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Hello All,
It's been a while since I posted, as I've been busy with more important things. I finally found some time to get back to work on the epic poem, and found myself buried within the intricacies of Alexander's last great pitched battle against Porus. I have made some startling discoveries about the much talked about and debated cavalry engagement on the Indian left flank.
Alexander needed to find a way to deal with the elephants with his infantry, since cavalry are terrified of elephants and would be useless against them. To allow his infantry to deal with the elepnants, he needed to find a way to secure their flanks (normally protected by his cavalry). To accomplish this, he decided to eliminate Porus' cavalry. Conventional wisdom states that Alexander sent Coenus left with orders to charge back to the right once Porus sent his own right side cavalry detachment back to his left to support his own left and develop a superiority of numbers over Alexander on that side. Arrian mentions Alexander sent Coenus right, and most historians have assumed that he meant to Porus' right...I am not of the opinion that this is what happened. The main problem confronted by the historian here is that Porus' left flank is assumed to be close to the river bank, and therefore, Coenus could not swing around that way. If we can assume that when Porus moved his army, he moved it a bit away from the river, then we can get away from this accepted line of reasoning. Under this assumption, Coenus was sent to Alexander's right with ample room for maneuvre. Alexander probably held Coenus' two Hipparchies behind his own line of Hipparchies with orders to charge once Porus sent in his remaining cavalry. Alexander's lead off skirmishing force acted as a covering screen which effectively drew the Indian cavalry out from behind the elephant line and into the open where they could be cut off and annihilated. This makes more tactical sense on a number of points.
cont'd...

1. It doesn't make sense to send Coenus left where he might be seen by Porus or his advisors and scouts...if seen Porus would likely not have sent his right to support his left. (the reason for this critical point was that Alexander wanted Porus to overload his left because Porus had an inferior force of cavalry and Alexander needed to eliminate it so his infantry could attack the elephants without molestation). To do this he tricked Porus into thinking that he could overwhelm ATG's cavalry force (by making him think it was slightly inferior in number) which could be seen concentrating on his left. 2. If Coenus was sent left then he would have to charge hard all the way back against the field (either as Fuller says it "in front of the Indian lines", or as Green says it "winging around Porus' right and behind Porus' lines to take them in rear". Either way, Coenus' maneuvre risked being either seen or intercepted...respectively. 3. Coenus' cavalry would already have been tired from the overnight trip over the river upstream, and then the long trip downstream...it would not be smart to push these horses further. To go left and then right would have meant another 6-8 miles of charging and exposure to strafing fire from Porus' long-bowmen. 4. There was not any tactical advantage of sending these Hipparchies left...save for a checking force against Porus' right side Hipparchies...and this was not likely to happen or be a problem. Thus far, Porus had not shown himself to be an offensive minded general on any occasion, i.e...his lack of initiative during the pre-battle ruse marches, his elephant line, his set-up across the river...Alexander could see through this man's psyche from 12 miles away and exploited it to the fullest. cont'd...

So the cavalry engagement unfolds like this...

1. Coenus is sent right behind ATG's right and hidden from view setting up on a dip on the ground...and told to wait until Porus takes the bait.

2. ATG sends in his horse archers to strafe Porus' infantry and annoy his cavalry...just outside the reach of his elephant mahouts...

3. Porus sends out his left side cavalry to repulse the horse archers...so far suspects nothing.

4. ATG rolls his horse archers out of the way and sends in his own 2 Hipparchies (with himself leading the charge). He keeps his other 2 Hipparchies hidden behind him and out of sight. This produces the desired result of giving the impression that ATG has now sent in all of his cavalry and that Porus can overwhelm them by sending his right side cavalry left. The trap is set, now all that remains is for Porus to take the bait...

5. Porus seeing his opportunity to annihilate ATG's cavalry sends his right side cavalry left.

6. As soon as they are fully engaged (probably out front of the lines somewhat), Coenus wings around Porus' left and charges the cavalry on Porus' left and rear.

The trap is sprung and Porus can't avoid certain defeat at this critical point of the battle. Now it is just a matter of time before ATG disects the elephant line and cuts the Indians to pieces. With Porus' left bottled up, Craterus can easily and without molestation cross the river, handle the small elephant detachment left there by Porus, and open the decisive second front. ATG's infantry advances without fear of being flanked by cavalry and engages the elephants frontally by clever use of the Hypaspists, Agrianians, archers, and Javelin men who surround and relentlessly harass the beasts and their mahouts. All of this was made possible by the elimination of the cavalry from Porus' battle plan. Of course, the elephants got their share of blood and it was still the elephants which posed the greatest problem for ATG.

later Nicator