty men on a two yard frontage plus fifteen yards manoeuvre room for each of seven eiles which is 305 yards, plus the basilike eile say 100yds to accommodate its larger strength and there remain 900yds for the Thessalians, allied and mercenary cavalry and any gaps.
Throughout this section Arrian refers to the Macedonian heavy infantry as 'hoplites' to me this signals Ptolemy's copying Kallisthenes so Polybios has no excuse since the accounts must be broadly similar if not identical, (my preferred theory) they are complimentary and consistent with one another. Polybios has been carried away with self-righteous anger and failed to read carefully, or has merely leapt on the fallacies which prove his so-called point. Of course the Persian army is too big to fit the ground the numbers given are propaganda even the Greek mercenaries may only have numbered 10,000 or so, which has major implications for the numbers at the Granikos; and the Macedonians will not fit either unless one looks at the units in the front line rather than the paper strength of the army's foot.
His last point brings to mind the famous quote of Hitler's to Dr Heinkel, to paraphrase; Polybios: 'The phalanx cannot have crossed such a river.' Posterity: 'And yet I observe that it did.'