pothos.org

Anybody seen that make of delicious red?????

Well, here I am, a week behind, and at least eight substantial posts to reply to !!!

Best I make a start, then......

Agesilaos wrote 16/7/14

agesilaos wrote:

‘All these words describe troops moving up in file into the intervals between existing files.’

And yet

I have never suggested that the expressions were synonyms

I had always thought that words describing the same movement were synonyms; but just how similar are they?

Quite wrong. A synonym is "a word or phrase identical or co-extensive to another in sense or usage in context" [C.Ox.D]As I have been at pains to say a number of times. and e.g. ship, boat and vessel may be synonyms and used to describe the same thing in one context, but vessel may describe a pot or container in another context, and similarly boat and ship may be used to distinguish one type of waterborne vessel from another!

I have also been at pains to emphasise that different terminology can be used to describe the same thing e.g. "the files marched up one beside another" and "the files took up position in parallel" are not synonyms, but do describe the same thing.
I am sure every reader understands this.

Not particularly similar; it is only [original]Xenophon's fantasy organisation that makes them seem possibly similar; where there are only two subunits (dekades) then clearly one will move passed the next one, but this leaves two sub-unit abreast ready for the next evolution and they

Something seems to have dropped out here, but since it is mere repetition, we can be reasonably sure you are saying that the two 'double' half files move out to come up beside the two front half-files as per your diagram on page 1. Quite impossible in practice because it requires a 'double' gap every two files i.e. 12 ft if the end result is to retain open order, or if you wish to end up in close order, the second front 'half file' has to shuffle sideways 3 feet, to close up into close order with its fellow front half-file and make room for the two rear half-files, ( Try it with coins or similar tokens) Agesilaos' drill" simply cannot practically be done. No wonder his diagram didn't set out the intervals !

Agesilaos' diagram for the later Hellenistic 'parembole/interjection, or insertion' is correct, but the diagram for 'paragon'/ lead up by the side' wrong for the Hellenistic meaning, and more importantly wrong for Xenophon's usage of the term.
[digression: The Hellenistic meaning is the same as Xenophon's ]

Xenophon uses the word 'paragon' and its variations in its military context some 18 times in his various works- six in the Cyropaedia, four in the Hellenica, five in the Anabasis and three in his Minor works. In each and every case the word means "lead up by the side of/move alongside; march men up from the side/beside" and the like, whether it be moving enomotia up side by side to form phalanx [Anab IV.3.26], moving officers along a rank for inspection [Cyro III.3.12], moving troops beside and past places [Hell IV.5.11; VII.2.8], or the 'dinner drill' moving lochoi, files, and half-files up beside one another [Cyro III.2.3] or doing the same for cavalry - moving half-files up beside files just as in the' dinner drill' [ Cav Commander IV.10].
In the case of of Epaminondas at second Mantinea, he formed phalanx, then 'left-turned' and marched toward the mountains ( incidently, in paragoge formation), and to form his depth, successive lochoi simply moved up 'beside/paragogon' the stationary leading lochoi until a sufficient depth was achieved ( exactly as if they were forming phalanx to the flank). Then the phalanx right-turned and attacked.....

I believe you have been led astray by the occasional, and incorrect, translation of 'paragon' as "wheel". Most assuredly it does NOT mean, ever, move to the side, then turn 90 degrees and move forward, as in your diagram. It is "lead up BY the side" not "lead TO the side."

Epameinondas, having conscripted for the battle all Thebans of military age and the other Boeotians who were willing and qualified, led forth from Thebes his army, numbering in all not more than six thousand. Diodoros XV 51 ii

Not solely a Theban levy then, but an army total of 6,000. Again, that there were twice the number of Spartans is crucial in your attempt to minimize the proportionate casualties but it is a digression to establish this, against the evidence of Xenophon it has to be said.

Like almost all commentators, I suggest Diodorus has been misinterpreted by some. He may have summoned all the Boeotian League troops, but the army he led forth from Thebes can only have consisted of the Theban contribution - the other contingents coming from Orchomenus , Hysiae, Thespiae, Tanagra and various smaller places. ( It is unlikely that Thebes would let thousands of hostile Boeotians within its walls, or feed and house them - most of these cities had fought Theban hegemony, and only come under her sway some three years before in 374 BC. Plataea had been razed in 373 BC, Thespiae in 371 not long after Leuktra ( in part because of their refusal to fight and attempted desertion at Leuktra) and Orchomenus in 364 BC.)
The contingents would have met up probably in the vicinity of Leuktra.

That there were actually twice as many Spartans has nothing to do with "minimising" proportionate casualties at Leuktra - it is all but certain as can be that this was so from much earlier. In this instance it is consistent with the evidence of Plutarch on numbers at Leuktra, for he tells us there were 10,000 plus 1,000 on the Spartan side, and since allies tended to amount to two thirds or so of the the Lakedaemonian contingent, that implies, since we know that 35 age classes had been called out, the four citizen 'Morai' ( Homioi and Hypomeiones) numbered some 4,480 hoplites plus the 300 Hippeis, plus perhaps 4-500 cavalry ( see also my post 16 July).

The number of enomotia ( 16) given in the 'Constitution' has been shown to be erroneous - possibly a copyists error, or else an attempt to 'correct' the number to match the 16 enomotia of Thucydides - who knows his figures are wrong.

Even if you want to add 2,000 old codgers and striplings they are irrelevant as only the left wing embolon fought and that was composed of the best troops in the army, so they would have been with the unengaged centre and right

.

The left wing was composed of the Thebans i.e "the picked men/epilektoi", it was the Thebans who were the pick of the army Diod XV.55.2, and the "old codgers and striplings" are most likely to have been in the middle and rear ranks of the 50 deep phalanx. It is the reluctant allies who form the centre and right.

This, in fact has some bearing on the 'files and half-files question'. There were almost 1,000 Lakedaemian killed,including 400 Spartiates/Homioi, to say nothing of wounded. On a frontage of only 80 ( your numbers and formation, 4,000 x 50 deep), that means each Theban killed over a dozen Spartans, or half-a-dozen each if we allow the second rank to participate !!!! Credible? No way !!

With 6,000 Theban hoplites, we have a frontage of 120 killing 1,000 - still over 8 each !

If on the other hand, there were 6,000 Theban hoplites who closed up to 25 deep, we have a frontage of 240, and the number falls to four per Theban, or two allowing for second rank participation.....much more credible ! Especially if we may allow that allied lochoi adjacent to the Theban column likely took part.

There is no direct statement that the allies encamped separately but cf VI 4 xxiv

With such words, then, he endeavoured to dissuade the Thebans from making the final venture; to the Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, he pointed out what manner of thing a defeated army was, and what an army victorious. “And if you wish,” he said, “to forget the disaster which has befallen you, I advise you first to recover your breath and rest yourselves, and then, after you have become stronger, go into battle against men who are unconquered. But now,” he said, “be well assured that even among your allies there are those who are holding converse1 with the enemy about a treaty of friendship with them; by all means, then, try to obtain a truce. And I am myself eager for this,” he said, “out of a desire to save you, both because of my father's friendship with you and because I am your diplomatic agent.”

It is hard to see how the allies could be treating with the enemy and the Spartans not notice if they were all in one camp.

I agree ! But you have things back-to-front, I suggest. I dealt with this earlier ( see my post July 20th) as to why ( assuming Xenophon isaccurately reporting the gist of what was said) Jason would say this - even though it is very unlikely to be true.
They would have been in one camp, and overtures to the Thebans from allied contingents unlikely for this and the other reasons I referred to.

Xenophon wrote:

Agesilaos wrote:
It is hard to see how the allies could be treating with the enemy and the Spartans not notice if they were all in one camp.

I agree ! But you have things back-to-front, I suggest. I dealt with this earlier ( see my post July 20th) as to why ( assuming Xenophon isaccurately reporting the gist of what was said) Jason would say this - even though it is very unlikely to be true.
They would have been in one camp, and overtures to the Thebans from allied contingents unlikely for this and the other reasons I referred to.

Methinks Xenophon (of Brisvegas) "doth protest too much" to 'return Bard'. Nothing precludes the allies making overtures to the Thebans. There are countless notations in the sources of interaction between opposing camps before and after battle. The most (in)famous example being Eumenes who was handed over without him suspecting Teutamos had done the deal.

On the matter of the allies and their negotiations, Xenophon (of Athens) can, of course, only be preserving the gist of anything that Jason might have said; anything he records can only be second hand at very best. 'Pacts of friendship' need not (and do not here) mean alliances made and signed on the spot. Deals were indeed done on the spot and the Spartans were seemingly quite good at it themselves (see Derkylidas' many truces in the field and Agesilaos' entreaties of frienship and truce in the same field). All it need mean is that some of the allies (those not displeased obviously) were negotiating their own way out of Boeotia without consulting the Spartans.

The surviving polemarchs had obviously decided that renewing the battle was not on and they at no stage looked to do so. Had they decided to retreat, as Agesilaos has postulated and I agree, advice to do so from Jason coupled with notification of treacherous allies, not at all displeased with the result, serve that very well. One might say that is the Spartans' "Mandy Rice-Davies" moment. As does the fear of Theban treachery. Truces, as far as I can recall, were generally observed. I cannot recall a truce made after battle (in the 'Classical' period) that was not kept (Sparta and Athens actually kept a 'false peace' for a year before that of Nikias; the truce contracted at Pylos). In fact, I cannot call to mind (mind you I haven't looked) an instance where an army was attacked after having negotiated a truce on the field. Harking back to Derkylidas above, it would appear Spartans seemed to trust most everyone in these truces even the barbarian Persian. Thebes, though, cannot be trusted.

I am going to confine myself to the strength of the Spartan Mora, which seems crucial and does not involve linguistics.

We have several sources for Spartan unit organisation and strength;
1) Herodotos tells us that at Plataia they supplied 5,000 men in an unspecified number of ‘lochoi’ IX 28 ii.
2) Thukydides V 68 iii gives a lochos of four pentekostyes each of four enomotiai of 32 for a strength of 512.
3) Xenophon Lak Pol gives a Mora of four lochoi each of two pentekostyes each of two enomotiai of 36 for 576
4) Plutarch Pelopidas 17 iv-v gives the strengths given by Ephoros – 500, Kallisthenes – 700 and Polybios among others – 900.

Now Xenophon of Oz posits,

The number of enomotia ( 16) given in the 'Constitution' has been shown to be erroneous - possibly a copyists error, or else an attempt to 'correct' the number to match the 16 enomotia of Thucydides - who knows his figures are wrong.

Now this is worse than disinformation – the query about the text refers to the number of Lochagoi – four- whereas Xen. Hell. VII 4 xx and 5 x, would imply that a lochos was half a mora in that the army previously described as six morai is now twelve lochoi. The emendation is forced, however as Lak.Pol is concerned with the pre-Leuktra army and it is likely that the crushing defeat and massive loss of citizens necessitated an organisational reform. Not only that the suggested change does not alter the sixteen enomotiai. It is somewhat naïve to suggest that a later copyist would correct the figure of sixteen enomotiai to match Thukydides yet leave the eight Pentekontereis, as opposed to four, and the four lochagoi rather than one.

Nor is it difficult to see how Ephoros and Theopompos arrive at their figures; Ephoros, a careless and lazy researcher has merely taken Thukydides’ figure for a ‘lochos’ as a ‘mora’ whereas Theopompos has researched the organisation correctly but used the theoretical strength of forty; one from each age group as the basis for his enomotia, hence 16 x 40 = 640, which he has rounded up, or, and this is very likely, Plutarch derived his figures from Polybios, whom he quotes as giving 900 and those of Ephoros and Theopompos come from Polybios’ criticism of them and the Megapolitan is improving his case (as usual). Why should Polybios make the ‘mora’ 900? Simple, his Spartans had been re-armed as sarrisa-armed phalangites and the unit had been reformed like much else by Kleomenes III.

So, The only source that implies a strength of more than 600 is Polybios who is comparing oranges to apples. Maybe you would care to name and shame the div that says Lak Pol ‘has been shown to be wrong’.

Nor are your proportions for Spartan expeditionary forces correct, though if you double Spartan numbers everytime that is unsurprising; Diodoros, whom you like to accept has Agesilaos proceed into Boeotia with five ‘morai’ of 500 and a total army of 18,000 a ratio of 7.2 allies per Spartan, XV 32 i

Agesilaüs led forth his army and reached Boeotia accompanied by all the soldiers, amounting to more than eighteen thousand, in which were the five divisions of Lacedaemonians. Each division contained five hundred men.

What has to be remembered is that these figures come from Ephoros (demonstrated by the use of his strength for the ‘morai’) we should adjust them, so that the five morai are 576 as per Lak Pol. So the ratio changes to 2880/18,000 16% Lakedaimonian; apply this to the 10,000 at Leuktra and you get a predicted 1,600 Lakedaimonians whereas the four morai alone would give 2,300, plus the hippeis, this force was overstrength by 50% vis-à-vis the Lakonian element, no doubt due to its small size, unless the pro-Theban Plutarch is reducing the size of the enemy in a really un-Greek way!!!

It is intriguing that sources other than Xenophon are regarded as "rationalisation, and spin based on pro-Theban sources" (Pausanis) and dismissed as pro-Theban in general. This does not preclude picking those bits that cohere with the espoused view though. Xenophon (the Athenian) is, though, held up as the very epitome of source integrity. That the fellow was an arch Loconophile and that such may infuse his narrative seems to pass notice. Even this source, though, is questioned when not cohering to the view: his reporting of Jason's advice that the allies were conversing with the Thebans, for example, is "a very dubious claim". All else - including Xenophin's portrait of the Theban's incontinent search for aid against the defeated Spartans - is acceptable though.

Paralus wrote:It is intriguing that sources other than Xenophon are regarded as "rationalisation, and spin based on pro-Theban sources" (Pausanis) and dismissed as pro-Theban in general. This does not preclude picking those bits that cohere with the espoused view though. Xenophon (the Athenian) is, though, held up as the very epitome of source integrity. That the fellow was an arch Loconophile and that such may infuse his narrative seems to pass notice. Even this source, though, is questioned when not cohering to the view: his reporting of Jason's advice that the allies were conversing with the Thebans, for example, is "a very dubious claim". All else - including Xenophin's portrait of the Theban's incontinent search for aid against the defeated Spartans - is acceptable though.

I grow very tired of 'sniping' personal attacks of this nature on my posts, especially when, as here they are completely false and intended purely to throw discredit on what I say. Indeed the whole post is purely spiteful and unfairly attacks my integrity.

If I point out that the sources for a particular passage in Pausanias are 'pro-Theban', that is merely an observation on that passage, it does not mean I "dismiss" Pausanias or ANY source. ( an example of the 'testis unis, testis nullus' fallacy, and another example of Agesialos' false suggestion that if one rejects part,why not reject the whole). Nor do I hold up Xenophon as the "very epitome of source integrity" - these are Paralus' weasel words, for you will not find them in any post of mine. It is also wrong to call Xenophon an "arch-laconophile", for whilst he may be pro-Spartan, he is quite capable of criticising them and their actions, and for that matter praising Thebans and their actions. That he is an 'arch laconophile' is another modern trope, thoughtlessly repeated.

As to Xenophon's reporting of Jason's claim that :

But now,” he said, “be well assured that even among your allies there are those who are holding converse with the enemy about a treaty of friendship with them;

I consider this "a very dubious claim" of Jason's because:

1. Whilst outposts, watering parties and deserters might 'converse' with the enemy, they do not negotiate "Treaties of Friendship"; nor do subordinate allies and their contingent commanders- who don't even have the power to negotiate a binding truce between the foes, let alone a Treaty of Friendship, between their own cities and Thebes.

2. It is exactly what Jason might be expected to say in HIS efforts to negotiate a truce. His accusation is very vague. A crude attempt to sow discord which even the ever-suspicious Spartans did not react to.

3. Such negotiations are not really credible, unless, as Agesilaos wrongly concludes, the allies were in a separate camp, unlikely in itself - and for which there is no evidence whatsoever.

4. The allied contingents remain loyal and obedient to orders. Only after the army is disbanded and goes home is there any sedition, which breaks out politically among some of the Arcadian allies the next year.

5. Would Jason know of such sensitive, secret negotiations if they were true? The Thebans would be unlikely to tell him, and if such delicate negotiations were true, the last thing Thebes would want is to have them betrayed immediately to the Spartans - the repercussions would be awful; which of course would be great if the accusations were false, as they so obviously are, but believed.

Note that I did not rule out Jason's claim, merely considered it unlikely......

Finally, I am criticised for weighing up and deciding what is probable and likely in what I am supposed to regard as the "very epitome of source integrity" and what is not. A complete contradiction in the space of a short post. I am both criticised for placing too much faith in Xenophon, who is after all our best source on Leuktra and the history of this period, and then for not swallowing everything he says, or rather has Jason say. No historian unequivocally accepts everything in a source, and if Paralus and Agesilaos took this approach, and I know they do not, then they would be very gullible indeed. Why therefore make such obvious false accusations in personal attacks on my integrity ?

Perhaps a further sign of desperation in debate?

Finally, I would sincerely hope that no reader here reading my posts for themselves would believe this sort of thing.

Xenophon wrote:I grow very tired of 'sniping' personal attacks of this nature on my posts, especially when, as here they are completely false and intended purely to throw discredit on what I say. Indeed the whole post is purely spiteful and unfairly attacks my integrity.

I am sorry that you find it 'sniping', 'spiteful' or an attack on your integrity; apologies for that was not the intention.

The point is that throughout your posts you have done exactly what you say has been done to yourself to Plutarch, Diodorus and Pausanias. At beginning matters were somewhat balanced:

Xenophon wrote:what we may term a 'pro-Spartan' one given by Xenophon ( which is the more complete one ) and a 'pro-Theban' given by the patriotic Boeotian Plutarch in his 'Pelopidas', and another, somewhat inaccurate, brief account in Diodorus [XV.53 ff], clearly written from a Boeotian source.

So all accounts are somewhat biased to one side or the other. As the thread wore on sources aside from Xenophon were more biased than he ("If Xenophon's account is 'bowdlerised', then that of Diodorus and Plutarch is even more so !"). These sources then became vehicles for Theban "propaganda" ("what Boeotian propaganda had to say I have quoted above…"). That view is then neatly expressed in what might be termed a 'summary statement':

Xenophon wrote:I do not consider Xenophon's account a "list of excuses". That the hitherto invincible Spartiates/Homioi were defeated, and with such heavy casualties, required some explaining. Furthermore, without it we would have pretty much only secondary tales based on Theban propaganda.

By this time in the thread then, the sources outside of Xenophon are "secondary tales based on Theban propaganda". All the while the Thebans are presented as "timid" and "desperate"; a description informed by Xenophon's theme. Were either Diodorus, Plutarch or Pausanias alive today, they might well consider that this recurrent theme was intended purely to throw discredit on what what they've recorded.

For the record, whilst those sources immediately above are not free of bias (if only for the more primary source material they chose) Xenophon is hardly free himself of such bias. Yes the Athenian does criticise Sparta (Spartans far more than 'Sparta'). It is the subject and nature of those occasional critiques which matter. Spartans are most often criticised when they disappoint for an admirer is often the most disappointed when the idealised do not meet expectations. Sphodrias comes to mind for his attempt on the Piraeus as well as Phoebidas (and there are others but I am not at home and cannot check). Spartan irreligious acts attract his criticism (both those previous would also come under that).

All of that said, if it can be said (and I do not agree) that the sources outside of Xenophon are "pretty much only secondary tales based on Theban propaganda", Xenophon's account of Leuktra is still, at bottom, a list of excuses for the shocking Spartan failure.

The left wing was composed of the Thebans i.e "the picked men/epilektoi", it was the Thebans who were the pick of the army Diod XV.55.2, and the "old codgers and striplings" are most likely to have been in the middle and rear ranks of the 50 deep phalanx. It is the reluctant allies who form the centre and right.

This, in fact has some bearing on the 'files and half-files question'. There were almost 1,000 Lakedaemian killed,including 400 Spartiates/Homioi, to say nothing of wounded. On a frontage of only 80 ( your numbers and formation, 4,000 x 50 deep), that means each Theban killed over a dozen Spartans, or half-a-dozen each if we allow the second rank to participate !!!! Credible? No way !!

With 6,000 Theban hoplites, we have a frontage of 120 killing 1,000 - still over 8 each !

If on the other hand, there were 6,000 Theban hoplites who closed up to 25 deep, we have a frontage of 240, and the number falls to four per Theban, or two allowing for second rank participation.....much more credible ! Especially if we may allow that allied lochoi adjacent to the Theban column likely took part.

Diodoros is the only source for this emergency levy and he first counts the whole army as 6,000 and then states that

. 2 He selected from the entire army the bravest men and stationed them on one wing, intending to give to the finish with them himself.

This at the very reference you quote, are you proposing that when Diodoros says ‘from the whole army’ he really means from the Thebans alone and that those selected were not really the bravest? The point is pretty moot, however as Diodoros’ account should be consigned to the bin in toto; he has Kleombrotos leave Leuktra only to meet Archidamos and join armies to fight, most likely his source, Ephoros credited the Lakedaimonians with 40,000 men, the figure found in Polyainos. This mass then fills the plain and attacks in a crescent shape, rather than deployed obliquely or advancing only with the left wing the Boeotian right retreats while the left charges at the double, Kleombrotos is slain rather than being taken from the field alive; this is fiction and literary trope of no merit as Polybios commented XII 25f iiiff

. 3 But when he describes the battle of Leuctra between the Thebans and Lacedaemonians, or that at Mantinea between the same peoples, the battle in which Epaminondas lost his life, if we pay attention to every detail and look at the former and reformation of the armies during the actual battle, he provokes our laughter and seems perfectly inexperienced in such things and never to have seen a battle. 4 It is true that the battle of Leuctra, a special affair in which only one part of the army was engaged, does not make the writer's ignorance very conspicuous, but while the battle of Mantinea has the appearance of being described with much detail and military science, the description is quite imaginary, and the battle was not in the least understood by the writer. 5 This becomes evident if we get a correct idea of the ground and then number the movements he describes as being carried out on it.

You have my figures wrong, rather than a front of 80 it is only 40 files wide in my view as I count only 2,000 Thebans with the Sacred Band forming the cutting edge or front seven ranks; they face the hippeis 12 deep on a 25 man front and only 8 of each flanking mora. This leaves 40 files on the Theban left flank and fully 136 on the right. That they did not intervene could be down to two things the presence of supporting troops that would take them in flank if they attempted to flank the ‘embolon’ or the collapse coming more quickly than they could react, or a combination of both factors.

Rather than increase Theban numbers unrealistically the simple answer to the high kill rate is that the Spartans broke and ran back across the ditch of their camp where they stood in its shelter; which is how the casualty stats stack up 2,600 Lakedaimonians lose 1,000, 38% losses to 2,000 Thebans losing 49 (taking Pausanias’ figure) 2.45% ; this screams rout, with the Spartan casualties maximised due to the attendant Theban cavalry and the Theban casualties lessened by the speed of the collapse (5% might be considered a more average loss for the victors in a prolonged struggle). Once the King was down along with his officers the Spartans broke as Epaminondas and the deep column hit; they were already in a mess having had their own cavalry flee through them according to Xenophon or being caught in the midst of an out flanking move that had been countermanded according to Plutarch Pelopidas

23 1 In the battle, while Epaminondas was drawing his phalanx obliquely towards the left, in order that the right wing of the Spartans might be separated as far as possible from the rest of the Greeks, and that he might thrust back Cleombrotus by a fierce charge in column with all his men-at arms, the enemy understood what he was doing and began to change their formation; 2 they were opening up their right wing and making an encircling movement, in order to surround Epaminondas and envelop him with their numbers. But at this point Pelopidas darted forth from his position, and with his band of three hundred on the run, came up before Cleombrotus had either extended his wing or brought it back again into its old position and closed up his line of battle, so that the Lacedaemonians were not standing in array, but moving confusedly about among each other when his onset reached them.

If you have to treble the likely strength of the embolon, to such an extent that with the allies the Boeotians will outnumber the Lakedaimonian army the idea is clearly flawed.

Back to 'paragein' and its meaning, it is bound to be repeteive when your response is to pretend that LSJ covers its meaning in one line and quite laughable to stress an English preposition when a full reading of the entry would demonstrate that the word can be translated with many different ones. But rather than attack your 'method' I will simply prove my case using the writer you hold in high esteem, Xenophon.

Hipparchos (The Cavalry Commander) IV 9(in Loeb, 10 on Perseus)
καὶ τὸ μέτωπον δὲ οὕτως ηκμύνοιεν ἂν τῆς τάξεως ἀταράκτως οἱ πεμπάδαρχοι παράγοντες, ὁπότε τούτου καιρὸς εἴη.
Thus, too, the half file-leaders will wheel and extend the line without confusion, whenever there is occasion to do so. Bowerstock.

More literally (I too do not translate 'paragein' as 'wheel' which seems to be a translator's fall back for any military manouevre! See Cynoskephalai thread.)

And the front-rank in this way may be lengthened (ηκμύνοιεν )without confusion, by the pempadarchoi performing 'paragoge', whenever it is required.


In my interpretation the front IS extended by 'paragoge' see the diagram you label wrong; in your version it remains constant. I await a forced explanation, or an admission of error. I won't be taking bets on which though

edited to clarify reference

Gentlemen, I am now faced with over a dozen lengthy posts to respond to. We have reached the point where it is futile for me to try and respond to your united attacks since it simply generates further avalanches of words. It would take me over a week to properly answer the matters raised in your posts.....assuming you don't generate more in the meantime.

If we are to continue, there must be an immediate moratorium.

if you can't resist the need for a posting 'fix', there are other threads you might turn your attentions to, such as the "Issos" thread.....

Great !.....Having answered one lengthy post, and reduced the backlog to seven, there are now two more, making nine in total ! .....And still more to make up a dozen !What happened to a moratorium ?

I have now responded and caught up as best I can, and will post these replies shortly in chronological order. In the meantime, Agesilaos has shifted much of the digression about Leuktra to its own thread - an excellent idea to be commended. Because that thread still needs some editing for it to make good sense - a number of posts and quotes still remain to be differentiated - and because in replying, I have done so by dated references to this thread, I shall post all replies here, and once the new thread is sorted out, may paste appropriate posts across.......

Next in chronological sequence is Paralus’ post of July 16, back on page 5.

Xenophon wrote:Moreover neither of these allies has so far put up a convincing case for an alternative to the system of a hoplite phalanx forming files generally, but closing up to half-files to fight, apparent from the works of Xenophon. ( sigh! Once more unto the breach dear friends.....)

“I've proposed a 'system'. In the absence of anyone proposing an alternative system, the 'system' is 'proved'. That the 'system' is, though, based on evidence in dispute.”

Please note these are Paralus’ words, putting bias and spin on what I actually wrote – as he does with the words of the the Athenian Xenophon. I never said the system is ‘proved’ – it cannot be. But the hypothesis of Anderson, Connolly, myself and others fits the known facts best and is consistent with all the known evidence.

Agesilaos and Paralus are quick to criticise – sometimes I think that my function is simply to put up information for them to have a go at – but they offer no better alternative, or even an alternative overall drill system at all, let alone one that works.
Nor is the evidence itself in dispute – see my diagram p.1 – only the interpretation of that evidence. Agesilaos’ alternative did not fit the evidence at all, nor is it practical, and Paralus has not even offered an alternate interpretation. Earlier though, if I recall, somewhere back among the blizzard of words he seemed to accept the ‘files/half-files’ drill as correct, ( perhaps that was for the Macedonian phalanx??) but now argues vociferously against it......perhaps he might like to set out his position, if he has one.

Xenophon wrote:I don't think this is correct, certainly if you are referring to the immediate aftermath of Leuktra. I cannot find a reference to any of the Spartan allies "having discourse with the Thebans."

Then you need to read the text of Xenophon a little closer (6.4.24 - Jason of Pherae):


"And know too that some of your allies are at this moment discussing treaties of friendship with your enemies."

No, it is Paralus who needs to read Xenophon a little closer.This allegation which Xenophon puts into the mouth of Jason has already been dealt with ( see my previous post). Xenophon does NOT say it actually occurred, it is merely something which Jason might be expected to say, and the Spartans evidently did not give it credence – we hear of no steps taken by them, for example, in any source.

Xenophon wrote:It will be remembered that many of the surviving Spartans were in favour of renewing the battle, but XH VI.4.15 goes on to say : "....perceiving that the allies were one and all without heart for fighting, while some of them were not even displeased at what had taken place...." and the Spartans then formally conceded the battle by asking for the return of their dead. No mention of any discourse with the Thebans, and despite their demoralisation caused by the death of Kleombrotus and so many Spartiatae, the allies and mercenaries remained disciplined and under orders.

Oh dear. See above regarding the "discourse". "Many" of the surviving Spartans? I believe it is actually "some". But let's not quibble because the "many" were quickly silenced by the surviving polemarchs who saw that "nearly a thousand of the Spartans had died, which included about four hundred homoioi..."

Ah, here comes the sarcasm – sure sign that Paralus relies on weak argument. Sure enough, this is not quite what Xenophon says. Far from being “quickly silenced”:
“...and perceiving that the allies were one and all without heart for fighting, while some of them were not even displeased at what had taken place, gathered together the most important personages and deliberated about what they should do.”

In other words, (and one man’s “some” is another man’s “many” ) there were sufficient among the Lakedaimonians in favour of fighting on, that they held a conference of the Spartan and Allied commanders to decide whether to renew the battle or not.

Xenophon wrote:Furthermore, your military naivete is showing again if you think having an intact Lacedaemonian army outnumbering yours camped on your doorstep some 10 miles from Thebes isn't "threatening". Its mere existence is a threat, even if it was licking some severe wounds. Some might think that made the beast all the more dangerous.[ As Jason points out] The Boeotarchs wouldn't agree with you, as their immediate attempts to summon allies shows.

Yet again - to your convenience or, perhaps, naivete - you ignore the wider political picture. Thebes, shorn of all allies, had just fought and, surprisingly, won a battle for survival. This was no offensive campaign; it was a battle of defense against a numerically superior invader. Your entire view is that the initiative was constantly with the Thebans; that they should always be doing something. This is absolutely incorrect. It was a defensive battle in the face of an invading army well in excess of Thebes' numbers. More in terms of Artemesion or Marathon.

We can agree this for the most part – the Thebans had surprisingly won a defensive battle for survival. I am perfectly well aware of Thebes political and military position, and I certainly do not ignore it. It was the Thebans who took the initiative in offering battle. Moreover, if the victory was a ‘decisive’ one, then the initiative must lie with the victor. My view is that the victory decided nothing – was indecisive, and therefore unlike Marathon – which itself wasn’t all that decisive in the long term, since the Persians returned and destroyed Athens.
But what did the contemporary Thebans think ? Did they believe they had won a decisive victory? The answer is definitely not. They recognised that the Lakedaemonian army still posed a threat, and that they needed help to deal with it. When that help arrived, in the form of Jason and his army, they wished to fight a decisive battle but Jason talked them out out of it; “Jason sought to dissuade them, pointing out that since they had done a good work, it was not worth while for them to venture a decisive engagement in which while they might gain more still, they might also lose what had been won already.......these were the the arguments he used to divert the Thebans from their plan of risking a decisive battle.” [XH VI.4.22-24] ( my emphasis).

Clearly, neither Thebans nor Jason regarded Leuktra as having been decisive, and recognised that all that had been achieved was a ‘deadlock’.

Xenophon wrote:I do not consider Xenophon's account a "list of excuses". That the hitherto invincible Spartiates/Homioi were defeated, and with such heavy casualties, required some explaining. Furthermore, without it we would have pretty much only secondary tales based on pro-Theban sources. Xenophon seeks to explain the "why" of the astonishing defeat and expounds on this, and his account makes considerable sense. As he rightly says; "But in the battle, at any rate, everything turned out badly for the Lacedaemonians, while for the other side everything went prosperously, even to the gifts of fortune/luck."

Oh dear II. Of course it is a list of excuses. It is, as I wrote, "the Thebans ate my hoplites miss". In a purely military or tactical sense, Xenophon is utterly uninterested in the reasons for the Spartan catastrophe. He is far more interested in the wine consumption of Kleombrotos and his officers and the turns of outrageous fortune that so sunk his heroes rather than the tactics that won the battle. Yes Xenophon 'explains' the 'why' and that explanation is little more than excuses. He does not care to closely examine the seminal battle of his time and his account shows this. His information is utterly Spartan and his text littered with "they say". Agesialos' hatred of Thebes is also Xenophon's. Compare, for example, Xenophon's description of Agesilaos' actions and victorious maneuvers at Koroneia where he is duly interested in how the king achieved his victory over the hated Thebans.

Yes, Xenophon’s informants are clearly all Spartan and the account sounds very contemporary, hence Spartan ignorance of the roles of Epaminondas and Pelopidas. But the rest of what you wrote is simply untrue, and not in accord with what Xenophon wrote. He is not interested “in the wine consumption of Kleombrotus and his officers” and does not suggest that Kleombrotus and his officers were ‘drunk,’ merely that some reckoned it gave Kleombrotus ‘dutch courage’ and made him aggressive – thus for example he advances with the Spartans without letting the allies know.Nor does he put down the Spartan defeat to “outrageous fortune.” These are your words, not Xenophon’s.
Next, he describes the driving back of the stream of Theban deserters, including the Thespians, when it might have been better to let them go.
Then, the cavalry driven back into their own phalanx.
Next, he describes the formation depths once the armies were formed up.
Finally he describes the respective advances, the clash of the phalanxes, and the mortal wounding of Kleombrotus.These are all simple factors in the battle. His account of the fight is pretty matter of fact, recounting the ultimate pushing back of the Spartan right, followed by the left falling back. No ‘excuses’ are offered for this “disaster”.
Curiously, he does not mention the manoeuvre that the Spartans were engaged in when Pelopidas disrupted it, though he certainly knew of it (see e.g. the Cyropaedia) –he might have learned of it some time after writing his account.[Plut Pel. 23].
Apart from this omission, far from being “uninterested” in what was happening tactically and militarily, Xenophon gives us our best and most detailed account of what happened.An account that is every bit as detailed as Koronea and in fact the account of Leuktra is much longer and more detailed than the account of Koronea ( 5 pages to 3), so your allegation is quite wrong.
Nor is the text ‘littered with “they say”...’ – only one “it was said” with reference to the wine.
Where are the references for Xenophon himself bearing any ‘hatred’ for Thebes? Based on his account of Leuktra not mentioning Epaminondas and Pelopidas? He doesn’t mention individual Spartan commanders either (other than ‘honourable mentions’ of the fallen), does that make him a ‘Spartan hater’ ?
I would suggest Xenophon’s account of Leuktra was written not long after the battle. Only later did Epaminondas and Pelopidas become prominent and reknowned and mythologised for their parts. Certainly, when some 9 years later, Epaminondas fights second Mantinea (362 BC), Xenophon gives due prominence and fulsome praise to him. If he supposedly ‘hated’ Thebans and (allegedly)deliberately ignored the leaders at Leuktra ( where Epaminondas was NOT commander-in-chief, nor even ‘primus inter pares’), why does he do the opposite when describing Mantinea ? (see below)

Here he is being pro-Theban and anti-Spartan :
[ V.4.1] “The Lacedaemonians, namely, who had sworn that they would leave the states independent, after seizing possession of the Acropolis of Thebes were punished by the very men, unaided, who had been thus wronged, although before that time they had not been conquered by any single one of all the peoples that ever existed; while as for those among the Theban citizens who had led them into the Acropolis and had wanted the state to be in subjection to the Lacedaemonians in order that they might rule despotically themselves, just seven of the exiles were enough to destroy the government of these men. How all this came to pass I will proceed to relate.”

As for individual Thebans, Xenophon’s account of the second Mantinea campaign and battle is full of praise for Epaminondas e.g.
[VII.1.42] “Now upon the urgent entreaty which the aristocrats of Achaea addressed to him, Epaminondas effected through his personal influence an arrangement that their opponents were not to banish the aristocrats or to change the form of government,”
...or...
[VII.5.8] “I would not pretend his that his strategy turned out fortunately. But, for what can be achieved by forethought and boldness, the man was, I consider, in no way wanting.”
...or...
[VII.5.19] “Now the fact that Epaminondas himself entertained such thoughts, seems to me to be in no wise remarkable, — for such thoughts are natural to ambitious men; but that he had brought his army to such a point that the troops flinched from no toil, whether by night or by day, and shrank from no peril, and although the provisions they had were scanty, were nevertheless willing to be obedient, this seems to me to be more remarkable.”
...Or [VII.5.21]...
“Again noteworthy are the dispositions after he had led the army out......etc"

He only ever praises Epaminondas, and he nowhere disparages him.
In short, your whole paragraph is pure rhetoric, and unfortunately incorrect at that, because nowhere does Xenophon express ‘hatred’ for Thebes.On the contrary, his sympathies lay with the Thebans, and he is critical of the Spartans ( see e.g. V.4.1 quoted above). Indeed the pious Xenophon seems to have viewed Leuktra as divine retribution for Spartan ‘hubris’. Xenophon might have been pro-Spartan, but he was NOT anti-Theban, let alone a “Theban hater”.

Xenophon wrote:The point about the civilians being driven back to the camp by the Lacedaemonian allies and peltasts is valid too, for skulking among them were "others who did not want to fight" i.e. deserting soldiers, now forced back into the ranks.

Oh dear III. Polyaenus (2.3.3) says that the Thespians left after Epameinondas told those who did not wish to fight to leave. They apparently left with the camp followers and were forced back by the Spartans. Clearly these 'deserters' pressed into the Theban "mass", were crucial to the Spartan defeat. Really...

It was these men, mainly Thespians, that I was referring to.
The “really” might best be applied to Polyaenus’ anecdote, which is also found in Pausanias IX.13.8. where Epaminondas “permitted all who would to leave the camp and go home. The Thespians left with all their forces, as did any other Boeotians who felt annoyed with the Thebans....”
How likely is it that Epaminondas thus dismissed something like 10% or perhaps more of the already understrength army ? Especially as he wasn’t in charge. ( The seven Boeotarcchs shared command equally), and they had gone to considerable trouble to insist their allies take the field. I’d be inclined to suspect that in reality, they didn’t have much say in the departure. If nothing else, these troops were a valuable addition, and could face off an equal number of Spartan allies who might otherwise have done mischief, if nothing else.
Your lack of military understanding shows once more. As the saying puts it:
“They also serve who stand and wait”.
Those Thespians ( and others) standing on the field were a threat-in-being, hence useful and no commander would simply dismiss them.
Moreover, this supposed magnaminity of Epaminondas cannot be true, and in reality the Thebans not long after destroyed and razed Thespiae as punishment for their attempted desertion.

Xenophon wrote:As to Xenophon not naming Epaminondas and Pelopidas, it is unlikely that his Spartan sources knew of them. Epaminondas was officially just one of the seven Boeotarchs in command, and Pelopidas merely the junior commander of the "Hieros Lochos". ( Xenophon doesn't mention the junior commander of the "Hippeis" either, nor the commanders of the four Spartan "Morai", save those who fell.)

Oh dear IV. This, really, is simply not credible, not to mention 'special pleading'. The assertion that Xenophon, writing a history of his time, did not know of these men because his Spartan sources didn't know of them is absolutely ridiculous. Xenophon well knew them: they were not only the leading men of Thebes but also the hated enemy of his hero Agesilaos. Ancient Biographers wrote accounts of these men yet Xenophon is unaware because his "Spartan sources" are unlikely to have known of them??!! Xenophon deigns only to introduce Pelopidas as the filthy Thebean mediser at 7.1.33-37. Now, I wonder why that might be? I'm afraid, Xenophon of Brisvegas, that your partisan stripes are well on show!!

More rhetoric and sarcasm ? “Oh dear” yourself.
It has already been pointed out that Xenophon’s account of Leuctra was clearly almost contemporary with the event; there were no biographer’s accounts extant at that time. Epaminondas and Pelopidas were certainly NOT the leading men of Thebes prior to Leuktra, as shown by Epaminondas’ status before the battle. He is simply one of the seven Boeotarchs, not even ‘primus inter pares’/first among equals, for it is the vote of the late-arriving seventh Boeotarch which swings the vote in favour of battle. Xenophon’s informants were men who called at his estate at Scyllus, (where he resided from around 387 BC) and hence his information was limited. Since Epaminondas’ prominence dates from after Leuktra, he was hardly yet “the hated enemy of his hero Agesilaus”.Nor is Pelopidas a “Thebean mediser” (sic). These colourful and rhetorical phrases are not to be found in Xenophon, but are products of Paralus’ imagination and hindsight – and wrong.

Whose partisan stripes did you say were on show?

Instead there is a matter of fact account of the embassies by Pelopidas and others,including Athenians, and Xenophon points out how Pelopidas had advantages in persuading the King – “It also greatly contributed to Pelopidas’ reknown that the Thebans had been victorious at the battle of Leuktra”. Despite Pelopidas obtaining the King’s Decree, the Greek cities refused to swear the oaths, and as Xenophon remarks, matters “came to naught”. At no time are Pelopidas or his efforts denigrated in any way, nor those of the other Greek embassies to the Great King, nor does Xenophon accuse anyone of ‘medising’.

Agesilaus wrote; 17/7/2014 back on page 5

Xenophon wrote:If you don't 'trust' that what we are being told is correct, then one must presumably disbelieve it, and think it incorrect. Furthermore you imply that if part is to be discarded, then one should discard all.

“No, if you don’t trust it you neither believe nor disbelieve it; to use the specific example I was thinking of; you believe that enomotiai could form six or twelve deep (according to you because of half-file insertion this reflects close and open order, though Xenophon says nothing about intervals) BUT you reject his clear statement that a mora consisted of sixteen enomotiai of thirty six men, yet the reasoning is seemingly beyond our comprehension since you consistently refuse to supply it. I accept both statements from a source that ought to be in the know and with no contradictory evidence that is credible.”

Of course Xenophon does not mention the actual intervals, because they are so obvious ! For example, if a man occupies a roughly 3 feet frontage, then the interval between files that the half-file marches into MUST be 3 feet !!

There are very good reasons for thinking that Xen ‘Lac Con’ XI.4 as it has come down to us is incorrect either through deliberate emendation, or negligent copying. I’ve already said I’m not going into the subject of Spartan organisation – it is one digression too far, complex of itself and if it is to be discussed in detail on an Alexander forum, then should have a thread of its own in ‘off-topic’.....

Agesilaos wrote:“You will have to name the many battles where the left flank was massed in column and the right refused just saying it is not good enough. Ascribing co-ordination with the horse may be too far but given the total absence of any comment on Theban plans by Xenophon and Diodoros’ fictive farrago it is hard to say, I would only observe that at Mantinea it is a co-ordinated attack by horse and foot that is launched.”

You are putting words into my mouth that I didn’t say, and trying to narrow the question artificially. I was not referring to the details of Leuktra, but the general tactics. The ‘deep’ formation was no innovation. The Thebans had used it without much success at least twice before. Weighted flanks, to create a ‘schwerpunkt’ were nothing new either, e.g. Marathon, where both flanks became weighted due to the necessity to stretch the line to fill the battlefield, and several Spartan successes where they weighted their right flank so as to outflank a foe, while their left did little.
Indeed it would be fair to say that seldom, if ever, did phalanxes simply clash head-on, without some tactical ploy being attempted.
Incidently, there is nothing in XH VII.5.24 to suggest that Epaminondas co-ordinated his phalanx with his cavalry and 'hamippoi', merely that he thought if he could win the cavalry battle, he would win overall, and at VII.5.25 they are described fighting a separate battle against the allied cavalry.

Agesilaos wrote: “Instead of splurting your tea it would be more germane to list the battles where we know that the armies anchored both flanks; unlikely to be forthcoming as the state of the evidence is woeful as regards numbers and none too hot with regard to locations.”

Well, you have mentioned Marathon, where both numbers and location are reasonably certain. The Athenians seem to have numbered about 9-10,000 hoplites plus some 600 Plataean hoplites, plus both Athenian and Plataean light troops/psiloi. Allowing for Richard Dunn’s calculations of the ancient shoreline, the plain was around 1.4 miles/2464 yards, give or take, for most of its width, but 1.6 miles/2,800 yards (wider than at present) at the Greek end of the plain. Formed up 8 deep in open order, 4 deep in close order the hoplites would have a front of around 2,500 yards. This would have had to ‘stretch’ in the beginning, hence the thinner centre, but by the site of the Athenian trophy the battlefield and the hoplite line are exactly the same width, give or take – with flanks secured by mountain on the left and sea on the right.. Hardly co-incidence, and vastly more credible than the idea that the Athenians advanced with open flanks against an enemy with adequate cavalry, as you suggest !!!

I could mention other examples......

Agesilaos wrote:

Xenophon wrote:But why adopt 16 deep, if not to fill the plain? Especially as 8 deep was the general 'norm'.

Good question, but you won’t like the answer which lies in the power of depth, in which the Thebans clearly believed (Xenophon’s 100 deep Egyptians against which ever ridiculous number he chose is a case of post factum denial); the acknowledged experts also went deeper than the norm – six against four, in your model twelve against eight in mine; one would expect the Spartans to understand these things.

Glib? Well the allied army certainly did not fill the plain and they had the advantage in cavalry yet hid it behind their shorter line?

“The power of depth” has rightly been recognised for the myth that it is throughout military history in terms of physical battle power. Its virtues lie in psychology – a deep formation boosts the morale of the attackers, and can dismay the defenders, and also an improvement in mobility, being handier than a line, especially for inexperienced troops.

The Spartans certainly did understand such matters – as did Xenophon. Evidently they considered 6 deep in close order sufficient to resist Theban ‘deep’ formations; remember that the Thebans did not ‘shatter’ the Spartan line at Leuktra, for all the Spartan casualties were wounded in front according to Diodorus, and the phalanx withdrew to their camp in good order, and even contemplated renewing the battle, according to Xenophon, our best and only contemporary source. As you rightly point out Diodorus’ account is unreliable ( I wouldn’t go so far as to say complete ‘fiction’, for some details read credibly) and the Lakedaimonian army certainly did not flee in “utter rout”.

At Nemea, both sides filled the battlefield, so there was nowhere for the cavalry to deploy, and of course they could not face hoplites frontally. Their role therefore was limited to the pursuit, if any, hence their deployment behind the phalanx.

Agesilaos wrote:

Xenophon wrote:Ah!....naughty! 'Parembole' in the sense of 'interjection' is a Hellenistic manual term, and evidently anachronistic in Xenophon's time, for Xenophon does not use the word at all. Instead he uses 'paragoge'/marching up by the side. So let us stick with contemporary usage for Xenophon's time if we must invent a term and call it the 'paragoge hypothesis' !

Ah! The wedding of wishful thinking and circular argument. ‘Parembole’ is used by Aeschines, a younger contemporary of Xenophon so the word is not anachronistic, it is simply not the word Xenophon chose to use. I have illustrated how the manoeuvres differ so let’s stop pretending they are even remotely similar.

I did not say the word did not exist – I can read the LSJ as well as you, and it reveals that ‘parembole’ was not used in a military context in Xenophon’s time, and hence anachronistic in that sense. You are quite right, obviously Xenophon chose not to use it, instead preferring ‘paragon’/lead up by the side. The manoeuvres do not ‘differ’ as I have shown time and again. Your manoeuvre of marching across the rear, then turning 90 degrees to march up on the flank of a unit ( and extending the frontage? Since you don’t give intervals, it is hard to say) does not fit any definition of paragoge ( in the military context) – and would not work, for with other enomotia to either flank, the frontage had to remain constant.

Agesilaos wrote:

I am surprised you have not pointed out that Aelian’s ‘paragoge’ is not the same as mine and must be different from Xenophon’s. In the Taktike (careful might get back to the Subject, dammit!) it is a lateral march with the officers on one or both flanks. It is hard to see how this usage could arise from insertion but it is quite clearly very close to stage two in my diagram, the ‘metapon’ provides the flank during the lateral movement (which could go left or right, of course).

Actually, you are quite wrong. As we have seen, ‘paragon’ essentially means march up by the side/beside/alongside in a military context ( I have mentioned its meanings in other contexts). In Aelian, ‘epagoge’ describes the phalanx in column, and to deploy each sub-unit marches up to the left of its predecessor. Aelian’s ‘paragoge’ has the phalanx formed. The phalanx then turns to the flank and “marches in formation/line” laterally, with the officers of the leading rank now marching by the side of the phalanx ( either left or right depending which flank is being marched to), hence the use of the expression ‘paragoge’ – used in the same way as Xenophon.

Epaminondas’ phalanx at Mantinea did exactly this, the phalanx moving to its left, what Aelian would call “paragoge/ march in formation/line to the left” [Aelian 36.3; Devine]

Agesilaos wrote:

Marathon was fought on a plain with open flanks it would seem and it is difficult for a theory that posits a fighting depth of four as the norm to accommodate Herodotos clear statement that the centre of the Athenian line was ‘of few ranks and weak’ whereas ‘the wings were strong in numbers’

.

τότε δὲ τασσομένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῷ Μαραθῶνι ἐγίνετο τοιόνδε τι: τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐξισούμενον τῷ Μηδικῷ στρατοπέδῳ, τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ μέσον ἐγίνετο ἐπὶ τάξιας ὀλίγας, καὶ ταύτῃ ἦν ἀσθενέστατον τὸ στρατόπεδον, τὸ δὲ κέρας ἑκάτερον ἔρρωτο πλήθεϊ.
VI 111 iii
As the Athenians were marshalled at Marathon, it happened that their line of battle was as long as the line of the Medes. The centre, where the line was weakest, was only a few ranks deep, but each wing was strong in numbers.
Trans A D Godle

See my comments above – if their line was as long as the Medes, this implies the respective lengths were governed by the terrain, exactly as I have put it above.

Greek not only has a word for two it has specific dual verb forms, since you reckon four as the norm there is little choice but to assign a depth of three in your model ; in mine four would be half strength; Plutarch’s assertion, Aristides 5 iii, that two tribes held the centre, leaving four on each flank works on both models; yours would yield , on depths of 6 and 3, 2000 Athenian files and a further 160 odd Plataian files; as the frontages were equal this would lead to a Persian strength of 21,600 infantry. On the same basis but using depths of 8 and 4 we arrive at 1125 + 500 =1625 files for a Persian strength of 16,250. VI 95 ii gives 600 triereis for the Persian fleet which would have 102,000 rowers and 18,000 marines @30 per ship, these numbers are not credible; this fleet was island hopping without army support and would die of thirst before it had travelled two days.

If we work backwards and assume that the crews beefed up the marines there would be 200 troops per ship making my fleet 80 strong and yours 108, neither of which are impossible. We might suggest that Herodotos conjured his figure for the fleet by dividing a guestimate of the Persian army and dividing by the number of marines. Neither method is to far from 18,000 so this meander ends without reaching the sea, other than to restate that there does not seem room for a thin centre in your theory and that lower figures are probably to be preferred as we still have to allow for the cavalry; which, like that at Nemea was conspicuously absent.

I don’t agree these figures or calculations – or rather estimates – see above, though I’d agree the Persians most likely did not number more than 20,000 maximum ( all that the battlefield might contain) and were probably significantly fewer - perhaps only afew thousand more than the Greeks.
The Persian cavalry played little or no part for much the same reason as at Nemea. With the battlefield filled, they could not face and defeat hoplites frontally. In addition, it is likely that the cavalry were camped around the Makaria spring and as Peter Krentz has postulated, could not deploy quickly enough through the narrow gap between the marsh and Mt Stavrokoraki, due to the fast Greek advance – which covered a mile or thereabouts, in perhaps 12-15 minutes or so.

Ancient cavalry is not comparable to Napoleonic horse, not only did the Greeks lack saddles and stirrups but their horses were smaller, more like our ponies and not really effective against hoplites (they did not have the xysta of the later Macedonians, and could carry fewer javelins and throw them with less force than foot skirmishers, who were themselves not considered the equal of a hoplite (despite Demosthenes’ failure in Aetolia and victory at Sphakteria!).

Not that old canard about stirrups ! They are only useful for only two things – mounting, and by standing in them, delivering an effective downward blow. When learnng to ride, many instructors insist on riding bareback, so as to learn to control the horse with thighs and knees, ( stirrups make for lazy riders) and certainly stirrups do not help a man to twist and turn to throw javelins. The remainder of your paragraph I would agree with.

Agesilaos post 18/7 top of page 6; Paralus’ post 19/7
On the subject of matters naval and the rendezvous, Agesilaos and Paralus have set out matters fully, and I don’t disagree by and large. I agree with Paralus that the army that was “intended” to be transported across the Gulf of Corinth must be that of Archidamus, not Kleombrotus. I also see no evidence that any line might have dropped out.

I’d also agree with Paralus that initially the reason for planning an amphibious relief was concern about Athens position – if hostile she was ideally positioned to block Archidamus’ army.

Amphibious operations are notoriously difficult to prepare and organise, even today. In this instance, the ships could not have been at readiness, they had to be manned i.e. rowers recruited, and also ships equipped for sea. Archidamus’ force may be estimated at 2 x Morai at full strength, all age groups, some 2,560 men;the senior age groups for the other 4 Morai, another 640 plus various odds and ends, say another 1,000 making a total of around 3,500 Spartans. The allies could have added as many as 12-15,000 more hoplites, but probably less so perhaps Archidamus’ army conservatively numbered around the 10,000 or so, like the original army.

It is interesting that Xenophon only says they intended to go by sea initially – he does not say they actually did so. Archidamus while still marching up the Peloponnese would have learnt how the Athenians had snubbed the Thebans, and that the land route was now open, and probably calculated that the march from Corinth to Aegosthena ( around 25 miles) would be quicker ( a day at most), easier, a lot less risky, and a lot cheaper than by sea, not to mention possible adverse weather, and the need for multiple ferry trips. With plans advanced, there would be no time to change the rendezvous point, or the Kleombrotons line of retreat, not to mention ruining their deception plan.

Thus it seems highly likely Archidamus marched by land, and waited for those allies he had not picked up on the way, who would have been following in his footsteps.

In addition, we learn from Thucydides [VI.31] that a trireme equipped as a transport could carry 100 hoplites, which implies if Archidamus’ full force was to be transported in one ‘lift’, something of the order of 100 such vessels would have been needed – more than twice the number Athens initially sent to Sicily ( 40 transport triremes escorted by 60 ‘fighting’ triremes ). The cities mentioned could only muster 71 triremes between them for the Persian invasion, when Corinth still had a large navy, and are unlikely to have had even this number available and seaworthy at the time. In addition, even, say, as many as 50 triremes would require the recruiting of skilled rowers, normally 170 per trireme. Stripped to a ‘skeleton’ 70 odd rowers as a transport, that means recruiting at least 3,500 skilled rowers. These all had to be fed and paid, assuming they were available. Certainly preparing an expedition similar to Athens expedition to Sicily would not occur in a matter of days. It seems that going by sea would have taken considerable preparation time and when ready, had to be in relays, spread over several days.

Once the land route opened up, thanks to Athens hostility to Thebes,the change to use it, whereby the army would be there in a day, was an obvious one, and doubtless Archidamus was duly thankful to the Gods.

Paralus wrote on 19 July:

Xenophon wrote:Your reference to Xenophon is, I take it, to “Constitution of the Lacedaemonians” XI.4, where we have an enomotia performing drill similar to the ‘dinner drill’. An enomotia of 36 are described as being drawn “...drawn up at the word of command in single file, sometimes in threes [i.e. 3 files x 12 deep, in open order] and sometimes in sixes...”[ i.e 6 x 6 deep in close order]...”and the depth of the phalanx[but not its frontage] is increased or diminished." Incidently, the word for file-leaders here is ‘paragogai’. [CORRECTION: should read 'Protostatai']

Xenophon wrote:How else do you think an enomotia, which you know to be drawn up in files, forms single file, threes and sixes ? And does so in a fashion which alters its depth ? How can this be done without “moving from one state to another”? Realistically, this can only be as per my notes in parentheses, which is not only consistent with the ‘dinner drill’ but also the phalanx formation at Leuctra.

Xenophon wrote:Thus we have Spartan ‘enomotia’ one behind the other in column of march, 3 files of 12 wide in ‘open’ order, and after deployment into line they close up to 6 deep for combat [Xen Lak XI.8]…

Lak. Pol. 11.4 says absolutely nothing of file insertion or of filling spaces between files. It simply says that the enomotia form into files “sometimes (two), sometimes three, and sometimes six abreast”. At 11.6 Xenophon describes nothing of file insertion either, simply relating that the ἐνωμοτάρχης deploys his section from column of march into line and does so as ‘thin’ or ‘deep’ (ἀραιαί τε καὶ βαθύτεραι) as orders demand – just as Thukydides corroborates in his description of Mantinea (418).

Paralus has been somewhat careless in his reading, or else is being disingenuous.We have already long since established that the ‘parembole/interjection’ terminology of the Hellenistic manuals does not seem to have been used in a military context some 200 or more years previously, and that Xenophon certainly never uses the term. “Deploys his section from column of march into line” is not the most accurate translation, and a little misleading, because the question is how this was done. A more accurate translation of the passage reads:
“Orders to form phalanx by leading up by the side/paragogai are given verbally by the platoon commander/enomotarch acting as a herald, and the line is formed either thin or deep, [alternately; “the depth of the phalanx is increased or diminished” ]
Nothing whatever in this is difficult to understand/learn”.

That’s right, as elsewhere Xenophon uses the term ‘paragon’, just as in the dinner drill !! Note too that Xenophon does NOT say that there was any change in frontage.

Arguments such as:
Xenophon doesn’t say the word ‘parembole/interjection’/ doesn’t describe file insertion, therefore it can’t be the same.
...and...
“simply says that the enomotia form into files “sometimes (two), sometimes three, and sometimes six abreast”.
...are flimsy at best, and use bad methodology. Flimsy because the first is based on the assumption that forming up by files/half-files could ONLY be described by the term ‘parembole’, which is patent nonsense, as I have demonstrated a number of times. Xenophon uses the expression ‘paragoge’ instead – a word whose meaning is plain, and which describes the drill movement in question admirably.
The second is also flimsy, because it doesn’t allow for movements to change formation, and seeks to narrow the meaning artificially.
Bad methodology because they take a paragraph in isolation, and ignore the larger picture.( sometimes called “salami slicing” – a fallacious method) A holistic approach is the better method. For instance when Xen ‘Constitution’ 11 is read in conjunction with the ‘dinner drill’ the similarities are striking, even down to the vocabulary, and quite clearly they are describing the same thing save that the dinner drill describes files of 8, and ‘Constit’n’ files of 12 for the platoon/enomotia. Incidently the "(two)" is actually a missing word, and usually emended as single file, not two.

The second of Paralus’ statements begs the question of how the Enomotia gets from single file (1x36deep) to threes (3x12 deep) and finally six abreast (6x6), answered by his second quotation of me above. They are not picked up and plonked down like chess pieces ! They must perform drill to change formations, and that drill is clearly the same as the ‘dinner drill’. Even Blind Freddie can visualise this – as Xenophon says, “Nothing whatever in this is difficult to understand/learn”

Lak. Pol. 11.8 – again – says nothing of forming up “six deep for combat” as you clearly imply with the reference placed after this assumption. This passage simply states that the army forms into battle line to face the enemy. Assumption is, in fact, a key word here:

Since the six deep is the last evolution [11.4], it must be the case that it is ‘close order’/pyknosis, and that in order to get to this, when the files stand 12 deep, they must be in ‘open’ formation.[ see diagram page 1, again !]

Once again, Paralus wrongly seeks to take this paragraph in isolation. In fact, it is clear from the reference to counter-marching [ see Laconian counter-march] that the column of platoons/enomotia deploys into a line/phalanx in ‘open order’, which logically must be 12 deep. Hence the six deep referred to must be ‘close order’.

There are no assumptions here, it is just plain comprehension of what Xenophon writes. XI.3-10 must be read together, not each paragraph in isolation, and also together with what Xen. writes elsewhere. Paralus apparently finds himself baffled by the meaning, despite Xenophon telling us it is simple to understand. If he has an alternate explanation, he does not put it forward, confining himself to ‘salami slicing’, and incorrect, criticism.

Xenophon wrote:For the avoidance of confusion, we should distinguish between deploying from column into phalanx, and subsequent 'closing up' into battle order/pyknosis.
Hippocrates orders his men into line at 93.2, and shortly after joins them, and they are 8 deep.Subsequently they seem to have closed up into 'battle order, as per the bold section of the quote in my previous post. and Hippocrates starts giving his address, but gets only halfway down the line before being interrupted by the Theban attack....

Thus we must assume that the Athenian line closed down from eight to four – even though this is nowhere stated. Thukydides’ description of Delion has the Boeotian army as in “battle order and ready for battle” at 93.1. He then describes this battle order noting that the Thebans were 25 shields deep and the others at varying depths. We mustassume here that the Thebans initially deployed fifty deep. At Leuktra we assume the opposite: the Thebans, fifty deep, must have closed up to 25 deep. In the same battle we must assume that the Spartans – described as twelve deep – must have closed down to six deep. We must assume that the allies at Nemea closed down from sixteen deep to eight. None of this is anywhere stated; it must be assumed. The theory of the “Innate Assumption”?!

Ah, the odious politician’s rhetorical trick of repetition in order to try and make something wrong seem credible. There are NO assumptions anywhere here by me. We are told the Thebans were 25 deep in battle order/close order, and if that is so, then it is blindingly obvious that they would be 50 deep in ‘open order’.We are told the Athenians were 8 deep, [Thuc IV.94] and later “When the Athenians were ranged in order of battle and on the point of advancing....” which implies something different to the earlier 8 deep, and logically that would be half-files 4 deep – but note that I did not assert this as a certainty but used the word “ seems” – again no assumption. Same goes for Leuktra. They formed up 50 deep, and thus likely closed up to 25 deep. This can be checked by looking at the Spartan casualties. As I have posted elsewhere, it is impossible that on a frontage of 80-120, they could have killed nearly 1,000 Spartans, or 8-12 Spartans each, plus an equivalent number of wounded !!

On depths, it is interesting to note that Xenophon (of Brisvegas) mentions Agesilaos’ anastrophe near Mantinea. Having performed this and thus doubled the depth of the phalanx, Agesilaos then ‘reversed’ it by extending the battle line back to what must have been its original depth. This depth, Xenophon (of Athens) tells us, was “nine or ten shields deep” (Hell. 6.5.19). One assumes that should Agesilaos have actually fought then it would have to have been in the order he was in: nine deep or ten deep.

Paralus’ “assumption” has no basis. King Agesilaos is withdrawing from a narrow valley after realising the enemy were on the heights above, and his army is in a marching column i.e. ‘open order’. After doubling its depth as it withdraws, once out of the valley it resumes its original marching order “9 or 10 shields deep” ( i.e. if the column were turned into line facing their opponents ) which can only be in ‘open order’, and would have halved when it closed up for action.

At Hell. 6.2.18-21 Xenophon (of Athens) says that the Spartan Mnasippos attempted the same manoeuvre at Corcyra. Here, unlike Agesilaos, it failed. Xenophon writes that Mnasippos was successful at his end of the Spartan battle line, stating that “after he had formed the troops in line, Mnasippus himself turned to flight those of the enemy who were in front of the gates”. There is no indication, yet again, of any close down before battle was engaged. Further, Xenophon goes on to note that although Mnasippos was successful at his end of the battle line, the other end was not so fortunate. He then decided to aid by means of anastrophe. At this stage of the battle Xenophon clearly states that “the Spartans, who were arrayed eight deep” feared that the end of their line would not withstand the charge of the enemy’s “massed formation” attacking it. Clearly the Spartans are fighting eight deep here; there seems no other explanation. Perhaps we are to assume that they closed down from sixteen deep?

You’ve left out a word here, it should read “arrayed only 8 deep”, presumably as opposed to the 12 deep common at this period, and since 12 deep was ‘open order’ then so must “only 8 deep” here.

Our sources for hoplite combat provide numerous notations of depth. Nowhere are we told that any of these depths with which we are provided subsequently halved for combat. The thought intrudes that perhaps these notations of hoplite depths in our sources are simply the depth at which those forces fought. Hersey to the ears of Xenophon (of Brisvegas), I know. Still, it is a simple, straightforward reading with the benefit of necessitating nil assumptions.

Actually, we are told of hoplite depths on only 20 or so occasions in all our sources, some of which are not actual battles. The majority are described as 8 deep ( the main exceptions being the Thebans, and latterly Spartans 12 deep) i.e. the files are 8 deep. In fact we ARE told that combat took place in ‘half-files’, for combat was in close order, and close order was 4 deep ( see my diagram P.1). We know from Xen Anabasis that hoplites customarily fought 4 deep, and this is explained by them fighting in ‘half-files’ as per the ‘dinner drill’ and similar passage regarding files of 12 down to 6 in the ‘Constitution’. Thus files formed in open order and closed up into half-files to fight – that is all but a certainty, as much as anything can be in our sources. The depths referred to in our sources are unmistakeably the depth of the file in ‘open’ order, as I have alluded to time and time again. If that depth is the fighting depth in ‘close order’, then what are the half-files for ? How do you explain drill manoeuvres that involve file in open order and end up in half-files in close order? Why does Xenophon say that 4 deep was the usual or customary battle formation ?

Your “straightforward reading” explains none of this, and far from nil assumptions relies on various dubious assumptions without a proper basis, and does not take into account all the evidence. Furthermore, when battlefield widths can be measured against likely numbers, files in ‘open order’ makes much more sense than the shrunken frontages with open flanks that results from your assumptions.

On the use of the two different terms by Polybios, I can only agree with Aegesilaos.....

“Well he would say that wouldn’t he?” To test Paralus’ objectivity, count the number of times he attacks my posts, not just in this thread but overall, against attacks on Agesilaos.

... The Megalopolitan clearly distinguishes between the two and presents them as different things. As has been demonstrated, the word parembole was in use in the time of Xenophon (he of Athens). On this our Xenophon contends that “words can change their meaning over 200 years, or that one term might replace another is also possible” adducing the term “gay” as an example.

This flimsy argument, so oft repeated and refuted, is beginning to look like wilful blindness! 'Parembol'e, so far as we can tell, was NOT used in a military context in Xenophon’s time, and even if it was, would make no difference because Xenophon, for whatever reason does NOT use it, but uses ‘paragon’ instead ( note: paragon is not just limited to files and half-files, but describes leading up by the side/beside/alongside in other military situations too).

Maybe but that is a luxury not afforded ‘chillarch’ on another thread hereabouts where it must always mean ‘commander of thousand’ nor ‘hipparchy’.

An utterly untrue accusation. Not only that but even if it were true, it is a completely different word in a completely different context. There is no valid comparison.An illogical accusation.

I would disagree with a comparison such as “the difference in meaning is like the difference between 'jog' and 'run'”. Although involving the deployment of units of troops they are distinct things. A more apt comparison would be the joining of two batteries. Just as with these two manoeuvres, the batteries may be joined by two methods: series or parallel. Both involve connecting the two but you wouldn’t want to mix them up. One will double the voltage and the other the capacity whilst leaving the voltage as is.

A totally inappropriate analogy. In this instance, Xenophon’s description using ‘paragon’ produces the same result as the Hellenistic ‘parembole – a phalanx drawn up in close order of half-files, not something different. The distinction attempted to be drawn here is false – see my comments above about the flimsiness of this argument.

Xenophon wrote:2. He uses 'paragon' and its variations many times, which means 'bring up by the side' (of), leading by, and deploying from column into line.'He simply prefers to say, "leading up by the side"/paragon rather than "interject"/parembole, or even "entaxis" insert. All these words describe troops moving up in file into the intervals between existing files.

I’m afraid I’d have to see that as a synonym as well: "a word that means the same or nearly the same as another word, such as bucket and pail".

They are not synonyms for reasons I have explained.
The endless repetition of this illogical argument – that the ‘dinner drill’ can’t refer to forming a phalanx of half-files in close order because Xenophon doesn’t use ‘parembole/interjection’ will not make it so. This is all a red herring. Let us just read what Xenophon says on its own merits, without dragging in Hellenistic terminology. The meaning is crystal clear ( even Agesilaos agrees the files are doubled down, though his mechanics are wrong). The files form in open order and close up in half-files. This is consistent with everything Xenophon says. Two hundred years later we find this same drill in use in the Macedonian phalanx, unsurprisingly, even though it now has a technical name – ‘parembole’.(The manuals have technical names for every evolution)

Agesilaos wrote 19 July on page 6

The question that remains is 'Why Aigosthena?' A small port difficuly of access ; the maintrouble here is that we are reliant upon Xenophon, a biased source, he is clearly at fault with the battle, which as you say is a series of excuses, Lechaion makes much more sense for a northward thrust. I see a retreat noticed to the ephors and supported by them by the naval deployment (there were no Theban ships in the area) a clear indication that the men on the ground recognised their defeat and were requesting support for their withdrawl.

This is based on pure supposition. Please be specific about what you regard as ‘biased’ about Xenophon’s account of Leuktra, the best we have ? He makes no criticism of the Thebans. Nor is his factual account ‘excuses’ ( see my posts ante).

As to the aftermath, Spartan intentions are not clear. The Kleombrotons remained ‘in situ’ awaiting re-inforcements, but that could easily initially have been to renew matters, as had been mooted by them earlier. Once Jason and his army was in the offing, perhaps it was then that the factors favoured a withdrawal – we just don’t know, though the fact that Jason had to persuade the Spartans into making a truce to cover their withdrawal argues that up until that point, they weren’t interested in one. One must try and understand what was going on at the time, not make assumptions based on hindsight.