pothos.org

Excuse the length: believe me it's been edited many times, being now about half what it was, but, much of what makes the point predates Alexander. I'll check the spelling and grammar tomorrow....I've been at this too long.

As things are, it is he (the Great King) who disposes of the affairs of the Hellenes and orders what each city must do and all but sets up governors in the cities. What else is lacking? Did he not decides the war and does he not direct the peace? Is he not now placed in charge of things? Do we not take ship to him as if to a master to denounce each other? Do we not name him “the Great King” as if we are his prisoners of war? Do we not in our wars against each other place our hopes of salvation in him, the man who would gladly destroy both Athens and Sparta? Isoc 4.120-1

The great panhellenist, Isocrates, bursting with the full-flower of indignation in the late 380s. Composed within the shadow – long, dark and trend setting – of that consummation of Spartan perfidy, known to history as the “King’s Peace” or, more correctly, the Peace of Antalcidas, it aptly sums up the world view of the pamphleteer and those of a similar view.

There is a view that this view was prevalent among the tired city states of Greece and that Philip, followed by Alexander, merely accepted the natural Greek urging for retribution and a settling with the “common enemy”, Persia. As in most things, actions speak far louder than words and in this case, the actions of the city states indicate anything but.

The panhellenist “century”, the fifth, saw some of the great Greek victories over the “common enemy” including Kimon’s at the Eurymedon sometime in 469/7. Kimon, in fact, was the original of the breed. When the Spartans requested Athenian help to dislodge the Messenians from Ithome (464) he urged the Assembly not to “stand by and see the city deprived of its yoke-fellow”. Evidently Kimon had failed to realise that Sparta had given up any interest in the war against Persia in 478. It is more likely that, via his “Spartan policy”, he was dreaming of an assault on Asia Minor by both “yoke fellows”. He died in the stalemate at Cyprus and such dreaming died with him. Pericles decided that Athenian aggrandisement might proceed apace once rapprochement with Persia was obtained and so Kallias had his name attached to the first of the “Persian peaces”.

The outbreak of the Peloponnesian War saw the Peloponnesian League declare war against Athens under all the correct banners, the most important of these being the “liberation of the Hellenes” (Thuc 1.139.3; 2.8.2). Archidamus, the Spartan King, then gives – two paragraphs into his speech – some sage advice to his gathered homoioi:

In the meantime we should be making our own preparations by winning over new allies both among Hellenes and among foreigners – from any quarter, in fact, where we can increase our naval and financial resources. (Thuc. 1.82.1)

The implication is absolutely obvious, particularly the financial: Persia. Indeed in 430 Athens was to intercept Spartan ambassadors on their way to Persia “to see if they could somehow persuade him to provide money and join in the war” (ibid 2.67.1). the price, though, was the thing and, in 425, returning ambassadors from the King were apprehended by Athens and their dispatches translated before the Assembly. They were to inform the Spartans that the King did not “know what you want. For although many ambassadors have come, none of them say the same things. If you are willing to say something unequivocal, send men to me with my envoy”. The game was afoot. It and it was not called Panhellenism. The Persian purse was open for business.

That business would be concluded when internal Spartan idealists finally realised that external ships and money – Persian money and, essentially, Persian ships in fact – were absolutely necessary for victory over Athens. The deal was done and the money procured under the Treaty of Alliance between Persia and Sparta in 411. The deal was furthered by the ambitions of Cyrus The Younger and Lysander and the Greeks of Asia Minor were to be the price.

Slightly guilty and spurred on by Lysander for whom the end of the war was the end of a grand career (not to forget those idealists), Sparta sought to renege on her treaty. Agesilaos, replacing the aimless Dercilydas, sacrificed in the fashion of Agamemnon and set out for Asia to “liberate the Greeks”. He spent two dilatory years making treaties, pillaging and promising to “march up country”. By the time he’d had a nice talk to Pharanabazus (having already concluded a treaty with Tissaphernes that eventually saw him executed) he was recalled to Greece to fight the “Corinthian War”. Agesilaos obeyed his city's summons though whether he was more upset at leaving his panhellenist play acting or Megabates, the son of Spithridates to whom he was "passionately attached" in a way "which had taken possession of him", is difficult to say (Plut. Agesilaos 11)

One thing was certain, the King, you see, was upset and had supplied Konon, the Athenian general with money and ships as well as, one suspects, some of the mainland states (although the Oxyrhynchus Historian disagrees). Spartan aggrandisement would be terminated via the total destruction of its naval power at Cnidus. Spartan ambitions on the Asia Minor littoral were going nowhere sans navy. The Greeks of Asia Minor wouold remain the King's.

Forced to the Susa negotiating table, Sparta, via Antalcidas and some five years of diplomatic wrangling, finally swallowed the pill that Xenophon could never bring himself to report: the summary handing over of the Greeks of Asia for Persian support ( it was all the medizing thebans fault and, notably, every dealing of the Thebans, as opposed to the Spartans, with the King was duly reported on by a Xenophon suffering appoplexy). This had been fact since the defeat of Athens in 404 but, just in case the Spartans misunderstood, the King made it plain:

King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia should belong to him, as well as Clazomenae and Cyprus among the islands, and that the other Greek cities, both small and great, should be left independent, except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; and these should belong, as of old, to the Athenians. ( Xen. 5.1.31)

It would remain fact until Alexander’s invasion some seventy or so years later. All that would change would be the Persian prostatai of the peace: Sparta, Athens or Thebes. All took their turn before the King in 368/7 in the representations that led to the renewal of the Peace under the auspices of Persia’s policeman Thebes.

As to that other leg of Panhellenism: Persian softness and decay. Fear of Persia and the King’s committing of forces (particularly naval) was enough – despite the rhetoric of Isocrates, Xenophon and their ilk – to keep the Greeks in line. Persian ships and money destroyed Spartan naval power in 394. Perhaps the most salient example is that of Athens and the “Social War” of 357-55. Athens, as always resolutely pursuing dreams of an empire irrecoverable, supported the rebel satrap (again) Artabazus in his revolt, the King sent an embassy to Athens declaring that he would join the war with 300 ships in support of Athens' "allies" in revolt, Byzantium, Chios and Rhodes, and destroy Athens. The Athenian general, Chares, and his fleet, were summarily recalled and the war was concluded.

No Matter the rhetoric of Isocrates and those like him, the actions of the Greek city states were always in accord with their own designs. Those designs revolved around hegemony at home. If it meant the selling of the Asian Greeks then so be it.

It was, though, a wonderful propaganda tool for Philip and Alexander. The entire war of Macedonian imperial aggrandisement would be fought as an Hellenic crusade of retribution. There may have been some who actually believed it. There will have been just as many if not more who saw it otherwise. The money that came from Persia after Issus (in support of Antipater) was an indication: Persian money (sent by Alexander) to aid in the suppression of Greek states by Macedonia.

The “Exiles Decree” of 324 showed only too clearly exactly what the panhellenists had achieved: the substitution of one Great King for another; one more directly autocratic in his handling of the Greeks.

Well...

You have a point there. There were people that believed in the idea, and others who just saw benefit from it. There were those that were panhellenists, and those who couldnt see easy beyond their city-states. Herodotus was a panhellenist, and said that Greeks have to be united in order to achieve things.

Panhellenism was back then in it's infancy.They all knew that they were Greeks, but couldnt just leave the city-state idea that easily. The next step came with Alexander and after his time, but finally it was the Roman occupation that made the Greeks stop battling eachother.
And then the Roman Empire that had taken so many things from the Greeks, became Greek. The capital was transfered from Rome to Konstantinoupoli and as time passed the Roman origins of the Empire gave their place to the Greek culture of the time. By that time though Athens was only a small town with little population (around 10.000) along with other great cities of the classical and hellenistic era. Konstantinoupolis became what Athens was.

Alexander surely had also a vision like this in his mind. It wasnt everything about conquest. And because a panehellenic idea suited him for his conquests doesnt mean that he didnt believe in it.

Efstathios wrote: Herodotus was a panhellenist, and said that Greeks have to be united in order to achieve things. Panhellenism was back then in it's infancy.They all knew that they were Greeks, but couldnt just leave the city-state idea that easily.

There is enough in Herodotus’ writings to suggest that’s true. He was writing in the years between the two Peloponnesian wars and most likely will have reflected the view of a Kimon. Panhellenism then was a more “pure” ideal – for want of a better description. By the time of the later part of Philip’s reign it had become wrapped in bigoted notions of Greek superiority and Persian effeminacy and hedonism. The later a misplaced view put by both Xenophon and Isocrates who, in his Panegyricus, makes the claim that the Persians, by nature of their upbringing and the manner in which they were governed, could not possess virtue or be successful in war. A strange thing to say about a people who’d carved out and kept the greatest empire to date. Notwithstanding many a Macedonian who survived Guagamela and could attest to how near run a thing it was.

The city state ideal was just as prevalent through the fourth century – if not more so. Spartan imperial notions dominated the first quarter of the century and, were we to rely on Xenophon, the extent of their “medizing” would never be known. Xenophon happily traduces the Thebans for the same thing. What is often missed is Athens. It is readily assumed that imperial designs were put away after 404. Not so. Persia, having helped re-create the imperial pretensions in 396-4, found itself having to slap it down on more than one occasion. First via the Peace of Antalcidas, then again 375 and finally in 355. Empire was all – it was the glittering, if irrecoverable, ideal that far outshone panhellenism. Athens’ big argument with the peace of 386 and 376/5? The ownership of the key to empire in the northern Aegean, Amphipolis. Ironic that in the throwing out of the Persians from Samos in 358/7, Athens decided to replace them with that fiercely resented tool of empire, a cleruchy. It followed up with more in the Chersonese. Empire dreaming indeed.

No surprise that after the battle of Issus, Alexander intercepted three Greek ambassadors to the King. They were from the panhellenic states of Sparta, Thebes and Athens. The last a member of the League of Corinth. The Persian purse was still open for business. Unfortunately, the Cilician branch had suffered an agressive takeover bid by Macedonian interests.

Efstathios wrote: Alexander surely had also a vision like this in his mind. It wasnt everything about conquest. And because a panehellenic idea suited him for his conquests doesnt mean that he didnt believe in it.

Indeed, Alexander may have found some merit in the idea. I believe his father may have put slightly more stock in the notion but, as he was assassinated, we’ll not ever know. Philip’s pulling back from Greece in 346 has always intrigued me and many an explanation has been run. From what we know of the man – and this might simply suit my slightly cynical take on these matters – I believe it had a more practical rationale: Athens. If you were planning to embark on a an Asian conquest a navy was going to be required. Why build one when a more than suitable armament existed in the Piraeus? Philip pursued alliance (on increasingly thoroughly Macedonian terms to be sure) with Athens when another might just as well have walked away or over them.

Alexander’s panhellenism may well have had a genuine kernel but its flowering was propaganda. For a grand exercise in Greek revenge he asked very little of them. If one were to set aside the Thessalians – who had been providing large contingents for Macedonian forces and whose cavalry had essentially become part of that state’s army – he took only 7,000 from the League. The Illyrians, Triballians, Thracians, Agrianes and others will have numbered more. They are scantily attested in action as far as the campaign is concerned. The impression being that the Macedonians were doing all this on behalf of the Greeks.

Panhellenism without the pain – from the city state point of view

Yes, but the reason why Alexander didnt take more southern Greeks, was to avoid a possible rebellion, and to generally keep the Empire mainly Macedonian. I believe that if Athens, along with other cities were friendly to Alexander, with no rebellions against him, he would have taken more of them along.

Efstathios wrote:Yes, but the reason why Alexander didnt take more southern Greeks, was to avoid a possible rebellion, and to generally keep the Empire mainly Macedonian. I believe that if Athens, along with other cities were friendly to Alexander, with no rebellions against him, he would have taken more of them along.

I'd suggest that reason he took so many Illyrians (and their back and front yard neighbours, Triballians etc) was to forestall rebellion. The contingent of Greeks from the supposedly panhellenic League are a mere token gesture. The number of city states in the League is debatable but largely irrelevant as it will more than those in the original (less Sparta) of 480. That League mustered some 10,000 as a holding force for Tempe in 480. It was reduced to some 7,000 for Thermopylae.

Alexander was, apparently, quite happy to accept only the Thermopylae holding force from the entire League for this great panhellenic invasion? I'd more likely suggest that this was all he asked for rather than what was feely offered by states who'd just witnessed the visitation upon Thebes of the angel of Macedonian retribution. It was a token levy. The paid for mercenaries numbered almost as many.

And, with that in mind, I'd go a little further than your observation that this was to be a "mainly" Macedonian empire. It was, and would continue to be, a wholly Macedonian empire. The invader set out to make Persia a Macedonian province. If, along the way, he was able to dispose (resettle) numbers of mercenaries (Isocrates' vagabonds) in the fortress towns of empire, so much the better.

There was to be no grand Greek army of invasion. Indeed the cities of Asia Minor seem not ever to have been included in the League after their “liberation”. That did not absolve them from contributing though. Until he was loaded with the largesse of Issus, Alexander demanded and received that which, likely beforehand, went to the King. After Issus, he doled some of it out to Antipater so as to maintain order in an increasingly seething Greece.