Tactike theoriai – manuals or philosophy

[agesilaos]

One good thing about a bit of argy-bargy is that some new details can be thrown up in the melee. One such is the location of Aigosthena, something well established by archaeology and epigraphy; this site is to quote ‘Megara; the political history of a Greek city state to 336 BC’ by R P Legon, Cornell Uni Press, 181, ‘Aegosthena, though possessing an excellent protected harbour, was isolated between Pateras and Cithaeron at the northeastern extremity of the Megarid, and was at least as difficult to reach from Megara as from Southern Boeotia.’ (page 32/3). So why did Archdamos go there?

I think the answer lies in the note at Hell. VI 4 xviii

ἐπλήρουν δὲ καὶ τριήρεις αὐτοί τε οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Κορίνθιοι, καὶ ἐδέοντο καὶ Σικυωνίων συμπληροῦν, ἐφ᾽ ὧν διενοοῦντο τὸ στράτευμα διαβιβάζειν.
Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians themselves and the Corinthians manned triremes and requested the Sicyonians also to help them in so doing, intending to carry the army across the gulf on these ships. Carlton Brownson

It might be assumed that the strateuma/expedition which was to be ferried across the Gulf was the ‘Relief Force’ but nothing prevents it meaning the ex-Kleombrotos’ force. Aigosthena is the closest port to Kreusis whither the defeated Spartans retreated but small and difficult to access for the Relief Force which would have marched passed the much finer harbour at Lechaion where the Korinthian and Sikyonian contingents would gather for such a move.

It follows that if the Spartans knew the defeated troops were looking to withdraw to Aigosthena that that news had been imparted by the messenger who arrived during the Gymnopaideia, which in turn means that the Spartans had decided to pull out immediately after the battle. Further the Relief Force was intended purely as an escort from Aigosthena and was never intended to continue hostilities; despite Xenophon’s shouting about how keen the Achaians etc were stoutly loyal it would seem that the government of the time was rather more cautious.

How could Xenophon miss this out? Well he may have chosen to gloss over it or there may well be a lacuna in our text. VI 4 25- 26

ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐδείπνησαν, πρὶν καθεύδειν παραγγείλαντες ἀκολουθεῖν, ἡγοῦντο εὐθὺς ἀφ᾽ ἑσπέρας τὴν διὰ Κρεύσιος, τῷ λαθεῖν πιστεύοντες μᾶλλον ἢ ταῖς σπονδαῖς. 26] μάλα δὲ χαλεπῶς πορευόμενοι, οἷα δὴ ἐν νυκτί τε καὶ ἐν φόβῳ ἀπιόντες καὶ χαλεπὴν ὁδόν, εἰς Αἰγόσθενα τῆς Μεγαρικῆς ἀφικνοῦνται. ἐκεῖ δὲ περιτυγχάνουσι τῷ μετὰ Ἀρχιδάμου στρατεύματι.
But when the men had dined and before they went to rest, the polemarchs gave the order to follow, and led the way immediately upon the fall of evening by the road through Creusis, trusting to secrecy more than to the truce. [26] And proceeding with very great difficulty, since they were withdrawing at night and in fear and by a hard road, they arrived at Aegosthena in the territory of Megara.

The emboldened phrase clearly looks back to the actual night time withdrawl, yet the text as it stands grafts the fear and the hard road and the night onto the whole journey to Aigosthena. Something, probably only a line seems to have dropped out between ὁδόν, and εἰς.

[Paralus]

One good thing about a bit of argy-bargy is that some new details can be thrown up in the melee. One such is the location of Aigosthena, something well established by archaeology and epigraphy; this site is to quote ‘Megara; the political history of a Greek city state to 336 BC’ by R P Legon, Cornell Uni Press, 181, ‘Aegosthena, though possessing an excellent protected harbour, was isolated between Pateras and Cithaeron at the northeastern extremity of the Megarid, and was at least as difficult to reach from Megara as from Southern Boeotia.’ (page 32/3). So why did Archdamos go there?

Yes, lots of little tidbits. Aigosthena would seem to be identified as the modern Πόρτο Γερμενό / Porto Germeno. This is, even today, 'isolated' and if one were to be traveling on foot (as the Spartans were from Leuktra), a difficult march indeed as Xenophon (of Athens) describes it to be. It is also a difficult march from Megara (or Athens for that matter) as Legon states above. Xenophon lists the pro-Spartan allies who joined the force from Sparta and goes on to say that "the Spartans themselves and the Corinthians manned triremes, and they asked the Sicyonians to sail with them, because they intended to use their ships to carry the troops across the gulf" (Hell. 6.4.18) as Agesilaos notes above. I disagree that this was for the survivors of Kleombrotos' force, Xenophon's text indicates that it is the troops under Archidamaos that are to be so transported for it is these that the entire passage is discussing. It also seems odd that the force would march to Aigostheni and then request ships from the Sicyonians and Corinthians to ferry the survivors from Kleombrotos' force. It is far more simple that this is Archidamos' force, assembled at Corinth, which is ferried to Aigostheni.

Archidamos, then, had no intention of taking the normal route via the Megarid into Boeotia via Cithaeron; he would assemble his force on Corinth and sail across the gulf to Aigosthena. It is also to be noted that Megara is not mentioned in the list of 'enthusiastic' allies with Archidamos. As well, at the time of the force's dispatch, Sparta is unlikely to be certain of just how their partner in 'peace', Athens, stood in regard the recent defeat. The Ehpors and Archidamos would seem to be taking no chances and it would seem that the force was, indeed, not likely a new invasion force; rather one of secure and escort.

From this either Archidamos must have known this to be the route the defeated force would take or it is a rather monumental coincidence that the two forces meet at an isolated harbour at the northeastern extremity of the gulf Archidamos chose to sail across. Thus it must also follow that Archidamos was not waiting for the allied contingents of his own force at Aigosthema but for those of the defeated one. It rather beggars belief that the Spartan king would assemble the Corinthians and Sycionians and sail across the gulf without the Tegeans, Mantinieans, Phleiasians and Achaeans who would then face the difficult march through the western Megarid to this isolated port. Not to mention the fact that the Spartan king and his force had just marched through the very territory of those allies so enthusiastic to join him.

[Xenophon]

An excellent idea of Agesilaos, to make at least a rough estimate of how long the Lacedaemonian army likely remained in Boeotia, still threatening Thebes.

The forum name is clearly well chosen: read one Xenophon, read 'em all. This - "the Lacedaemonian army likely remained in Boeotia, still threatening Thebes" - is something of a religious mantra. The argument is based solely on a description of the Theban forces who are painted as being thoroughly incontinent at the prospect of their defeated foe. Secondly we are treated to the picture of these same incontinent Thebans sending "desperately" to both Athens and Jason of Pherai for aid against these encamped and resolute Spartans. One wonders just how these timid creatures managed to win Leuktra and give the Spartans a caning in the process!

I always smile to myself whenever Paralus' posts start to consist of more sarcasm and rhetoric, or 'colourful phraseology' than facts.....it is a sure barometer that he is on the back foot. I have already explained why an army which outnumbers yours, sitting in a fortified camp on your city's doorstep, less than 10 miles away is an obvious 'threat-in-being'...even when defeated and demoralised. Especially when those enemies were Spartans, who did not lose their reputation overnight, as was proven by subsequent events and the "Tearless Battle".

I'm glad we agree that the Thebans were themselves somewhat surprised by their unexpected victory - won only, as Xenophon says, with every possible advantage, and every possible disadvantage to the Lakedaemonians. They were only too well aware that they weren't out of the woods by any means, hence their "hasty" appeals for allies. In addition, the Lakedaemonians weren't the only ones with luke-warm allies - that recent Spartan ally Thespiae for one, and there were others. [Paus IX.13.8]

Unsaid is the fact that the Spartans - utterly defeated as the realists amongst them recognised - sat squat within their encampment and moved not one inch whilst "threatening" Thebes. Unmentioned by Xenophon of Brisvegas is the fact that these Thebans were outnumbered somewhat severely. The only figures we have for the armies are 11,000 for the Spartans and 6,000 for the Boeotians (Plut. Pel. 20.1; Diod. 15.52.2). These two sources have already been marginalised as 'pro-Theban' (and if that is so, Xenophon reads as "sir the dog ate my hoplites") but there is nothing in those figures to really question. Spartan armies sent to Boeotia in the immediate years prior this campaign number 18,000 or so (Diod. 15.32.1; 34.1). As for Thebes, this was a full citizen levy and those Boeotian allies still with her.

Yes, I have already pointed out that both sides were in a 'Mexican stand-off" and that each relied on the appearance of fresh forces to break the deadlock. Which fact alone demonstrates that Leuktra was 'indecisive', as the Thebans themselves recognised. ( which I'll return to anon)

From a different context, I will quote Thucydides:

"They might seem to have been worsted by Fortune but in spirit they (the Spartans) were still the same" [V.75.3]

As to numbers, I have already referred to the general consensus on that score, and outlined the reasoning, namely some 10,000 or so Lakedaemonians and 1,000 cavalry; and 7-9,000 Boeotians with 7-800 cavalry. We are told that of the Boeotian command, 3 Boeotarchs were for giving battle,(Epaminonds, Malgis and Xenocrates) and 3 not (Damocleidus, Damophilos and Simangelus) who were in favour of withdrawing to the city and being besieged. If the numbers were really 11,000 to 6,000 - almost two-to-one - there would have been no question of offering battle. The split argues strongly that the Thebans were outnumbered, but not significantly so. The deadlock was broken by the arrival of the seventh Boeotarch (Brachyllides) and his troops, who voted for battle.[Paus IX.13.6 ]

Which brings us to the next point. Agesilaos had played his hand well. In the discussions over the peace between Sparta and the Athenian Confederacy, Agesilaos had neatly isolated Thebes. After Athens renounced war and agreed, Thebes was utterly alone; her former ally (along with her confederacy) now on the sidelines. Agesilaos and Sparta expected that this would be a decimation of the hated Thebes. As it turned out, Thebes won and, in the process, dealt the Spartan core of the army a fearful belting. The surprise of the 'backs against the wall' victory is palpable.The Theban command, in receipt of a request for a truce to collect the dead, can only have expected that the Spartans will have sent to Sparta for aid / advice as well. Their first thought is to send to Athens - that flighty, erstwhile ally - to restore the former alliance. Athens, only too well aware that a dominant Thebes was not a welcome prospect, declined any interest. Their second was to send to Jason to ask for alliance against the Spartans. If there were to be further campaigning - especially with expected reinforcements from the Peloponnese, alliances were crucial: Thebes could not carry such a war alone (Philip did no such thing either decades later).

With which I'd pretty much agree, despite the exaggeration of the magnitude of the defeat, and as I have already pointed out, Jason appears to have been an existing ally.

"As for Thebes' supposed craven indolence in waiting until Agesilaos returned home before poking their noses into the Peoloponnese" this, as Xenophon of Brisvegas would say, is to utterly ignore the military and political realities. Thebes, having just fought a battle for its existence, was in no position to invade the Peloponnese. Such an invasion could never take place until Thebes had an ironclad alliance in place that would supply the necessary manpower. As just explained, she did not possess that manpower on her own. That would be the purview of Epameinondas in the aftermath.

...But Thebes did have just such an alliance. The two major Arcadian cities of Tegea and Mantinea ( not to mention Argos and Elis) could field more men than the Spartans, and alone could challenge Sparta as the forced retreat of Agesilaos from an awkward situation demonstrated [XH VI.5.18]. The Thebans arrival gave them overwhelming numbers - though they could not have been the 50,000-70,000 of Diodorus [XVI.62.5] and Plutarch Agesilaos XXXI.1 and Pelopidas [XXIV.2], but perhaps might have been no more than 30,000 or so. The Lakedaemonians could probably only muster less than half that figure. Epaminondas' caution in coming to the Arcadians aid is wholly unjustified....but perhaps again illustrates that their reputation still stood high.

Whatever else might be said, the disasters that enveloped Sparta over the following few years can all be laid at the door of Leuktra. There could be no decent land alliance and grand campaign against Sparta without it. This was no mora defeated by Iphikrates' peltasts nor was it Shpacteria. This was a comprehensive and catestrophic defeat of homoioi arms in pitched battle. It was, for Sparta, the Titanic's iceberg: the SS Lakadaemonia ,while still afloat, was on severely limited time and its allied passengers were inevitably abandoning ship.

I don't believe that is so. It is a 'modern topos' using plenty of hindsight. At the time, second Mantinea and the death of Epaminondas undid everything Leuktra stood for. The Arcadians, Achaeans, and Elians were all back in the Spartan fold, and allied to Athens. Thereafter Thebes and Sparta, both exhausted, did little or nothing until Philip's much later appearance in the Phokian War.

[Paralus]

Your reference to Xenophon is, I take it, to “Constitution of the Lacedaemonians” XI.4, where we have an enomotia performing drill similar to the ‘dinner drill’. An enomotia of 36 are described as being drawn “...drawn up at the word of command in single file, sometimes in threes [i.e. 3 files x 12 deep, in open order] and sometimes in sixes...”[ i.e 6 x 6 deep in close order]...”and the depth of the phalanx[but not its frontage] is increased or diminished." Incidently, the word for file-leaders here is ‘paragogai’. [CORRECTION: should read 'Protostatai']

How else do you think an enomotia, which you know to be drawn up in files, forms single file, threes and sixes ? And does so in a fashion which alters its depth ? How can this be done without “moving from one state to another”? Realistically, this can only be as per my notes in parentheses, which is not only consistent with the ‘dinner drill’ but also the phalanx formation at Leuctra.

Thus we have Spartan ‘enomotia’ one behind the other in column of march, 3 files of 12 wide in ‘open’ order, and after deployment into line they close up to 6 deep for combat [Xen Lak XI.8]…

Lak. Pol. 11.4 says absolutely nothing of file insertion or of filling spaces between files. It simply says that the enomotia form into files “sometimes (two), sometimes three, and sometimes six abreast”. At 11.6 Xenophon describes nothing of file insertion either, simply relating that the ἐνωμοτάρχης deploys his section from column of march into line and does so as ‘thin’ or ‘deep’ (ἀραιαί τε καὶ βαθύτεραι) as orders demand – just as Thukydides corroborates in his description of Mantinea (418).

Lak. Pol. 11.8 – again – says nothing of forming up “six deep for combat” as you clearly imply with the reference placed after this assumption. This passage simply states that the army forms into battle line to face the enemy. Assumption is, in fact, a key word here:

For the avoidance of confusion, we should distinguish between deploying from column into phalanx, and subsequent 'closing up' into battle order/pyknosis.
Hippocrates orders his men into line at 93.2, and shortly after joins them, and they are 8 deep.Subsequently they seem to have closed up into 'battle order, as per the bold section of the quote in my previous post. and Hippocrates starts giving his address, but gets only halfway down the line before being interrupted by the Theban attack....

Thus we must assume that the Athenian line closed down from eight to four – even though this is nowhere stated. Thukydides’ description of Delion has the Boeotian army as in “battle order and ready for battle” at 93.1. He then describes this battle order noting that the Thebans were 25 shields deep and the others at varying depths. We must assume here that the Thebans initially deployed fifty deep. At Leuktra we assume the opposite: the Thebans, fifty deep, must have closed up to 25 deep. In the same battle we must assume that the Spartans – described as twelve deep – must have closed down to six deep. We must assume that the allies at Nemea closed down from sixteen deep to eight. None of this is anywhere stated; it must be assumed. The theory of the “Innate Assumption”?!

… for an actual example of this depth in battle, see Xen.Hell VIII.5.23 where the Spartans at second Mantinea deploy their cavalry “like a phalanx of hoplites in a line six deep.” (i.e. half-files from 12 deep files)

I admit to having puzzled over the regular insistence that Xenophon’s description of Mantinea (362) provided corroboration of Spartan phalanxes fighting six deep for I could not find him saying so (until I read back to find that quote). From memory, this claim was made three times. I see now why Marincola’s eminently logical rejection of the emendation of this passage in favour of all the extant manuscripts was met with such questioning. It would appear this was the one and only supposed reference to Spartans fighting six deep and, as such, ‘corroboration’ of them doing so at Leuktra. I do not know of any other reference to six deep but others might?

On depths, it is interesting to note that Xenophon (of Brisvegas) mentions Agesilaos’ anastrophe near Mantinea. Having performed this and thus doubled the depth of the phalanx, Agesilaos then ‘reversed’ it by extending the battle line back to what must have been its original depth. This depth, Xenophon (of Athens) tells us, was “nine or ten shields deep” (Hell. 6.5.19). One assumes that should Agesilaos have actually fought then it would have to have been in the order he was in: nine deep or ten deep.

At Hell. 6.2.18-21 Xenophon (of Athens) says that the Spartan Mnasippos attempted the same manoeuvre at Corcyra. Here, unlike Agesilaos, it failed. Xenophon writes that Mnasippos was successful at his end of the Spartan battle line, stating that “after he had formed the troops in line, Mnasippus himself turned to flight those of the enemy who were in front of the gates”. There is no indication, yet again, of any close down before battle was engaged. Further, Xenophon goes on to note that although Mnasippos was successful at his end of the battle line, the other end was not so fortunate. He then decided to aid by means of anastrophe. At this stage of the battle Xenophon clearly states that “the Spartans, who were arrayed eight deep” feared that the end of their line would not withstand the charge of the enemy’s “massed formation” attacking it. Clearly the Spartans are fighting eight deep here; there seems no other explanation. Perhaps we are to assume that they closed down from sixteen deep?

Our sources for hoplite combat provide numerous notations of depth. Nowhere are we told that any of these depths with which we are provided subsequently halved for combat. The thought intrudes that perhaps these notations of hoplite depths in our sources are simply the depth at which those forces fought. Hersey to the ears of Xenophon (of Brisvegas), I know. Still, it is a simple, straightforward reading with the benefit of necessitating nil assumptions.

On the use of the two different terms by Polybios, I can only agree with Aegesilaos. The Megalopolitan clearly distinguishes between the two and presents them as different things. As has been demonstrated, the word parembole was in use in the time of Xenophon (he of Athens). On this our Xenophon contends that “words can change their meaning over 200 years, or that one term might replace another is also possible” adducing the term “gay” as an example. Maybe but that is a luxury not afforded ‘chillarch’ on another thread hereabouts where it must always mean ‘commander of thousand’ nor ‘hipparchy’.

I would disagree with a comparison such as “the difference in meaning is like the difference between 'jog' and 'run'”. Although involving the deployment of units of troops they are distinct things. A more apt comparison would be the joining of two batteries. Just as with these two manoeuvres, the batteries may be joined by two methods: series or parallel. Both involve connecting the two but you wouldn’t want to mix them up. One will double the voltage and the other the capacity whilst leaving the voltage as is.

2. He uses 'paragon' and its variations many times, which means 'bring up by the side' (of), leading by, and deploying from column into line.'He simply prefers to say, "leading up by the side"/paragon rather than "interject"/parembole, or even "entaxis" insert. All these words describe troops moving up in file into the intervals between existing files.

I’m afraid I’d have to see that as a synonym as well: "a word that means the same or nearly the same as another word, such as bucket and pail".

On the Leuktra matter and Xenophon's relating of it, perhaps another thread is the way to go. Something along the lines of "Leuktra, Thebes and Sparta: Xenophon as fair witness"??

[agesilaos]

Paralus, I agree that the impression given is that the Relief Force is intended to be ferried across the Gulf BUT, were that the case they would not march passed easily accessible ports to the isolated outpost of Aigosthena, when any Achaian port or better still Lechaion was available; I can only see the destination of Aigosthena making sense if one is ferrying troops in relay from Kreusis, from which it would be the nearest friendly port; its difficult access would also be a defensive bonus.

Now, we are told that the Spartans sent triereis, presumably from Gytheion, a journey of about 275 miles or three days at a constant 5 mph, which fits well with the army's march of three days, since they would not have delayed for a day but set off the evening before the army marched. One also has to wonder why the Spartans would tax their own small fleet with such a periplous when they had allied ships aplenty on the Gulf if this was a ferrying job for the newly raised army; sufficient threat of itself to encourage loyalty. I would think that the Spartan ships were there to ensure the Sikyonians and Korinthians stayed onside and also to reassure the demoralised survivors of Leuktra. I do not doubt that the messenger from Leuktra communicated the doubtful enthusiasm of the allies there and the Ephors took precautions; I cannot imagine they were sitting back imagining a draw going to extra time which they'd win on penalties! This really was the hoplite equivalent of Germany's 7-1 thrashing of Brazil, in this case Scolari (Kleombrotos) died of wounds.

Aigosthena makes no sense unless it was the pre-planned place of withdrawl communicated to the ephors by the messenger from the defeated force; which means they were in no doubt that they were thoroughly beaten despite Xenophon's bravura, 'Shall we go again, sir?' Springs to mind from the Light Brigade in 1854.

The only access to Boeotia for a force sailing from Aigosthena would be the Phokian pass that Kleombrotos' stronger force had found too well defended of the bridgehead at Kreusis which afforded a difficult route to Leuktra which was now covered, strategic nonsense were anything offensive intended.

[Paralus]

I don't see the 'relief' army marching past more serviceable ports as I don't see that army marching to Aigosthena. Yes the Spartans 'themselves' manned ships, so too the Corinthians and the Sicyonians. Xenophon says this was because they intended to use these ships to convey the troops across the gulf. Again, the only troops being discussed here are those with Archidamos. Archidamos marched his force to Corinth in my view from whence the assembled ships transported the force across the gulf to Aigosthena. The allies will have been picked up on the march.

We are then told that the defeated Spartan force endured a difficult march south from Leuktra via Kreusis to Aigosthena - "eventually arrived at Aigosthena" where it "met up with the force that had been sent out with Archidamos". So Archidamos is at Aigosthena when the defeated arrive. There is no indication that ships were ever intended to convey the defeated to Aigosthena in that. Rather there is every indication that the intended plan was exactly what Xenophon says: the defeated would take the "hard road" via Kreusis heading for Agesthena. Such then implies that Aigsothena was the appointed place (or area) that the two would meet up. Also, one could hardly describe sailing from Kreusis to Aigosthena - essentially from one bay, around the peninsular, to the next - as sailing "across the gulf". On the other hand, one could definitely describe sailing from Lechaion (or Sikyon) to Aigosthena as transporting troops "across the gulf".

Having met up at Aigosthena, the united force then dispenses with the triremes and marches back to Corinth where it is disbanded. Athens' decision to stay out of hostilities is very likely known by then and it was perhaps decided that troops should simply march back rather than be relayed by ship in groups.

[agesilaos]

The question that remains is 'Why Aigosthena?' A small port difficuly of access ; the maintrouble here is that we are reliant upon Xenophon, a biased source, he is clearly at fault with the battle, which as you say is a series of excuses, Lechaion makes much more sense for a northward thrust. I see a retreat noticed to the ephors and supported by them by the naval deployment (there were no Theban ships in the area) a clear indication that the men on the ground recognised their defeat and were requesting support for their withdrawl.

[system1988]

Hi all

I thought It would make a pleasant break from all the long theorizing and commenting for all by showing you a few photos from the areas that are most discussed in this thread.

Here is the link to the photos

http://s1246.photobucket.com/user/IamSy ... t=3&page=1

The first photo is Siphe, a fortified bay near Kreusis

The second photo is Kreusis itself

The third photo is Aegosthena

The fourth photo is Aegosthena again... "a small port of difficult access"

The fifth photo is the acropolis of Kreusis. Not much can be seen but the site is full of archaological finds.

Best

Pauline

[Xenophon]

"...The one missing distance is from Kreusis to Aigosthena and with good reason. There is no pass available to move to Aigosthena from Aliki (nor Paralia Livadostratas, which is where some maps locate Kreusis but this lacks any route to Thisvi whence Kleombrotos moved on Kreusis). Xenophon tells us that the Spartans returned to Kreusis (VI 4 xxv). As both Kreusis and Aigosthena are ports 13 miles apart by sea. Kleombrotos had captured twelve triereis and these may have been used to ferry the army to Aigosthena. "

My ancient Greece overlay over Google Earth shows a road some 8 miles long between Creusis and Aegosthena, crossing the peninsula ( the modern road follows the same route ).Ships would have to go the long way, sailing around. We would expect such a route to have existed in ancient times, especially since ancient roads often followed pre-historic tracks, and sea-communications could be cut by adverse weather.The idea that 12 triereis could transport the army, even just the Spartans, is just not credible for obvious reasons. Apart from anything else it contradicts Xenophon, who specifically tells us the whole army went by land :

"... the polemarchs gave orders that after dining all should have their baggage packed and ready with the purpose of setting out during the night, in order that at daybreak they might be climbing Cithaeron. But when the men had dined and before they went to rest, the polemarchs gave the order to follow, and led the way immediately upon the fall of evening by the road through Creusis, trusting to secrecy more than to the truce..And proceeding with very great difficulty, since they were withdrawing at night and in fear and by a hard road, they arrived at Aegosthena in the territory of Megara. There they fell in with the army under Archidamus. And after waiting there until all the allies had joined him, Archidamus led back the whole army together as far as Corinth; from there he dismissed the allies and led the citizen troops back home."

We may dispense therefore with Agesilaos' calculations and hypothesis of the Spartans fleeing in 12 ships and abandoning their allies - it is simply untenable, as well as contradicting what we are told by Xenophon.

I remain to be convinced that when Xenophon describes Archidamus as waiting for all the allies to assemble he means those due to join the new expedition. The relevant states all lay en route viz

And the Tegeans served with him zealously; for the followers of Stasippus were still alive, who were favourable to the Lacedaemonians and had no slight power in their own state. Likewise the Mantineans from their villages1 supported him2 stoutly; for they chanced to be under an aristocratic government. Furthermore, the Corinthians, Sicyonians, Phliasians, and Achaeans followed him with all zeal, and other states also sent out soldiers. And the Tegeans served with him zealously; for the followers of Stasippus were still alive, who were favourable to the Lacedaemonians and had no slight power in their own state. Likewise the Mantineans from their villages supported him stoutly; for they chanced to be under an aristocratic government. Furthermore, the Corinthians, Sicyonians, Phliasians, and Achaeans followed him with all zeal, and other states also sent out soldiers. IV 4 xviii

The reference to Stasippus (pro-Spartan) still being alive foreshadows the subsequent struggle and triumph of the anti-Spartan faction a year or so later, and the declaration of Arcadian independence. The specified states were indeed all 'en route' - they help us identify Archidamus' route - but note that "other states also sent out soldiers", who must have followed on behind. Again, exactly what we would expect, for Archidamus was hardly going to wait for every last ally to come in.

"The passage concerning the sending of an embassy to Jason reads

But to Jason, who was their ally, the Thebans sent in haste, urging him to come to their aid; for they were debating among themselves how the future would turn out.
πρὸς μέντοι Ἰάσονα, σύμμαχον ὄντα, ἔπεμπον σπουδῇ οἱ Θηβαῖοι, κελεύοντες βοηθεῖν, διαλογιζόμενοι πῇ τὸ μέλλον ἀποβήσοιτο.

The word you have as ‘Now’ is μέντοι which means ‘indeed, however or to be sure’, which, since they sent to him in all haste would make both embassies leave at the same time.

That they left simultaneously is hardly likely. A better translation would be:
(the Theban request is rejected) "..and so he left Athens. However/Nevertheless, the Thebans sent in all haste to their ally Jason urging him to come to their aid; for they were debating among themselves how the future would turn out...."

The events clearly occur after the return of the failed embassy - apart from anything else, they could hardly hold a debate until the outcome was known.

This makes the mission to Athens less important to the timings; two days to get to Jason seems fine but if his forced march only proceeds at 25 miles a day he is hardly busting a gut, assuming you still believe an average march was 21 miles. I would think two days again would be nearer the mark, he has a small professional force and he traversed Phokis before they could muster (I agree he must have been on the border). I see no reason for the Truce not to have been concluded in a day, neither side was strong enough to be keen on renewed fighting.

I think this an impossibly tight schedule. Jason would have had to consider the Thebans plea against what he was currently engaged in, supply his men for the march ( no time for foraging on a forced march), strike camp and set off, that might take a day in itself, which we have made no allowance for, so even if we allow 2 days for the actual march, the MINIMUM total, allowing for no other possible delays, for the period that the Lakedaemonians lay before Thebes is still ten days or so, and probably closer to two weeks. Also, truce negotiations are never quick affairs. It is incorrect that neither side wished to renew fighting. The Thebans did - they wanted to fight a "decisive" battle, obviously recognising that Leuktra had been indecisive [XH VI.4.24]

Consider that Jason had to arrive, listen to Theban arguments and even plans for an attack and argue those proposals down, negotiate with the Thebans as to what terms they might agree to a Truce on, obtain safe conduct from the Lakedaemonians, speak to them, only after which did the Spartans ask him to negotiate a Truce, negotiate with them on their proposed terms, then go to and fro with the inevitable haggling.....all that is very unlikely to have occurred in a single day, and even two days must be a minimal estimate.

After the Truce is agreed, the same night the Lakedaemonians decide to decamp, wisely deciding not to rely on the truce but depart secretly under the cover of night, as we have seen. And "if 'twere done, t'were best done quickly" ( to quote MacBeth). An elementary precaution would be a piece of dis-information as to this departure, in case some treacherous deserter looks to claim a reward from the enemy, so the Polemarchs say they will leave late in the night, so as to be on the slopes of Cithaeron at daybreak. In fact they leave immediately after dinner and head in a completely different direction, to Creusis [XH VI.4.24]. All standard military precautions.

Pausanias IX 14 i has

After the battle Epaminondas for a while, having proclaimed that the other Peloponnesians should depart home, kept the Lacedaemonians cooped up in Leuctra. But when reports came that the Spartans in the city were marching to a man to the help of their countrymen at Leuctra, Epaminondas allowed his enemy to depart under a truce, saying that it would be better for the Boeotians to shift the war from Boeotia to Lacedaemon.

It may be that the allies were no longer present when the Truce was settled. That the orders to be prepared to march were given by the polemarchs at dinner and were changed at short notice may point to the Spartans alone being involved, the allies would be unlikely to dine with their masters, I think and I am sure the camps were separate (though that may be a dream).

Pausanias account is a fine piece of rationalisation, and spin drawn from a pro-Theban source, obviously, and allowing Epaminondas an apochryphal 'bon mot' as well!

I find Xenophon's version, with the truce being imposed by Jason's refusal to attack the Lakedaemonians, far more credible.
The words given by Pausanias to Epaminondas are plausible, but do you really think the allies would listen to the enemy, or meekly obey their wishes, or that the Spartans would let them ? Humbug !
In any event, the evidence suggests the united army stayed together, joined Archidamus, and marched to Corinth, where the allies were formally dismissed.

There may only be five days before the Spartans withdrew, then and one for them to either be shipped to Aigosthena or march along a coastal track. Can the six days fit with the relief expedition.

Completely impossible - see above and my post July 15, and they certainly didn't travel by ship.

There is no mention, or implication of separate camps ( a potential military disaster, allowing piecemeal attacks on each camp, not to mention the risk of a wholesale 'going over' to the Thebans - though that was never going to happen in fact.)

With no evidence whatsoever for separate camps, which is based on a presumption that Spartan allies were communicating with the Thebans, a very dubious claim by Jason, made for obvious reasons, which would have been difficult from inside a single stockaded camp, it would appear your self-diagnosis of a dream is correct.

A small digression on this. Let us reckon that while Xenophon's speeches are not verbatim, they still preserve the essence, or gist of what was said. Jason makes the shrewd claim to the Spartans that "..some, even among your own allies, are already negotiating with the enemy about a pact of friendship.".

How likely is this? Pacts or treaties of friendship are not negotiated by contingents of soldiers in the field, but are the prerogative of sovereign states. Is it likely that in the 10-14 days or so available that word could have gotten back to the cities in the Peloponnese, that they then considered and debated their positions, and that their pro-Spartan rulers would get an embassy to Thebes to put out feelers? Not very likely then.

But to quote Mandy Rice-Davies again : "Well he would say that wouldn't he". The same applies to Pausanias' report of Epaminondas "..proclaimed that the other Pelopponesians should depart home."

Such posturing was to be expected, and doubtless no-one believed it for a minute.

The messenger bearing the sad tidings has 148 miles to travel, two and a half days at 60 miles per day, unlike the Theban he would be able to exchange mounts as he would have been a Spartan officer. The mustering of the army need not have taken longer than a day; the Spartan troops were already gathered for the Gymnopaedia, messengers would be sent to the allies to muster en route as soon as the decision to move had been taken, the army could move on the morning of the fourth day after the battle and march the 126 miles to Aigosthena in three days; the Spartan army had marched the 160 miles to Marathon in that time and this was a similar emergency.

Once again, this is an impossibly tight schedule because Agesilaos does not consider the detail. The distance along the Spartan messenger's route is roughly 150-160 two dimensional map miles. Whilst we use this for convenience, military planners allow that digital distances are often 10-15% shorter than actual three dimensional ones on the ground, for various reasons. In addition, we have had the problem of the measurers waypoints not following twists and turns leading to shortening. ( see discussion of length of Euphrates on a different thread). Still, 2.5 days or 3 days is much of a muchness - though I think 60 miles a day in Greece is stretching it a bit. The messenger evidently arrived late in the afternoon ( the Ephors allowed a theatre performance to continue). The next day was a day of mourning, after which the Ephors took action ["The next step taken by the Ephors...XH VI.4.17 ]. So at least a full day's delay after the messenger's arrival.

That the army was ready to march instantly is an impossibility, even if every man was in the city. Try reckoning how long it takes to spread a message by word of mouth to thousands of men, even with town criers. These then have to go home, get their gear ready and report to their mustering points. I can't see the army marching out that same day. Far more likely it was dawn next day.
As to comparisons with the Marathon march, that was a mere 2,000 men, and did not involve picking up allies en route - with doubtless delay each time a contingent was picked up, and over rather different terrain.

…given the specific positive evidence in Xenophon's works and other evidence.

Almost slipped through; as has been stated repeatedly Xenophon provides no evidence for ‘half-file deployment’, as you have stated he never uses the word for this, ‘parembole’. That you cannot accept that ‘paragogein’ means something different does not make it evidence of anything 9other than the believe that Faith can change a language.)

This is completely false, and continuing to repeat this falsehood will not make it true. For the "N" th time, look at my diagram etc on page 1 . Nobody uses 'parembole' to mean file insertion in Xenophon's time. And even in English 'file insertion' is a misnomer. It's usage in this way comes from late Hellenistic manuals over 200 years later. 'Paragon/leading up by the side, beside' does indeed mean something different - I have ACCURATELY given the actual meaning a number of times now; but it can, and is, used by Xenophon to describe 'half-file leaders' leading up their half-files beside the front half of the file. I'll have more to say when I (eventually) catch up with Paralus' latest post on the subject. ( Lord knows when ! )

[Paralus]

An excellent set of photographs Pauline - gives a visual sense of the ruggedness of the area. The defeated Spartan army certainly chose the back door, 'fire trail' path to succour. I drove much of that northern side of the gulf back in 2007 from Atirrio through Itea, Dephi, etc and it is rather rough in many parts. Hard to imagine Philip, in 339/8, driving an army through the Gravia pass down to Amphissa in a time before modern roads. Photo below of one of the western outliers of Parnassos (immediately west of Delphi). Just down from here via several hair pin bends begins the road up to Amphissa and the Gravia pass. As I recall we had to dodge many a bus and mining truck who all seemed to think that my side of the road was theirs for the use of at any time. Would dearly love to track down that red being swallowed with rabbit stew (αβαντις). Very good: took another bottle back to the hotel in Delphi!

Immediately west of Delphi

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Itea. Road to Amphissa and Gravia pass bottom right.

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Salaminia,young Paraloi and that red...

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[Xenophon]

System 1988 wrote:

Hi all

I thought It would make a pleasant break from all the long theorizing and commenting for all by showing you a few photos from the areas that are most discussed in this thread.

Always good to see what it is we are discussing....many thanks ! "long theorising and commenting" is right.....devilish hard to keep up with two prolific writers !!

As previously, may I ask for a moratorium for a couple of days to allow me to at least get on the same page ?

[Paralus]

As previously, may I ask for a moratorium for a couple of days to allow me to at least get on the same page ?

You may ask.

I could continue to post a photo or six! Then again, I do think that the Leuktra material deserves splitting off. Not certain Amyntoros is available to do so. Perhaps Marcus if he's following.

[Paralus]

I'd accidentally left out a section of my post on the "Innate Assumption" above; a matter of much cutting and pasting into and out of 'word' I'm afraid. My error.It was to do with the battlefield maneuver called anastrophe. I was going to post it here but it makes more sense inserted where it should have been Given that which follows it. I shall 'reduct' the post and the inserted paragraph will be in Italics.

[agesilaos]

Excellent pictures, Pauline, could you just clear one thing up, what is the modern name for Kreusis? I was tornbetween two sites but since thare are remains I presume that epigraphy has securely identified the site, thanks.

Just to clear a couple of points. I did not trace a route, as per the Xenophon thread but used the route finder app which gives the actual road distance so there is no need to factor in an extra 10%; I have sent the detailed map of the area to you and you should be able to see that there really is no route to Aigosthena, the overlay cannot be accurate. If it were then we would be looking at a winding mountainous track, in single file the retreating army would stretch for 20km once the train is factored in, that's a day's march.

You seem to have ignored the fact that Xenophon imples the journey to Aigosthena took one night and was conducted in fear on a hard road; this timescale is certainly nonsense, the journey to Kreusis would fill the night. You also ignore the point of meeting at Aigosthena; this rendevous must have been conveyed by the initial messenger and so the force that you want to be' threatening Thebes' was already planning to bug out. Nor was there 'a day of mourning' all Xenophon says is that those whose relatives had survived were miserable whilst the relative of the dead were happy.

The march to Marathon covered the same route for the most part nor would two maorai and the remnants come to more than 2,000 (two morai 1,200 five age groups from four morai 16 x 4 x 5 = 320, total 1,520).

[system1988]

Excellent pictures, Pauline, could you just clear one thing up, what is the modern name for Kreusis?

The modern name of Kreusis is Livadostrata, a name the Katalanoi gave to the area and it means "riva d' ostria- the side of the southern wind"

Also, Paralus, thank you for the Delphi photos as well as the one of your lovely family!

I am also sending a photo of the area Ancient Thespies, Modern thespies, Plataia (the battle took place just outside the modern village where the victory monument was found)

Finallly the victory monument of the Leuktra battle built by the victorious Thebans. What is missing is the decorative armor on top of the monument.

Due to the size of the photos here is the link to them:

http://s1246.photobucket.com/user/IamSy ... t=3&page=1

Best