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Arrian (Anabasis) briefly writes about a change Alexander makes to the phalanx at 7.23 but does not say anything more about it (and most obviously because Alexander dies shortly after without being able to implement this new formation in battle).

Arrian writes:

The Persians then were enrolled in the various Macedonian units, so that the 'decad' -- or section -- now consisted of a Macedonian leader, two of his compatriots, one of them a 'double-pay' man, the other a 'ten-stater' man (so called from the pay he received, which was less than that of the 'double-pay' soldiers but more than that of the ordinary rank and file), twelve Persians, and last another Macedonian 'ten-stater'. Four Macedonians, that is -- the section-leader and three others on extra pay -- and twelve Persians. The Macedonians wore native equipment; the Persians were armed either with bows or light javelins.

From what I've read, little is made of this change by modern authors. It might be mentioned in a passing statement, but is quickly forgotten. This type of change would have been huge to how we think of the Macedonian phalanx and its role in battle. If Alexander only thought it was necessary to have three Macedonians in the front of the phalanx equipped with "native" gear (i.e. the sarissa, etc.) to attack/drive back to enemy, then shouldn't our perception of the Macedonian phalanx gaining its strength by its depth (and by sheer numbers) have to be rethought?

To me, this new formation seems like it's purpose was for a lightning quick and utterly debilitating attack: kill/wound as many as possible from a long-medium range with the missile troops while the entire formation marches quickly towards the enemy with sarissas extended to finish off/hold in place/drive back any that remain standing, and finally perhaps with the cavalry coming in to finish off the annihilation.

Thoughts?

This formation was intended only for use against the Arabians, whom it is supposed, were light troops both on foot and mounted, against such an enemy missiles become important, the sarrissophoroi are to function merely as defence against any cavalry attack, as in the early eighteenth century.

This was not intended to replace the old style of phalanx, which is why the successors never adopt it, it was a stop gap measure to make the best use of the few Macedonians at hand and utilise the native troops Peukestas had brought in a minor campaign before the arrival of substantial reinforcements and the real business of war. Though not mentioned, there was still the phalanx of the Epigonoi arranged in the traditional manner, presumably they were to be bloodied though the likely nature of the fighting would mean that this would take the form of 'ballet dancing' in the face of the enemy.

agesilaos wrote:This formation was intended only for use against the Arabians, whom it is supposed, were light troops both on foot and mounted, against such an enemy missiles become important, the sarrissophoroi are to function merely as defence against any cavalry attack, as in the early eighteenth century.

This was not intended to replace the old style of phalanx, which is why the successors never adopt it, it was a stop gap measure to make the best use of the few Macedonians at hand and utilise the native troops Peukestas had brought in a minor campaign before the arrival of substantial reinforcements and the real business of war. Though not mentioned, there was still the phalanx of the Epigonoi arranged in the traditional manner, presumably they were to be bloodied though the likely nature of the fighting would mean that this would take the form of 'ballet dancing' in the face of the enemy.

While it can be assumed Alexander devised this formation to be used at least in the next campaign, it is unclear whether this was only a temporary unit ("only for use against the Arabians") that would be disbanded after the Arabians were presumably conquered. Rightly so, the phalanx of the Epigonoi still exsisted, as did other sarissa-phalanx units made up of purely Macedonians. But I'm not sure this was meant to simply be a "stop gap measure to make the best use of the few Macedonians at hand and utilise the native troops" as you call it. The new formation wasn't created using the remaining scraps of the Macedonian soldiery, it consisted of a "Macedonian leader" (the file-leader, lochagos, called by Asclepiodotus (Tactics 2.2) to be the "best man") and next a 'double-pay' soldier and 'ten-stater' soldier, both receiving higher pay than the ordinary soldier; the file-closer is also a 'ten-stater' soldier. The men behind the front rank, it is advised, should be the "most intelligent" (Ascl. Tac. 3.5) and also "not much inferior to the first [rank]" (Ascl. Tac. 3.6). Likewise, the file-closer, in this case a 'ten-stater' soldier (who was on a higher pay scale than the ordinary soldier, as mentioned before), should be "men who surpass the rest in presence of mind" (ibid). So it seems this new formation wasn't simply created to utilize what remained or solely to involve the natives in a Macedonian formation. It was carefully and purposefully crafted, and was meant to be in specific situations in war. The Macedonians that were involved in this were highly skilled and experienced soldiers not to be wasted on a temporary formation created from some remaining bits and pieces of a previous army.

Since the men in the front three ranks were still equipped in Macedonian weapons (i.e. the sarissa), then was it possible that Alexander realized that a sarissa-phalanx of only three men deep was sufficient enough manpower to perform as well as a sarissa-phalanx of eight (or more) men deep? This is what is interesting to me. He kept to other phalanxes intact, but was this a experimental unit?

At the time Alexander had only 3,000 or so Macedonians, having released the 10,000 veterans under Krateros. Since some of these must have been hypaspists, they are attested in the final days, maybe there were a mere 2,000 for the phalanx or 500 files' worth (which compares to 750 for the former army) promoting the Macedonians would not just be financially feasible but probably a political necessity given the rank and file's resistance to integration.

Given the expected arrival of reinforcements from Europe I cannot but see this phalanx as a stop-gap. As to only having three sarissamen being equivalent to sixteen, we can only adduce from the persistence of deeper formations throughout thre Hellenistic era that this was not so else those manpower starved kingdoms must surely have employed the lesser depth. The function of the sarissophoroi here is to keep the enemy off the missile troops who provide the offensive power of the formation. The wisdom of such an arrangement can only be doubted.

I seriously doubt the efficacy of such an arrangement - especially against supposed mobile mounted troops such as archers and the like. To thoroughly confuse a timeline, had this formation confronted the Parthians - as did the eponymously named Crassus - they will, in my view, have performed far worse that the Roman Legions. Dense volleys of arrows will have decimated not only the Persians but also the Macedonians.

I can't help but agree that this was a stop-gap measure and that these, at a pinch, would become the beat police of empire whilst the Great sallied forth with what Macedonian units he could take and the Epigoni after those yet to acknowlege his right to rule if not god-head.

Paralus wrote:I seriously doubt the efficacy of such an arrangement - especially against supposed mobile mounted troops such as archers and the like. To thoroughly confuse a timeline, had this formation confronted the Parthians - as did the eponymously named Crassus - they will, in my view, have performed far worse that the Roman Legions. Dense volleys of arrows will have decimated not only the Persians but also the Macedonians.

I can't agree with this opinion of the formation's efficacy.....Alexander was actually reviving the old Persian infantry formation as used by Darius I and Xerxes - in Xerxes time the infantry fought up to ten deep with a 'sparabara'/shieldbearer armed with large rectangular wicker shield and six foot spear as the front rank or two, backed by shieldless archers. The formation was optimised to fight and beat the main foe of Persia, namely nomad horse archers. The spearmen sometimes set up a 'shieldwall' ( like a row of mediaeval pavises) for the archers to fight behind.One might recall that in Xerxes war against the nomads, they avoided pitched battle against such formations. Since foot archers invariably outrange horse archers, they will generally win, and should the mounted men charge, the spear-armed 'sparabara' will keep them at bay. Of course this formation wasn't anything like as effective against armoured Greek Hoplites largely immune to arrows, as Marathon and Plataea would demonstrate....Alexander's "new" phalanx is a variation on this, using 'sarissaphoroi' instead of 'sparabara'.

As to why Alexander toyed with this 'old' Persian formation, it may be because of manpower shortages as suggested, thus he was forced to use native troops in a manner they understood, but that seems doubtful to me. He could have easily armed these 'native troops' with 'sarissas', told them to follow their Macedonian file leaders, and had a Macedonian style phalanx drilled in a couple of weeks at most.
On the other hand, if he was secretly planning an invasion of the steppes as his next conquest, then such a formation makes perfect sense, since heavy infantry, armed with only hand-to-hand weapons are very vulnerable to horse archers, whether Macedonian 'sarissaphoroi' or Roman 'legionaries', as your reference to poor Crassus and his army demonstrates.....

Xenophon wrote:I can't agree with this opinion of the formation's efficacy.....Alexander was actually reviving the old Persian infantry formation as used by Darius I and Xerxes - in Xerxes time the infantry fought up to ten deep with a 'sparabara'/shieldbearer armed with large rectangular wicker shield and six foot spear as the front rank or two, backed by shieldless archers.

Hello "Old Man"!

I don't see this as a re-run of older Persian tactics. Facts are facts and the stark fact is that Alexander had repatriated some 10,000 phalanx infantry with no replacements within cooee. Fact is there were no replacements as the Lamian War would very shortly showcase.

Fact is what Alexander had - in over abundance - were light armed Asiatics; some twenty or more thousand of them in fact. Now, were he to use these in a revival of the Persian "phalanx" there is little need for sixteen ranks - he might as well have utilised a force ten deep. Funnily enough he did not, instead attempting to replicate a Macedonian formation sixteen deep. Interesting that eh?

His phalanx infantry - aside from those few (comparably) Macedonians he kept (8,000 or so) - would be those in whom he'd invested training: the Epigoni. Until, of course, national troops arrived.... whenever. Not that his national troops were so central to his purpose anymore.

Xenophon wrote:As to why Alexander toyed with this 'old' Persian formation, it may be because of manpower shortages as suggested, thus he was forced to use native troops in a manner they understood, but that seems doubtful to me. He could have easily armed these 'native troops' with 'sarissas', told them to follow their Macedonian file leaders, and had a Macedonian style phalanx drilled in a couple of weeks at most.

Unlikely. One wonders why he invested so much time and energy in training the Epigoni if everything was so supermarket simple. Why have trainers spend up to four / five years training Asian troops to Macedonian performance standards when such might be picked up and drilled in a "couple of weeks"?

Most unlikely.

Xenophon wrote:On the other hand, if he was secretly planning an invasion of the steppes as his next conquest, then such a formation makes perfect sense, since heavy infantry, armed with only hand-to-hand weapons are very vulnerable to horse archers, whether Macedonian 'sarissaphoroi' or Roman 'legionaries', as your reference to poor Crassus and his army demonstrates.....

There is - aside from one grandee from the Caucuses thinking the lad was gullible enough – no evidence for this. Prior to his death Alexander was training naval forces for a campaign. In the west, at Cyinda, he stocked the treasury of Cyinda with enough money to finance the Diadoch wars until at least 301. He’d also sent Craterus with orders to see to the armaments being assembled in the area for a campaign that was clearly directed to the west and just as clearly reliant on a large naval force. Indeed it is the part completed naval force that supplies the Diadochoi in the years immediately following his death.

He had, to my mind, as much interest in some phantom “Steppes” campaign as handing over the kingship to Demosthenes. Indeed his actions with respect to India indicate he’d lost interest there as well.

Alexander had already dealt with “steppe” horse archers in the northeast prior to the Indian campaign. I don’t think they necessarily taxed him to the extent that he felt the need to invent a faux-phalanx, matching his Macedonian phalanx, simply with them in mind.

Go west young conqueror…. after, of course, belting those sacrilegious Arabs yet to acknowledge your godhead.

Quite agree, and Persian tactics were not quite as described; Yes, there was a shieldwall of sparabara and a substantial body of archers but there were also the takbara to issue from the ranks with pelte and sagaris to fall upon the disrupted enemy. These tactics were pretty common in the Middle East and were not designed with the nomads of the Steppe in mind but similarly constituted armies, to whit , the Babylonians, Medes and Assyrians.

Alexander would have little interest in conquering 'the sea of grass', he needed cash and civilisation so must have turned West had he survived. Also, it would have taken possibly more than a year to reach the Oxus again from Babylon and on the initial march he had lost many more men to the terrain and climate than to enemy action; such a move, taking him to the periphery would be against inherent military probability.