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‘Plutarch gives the same number [six hundred thousand], Diodorus and Justin four hundred thousand, and Curtius 250,000. All these numbers are fantastic, but we cannot now discover the truth.’

So , Aubrey de Selincourt in his translation of Arrian for Penguin Classics (footnote 20 p115) ; can such a counsel of despair be truly justified? It will be argued here that the matter is by no means so obscure.

D W Engels has already demonstrated the method, ‘Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army’ Appendix 2, yet, strangely, no one has applied it to his Persian opponents. Engels demonstrates that one can use the known numbers of Alexander’s army, and the measurable constriction of the Pass of the Pillar of Jonah coupled with the calculated marching rate to arrive at the length of time Alexander has to reach the Pinaros and hence the identity of that stream.

It follows that if we can arrive at the length of time Dareios had to cross the similarly restricted Amanic Gates we can extrapolate the number of men he could have had with him.

The precise position of Dareios’ camp at Sochoi is not established its general location is and it lies sixty-five miles from Issos. Analysis of the marches of both Alexander and Xenophon result in an average daily march of fifteen miles per day. Xenophon’s evidence is especially useful as like Dareios, Cyrus the Younger was marching with an army of both Greeks and natives yet attains the same average march as Alexander.

Despite sending a large baggage train on to Damascus Dareios had not shorn his column of its impedimenta for the Royal Mother, Wife and children complete with attendants were captured after the battle; there is no reason to argue that this was a flying column and allow a more rapid advance.

We can be sure that the Persian march began on the same day that Parmenion’s troops were withdrawn from the passes into the Amuq Plain to rejoin the main army. Had the Persians moved prior too this they would have been observed and Alexander would not have been surprised by their move north, as he clearly was. A later move would not allow enough time for the march, since we have discounted any increase in rapidity.

Engels recognises that the four days that this allows Dareios is probably too little time for the march and posits a day’s delay for Alexander at Issos and we must accept this as the four days are just enough to reach the Pinaros were there no constricted pass to cross. This additional day is the time that Dareios has to cross the pass, then.

The Amanic Gates are at least as restricted as that of The Pillar of Jonah which will allow four men or two horses abreast. Alexander crossed with the cavalry to the rear whereas the Persian cavalry probably led their column, no advantage in speed would have accrued, however, as they must have crossed the Pass at a walk if not leading their mounts on foot.

Allowing the Greek Mercenaries the same 1m spacing as the Macedonians at three kmph 12,000 would cross each hour, native troops were probably in looser order say, 1.5m so 8,000 each hour while the cavalry needing a depth of three metres would cross at an hourly rate of 2,000. Exact hourly divisions are obviously a fudge but provide a useful base from which to work.

We must now estimate the length the Persian marching day. Whilst Curtius tells us that they it was their custom to commence the march later in the day than the Greeks the fact that they achieve the same daily march rate must mean that they marched for the same length of time about eight hours. In Cilicia in November there are eleven hours of daylight, the first would be taken up with the pre-march preparations leaving two for setting up camp at the end of the day.

We must now make a guess at the proportions of the troops crossing. We know that there were Greeks, Kardaka, cavalry and light troops as these are all mentioned in the battle descriptions. The 2:1 ratio of Kardaka to Greeks should be retained and it follows from Demosthenes’ taunt that the Persians outnumbered Alexander in cavalry, this is clear from Alexander’s declining the prospect of battle on the plains too. Since the Macedonians had c. four thousand we might allow the Persians six thousand more would take too long to cross the pass. These would take three of our eight hours, 12,000 hoplites one more and 24,000 Kardaka a further three, leaving an hour for the Royal ladies and some lights 8,000 for the sake of argument.

The next day more levies (up to 64,000) can continue to cross but they will arrive during the day of battle exhausted by their forced march.

We can control these findings by comparison with the frontages of the Macedonian line. The Macedonian infantry was faced by the Greeks and the Kardaka, but if as I have argued (‘The Break in the Macedonian line at Issos’) the Greeks actually charged into the flank of the Hypaspists it follows that they and half the Kardaka faced the Macedonian infantry with Alexander and the Companion Cavalry striking the junction of the Greeks and the Kardaka. The Macedonian line works out to about 1500m so the Greeks occupied 750m eight deep yields only 6,000 which is surely too low, given the force of the Macedonian phalanx a depth of sixteen may have been adopted which gives the same 12,000 posited above. Similarly, there will be 24,000 Kardaka.

I would not pretend that these figures are written in stone but they do show that the number of Greeks has been greatly exaggerated, Arrian has 11,000 surviving the battle! A patent nonsense if the force was a mere 12,000. The maximum number yielded of 108,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry is possible, the largest recorded ancient force being 120,000. This is an absolute maximum though and many of the troops here-designated lights are probably better considered armed servants. It is also apparent that only 18,000 men had any combat value supporting the evaluation of both Amyntas and Charidemos.

While the number of dead are known to Alexander and his troops as they had to clean up after Darius, I am wondering at how many troops actually followed Darius when he turned and fled, as that is the critical point of the battle when the Persians gave up and took flight after their King and leader. King Darius had enough troops to gather strength after he fled to return to fight another battle at Gaugemela, so while he suffered great losses, his decision to flee insured him of a large and vast number of troops for further use. The records of the Persian army would have been interesting to read, and I wonder at how he accounted for all the gold that he left behind in his grand tent as well as his immediate family. No matter how many troops, the decision that Alexander made to kill Darius is the real turning point of the battle. And while numbers are of some value, they only prove that each of the authors did not have access to the correct figures. The real point is that the over confident King Darius had his come uppance when he finally met head to head the courageous Alexander in person. Did he learn his lesson? It would seem that he did gain respect for King Alexander and his Macedonian army as he prepared for his next battle with him.

A quaint view, indeed; Curtius gives the Persian casualties as 100,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry as do Arrian and Diodorus whereas Justin has 61,000 dead inf and 40,000captured. These figures are just as ridiculous as those for the army; the Macedonians did not count the Persian dead.

Consider too, the Macedonian Army reached the Pinaros with only half an hour before sunset, since the frontline infantry were 1500 strong this means a kill rate of one man every thirty seconds assuming no approach march and a steady massacre; even against unresisting opposition this would be unachievable given the weapons being used.

As demonstrated above the stated number of casualties could not have even reached the field.

Dareios' army at Gaugamela was not raised from the survivors of Issos but from the Upper satrapies whose forces had escaped call up as too distant to reach the marshalling ground in time. He also had two years to raise them. The survivors went on to be destroyed by the native Egyptians,or crushed three times by Antigonos whose own forces cannot have been extensive; more would just have dispersed to their homes.

Numbers are important to the evaluation of military operations and hence the respective value of each commander. Far from being overconfident Darius modifies his strategy in the face of Alexander's refusal to leave Cilicia. Pressed by supply problems he successfully decieves the Macedonian as to his intentions; by sending his baggage south; a move interpreted as a move by the army and countered by Alexander's own move south. This is not hubris but sound flexible generalship; nor is the battle lost because of the narrows rather it is lost for the want of combat ready infantry; hence the move to a cavalry army at Gaugamela; though that too was insufficient to beat the best army in the world and a remarkable general.

On page 90 of NGL Hammond's book, there is an entire paragraph describing what became of the Greek Mercenaries as well as the rest of the defeated force. One large group escaped to Asia Minor,led by Persian officers. Another group which included 4,000 Greek mercenaries, fled to Tripolis, and were later annihilated when they scattered on a spree of looting. A third group of 8,000 Greek mercenaries made their way eventually to Taenarum in the Peloponnese. Then on p. 106, Hammond says that Darius's elite infantry consisted of some 6,000 Greek mercenaries and 1,000 Persian guards. But on p. 89 what interests me is his comment that "allthough the army of Darius was much larger, there were no more men in his front line than in Alexander's front line, so that his superiority in numbers was of little value."

He continues to say quote" The victory and the small number of killed were due to Alexander's planning, due to superior weapons and armour, and to fighting in formation." He further goes on to say that the numbers were probably inflated by Callisthenes and also deflated, and that Alexander erected altars in thanksgiving to Zeus, Heracles, and Athena. No doubt that the obvious respect for the gods attributed to the success of Alexander.

But aside from that, I remembered something about King Darius that has led me to the most amazing story I have ever read, called The Gemstones File. Robert Howard has a website called TheForbiddenKnowledge, with the subtitles, Wake Up America. There is an article there that is so amazing I could hardly believe it...probably some of you have heard of it. It asserts that Onassis was the real kingpin in America's past trials and tribulations, which include not only the Kennedy assassination but also the Nixon/Hoffa/Howard Hughes combination.

This is the most amazing article I have ever read, prompted by this particular thread...I wish I could get to the bottom of this story. But my memory of King Darius reminded me of a time when I met Eugene Wyman, demoratic chairman of California, and by chance I found this article...just amazing to read.

Ahhh…Persian numbers. This is a perennial and the battle at Issos provides a neat board for military monopoly.

The underpinning logic of Greek / Macedonian numbers for Persian forces rests upon two pillars: one Greek (or Macedonian) is the worth of 1,000 effete Persians and, given their inferior and effete nature, Persian military successes – that which begot them empire – is the result of bloated numbers (not to mention the even further inferior nature of the conquered).

It is in this vein we have Xenophon, not an embarrassed flush to cheek, claim that 900,000 took the field at Cunnaxa (what was Cyrus thinking?!); Diodorus (11.74.1) 300,000 to deal with Egypt and a similar force plus 300 or more triremes to deal with Cyprus (15.2.1). We need not deal with the plainly ludicrous figure of 1,700,000 for 480/79.

All of these figures are bunk as are the figures for the Persian arrays that faced the Macedonian conqueror.

Whilst I’m not about to challenge Agesilaos’ mathematics, I might add to them. What follows is expounded in far more detail by George Cawkwell (“Persian Army Numbers” in The Greek Wars).

What is often not taken into account is the baggage/supply train. That is an “all-in” description and encompasses everything from grain and the millers to work it through arms and armourers to the provision of tents and, in the end, personal belongings. Many of these things are carried by wagons. The Greek sources are not terribly interested in such things but both Persian armies and Alexander’s army used them. Thus some sort of road (or wagon traversable ground) was necessary for such transport.

Armies, marching in column, will have had the various units followed by that which was necessary for encampment in tow. The army units are likely to have marched in columns of three or four abreast given that defiles and, in this instance, passes had to be negotiated. Cawkwell suggests that an army of 60,000 with transport and baggage animals might stretch some 48 kilometres (30 miles). Such a column would be difficult enough to manage through the Amanic Gates – the men alone (allowing a metre per man minimum) would need to average some 5 kilometres an hour to pass inside four hours. If we take the figure of 600,000 we arrive at four lines of men extending some 150 km. We are into territory of well over a day – simply to see the soldiers through.

Cawkwell assumes a march from Sochi to Issos of near 100 miles (160km). He argues that if Darius made this march in five or six days the army cannot have been anything like the numbers the Greek sources provide. It is far likelier to have been in the order of 50-60,000 at most. Larger armies would not have made the march in time. This plus the fact that Darius had to have the necessary food and supplies for this army to be kept in the field for some time as he is not to know when the confrontation will take place. Feeding, supplying, marshalling and controlling armies in ancient times were the necessary constrictions on size.

By the time we get to Gaugamela – the “showdown for empire” – the Greco-Macedonian sources are in full and florid flight. Here we have numbers that would comfort both Ctesias and Herodotus and fit well with Semiramis’ legendary army.

You'll get me to bite with that attack on the flank of the hypaspists at some stage...

Ah, Hammond; whilst I would not wish to blacken the memory of a considerable scholar, his view is rooted in a mistaken belief that Arrian was working from Ptolemy who himself was working up the so-called Ephemerides which Hammond posits were a minutely accurate and quotidean record of all the King's business. Thus he believes in the 30,000 mercenaries uncritically and can accept over half escaping from the centre of a double envelopment. Oddly, he insists that Alexander charged at the head of the Hypaspists despite Arrian, he does not consider the limitations of time and space. His analysis merely tinkers with the accepted version based on an imperfect autopsy of the battleground (which he does identify correctly) along with all the modern accounts anomalies in the sources are glossed over (see the thread 'Problems with Issos' for some examples.

We should not wonder at this phenomenon; an academic commissioned to produce a book has a good deal of time pressure and is unlikely to consider variations on what has been the accepted line for centuries other than to place greater or lesser emphasis on one or other of the source traditions. For this reason it took Engels' monograph on logistics to point up, for example, the impossibility of Arrian's two day march to Myriandrus and the superiority (in this instance) of Curtius' version.

Paralus, we know that porters were just as effective as pack animals in the ancient world and from Curtius that the Persians had a host of them called 'Gandabae' from his account of Parmenion's capture of the treasure at Damacus. I presume that their duty would extend to picking up a javelin and swelling the ranks. To allow for them would reduce Dareios' numbers further. Allowing the pared down Macedonian numbers; one per horse man or ten foot. I hardly think we can reduce the hoplites below 12,000 nor the cavalry from 6,000 so that's 7,200 servants and grooms who could be subsumed in the 8,000 lights I have posited above and one could just about scrape the 2,400 for the Kardaka. Any increase in the proportion could be taken from the Kardaka and may be responsible for their pitiful performance, their rear ranks consisting of unsteady servants.

I wait with girded loins and an AC/DC (Bon Scott, naturally) soundtrack for a countercharge on the hypaspists.

I agree re Hammond. The word "uncritically", though a tad strong, is largely apt. In his defence, when it comes to one's own firm belief this is natural and affects us all; some more or less. One might also point to Hammond's extremely strong belief in the fact that the army assembly was a powerful and binding organ of state upon the king with a wide ambit; there were three separate "Guards" (hypapspists troops) and his claim that at Paraetacene Eumenes' hypaspists are the "sons of" Alexander's hypaspists. If Hammond has a fault it is to argue a view and to then treat that view as uncontested fact from that time forward. He does this with the latter example in the face of the fact that no source mentions these sons (and their European families) coming across the Hellespont at any time and that mathematics - if they are from Asian wives - makes a mockery of it.

Anson's view of the Ephemerides as a "day journal" being adopted from Persian court practice (along with much else) much later in Alexander's campaign sits better.

agesilaos wrote:Paralus, we know that porters were just as effective as pack animals in the ancient world and from Curtius that the Persians had a host of them called 'Gandabae' from his account of Parmenion's capture of the treasure at Damacus. I presume that their duty would extend to picking up a javelin and swelling the ranks.

Indeed. This does not preclude the use of wagons and pack animals within any Persian army. In fact, there must have been plenty. These will have had to cary the numerous heavy items of supply which will have included such items as grain, amphorae, mills for the grinding of grain and a multitude of other "necessaries" to feed and supply an army in the field. Only very rarely do we hear of these in Greek sources - the Sicilian expedition (thank you Thucydides) an oustanding exception. More pertinent examples:

Her. 9.80.2:
and [in the Persian camp] sacks they found on wagons, in which were seen cauldrons of gold and silver...

Xen. Anab. 1.7.20:
[...] while the greater part of the army was proceeding in disorder and many of the soldiers' arms and accoutrements were being carried in wagons and on pack-animals.

1.5.7:
And Cyrus sometimes made these stages through the desert very long, whenever he wanted to reach water or fresh fodder. Once in particular, when they came upon a narrow, muddy place which was hard for the wagons to get through

1.10.18:
They found most of their property pillaged, in particular whatever there was to eat or drink, and as for the wagons loaded with flour and wine which Cyrus had provided...

What was true for Cyrus "Royal Army of Usurpation" was undoubtedly true of any other Persian army - he was a Persian brought up as such and his "friends" (advisors) were all Persian. Alexander also utilised wagons (he burned some prior to the march into India and Arrian notes them (6.25.2) in Gedrosia:

The consequence was, that it was no longer easy to convey the soldiers who were suffering from disease, or those who were left behind on the roads on account of the heat, partly from the want of beasts of burden and partly because the men themselves were knocking the waggons to pieces, not being able to draw them on account of the depth of the sand...

Whilst I do not disagree with the skill of the porters - or their use as lights (cf Ptolemy's Egyptians at Gaza) - I'd argue that the Persian force that marched from Sochi onto the field at Issos possessed its fair share of wagons. which will have slowed it through the gates. Even were we to allow that porters carried all of the army's needs, they will have been seriously burdened and delayed the march through the high passes.

agesilaos wrote:I wait with girded loins and an AC/DC (Bon Scott, naturally) soundtrack for a countercharge on the hypaspists.

Unlikely today! Woke up at 07:30 to find the outside temperature at 31 deg C. With a top of 43 predicted I'm in the pool and then off to a purveyor of frosty porticles of p***. Black ones at that...

Well, since misinformation and exaggeration is part of the entire military strategy, no doubt all the confusion in numbers is working to this day. A great strategy to wreak havoc and confusion upon posterity and history buffs in particular...it seems to be working quite well, isn't it?

I agree totally that the Persians and others used wagons, but factoring them in reduces Dareios' possible army too much. I would willingly concede that more of the Kardaka could actually have been porters; this exercise can only point to a maximum.

That said I believe that Dareios was attempting to move quickly to battle which requires less baggage (and he would have Issos to supply him),the sending of the baggage to Damascus served a double purpose; to deceive Alexander into thinking that he was moving south and to speed up his column (though, as mentioned above, not enough to warrant classifying it as 'flying'). The timing of the move is crucial and the subject of my next posting.

On Hammond I would add his paper 'Asthippoi; a cavalry unit in the army of Antigonus Monopthalmus' read that and then Milns' masterful dissection of it in 'Asthippoi Again'; I mention this especially as one still sees the former article mentioned in relation to the asthetairoi debate by people who really should have read the latter.

agesilaos wrote:That said I believe that Dareios was attempting to move quickly to battle which requires less baggage (and he would have Issos to supply him),the sending of the baggage to Damascus served a double purpose; to deceive Alexander into thinking that he was moving south and to speed up his column (though, as mentioned above, not enough to warrant classifying it as 'flying'). The timing of the move is crucial and the subject of my next posting.

Agreed. The twaddle of the story wherein Darius is advised by an Athenian about the Macedonians and what strategy to take (he is killed after his temerity) is - with all its literary echoes - a neat congruence with Herodotus' Demaratus. The story is, ostensibly, part of the "dilatory Darius" tradition (as opposed to the "brave Darius") and designed to contrast his ineptness with the speed and brilliance of the Macedonian invader. Darius needed no such advice and, whilst not reading too much into the facts and overestimating ancient communications, the march from Sochi to Issos so as to lie across the Macedonian's supply lines cannot not have been the result of mere tyche. The reaction of Alexander is, despite the familiar refrains of decisive reaction and double quick march et al, palapble in the source tradition: utter suprise even unto sending some hetairoi in a ship to confirm the unthinkable. He was caught totally unawares by a strategic march in behind his lines.

That said, and granting the heavier baggage indeed went on to Damscus, many a wagon will still have transported the military readies to Issos - including grain or milled flour. As Alexander had already passed through this area (leaving the wounded / incapacitated at the eponymus village), its ability to support a very large field army for any length of time might be questionable?

I'm of the opinion that this force was no larger than that with which Artaxerxes faced down his brother at Cunnaxa. The Greeks formed at least one third to half of the line (or near enough) in that army and so it might well be some 25-30,000. I'd estimate Artaxerxes' to be in the vicinity of 45-60,000 (depth is all) and whilst Darius may have a little more time to organise, the areas from which he drew are largely the same.

agesilaos wrote:On Hammond I would add his paper 'Asthippoi; a cavalry unit in the army of Antigonus Monopthalmus' read that and then Milns' masterful dissection of it in 'Asthippoi Again'; I mention this especially as one still sees the former article mentioned in relation to the asthetairoi debate by people who really should have read the latter.

Absolutely: Milns surgically disects the edifice. Hammond, though, continued to treat it as uncontestable fact He seems to have a "literal" bent to his nature. There often seems no room for the ability of Greeks to utilise colloquial / "slang" terminology or for the off-handed manner in which the source material uses terminology (he often seems to treat Arrian's Anabasis as though it were a technical manual). Such is apparent in his paper on "The Various Guards" and his literal take of "the men from the hypaspists". In the latter his view is, though correct in an absolutely literal translsation, the least likely in any practical sense.

I can see you remain wedded to a wagon train, Paralus, might have to start calling you Rowdy! Anyway, thought I'd just add Sabin's comments in his model chez 'Lost Battles;

Few scholars have ventured to suggest lower figures, though Devine has made some tentative proposals that are around half Curtius's front line numbers and Ashley has guessed at 12,000 mercenaries, 10,000 Cardaces, 12,000 light infantry and 24,000 horsemen. Here our modelcomes into its own as a means of giving a very broad-brush indication of what might be more reasonable forces. If we classify everyone except the Greeks and half the cavalry as levies, the with Darius as a timid average general, an army of 15,000 mercenaries, 30,000 Cardaces, 20,000 light infantry and 15,000 cavalry (exactly half of Arrian's totals) wouild have a fighting value of 68 and would just fit within the available zones.

Well, Ashley ('The Macedonian Empire' 1998) can be kicked straight into touch, the cavalry alone would take 12hrs to cross the pass; not having read his book I can't provide a more specific criticism. I have Devine's paper, 'Grand Tactics at the Battle of Issos', Anc Hist 1985; so will reserve any comment until I have dug it out.

Sabin's own guess also falls on the cavalry, almost a marching day's worth! The question remains whether the numbers we have adduced are realistic in his model. The key factor here is quality, by making our 6,000 cavalry half veteran a nd half average ( as opposed to 15,000 half levy and half average), keeping the Greeks average and the other infantry levy the addition of 54,000 Kardaka and lights matches Sabin's model strength. This is within the realms of possibility. G'day, belated Australia Day greetings; for some reason my local was celebrating it, there'll be now't for St Georges', though

agesilaos wrote:

[...] Devine has made some tentative proposals that are around half Curtius's front line numbers ...

I have Devine's paper, 'Grand Tactics at the Battle of Issos', Anc Hist 1985; so will reserve any comment until I have dug it out.

I have Granicus, Gaza, Paraetecene, Gabiene and Gaugamela but not, unfortunately, Issos (don't quite know how I missed that). Possibly I might have the dog by the tail but that quote seems to suggest 125,000? If so I'd disagree. Devine is not always right (which goes for all of us of course). He mangles the elephant dispositions at both Paraetecene and Gabiene; he claims the one taxis of infantry that crosses the Granicus (as a feint) with Amyntas are hypaspists (that might have been Hammond?) and at Gaza he describes Demetrios' cavalry as "sarrissa armed" when Diodorus clearly denotes them xystophoroi.

The only "hard" pointers to Persian numbers are the size of the forces that lotto winning Diadochoi (thank you Kyinda) could command and control (the largest being Antigonus' 80,000 in 306 and over 70,000 in total on the plains of Iran in 317) and the armies that clashed at Cunaxa. Cawkwell long ago demonstrated that Artaxerxes' force cannot have been anything like the rediculous numbers assigned to it. The mere fact that Cyrus asks Clearchus to march obliquely toward Artaxerxes in the centre of his line argues that the Greek hoplites - Cyrus' right wing - were not far from the Great King's centre else such an order is rank and utter stupidity. Clearchus, in the event, did not do so so as to keep the river on his right flank as a natural guard.

The Greek mercenaries at Issos are the insoluble cross word. The source tradition would have us believe that in the first two battles Darius deployed up to 50,000 Greek hoplites. It is somewhat inconceivable that, if half a century of pan-Hellenic prattle by the likes of Isoktrates was correct, Alexander crossed into Asia ignorant of the fact that a force of hoplites larger than Plataea awaited him. Such contingents in other Persian armies are closer to the truth (Pammenes’ 5,000 for example).

Whilst Darius may have had slightly more time to raise his army – Artaxerxes being occupied demonstrating his legitimacy by dealing with the regulation revolt of the “province too far” (Egypt) – it is clear, given the absence of contingents from the “upper” satrapies, that he cannot have too much more. The vulgate situates his decision to raise and lead an army after Memnon’s death and the end of effective operations to regain the coast and islands and transfer the war to Greece. It is more likely that he began at the time he appointed Memnon to his command of the navy and the “entire sea-coast” (by Halicarnassus in the vulgate).

We only get hints at this such as Arrian noting that, after Memnon’s death, Darius sends Memnon’s son, Thymondas, to “take over the Grecian auxiliaries from Pharnabazus and to lead them up to him”. One can assume that these were the mercenaries formerly under Memnon’s command and bought with the money Darius sent him after Halicarnassus. Doubtless they were part of the “land army” Diodorus has Alexander so concerned about. Are these Darius’ mercenary hoplites? If so, are we expected to believe that an army of 20-30,000 marched up to him at Babylon?

The mercenaries from the fleet were probably carried on 100 triereis @ 30-50 per ship that is only 3,000-5,000 these would have been additional to 7-9,000 raised from the Western satrapal forces and would have met him at Thapsacus not Babylon probably having landed at Soli.

I was not holding Devine up as a paragon but just did not want to criticise his findings unseen when I have access to them. I'll see if I can-t get them scanned and sent to me in an e-mail then I can forward the article to you, Para'.

Incidently and totally off topic; part of the Aussie week promo we have been subjected to was a Australian based scrabble game where you got a tile per pint prize (gallon of Fosters, useful for selling on to the poor misguided fools who drink it!). Anyway I had 26pts wth 'jumbucks' as in the unofficial national anthem but was pipped by 'jembutcabene' which is allegedly the longest place name in the land of the Golden Doughnut, as Sir Les puts it. Have I been jiggered by a bare faced Cane toad?

agesilaos wrote:The mercenaries from the fleet were probably carried on 100 triereis @ 30-50 per ship that is only 3,000-5,000 these would have been additional to 7-9,000 raised from the Western satrapal forces and would have met him at Thapsacus not Babylon probably having landed at Soli.

The Persian fleet is variously described (up to four hundred ships!) but the numbers you postulate seem more feasible. Arrian describes Pharnabazus as “sailing to Lycia” with the Greek mercenaries. Here he receives Darius’ instructions to deliver them to Thymondas for conveyance to the assembling royal army. At this time Alexander has overrun the coastal littoral down to Lycia as well as being in control of Phrygia, Pamphylia and Caria. Perhaps Arrian (or his source) has mistaken the landing site.

In any case, Alexander is possession of – if not total control of – the greater part of Asia Minor. The Greek mercenary hoplites available to the Great King must surely be looking like stock market investments over the past eighteen months. Memnon is accorded 5,000 at the campaign’s beginning; there are supposedly 20,000 at Granicus; Miletus possessed a good number but only “a few” survived and there are mentions of small garrisons (Hyparna e.g.). The largest concentration of Greek mercenaries left appear in the taking of Halicarnassus. Ephialtes leads out 2,000 “picked men” from the mercenaries which might indicate a total near to (or somewhat less than) what Memnon began with. The survivors are likely found aboard Memnon’s and Pharnabazus’ triremes.

I’d think the numbers of Greek mercenaries available from the Western satrapal forces had diminished significantly – especially given Macedonians, ostensibly, controlled the greater part of these and they had been defeated at the Granicus. Greeks from the Phoenician seaboard and Egypt might well have enlisted but if Darius had significant numbers (12,000 or more) these, seemingly, had to have come from Greece (the Peloponnese) via Soli. This, we are told, is where many escapees subsequently returned to.

agesilaos wrote: I'll see if I can-t get them scanned and sent to me in an e-mail then I can forward the article to you, Para'.

Very kind. By the way, you’ve been dudded on that name.

Hi I'm having a bit of trouble following this conversation as I am not an academic. So, I'd like to ask how many troops under Darius fought against how many troops under Alexander at the battle of Issos?