swan wrote:
But as for your comment about Pammenes as Royal agent ‘Artabazus instructed Pammenes, who was suspected of communicating with the enemy’ Polyaenus: Stratagems Book 7. I’ve not managed (yet!) to track anything further about whether Artabazus was right to suspect Pammenes. I’ve been assuming Pammenes was motivated to work for Artabazus because Thebes needed money, but maybe he was playing a double game and receiving money from Artaxerxes as well.
Much confusion here it would seem.
The clue to that “stratagem” of Polyaenus lies in the convoluted politics of the first half of the fourth century – particularly second quarter. As is well known this was a time of constant internecine warfare as Sparta filled the void left by Athens’ defeat. The power politics involved in the keeping of this Spartan “empire” alienated allies and in large part enabled the rise of Thebes. It also provided the raison d'être for the Second Athenian Confederacy. The constant wars between these competing blocks - and other incidental states often used as causus belli - resulted in a number of what became known as “common peaces”. There are two constant features of these peaces (outside of 362/1): Persia as “sponsor” or guarantor and, secondly, the
prostatai of the peace.
For that concluded in 387 (the “King’s Peace or that of Antalcidas) and its subsequent reaffirmations, that prostatai (or “policeman” / interpreter) was Sparta with the inferred threat of Persian interference should “the Greeks” not comply. The exceptions to this were 375 (where Athens was constituted “hegemon on sea”) and 367 where Xenophon in full florid outrage details Thebes’ gaining of that position which he dare not mention in regards his beloved Sparta: the King’s “chosen instrument” for control in Greece.
The final “common peace” was enacted after Mantinea in 362/1. This was done without the input of Persia. Artaxerxes II, old and dilatory, was facing unrest and rebellion in the west and was little interested. It remains, though, that Thebes was still friendly towards the empire and so a general from that city is most liable to be suspect given that relationship.
Just as important is the context of Artabazus’ suspicion. This occurs in the aftermath of what is sometimes called the “satraps’ revolt” (below) – a period of insurgency of some eight years. In this period Athenian imperial ambition, in the absence of Persia, had burgeoned. Artabazus’ erstwhile “ally”, the rather “whatever it takes” Chares, had been collecting (extorting) money to fund an ever poorer Athens and had taken service with Artabazus for this purpose. Having won a victory (which he described, in full hyperbole, as another Marathon) the new Great King – Ochus, a different proposition to his predecessor – demanded that Athens remove him or he would enter the Social War on the side of her rebellious allies. Athens, in quisling fashion, recalled the general for hire.
What of Pammenes were Ochus in contact with Thebes? Pammenes is no ordinary “general for hire” as Chares; he is most certainly among the leading Thebans along with men like Pelopidas and Epaminondas. He will have been well involved in Theban / Persian relations.
As to the wider situation, details of the happenings in Phoenicia, Anatolia and the Hellespontine region are desperately patchy for this time. Diodorus telescopes what most likely took place over 366/5 – 358/7 into his archon year 362/1. Thus we have what appears a “satraps’ rebellion”. More likely is that this was an “insurgency” that ran for some eight or nine years. It suits Diodorus’ (or Ephorus’) purposes to present the “empire” – or at least great parts of it – as in rebellion. This suits the “Persian decadence, decay and weakness” topos as does his inaccurate, Hellenocentric descriptions of Greek generals having to lead Persian armies (Mentor). In this aspect all is connected to Egypt and this province is somehow accorded the role of coordinator of this uprising. That there was some coordination is true: Tachos, the Egyptian Pharaoh, took an army into Phoenicia. If this was simply local he need not have done so.
To present Egypt as rebelling against the “authority of the king” and resisting attempts at recovery as surprising is akin to expressing surprise at the Pope for saying mass.
In fact, Egypt in this period had been “free” for most of the century - it was logical for Phoenician satraps or hyparchs to look to it. It was also in a mess. Tachos, having marched into Phoenicia, suffered a revolt at home as his son Nectanebo II took control. Tachos immediately went over to Artaxerxes Ochus (III) and Sidon too returned to the fold (after the dissidents were turned over). These machinations went on for some considerable time as Ochus, Mazaeus and others put the area to rights. That accomplished, Ochus sent a royal army to win back the
province too far. Problem was, there had been several “market gardens” prior to this successful invasion and others had taken note.
Which brings us back to Artabazus. He had disobeyed the new king’s instruction to the satraps to disband their mercenaries and had, in fact, hired more. This has been presented as part of a wider rebellion in league with Egypt but the two are – almost literally – at opposite ends of the empire. The likely cause of his “revolt” is his ultra-blue blood – he was a grandson of Artaxerxes Mnenon – rather than any western empire-wide uprising. Certainly after Ochus had made his intentions clear, and Chares sailed home with his
diekplous between his legs in obedience to the King’s demand, Artabazus will have been in no doubt that he was confronted with a king who meant business. Accordingly he seems to have summed up the situation and decided that a holiday elsewhere - preferably overseas - was a most promising option.
Why would Artabazus go into exile in Macedonia? Following on from Athena’s Owl’s observation about likely contacts between Hellespontine Phrygia and Macedonia, the rest is simple deduction. Athens, her imperial impotence laid bare by a single demand from the Great King, was no safe haven. She - and more importantly her politicians - in no way could be relied upon. Thebes, involved in a ruinous and costly war without immediate end, was not the power of the 360s. Further she was Persia’s last
prostatai in Greece. She was scarcely more reliable than Athens. Macedonia, ever strengthening and with no exposed naval ambitions in the Aegean to worry Ochus, was a logical choice for a European vacation.
Pehaps, also, the exchange rate for Darics was good...