Antipater's summons to Babylon

[theaccursed]

Hello, Paralus.

My sincere apology if naming you offended you. And if you think I'm being sarcastic here (this is the internet after all) I'm not. It just didn't occur to me that you'd mind, since you've posted your name in this forum before. Your name is what I think when I read your posts, even though you also call yourself Paralus. I'm no "cad" I hope. On the other hand, I don't even have the faintest clue to what that word even means (english isn't my native tounge) so I think I'll chose to interpret it as "You very nice but somewhat unfair person, dragging me into this for no good reason!". And you're right. And I'm sorry about that.

Regarding you going to war against Alexander: I began to form that view of you with your "Antipater and the Argyraspyds...would they?" thread. And it was enforced by some other post I read by you (can't recall which right now). You seem to believe, or have at least given me the impression, that it would be easy to raise a macedonian army against Alexander, and that several of his generals would gladly had taken him on.

I just think that you - greatly - underestimate the impression Alexander made on his soldiers and generals, and underestimate their estimation of his talent. Recall how the soldiers reacted when they found out that Alexander was dying in Babylon. This was after the Gedrosian desert, after two mutinies, after Cleitus, after Parmenion, after his orientalization. After all this...they were still prepared to tear the place down just to see him one more time. And this was not the first time they reacted this way.

What I'm saying is: to you it's purely theoretical. To them, it would have meant actually standing there on the battlefield, facing an army led by Alexander. I just don't think they would have been thrilled.

Tarn?
Tarn was biased (though certainly not the only one), no doubt. But I don't think he ever underestimated Alexander as a general, and would probably have been less than enthusiastic about the idea of having to face him in battle. Which, after all, was the reason I wanted to send back historians.

Again: I'm sorry about calling you by name. Had I thought you'd react the way you did, I would not have done so.

Sincerely

Daniel Svensson - The accursed

[Paralus]

G'day 'the accursed' (Daniel).

A cad is one who behaves in an unprinciplied manner - mostly used when that behaviour is directed to a woman.

I don't think that Alexander's marshals will have lightly taken the field against their king. That is not to say that - given little choice - they wouldn't. I have a lingering feeling that Antipater was "for it" and have often promised to put something together on that subject. Problem is, there is little that can be read definitively into those events near the end of both Alexander and Antipater's lives. It would not have happened without, of course, Craterus and his veterans. As later events would show, Macedonian manpower was at a premium - particularly in the "home army".

I do not underestimate the impression Alexander had upon his troops. I do, though, think that there remains a distinct possibility that his marshals' view had changed. As well, I think there was great resentment among any of those Macedonians that were slated for "security" duties back in the empire (Asia) whilst the royal army left for the booty of far horizons. Not to mention resentment over the epigoni - who would come to be the backbone (in numbers) of the diadochoi armaments.

Why was Antipater summoned to court? Why send one of your most able generals home in semi-retirement? Just what did Craterus make of it all?

In any case, it's a matter for another thread.

I'd still like to be in the assembly at Athens urging a successful foray into the Thermaic gulf. What would Philip have done with 8,000-10,000 Athenian hoplites landed in his rear?

You may, of course use my name. That was not so much the worry. It's bad form to do so though if you are using a nom de plume. that was the point

[theaccursed]

Hello Paralus. Well, then, while far from being a perfect person, a cad, I must say, I am not. At least not regarding my behaviour towards women.

Regarding Antipater, and why he was being summoned to court, I have a rather different opinion than you do. You won't belive it, no doubt. Still. Remember, that it was a minority of the satraps in the so called "purge" that Alexander had killed. Most of the satraps were reinstated, and some were actually congratulated on having done a good job.

Furthermore:

1. Olympias hated (I don't think the word is too strong) Antipater, and wanted to rule in his place. She urged Alexander to replace him...but he did not.
2. Alexander, as I recall, wrote Antipater and told him he wanted him to have bodyguards.
3. Antipater did a good job, and never, as far as I know, did anything that could have made Alexander believe he was not being loyal - until he refused to come to Babylon!
4. Alexander did not plan to remain in Babylon for long. He wanted to conquer Arabia - and the rest of the world.

So...who would remain in Babylon, in his place? Macedon was not the centre of Alexanders world anymore. Babylon was. And Alexander, I claim, wanted Antipater there, not to kill him or to put him in "court arrest"...but to rule in Alexander's place, just as he had done in Macedon. I claim he trusted Antipater - until he failed to show up in Babylon. Remember - Alexander hadn't seen his, in lack of a better word, "no. 2 person", in 10 years. Calling for Antipater, now that the conquest of Persia was complete (as Alexander saw it), wasnt exactly unreasonable. Not showing up, however, changed everything. I have no doubt, that to Alexander, this was treason. And so Antipater had to be replaced.

But, yes, I know about the "climate" today and how people view Alexander - a mindless butcher who killed people left and right - satraps, generals, soldiers - for no reason at all except paranoia and general bloodlust. Everyone was, it appears, innocent - except Alexander.

I just don't share that opinion. Which doesn't mean I share the "romantic" view of Alexander, either. I think he was a warrior king and a conqueror, who was prepared to do whatever it took - whatever it took - to win. And I think that to be such a person, that is, to be a successful conqueror, one has to be, when necessary, absolutely ruthless.

[Paralus]

G'day theaccursed.

You need to look into that nom de plume mate!

This really needs to be split to a new thread. I imagine one of the moderator group will get to that.

That is actually an interesting idea. Antipater's "relationship" with venomous Atrax robustus that passed for Alexander's mother is well attested. We cannot really know what Alexander was thinking in respect of this, but, he had put up with it for ten years.

Antipater was no young man. He was "old Macedonian" through and through and will have strongly opposed Alexander's "orientalising" policies. Up until his death, the logical candidate for chiliarch duties was the current one: Hephaestion. He was, ostensibly, Alexander's second in command. The Asian empire was in a state of unrest. After Alexander's death Perdiccas (via Eumenes) was still attempting to bring areas under control and Thrace was virtually independent. Monophthalmos could attest to work involved in holding what was "won". Why bring Antipater out to do it?

Aside from that, the series of events around this do not really add up. At the time of the mass demobilisation, Alexander informs his troops (that he is dismissing) that he has written to Antipater to make certain he ensures they have the best seats in the house for the theatre and contests. When the decree of the exiles is announced, part of it reads that "we have instructed Antipater to constrain those cities who refuse to accept you". In other words, Alexander has in mind that Antipater is going to be in place to carry out these instructions.

When, eventually Craterus and the veterans are ready to depart, Craterus is given instructions to depose Antipater and have him come to Babylon with reinforcements. As well as check on the armament being assembled in Cilicia along the way. What has suddenly changed?

Possibly something to do with the information reaching the king from Greece? Harpalus and his money are at Athens; many of the "repatriated" mercenaries are gathering at a base in the Peleponnese where a bloke by the name of Leosthenes GÇô an Athenian general GÇô is taking significant interest and the Atrax robustus is agitating for Antipater's head so well that even the apologetic Arrian must say: "It cannot be denied that the stories which tended to blacken Antipater's good name did seem to gain more and more influence over Alexander, for such things would naturally alarm anyone in his position".

Whatever it was, and whatever Alexander had in mind, Antipater was not having a bar of it. He'd witnessed the rest of his contemporaries depart the scene in circumstances of judicial murder and was not about to be placing his head on the block. Now as to what may have transpired, well I'm not sure either Antipater or Alexander relished the prospect of a trial of strength. There were, though, those mercenaries in Taenarum. They were for hire to anyone, but particularly to anyone fighting Alexander.

And then there is the meandering Craterus GÇô a man we are told affected royal dress and behaviour GÇô seemingly indolent in Cilicia. With him we have a senior cavalry commander (Clietus the White) and two phalanx commanders (Antigenes and Polyperchon). He had the armament and in Cyinda, the money. Why was he still there nine months later?

In the end though, we have not enough pieces of the puzzle to put it all together. In particular, we have zero information on the goings on in Macedonia over these twelve months aside from one fact: Antipater apparently knew better than to heed his king's summons.

[theaccursed]

Hello Paralus.

Regarding the nickname, I chose it, not because I particularly feel it fits Alexander (though in a way I guess it does, considering what historians say about him today) but because it happens to fit me quite well. Also, just in case it needs to be stressed, I am not a "romantic" - at least not regarding war. I don't think war and conquest is the least bit romantic, and I don't believe in the concept of the "war hero". I am not Tarn, reincarnated. I'm also definitely not opposed to being "sober" and "critical" when the subject is Alexander, on the contrary, I think it's the right attitude to have, though, thinking about it, I guess I would prefer sober and unbiased. It's just that I expect some kind of fundamental fairness and honesty, even when the subject is Alexander of Macedon. And I think many so called "Alexander scholars" are lacking in these areas.

Regarding Antipater, I think you've made some good points. But I don't think Alexander ever put more weight on rumors, in spite of being bothered by them, than he did on the actual facts. And there's something about the entire scenario - that had he only lived a little bit longer then everything would have exploded - that I just find...fishy. You could, ultimately, say exactly the same about every other point in time between 334 and 323 BC. And in 323 B.C., Parmenion had been dead for 7 years, and Alexander's "orientalisation" had been going on for about as long, yet only now, after seven years, Antipater suddenly felt that it would be necessary to go to war against Alexander?

But, as I said - you've made some good points. Still, even in your scenario, considering what then actually did happen - the strange and unexpected death of Alexander - everything seems rather more - in my opinion - to point towards murder, than towards Antipater planning to go to war.

[Paralus]

Still, even in your scenario, considering what then actually did happen - the strange and unexpected death of Alexander - everything seems rather more - in my opinion - to point towards murder, than towards Antipater planning to go to war.

Yes - that scenario has been about since antiquity as well. It was crystallised via the Liber de Morte wherein Antipater is accused of the plot. In antiquity (as today) there was a good amount of general belief that this may well have happened. Enough, at least, for Arrian to write (what is left extant prior to the lacuna) some three hundred words explaining away the stories of GÇ£bad bloodGÇ¥ as a GÇ£whispering campaignGÇ¥ initiated by GÇ£plausible, malicious peopleGÇ¥ at court. Later he goes on to dismiss the poisoning as GÇ£storiesGÇ¥. Plutarch too spends a reasonable compliment of verbiage in reporting and dismissing the story after stating that the story came out some GÇ£five yearsGÇ¥ after the death. His reasoning is that after GÇ£many daysGÇ¥ the body had not corrupted.

The fact remains that the poisoning story had wide distribution and was evidently believed by many. That two of AlexanderGÇÖs staunchest biographer/apologists saw the need to directly tackle and refute both the GÇ£poisoningGÇ¥ and the deterioration in AlexanderGÇÖs view of Antipater indicates the pervasiveness of the story.

ItGÇÖs difficult to get at the truth of it, but, if one used the yardstick for evidentiary proof on another thread, youGÇÖd have to conclude it may actually have happened.

And in 323 B.C., Parmenion had been dead for 7 years, and Alexander's "orientalisation" had been going on for about as longGǪ

On the matter of AlexanderGÇÖs GÇ£orientalisingGÇ¥ policy, there were long held disagreements with this. Not only the affected dress and the proskynesis, but the re-organisation of the army and the court. At Opis, Alexander GÇô in effect GÇô threw the lot in their face, including the fact that he had constituted an Iranian Guards Brigade (GÇ£Silver ShieldsGÇ¥). There was much hostility. Antipater did not reach his seventies by failing to read the wind one suspects. Craterus too resented this policy. In fact one can really only point to Peucestas and Hephaestion as enthusiastic supporters. Even seven years after ParmenionGÇÖs murder and three or so after ClietusGÇÖ murder, Antipater was not about to put himself in the position that a na+»ve and gullible Peithon would post Gabiene (where it could be argued that he won the day) when Antigonus GÇô never too old to learn a new trick from a dead king GÇô summoned him, on the basis of assigning him further territories and honours, hauled him up before a court of cronies and executed him. Peithon - the sources attest - was comfortable in his satarapy and apparently very popular into the bargain.

yet only now, after seven years, Antipater suddenly felt that it would be necessary to go to war against Alexander?

I suspect that Antipater will have been happy to have been left with the home territories. Happy to have his de facto kingdom to rule and pass on to another generation. As I wrote earlier: what had changed? Certainly in 324/3 something was different. Antipater was the last of this old guard. There was, of course, Polyperchon, but he was being demobbed as well.

IGÇÖd argue that Antipater had reason to feel threatened GÇô his actions demonstrate it. That a mercenary recruitment centre was busy at Taenarum GÇô with an Athenian general taking interest is also pertinent.

I donGÇÖt find it too much of a stretch to see Antipater presaging the line several of the Diadochoi would run over the next decade: GÇ£freedom and autonomy for the GreeksGÇ¥. ItGÇÖs supposition, of course, but should CraterusGÇÖ veterans have joined the cause and Antipater GÇô on a theme of GÇ£freedom for the GreeksGÇ¥ from the GÇ£Asian despot God-KingGÇ¥ GÇô raised the GÇ£Hellenic LeagueGÇ¥ (of Corinth) stiffened by battle hardened Taenarum mercenaries, who knows?

[Jim Boudreaux]

The opinion that Antipater would not have for any reason faced Alexander seems to me to be missing the point. What was the alternative? The fact that Antipater remained in Europe against direct orders with the knowledge of what the rusults of flaunting Alexander would bring, not only on himself, but upon his family and friends shows that something better could be gained by remaining in Pella than by dutifully marching off to Babylon. That something must have been a fighting chance.
Concern forced Antipater to dispatch his son Cassander to Babylon on his behalf. Wikipedia states: "He [Cassander] first appears at the court of Alexander the Great at Babylon, where he defended his father against the accusations of his enemies. " Were his enemies laying accusations against him in the hopes Alexander would elevate him to the post of Chiliarch and then leave them and him in Babylon while Alexander invaded Arabia. Accusers and enemies nowadays want bad for us not good. Things haven't changed that much since then.
Also Plutarch has this to say: And at another time, when Cassander would have said something in opposition to those who were bringing charges against Antipater, Alexander interrupted him, saying: "What meanest thou? Would men come so long a journey if they had not been wronged and were making false charges?" 5And when Cassander declared that this very fact of their coming a long distance away from the proofs showed that they were making false charges, Alexander burst out laughing and said: "These are the famous sophisms of Aristotle's disciples for either side of the question; but ye shall rue the day if it appear that ye have done these men even a slight wrong." How was Antipater to rue the day? By taking from Alexander the appointment as second-in-command at Babylon?
Also consider what type of armies would be facing each other. Battlehardened Macedonians and Greeks under at least 4 world class commanders and Polyperchon. Alexander with a diverse multilingual crowd, few with the mettle of the Macedonian or Greek. And only Alexander need be killed, the army would then collapse.

[agesilaos]

In 317 the Macedonian army was sufficiently impressed by Alexander's mother to lay down its arms and depose their king, Philip III and Queen Eurydike so I doubt you would find any willing to take arms against the great man himself.

Pursuant to the war in 317 Olympias was opposed by Kassander and throughout the Diadochoi Wars he was opposed to Antigonos whose man Hieronymos of Kardia is our main source. I am wary of all these stories of the rift between Antipater and Alexander they have the bouquet of later propaganda.

[Jim Boudreaux]

It would have truly been a sight to see. Two armies perched on opposing ridges poised to drive down into the vale below to contend in desperate battle over the fate of Macedon. Polyperchon and Eurydice in full body armor facing off on the marches of Epirus. Then amid the roaring and trumpeting the Epiriot Royal Guards part ranks and a lone figure walks unstedily down the slope as a hush falls over the massed warriors. This figure wears no armor, only a dress and recognition wrings a gasp from the Macedonians. Olympias!

In 317 the Macedonian army ground arms rather than attack this venerable relic of a glorious past. What Philip was, Alexander was. What Alexander was, Antipater was.
What Antipater was, Philip Arrhidaeus and Eurydice wer not; but Olympias was! These Macedonians were unwilling to war against an icon of a glorious iron willed past on behalf of a addled brained drooler.

But this was six years of bloody uncivil war later than the time being considered here. It is a good point, though, to question if the Macedonian rank and file would have thrown its weight behind Antipater. Like he, what choice would they have?

When Alexander died Athens and Aetolia had both failed to sway him to relent in his demands that they adhere to the Exile's Decree. In both their cases obedience was seen as detrimental to their vital interests and they were considering a military solution. When the Lamian War erupted Leosthenes was able to transport 10,000 mercenaries to Aetolia, incorporate 12,000 Aetolians into his army, pass through Phocis, pick up an additional 3,000 hoplites and blockade Thermopylae before Antipater could march 13,600 men to Pharsalus, with difficulty enlist 2,000 cavalry and himself march to the Gates.

From the rapidity of these achievements it is obvious that the Greeks did not begin their preparations upon hearing of the death of Alexander. They must have been preparing for war for some time and Antipater must have known about such preparations. Cassander did not tell Alexander that his father could not come to Babylon because of a pending uprising in Greece. Could Antipater have purposefuly kept this intelligence from Alexander to suit his own purpose? 25,000 Greek warriors would be of great use to him. With Thessaly and more time to recruit in the Peloponnesus this number could easily have reached 30,000.

In Thrace Seuthes had gained independence from Macedon, but if Alexander were to return to Europe Seuthes' head would gain independence from his neck. He had a keen stake in seeing Antipater remain in charge at Pella. Seuthes had 28,000 Odrysians under his command and along with the possible Greek allies Antipater would have then had 58,000 to go to war with.

If 13,000 were all the available men to field an army with in Macedon then Antipater could have ignored them if they were reluctant to fight with him. If they would join him he would have had 71,000 men to march out of Europe with. Once in Asia Craterus would have likely joined him bringing his army up to 82,000 strong. This army would have comprised 23,000 Macedonians and 30,000 Greek soldiers. With this Antipater could have had a chance, if not against Alexander's army, against Alexander. Antipater's objective would not have been to win a battle, but to kill a man. Alexaner would have been the point man of a Companion wedge driven into Antipaters army. Surely these desperados could have achieved what Persian blue-bloods had failed to do at the Granicus.

[Paralus]

In 317 the Macedonian army was sufficiently impressed by Alexander's mother to lay down its arms and depose their king, Philip III and Queen Eurydike so I doubt you would find any willing to take arms against the great man himself..

G'day Agesilaos.

Jim has argued the point about the civil war. I think at this time, the Macedonian army would have loved nothing more than "proper" Argaead legitimacy at the top. Arrhidaeus was only ever only a "sop" to that feeling. Given the choice between a rather ugly, ambitious Cassander and the not so gifted Polyperchon, Olympias GÇô frightening old murderous dowager that she was GÇô must have looked wonderful. Could she put a stop to all the incessant and growing nonsense?

And, yes it would have been difficult to march against its king. Difficult, not impossible though. Circumstances and personal gain dictate all.

GǪ Olympias was opposed by Kassander and throughout the Diadochoi Wars he was opposed to Antigonos whose man Hieronymos of Kardia is our main source. I am wary of all these stories of the rift between Antipater and Alexander they have the bouquet of later propaganda.

There is no doubt that Hieronymus was indeed an Antigonid man and most likely collected and began recording his history whilst Antigonid harmost in Thebes. Prior to that he was Eumenes' man and as such a part of that Diadochoi camp dedicated to - supposedly - protecting the "Kings". He like all who took part in the events he describes has latent (and not so latent: his apologia over the nomadic Arabs and their defeats of Antigonid forces under himself and Polircetes) biases. Eumenes, of course, derived what legitimacy remained to him (after Perdiccas' death) from Polyperchon and the old Atrax robustus Olympias.

There remains, however, the fact that Antigonus, when threatened by Perdiccas (Eumenes' patron) had no hesitation in scarpering to Antipater to raise both he and Craterus in arms against him. The "bad blood" between Antipater is reported in the vulgate tradition as well, and as the view tends, where there is convergence in the two traditions there is acceptance. It is, of course, quite possible that Arrian's "plausible, malicious people at court" are Antigonous and Eumenes or Perdiccas, though the cogent arguments of Bosworth point at Ptolemy as the author of this propaganda through the Liber de Morte. Plutarch's "five years after" story most likely did come from Hieronymus

Either way, the "bad blood" is reported in the Clietarchus sourced vulgate. It is also a fact that Antipater steadfastly refused his king's summons and GÇô if there were no bad relations GÇô why create them? Yes he sent Cassander but, what he thought of that son may possibly be summed up in the appointment of Polyperchon prior to his death. As well, whilst a cowed Greece was quite willing to obsequiously recognise Alexander's divinity, Antipater did not. In the words of even the rather excusing and apologetic (not to say somewhat idolising) Francois Chamoux (Hellenic Civillisation, Blackwell, 2003):

At variance with general willingness in Greece, Macedonians as a whole, and Antipater in particular, did not follow that intitiative. As long as Alexander was alive, no cult was dedicated to him in his native country.

I assumed it was an order, not initiative. In any case, Antipater eveidently had - at a minimum GÇô some "points of departure" with his King, Hieronymus' loyalties notwithstanding.

Apologies, Agesilaos for the slightly disjointed read of the above GÇô I'm in need of reaching the office GÇô I hope to re-visit this when I've more time.

[Paralus]

GGÇÖday Agesilaos.

A little less pressed for time now.

Just a note on Hieronymus. I have no doubt that as an historian, Hieronymus has his deficiencies. How bad we can, of course, not really tell from the truncated epitome we are left GÇô mainly through Diodorus. It is fair to say that what Plutarch reports in his Life (Eumenes) also owes much to Hieronymus.

As I say, it is safe to assume his work most likely began taking shape whilst he was at Thebes (after Demetrius took and then re-took it) and certainly under the patronage of Gonatas. That being the case, one can reasonably assume a favourable treatment of said patrons. As well, he was a participant in some of these events and, as such, a reasonable amount of acuity must be brought to bear on his accounts GÇô much like Thucydides and his rendering of the fall of Amphipolis (I wonder if the historian ever thought Athens would spend the rest of her independent years scheming to recover it?)

A good GÇô and somewhat similar GÇô example is his treatment of the Nabataean Arabs and the Antigonid troubles with them. The reason for the loss of the bitumen trade and the defeats of Antigonid forces is because the Nabataean lifestyle and culture renders it unconquerable. Nothing at all to do with Antigonid failures in planning and execution GÇô especially on HieronymusGÇÖ watch.

It is possible to say that stories of deteriorating relations between Alexander and Antipater are later interpolations into the Alexander story by Hieronymus. That, of course would presume that his history indeed covered the final years of Alexander, though, there is no reason to doubt this I suppose. Given that his first GÇ£patronGÇ¥ (kinsman?) was Eumenes GÇô who either feared or disliked (depending how you read it GÇô probably both) GÇô Antipater, he would have reason to paint him in a not too positive manner. That will have coloured his view of both Antipater and his family - particularly during the "first Diadochoi war" when Antipater and Cassander enjoyed "above the line" billing.

I do think that relations between Alexander and Antipater had soured though, and I donGÇÖt think the view distilled down to us can all be laid at the feet of propaganda. I canGÇÖt for the life of me see any reason for bringing Antipater to Babylon other than to have done of him. There certainly was no reason to leave Antipater GÇô a recidivist old guard Macedonian, having no truck with either his kingGÇÖs divinity or his 'bastardising' (as the old guard would see it) orientalising policies GÇô chiliarch of the empire. Prior to this, AlexanderGÇÖs rather murderous actions GÇô a GÇÿThebesGÇÖ on a GÇ£personalGÇ¥ scale GÇô demonstrate that he was putting into place people and structures he could trust (in as much as he now trusted anyone) before the next big excursus took him away for however long.

Antipater most certainly will have brought the reserves out from Macedon, had he heeded his kingGÇÖs summons; he may also have returned, just not alive. I suspect he well knew it.

[theaccursed]

Hello Jim.

The opinion that Antipater would not have for any reason faced Alexander seems to me to be missing the point. What was the alternative?

In my opinion, leaving Macedon with an army - and risking yet another attack on Macedon once he had left - to go all the way to Babylon (or perhaps even to Arabia, since that was where Alexander would have been) to face Alexander in battle, would have been a hysterical and completely unreasonable reaction to Alexander summoning him to come to Babylon. Not only is it possible that he could have lost against Alexander, but Macedon itself could also have been lost.

And yes, I do realise that he was afraid of Alexander, being that he knew what had happened to Parmenion, and could not know what Alexander thought about the rumors about him (Antipater). The reaction would still, in my opinon, have been beyond extreme.

But, then..."the alternative"? Well, how about remaining in Macedon and hope that Alexander would not come back for quite some time? And meanwhile perhaps send his son to Babylon to defend him against the rumors?

The fact that Antipater remained in Europe against direct orders with the knowledge of what the rusults of flaunting Alexander would bring, not only on himself, but upon his family and friends shows that something better could be gained by remaining in Pella than by dutifully marching off to Babylon.

Actually, he most likely didn't know what would happen when he disobeyed Alexanders orders. After all - what did happen? Alexander didn't return to Macedon, but, instead, prepared to go to Arabia. Still - I think this (though not necessarily Arabia) was exactly what Antipater was hoping for.

But regarding the rest - yes, I agree completely. He clearly felt that "something better could be gained by remaining in Pella" - something better probably being "remaining alive" for a few more years (which, after all, was all that he would have needed). But, again, that doesn't make marching to Babylon - or Arabia - with the army to attack Alexander (and leaving Macedon very weakened) a reasonable action.

Regarding your quotes ("...ye shall rue the day if..." - et. c.) :

This was in Babylon, after it had become clear to Alexander that Antipater hade disobeyed his orders and instead sent Cassander to Babylon. Which I belive Alexander perceived as treason. I don't think it's surprising that Alexander, under such circumstances, would be extremely negative towards Antipater, and probably belive that there must be some truth to the rumors after all.

[Paralus]

Well, how about remaining in Macedon and hope that Alexander would not come back for quite some time? And meanwhile perhaps send his son to Babylon to defend him against the rumors?

Well indeed and quite the point. I don't believe Antipater was rushing anywhere - least of all to Babylon. He'd enough problems brewing at Athens and the Peloponnese. He'd have defended himself against the inevitable retribution and championed the "Greek cause" against the exiles decree etc.

Which I belive Alexander perceived as treason. I don't think it's surprising that Alexander, under such circumstances, would be extremely negative towards Antipater, and probably belive that there must be some truth to the rumors after all.

And given the "perceived" treason he found after floundering through Gedrosia, Antipater could expect no less. If the story is true, there is no way he was being left behind when Alexander and the new royal army marched off.

Perhaps Craterus was to deliver the King's feelings on the matter? The same Craterus that Plutarch (or Hieronymus) shows as resenting his king's policies and defending the views of the troops and the "old guard":

...the Macedonians loved him (Craterus) so excessively, that if they saw but his hat, or heard his voice, they would all pass over in a body with their arms. And in truth Craterus had a mighty name among them, and the soldiers after Alexander's death were extremely fond of him, remembering how he had often for their sakes incurred Alexander's displeasure, doing his best to withhold him when he began to follow the Persian fashions, and always maintaining the customs of his country, when, through pride and luxuriousness, they began to be disregarded.

But, as I say, we won't ever know. In my opinion, Craterus' views would fit more with Antipater's. But it's only my opinion.

[Jim Boudreaux]

Hi theaccursed,
Of course I realize Antipater had alternatives. A boat to Gadira (Cadiz) to urge a Phoenician brave heart to anticipate Colombus by 1800 years was one of them. But seriously I did not mean to imply that Antipater would have had to attack Alexander, I am quite sure Alexander would've taken the initiative. Antipater's only concern would have been where to make his last stand.

As to leaving Macedon's defenses to the mercies of its enemies, I don't think that follows necessarily. I detailed how Antipater could have amassed a sizable army with no more Macedonians than he marched with to Lamia . In that instance he surely did not leave Macedon unprotected, but I am sure he left Sippas with enough of a force to see to its defense.

Also if he did find common cause with the Greeks and Thracians the greater number of the forces that could attack Macedon would be in Asia with Antipater. By Asia I mean Anatolia as I do not think Antipater would have had to go very far east to find Alexander, perhaps not even further than the straits. You point out that to battle Alexander would have been hysterical and unreasonable. I agree. So would
defending a narrow pass against a Persian host with only 300 hoplites. (I know there were Thespians and Thebans there as well, but they only blunt my point!)

I also agree that an alternate solution would be to await developments and send Cassander to reconnoiter, which is what he did, but to then not prepare for the possibility that Cassander may have returned in an urn would have been short sighted. I do not mean any disrespect to Alexander because of these posts, I think he is hands down the most remarkable and able military genius to ever walk this earth. I just think he did not have one big happy empire and want to examine the consequences of there being persons of power who were dismayed because of his real or perceived intentions.

True, Alexander did not return to Macedon, and I wonder why not. Harpalus in Athens with lots of money, mercenaries gathering in the southern
Peloponnesus, Aetolia and Athens chaffing under the stress of the Exile's Decree, Seuthes in open rebelion, Craterus idling in Cilicia and Antipater refusing his orders to reliquish his position add up to quite a reason to go west.

If Hephaestion had not died would he have gone? Questioning why these things did or did not happen, to me, is not questioning the ability of Alexander, but is a means to understanding the mind of Alexander. Understanding is what it is all about. By bouncing my conclusions off this forum I have had two occasions when Paralus has explained facets of this era that I did not consider and have gained an understanding that had escaped me before. That would not have happened if others oppinions were not sought. There are things about this age I do not know, but I think it is better to not know something than to not even suspect. So I keep up the search for the possibilities and hope to find the likelihoods.

[theaccursed]

Hello Paralus and Jim.

Apparently, I've misunderstood you two.

So, just to make sure I understand you correctly now: In your opinion, Antipater was trying to lure Alexander to return to Macedon - the "inevitable retaliation" (that, however, proved not to be inevitable), raise as large an army as he could, persuade Craterus and the returning macedonians to join him against Alexander, and then, when Alexander himself returned, greet him perhaps in Cilicia, with an army ready for battle - perhaps 80 000 soldiers - and focus, not so much on winning the battle as on killing Alexander. And the reason for such a drastic idea: Alexander's "orientalisation" - that he had heard of for 7 years or so, but never (like the rest of Macedon) actually seen for himself. Correct?

I actually kind of like it. It's a rather chilling scenario, and one that would certainly have caused Alexander very serious problems - had everything indeed happened exactly according to your scenario. A third mutiny, essentially, but on a huge scale, with, this time, all of Macedon deserting Alexander.

But: if Antipater wanted to provoke Alexander to return to Macedon, he could have been rather less subtle than to merely remain in Macedon and instead not only send his
own son to Babylon - but also to have him defend him against the rumors. To me, that rather seems like he was trying to soften Alexander's views of him, rather than
to provoke him.

Had he truly wanted to provoke Alexander, he could have simply sent only a messenger, with a letter beginning with (something like):

Dear fool - and traitor:

This is King Antipater I of Macedon. I have read your request for me to come to Babylon, and also to bring reinforcements. I think...not. Rather, I hereby order you to send me some reinforcements: the remaining macedonian soldiers. Furthermore, I order you to return to Macedon to surrender yourself and stand trial for your many crimes. Comply, and I and shall take sparing your life into consideration. Defy me, and I shall make you regret it. Also...if you write me again, do not refer to me as your representative, but rather as your king, and the one who is now in possession of all that once was yours.

That, I think, Alexander would have considered a "declaration of war". At least Caesar knew, by crossing the Rubicon, exactly what that would mean. Antipater sending his son to try to persuade Alexander that the rumors about Antipater were without substance? That's not exactly obvious. After that, certainly Alexander must have felt he couldn't trust Antipater. But I doubt he felt the same about Macedon itself. And Antipater would soon, as far as Alexander knew, be replaced.

I think a more reasonable interpretation is that Antipater simply didn't trust that Alexander would treat him fairly, had he come to Babylon, and that the "provocation" itself was a very unfortunate consequence. I think Antipater, in spite of disliking some of what he had heard about Alexander - still had enough problems to deal with in Greece to want to add to those a civil war, with Alexander as the opponent.

It's not a bad theory or an uninteresting scenario. But it is, in my opinion, far-fetched, and certainly not the simplest explanation to why Antipater remained in Macedon, but sent his son to Babylon.