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I know we have visited this topic before, But I have been reading other histories and campaigns and feel its worth revisiting. It has somewhat been disgarded the numbers of Darius Huge force at Issus and Gaugamela. The arguments against probable 500 000 men been the logistics and to supply and keep a huge host supplied. Some Porthonians argue this been impossible to maintain for a long period.

Other examples in my veiw argue against this. I have been reading the sketchy histories about Spartacus. The man ended up with 120 000. COmpany were it fully trained solders wives or children. Yet that huge host managed to maintain itself as outlaws and the hunted in Italy for over a year. Now if that number can maintain itself in a country run and over run by the mightiest War machine and political organisation the world has seen. I could be pretty sure Darius could call upon and maintain an army around 500 000 from his own massive Empire and huge money resources.

Alexanders numbers swelled to over 120 000 on his escapades east and supplied the masses from the resources around.

I know that most of the 500 000 host would have been rag tag conscripts forced to hgold a spear. But I think it logical to accept Darius did have and could have supplied such numbers.

Kenny

Hi Kenny,

For the purposes of logistics a comparison between the numbers of Spartacus' men and Darius army is a good one to make, except that I'm wondering if the articles that you've been reading on Spartacus also contain exaggerated numbers. I've poor knowledge of Roman history and the only ancient source on Spartacus that I've been able to find is Plutarch's Life of Crassus, viii-xi. The Ancient History Sourcebook has the excerpt on its Slavery in the Roman Repuplic page. Plutarch says that when Spartacus retreated with his men to the sea and tried to arrange passage on pirate ships to Sicily, "by landing two thousand men, he hoped to kindle anew the war of the slaves, which was but lately extinguished, and seemed to need but a little fuel to set it burning again." Now, IMO, I doubt that Spartacus intended to sail to Sicily with 2,000 men if that meant leaving 118,000 men behind!

I could be wrong, of course, and I'd like to know who says Spartacus ended up with 200,000 slaves in his revolt. Is it a modern writer(s) or an ancient source?

Best regards,

amyntros hi

We cant be specific and indeed the numbers mentioned could be exagerated.but what we do know is that Spartacus did defeat several Legions and Consular Armies time after time. So we must assume Spartacus had thousands of men. Or he had the most elite and best small Army in ancient warfare.

And these Roman armies were not the usual Arse end crap that Hannibal was bashing. it was in the era of Pompey. Crassus and the emergence of Caesar.

Kenny

Amyntros

Reading the brief history of Spartacus. It Is very evident he anhialated Roman Army after Roman army. How he managed it in an era of Romes emerging great commanders and tacticians, Has got to show some Greatness or Tactical Genius for Spartacus. I see no battle descriptions etc but his record is pretty good against arguably the Greatest war machine ever assembled. And the vast numbers has got to hold up to attain and maintain such a long winning streak of victories.

Kenny

Greetings Kenny,

I usually suggest a reading of Engels "Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army" as a start. I know some of his conclusions are in debate at this time but it is still a good place to begin. Have you had an opportunity to read this work?

Regards,
Sikander

Sikander Hail

Ill read the mentioned book about Macedonian logistics. However I dont think that would alter the points made and theories I would argue for the fact that I think Darius could have and maintain suck numbers.

Regards

Kenny

G'day Kenny.

The thing that needs to be borne in mind with respect to Spartacus is the relative supermarket his forces had available to him. Holland (Rubicon - a ripping read) too gives numbers approaching 120,000. What he also gives is a cogent description of Spartacus' "campaign". This began as a rebellion in central Italy with the aim of escaping harsh and brutal treatment. Far from there being any aim to establish the "freedom of the slaves" as such, the refusal to exit Italy via the north – as provided by the defeated home army (the main legions serving overseas) – served to indicate what it had become: a quest to take Rome and essentially place the slaves in the postion of master over Roman slaves. To use Green's words( Alexander to Actium):

Such men (slaves that were formerly free men, Spartacus et, al) while by no means challenging slavery as an institution, objected violently to being enslaved themselves…Paradoxically, far from wanting to change the class structure of their society, they merely aimed to correct what they saw as an improper skewing of the natural balance between naturally free men and natural slaves.

What then occurs is close to a shortened re-run of Hanibal. Spartacus defeats ill-trained Roman conscript armies and wanders central Italy looting as he goes. In this case, we can adjudge looting to most definitely include the lightening of Latin larders: crops cattle and fruits. In the end, overconfident, greedy and hubristic Crassus (whose Rumsfeld moment would, coincidentally, come in Mesopotamia) correctly bottled him up in the toe of Italy. Bereft of his larder, Spartacus had to eventually fight and go down as the rabble they had become.

Darius, unlike any of his forbears, had half an empire from which to draw his army and, more importantly, supplies. That half excluded Egypt, Asia Minor and Coele-Syria – a not insignificant part of the Persian larder. Persian armies generally took time to assemble – especially if they included a fleet. For instance, the fleet and army of 397/6 which Artaxerxes II was readying to retake Egypt (the first responsibility, it seems, of every new Persian monarch) was finally commissioned in time to swat Agesilaos' panhellenist adventure by wiping out Spartan naval power in 395/4.

The reason was not, as Herodotus would have it, that such armies were a congeries of human conglomerate rock but rather the distances and armouring involved. At the very basic level, the army needs a supply train of wagons. Such wagons need roads. In the eastern and central parts of the empire, the supply lines for Darius will have been as much a problem for him as for Alexander. The movement of such an army is difficult to imagine: 500,000 at three or four abreast in column would stretch for how many miles? A marching column of four abreast, and separated by one and a half metres would give us a column some 188 kilometres long. Then add the wagons.

It is, though, both the reasonable attested period of the Diadochoi (and other Hellenistic monarchs), the campaign of Cyrus (the pretender, 401) and the Battle of Magnesia (190/189) that give rather furious pause for thought when it comes to the somewhat incontinent figures of Macedonian and Greek sources.

Firstly, at Cunnaxa Cyrus, with his 10,000 and some Greeks holding the right of the field, correctly pins his hopes on these hoplites carrying the day. Noting – as the gap closed between the armies – that Artaxerxes and the Persians (in the middle of the Royal line) would be missed by the Greeks, he orders them to march obliquely towards the centre. It follows that the Greeks formed the bulk of the right of centre outside of Cyrus' centre. One imagines the army facing it then to be not much, if any, larger. No Greek commander would so precipitously expose a phalanx otherwise.

Secondly, Antigonus, "master of Asia" raises the largest attested army of invasion in 306. For this we have numbers of 80,000 infantry. The figures we have for Ipsus (301) put some 155,000 in action. Raphia (207) saw some 140,000. Ipsus essentially saw all of Asia (aside from "India") engaged. Even were we to add another 50,000 we fall well short of the astronomical 500,000.

Lastly we have possibly the last great Hellenistic monarch, Antiochus III "The Great". In a life or death defence of his empire – larger than was left to Darius in 331 – against Eumenes of Pergamon and Rome, he mustered some 70,000.

I don’t believe that Darius mustered anything like 500,000 at Gaugamela. That, though, is just my view of the evidence.

Michael Hail and thanks for more detail about the Spartacus campaigns. I was lead to understand that Spartacus did have the opportunity to get out of Italy. But for one reason or another decided to stay and fight the Romans. Some say he liked the celebrity and glory and wanted to keep it going.

All these campaigns just indicate the greatness of the Roman phsyche that they could lose a legion here and a legion there and still put army after army in the field. In reflection all Alexanders battles were imperative to win. He couldnt afford one single defeat. A loss at Granicus meant a fast ticket back to Macedonia a loss at Issus meant the same or worse hunted down like a fugitive. To say he went all that way with the similar sized army although replenished from time to time is a military expedition beyond equal. Okay the Roman Empire went further but it took decades centuries and army after army and emperor after Emperor to achieve.

I still think Darius could feild those numbers. If the numbers were huge at Issus Im pretty sure at Gaugamela would have pitched far more forces knowing how he got trounced at Issus. He would have thrown the kitchen sink in.

Kenny

jasonxx wrote:I still think Darius could feild those numbers. If the numbers were huge at Issus Im pretty sure at Gaugamela would have pitched far more forces knowing how he got trounced at Issus. He would have thrown the kitchen sink in.

Ahh, but that depends on the numbers at Issus. The numbers given for Issus - up to 600,000 - are plainly rediculous. Were Darius to have made his march to Issus, taking the assumed, logical route through the Banche Pass and Armanus Gates, he will have covered some 100 miles. Going on the previous figure, an Army of 300,000 will have had the head of its column debauch onto the plain at Issus as the tail had just commemced the same march!

More likely some 60,000 methinks.

Michael Hail

So you think Darius turned up with 60 000 troops to face Alexander at Issus. So prior to this engagement. Alexander had mopped up the whole of Greece something that the Persian invaders with large armies couldnd do.

Alexander had defeated equal numbers at Granicus the Mopped up the whole of Asia Minor. So taking all this into account you still think Darius with his huge Empire turns up with 60 000, to head of Alexanders 40 000 hardened troops. If Xerxes could muster Huge Numbers to invade Greece . Im sure Darius would have would have turned up with huge numbers as his own country and neck were on the line. Im pretty sure of huge numbers and his confidence in numerical supremacy, as he had brought his family and its dog to watch the show.

As for Gaugamela Even more It was darius last throw of the dice. wether 4 abreast and they stretched back to sydney he would have armed the organ gringers monkey to save his empire.

Kenny