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Economic data is difficult to come by as our sources are not interested in economics. It is therefore necessary to attempt to extrapolate from expenditure we can measure and check the results gained thereby against any numismatic indications.By far the most detailed information we have concerns the Macedonian Army and, for that reason, it is military expenditure that we must tackle first.MILITARY COSTSWe are fortunate that literary and epigraphic evidence survives which allow a reasonable reconstruction of pay rates for various troops throughout this period
Our first piece of evidence is IG2 ii I. 329 ll. 9-10 GÇÿhypaspistei drachmen kai toisGǪ| hekastes tes hemerasGÇÖ GÇÿA hypaspist is to receive a drachma a dayGÇÖ. This fragmentary Attic inscription refers to the rate of pay of AlexanderGÇÖs hypaspists.
This is supported by Arrian (VII xxiii 3) where GÇÿGǪkatalegen autous es tas Makedonikas taxeis, dekadarchen men tes dekados heeisthai Makadona kai epi toutoi dimoiriten Makadona kai dekastateron, outos onomazomen apo tes misthophoros, hentina meiona men tou dimoiritou, pleiona de ton ouk en timei strateuomenon epherenGǪoste entei dekadi tessaras men einai Makedonas, tous men tei misthophorai prouchontas, ton de tei archei tes dekados,..GÇÖ or GÇÿGǪ he organised them into Macedonian units, putting a Macedonian file-leader in charge of the file and behind him a double-pay man and then a GÇÿten-stater manGÇÖ, so-called because of his pay, which was less than the double-pay man but more than the common soldierGǪso each file contained four Macedonians, three on enhanced pay and one in chargeGǪGÇÖ.
The key here is the dekastateros, since this must be a silver stater, i.e. a tetradrachm his pay is forty drachmai, which is more than basic pay, but not double. This fits with the thirty drachmai of the hypaspist 30, 40, 60; so G.T Griffith GÇÿThe Mercenaries of the Hellenistic WorldGÇÖ.
However, he has ignored the file-leader, whose pay is surely higher; he is not included in the enhanced pay because he is on normal pay, but normal pay for a decadarch. Also the Hypaspists were elite troops and throughout history elite troops have attracted a higher rate of pay. We can still make sense of this if we assume basic infantry pay of 25 drachmai; it cannot be so low as 20 since this would put the GÇÿdekastaterosGÇÖ on double-pay which he explicitly was not. 25, 40, 50, 60 (for the dekadarch) in the pezhetairoi and 30, 50, 60, 75 in the hypaspistai seems a reasonable structure and allows

and allows for the differing status of the troops and suitable enhancements for rank. Dekadarchs, dimoirites and dekastateroi must have been close in importance as each supercedes the otherGÇÖs function once there is a casualty. Nor does the step-up from soldier to NCO seem excessive as the increase in responsibility and ability must have been great. (It is my opinion that the NCO class was frequently stripped from the phalanx units to form flying columns, these being the GÇÿnimblest of the phalanxGÇÖ and known also as asthetairoi but that is another paper.)
Regarding the troops of the League, it is surely unfeasible that Alexander would pay, what were essentially hostages, more than his frontline fighters. In 383 the Spartans allowed their allies to substitute a contribution in money for one in men at a rate of 3 Aegintean obols per man (Xen Hell. V ii 21) which is four Attic obols or 2/3 drachma per day or 20 drachmai per month, this is at first sight a reasonable rate but assumes that there had been no price inflation in fifty years. The point is moot if the League had to pay its own troops.
There remain the cavalry, mercenaries and the Balkan light troops to consider.
In Babylon (Diod. XVII lxiv 6) Alexander distributes bonuses of 6 minae to each Companion cavalryman, 5 minae to the allied cavalry, and 2 to the Macedonian infantry, the mercenaries receive two months pay. The amounts say nothing about the rates of pay only that the figures for the cavalry and the Macedonian infantry do not represent two monthGÇÖs wages for these troops and probably more. There would be a sound reason for the proportions of pay to be maintained, between these groups, however, 6:5:2: on a basic rate of 25Dr yeilds
75: 62.5:25. We can translate the infantry rate back into monthGÇÖs wages and arrive at eight monthGÇÖs wages for these groups. Curtius V I 45, supports these ratios only he says 600 denarii, 500 denarii, 200 denarii and three months wages; clearly he is using denarii for drachmai, a mina being 100 drachmai; assuming that the mercenaries were on the same 20 Dr/month as the league troops they received 40 or 60 drachmai each, which may not be far wrong as Kleitarchos would surely have expressed all the amounts in minae were the mercenaries to receive a simple fraction of a mina ( 3 obols a day or 15 dr/month would yeild 30 and 45 respectively so is equally possible).
The Balkan troops remain, and for them there is no evidence. However, at Athens, paupers received 2

The Balkan troops remain, and for them there is no evidence. However, at Athens, paupers received 2 obols a day dole. This may be seen as a starvation rate. Dikasts received 3 and were drawn from the poor. Since hoplites seem to have received 4 (though with a ration on top), it may be reasonable to allot them a rate of 2 obols but with rations provided. Barbarian troops were consistently cheaper than Hellenes and light troops the cheapest of the Hellenic types. This translates into 10 Dr a month. These assumptions are susceptible to tests. There exists an inscription (IG2 iv I. 68 ll 95-99) from Epidauros concerning the re-creation of a Hellenic League by Demetrius in 303-302. This contains a clause concerning the fines for the failure of League members to provide certain troops. It has been reasonably argued that the fines represent ten times the pay of the soldier concerned. Accepting this a hoplite commanded daily 2 Dr, a cavalryman 5 and a psilos 1.
Now, the rates above were based on the pay alone with rations being taken in kind, this could apply for the Epidauros case but since these troops are no longer campaigning against a foreign foe in a land devoid of markets it would seem more likely that an allowance for rations is included. After all Demetrius is still going to have to feed his men, and given the AntigonidsGÇÖ propaganda about Greek Freedom pillaging them might prove an embarassment. The rate for an Alexandrian hoplite was very likely 1 drachma a day all in, 4 obols pay, 2 obols rations so pay has doubled. The cavalryGÇÖs 13 obols have become 30 possibly reflecting an increase in the price of fodder. The poor old psilos has not improved his lot and still earns 2 obols 4 going on rations. The poor getting poorer is no new phenomenon. But overall,prices have doubled in the thirty years since Alexander died. To put such inflation into perspective, it is commonly reckoned that today prices double every ten years.
Later inscriptions give the following daily rates for citizens; c.270 a treaty between the Aetolians and Acharnanians allows, 1 Corinthian stater for a cavalryman (16 Attic obols), 12 corinthian (8 Attic)obols for a hoplite, for a peltast 9 Corinthian (6 Attic) and for a psilos 7 (4 2/3 Attic).
A treaty between Antigonos Doson and Hierapytna in Crete gives one Attic (Alexander) drachma per citizen daily in 228.
In 200, Hierapytna makes a contract to supply troops to Rhodes at a rate of 9 Rhodian (8 Attic) obols and 2 Rhodian drac

In 200, Hierapytna makes a contract to supply troops to Rhodes at a rate of 9 Rhodian (8 Attic) obols and 2 Rhodian drachmai for an officer. Interestingly the contract allows for mercenaries and citizens to receive the same rate of pay.
Finally Polybios (V i 11ff) states that in 218 the wages of 6,000 Macedonians and 1,200 mercenaries came to 17 Talents a month exclusive of rations. Assuming the mercenaries commanded 2 obols daily they would cost 12,000 drachmai or 2T, 15T between the remaining 6,000 gives 15 drachmai month or three obols a day

SOURCE Mac cav Ally cav Mac inf Hoplite or Citizen Pelt/merc Barb/psil
ATHENS 30
ARRIAN 75 62 1/2 25 20 20/15 10
EPIDAU 150# 60# 30#
AET/AC 80 40 30 23 1/3
ANT/HI 30
HI/RHO 53 1/3 off 40
POLYB 15 10
# including rationsThe most surprising thing must be the cheapness of Philip VGÇÖs Macedonians and the expense of Cretan troops. The figures in both the Aetolian decree and the Rhodian contract may include rations but the normal terminology is confused in these instances so certainty is impossible.There may be two possibilities for the low total of Philip V either campaigning in Greece counted as home service for which a lower rate was paid or inflation had caused the ration portion of payment to inflate so much that the wage was depressed. My preference would be for the latter explanation since PhilipGÇÖs men were to be paid by the Achaean League this must be service in a foreign land and he would certainly have no reason to economise, the Achaeans were to provide rations as well.Given that Cretan troops would normally be psiloi it may be that the starvation rate had risen from 2 obols to 6 obols (a drachma) a day the total cost of troops would remain about the same but the proportion that had to be provided grew steadily; men may fight for the promise of money but they cannot eat the promise of food.MACEDONIAN ARMIESPhilip II
The sources are somewhat scant but his in campaign against Onomarchos in Phocis (352) he deployed 20,000 foot and 3,000 horse and at Chaironaia in 338, 30,000 foot and 2,000 cavalry.
No details survive but as the kingdom would still need protecting, so it is unlikely that Philip would have taken more Macedonian foot than the 12,000 Alexander was to take to Asia, nor would all the horse be Macedonian. Allowing for this, rough costings for these armies are 108.5T and 149T respectively.Alexander
We will only consider the expedit

Alexander
We will only consider the expedition here as after the initial push it was Persian gold that paid for the conquest so little can be surmised about the state of the Macedonian coffers. The Army would have cost 114T and the fleet about 80 T. A total of 200T/month the figure Onesicritos gave for AlexanderGÇÖs debt according to Plutarch Alx. XV 1. In the same passage Aristoboulos states that there were 70T for supplies and Duris that this represented a monthGÇÖs worth. Parke estimates that at this stage ration costs were 1/3rd of overall costs, which works out fairly close to the overall cost we have calculated and may be said to provide a check.Antigonos Doson
Extracting the figures for the Macedonians at Sellasia 222 we find 13,000 infantry and 600 horse costing 74T it should be remembered that Macedon had been shorn of her Thracian territories and had lost ground against the Illyrians in the North and West. Even so this is a large expeditionary force for such an enfeebled State which coined only in bronze.Philip V
Kynoskephelai saw 16,000 Macedonian foot, 7,500 mercenaries and 2,000 horse total cost 125T. Following his defeat Philip worked hard to return Macedon to her former glory opening mines abandoned after the Gallo-Illyrian invasions re-establishing tax revenue and encouraging a baby boom.Perseus
His fatherGÇÖs good work saw to it that at Pydna the Macedonian army could field 21,000 Macedonian foot, 17,000 mercenaries and 4,000 cavalry or 199T of assets.
ConclusionWhat we can see is that PhilipGÇÖs armies may well have taken the whole of a yearGÇÖs production from the Philippi mines to fund but that when Macedonia was but a rump of his Kingdom she could still afford a broadly similar military outlay. In fact PerseusGÇÖ final effort saw the State match the effort Alexander had thought sufficient to conquer Asia.
Since these later kings were without much of the income available to Philip or Alexander and yet were able to support similar armies it is clear that Philip cannot have left Alexander an empty treasury. These tales of thousand talent debt can be safely disregarded as later propaganda designed to denigrate Philip and/or exalt his son. The figures in the earlier writers seem to relate to the cost of AlexanderGÇÖs campaign not any debt he contracted to support it.
It becomes clear, however that Alexander planned for swift campaign only allowing for a month before the campaign had to feed itself.