pothos.org

Paralus have you read Thucydides?

Paralus wrote:Indeed you can Phoebus. I did not. If you care to re-read the post you might note that “what piffle” related to the notion of “freedom of the Greeks” as propounded by the panhellenists and those that appropriated it. Alexander was hardly the first. His father before him had established the “league” as the framework for this overlay.

Right, and I was pointing at the similar propaganda thrown about by the Atheneans, Spartans, and Thebans. I simply don't see the difference between Alexander's claims and those thrown about by Epaminondas, for example. Did Epaminondas really care about the Messenians? Probably not. He knew that liberating the Messenians served an important political end against the Spartans.

Ultimately, I simply ask that people be fair with their contrasts and comparisons. Hellenes had been killing, disenfranchising, and enslaving Hellenes long before Phillip and Alexander made their rounds. Their propaganda was by no means new.

Again, if you re-read the post, you’ll likely note that Alexander is not differentiated from his “predecessors”. The whole point being addressed is panhellenism not simply Alexander’s use of it.

Ah. Then I merely misinterpreted you.

My view of “panhellenism” is not Alexander-centred. It is also not something simply related to this particular thread. You are new to the forum and will not, I suspect, have read any of the older material. Perhaps this will indicatemy position more fully.

Much obliged--I'll be reading up on that very soon.

The main difference is attitude.

How about the events of Sikelia, then?

In any case, there seems to have been no shortage of Greeks prepared to line up against Alexander.

Or against any other who sought to put the whole of Hellas under one boot.

With respect to the Spartan disaster at Leuktra, what makes you think that the number of dead here was anything like that at the Granicus?

Various sources I've seen attribute the casualties of that battle in the 1,000-3,000 range. Where Granicus is concerned, again, it all depends on whose figures you use to determine how many were there to begin with. As I recall, Green offers a round number of 5,000.

Where the comparative casualties are concerned, again, we're talking about a matter of capability. Heavy infantry aren't going to be able to necessarily chase down opponents, never mind encircle them... but we know they tried.

Cheers,
P

amyntoros wrote:What is it about Alexander that makes people want to ascribe a "higher" purpose or credit him with idealistic views about his conquests? Philip did everything that Alexander did (but on a smaller scale) and was set to invade Persia for himself, yet I've never seen him described as idealistic in any shape or form!

Well, Phillip and Alexander were different people with different motivations. More below.

Yes, I know you said Alexander "may" have possessed a certain amount of idealism, but I find even the need to suggest it quite curious. Of course I realize you are not the only person here who feels this way - yours just happens to be the last post before mine.

It's of course all speculation, but my thoughts draw on the evidence that Alexander leaves behind. Trained by Aristotle, allegedly a lover of Homer's, and apparently not cynical when pursuing the heroic ideal offered by his lineage, I wouldn't be surprised if Alexander initially did have a number of lofty ideas. People often forget that he was a rather young man when he embarked on his expeditions and conquests, and what effect his age may have had on his mindset.

Phillip too, was a young man when he embarked, and also endowed with a potent legacy. If we remove Alexander as a conspirator in his death, though, the main difference between the two would have been what each had to endure in his youth. Phillip gained his throne over his own kin. Alexander may have quarreled with his father, but if he did not murder him or assist in said murder then the level of cynicism would have been much different.

And after the death of Darius he insisted on going further, telling his men it was in order to capture and destroy Bessus. Then it was the taking of Bactria and Sogdia.

Which, if I remember, were somewhat related objectives (Bessus having gone there, I believe; I won't have my sources for another week or two). And legitimate ones, as well. What was left east of Babylon could in time have become a threat.

Once past Persia... I believe that's when Alexander truly caught that exploratory bug. After that, it's difficult to truly reconcile what he wanted. The subsequent conquests he was planning for wouldn't have brought him to new territories, and it's unlikely they would have interested him (as an adventurer) as much as his eastern trip (remember, he believed that the Nile eventually bottomed out in the Indian Ocean... and thus he technically had the "southern" fringe covered).

Anyways, I'm getting sidetracked.

I do believe that Alexander had a cut of dreams that went beyond mere conquest for lands, resources, and booty. I don't think anyone would have pushed to the ends of the earth until his own troops threatened mutiny just for plunder. Did those dreams change, shift, or even die? Yes. I believe that Alexander as you see him became just that when he was forced to return.

Just a quick answer to one small aspect of your post, Phoebus:

Phillip gained his throne over his own kin.

Put this way, it sounds like he knocked off his father or some number of brothers or the like who were in line before him. That wasn't the case at all -- his father, Amyntas II, died of natural causes if I recall rightly; his eldest brother, Alexander II, was assassinated while Philip was a hostage in Thebes; and the second brother, Perdikkas, died in battle much later, leaving Philip as the only adult male Argead available. He took the throne as regent for Perdikkas's son Amyntas, who was a baby at the time, and then was elected to remain king, no doubt due to his tremendous successes in improving Makedonia's wealth, strength and prestige. He didn't have Amyntas killed -- that was done either by or for ATG -- or even imprisoned him, but rather married him to one of his own daughters, Kynnane, which is pretty gentle treatment for a possible pretender by Makedonian standards. You could say he usurped the throne, but I think that had more to do with no Makedonian wanting anyone's butt except his in it even when Amyntas reached adulthood.

Warmly,
Karen

karen wrote:Just a quick answer to one small aspect of your post, Phoebus:

Phillip gained his throne over his own kin.

Put this way, it sounds like he knocked off his father or some number of brothers or the like who were in line before him. That wasn't the case at all -- his father, Amyntas II, died of natural causes if I recall rightly; his eldest brother, Alexander II, was assassinated while Philip was a hostage in Thebes; and the second brother, Perdikkas, died in battle much later, leaving Philip as the only adult male Argead available. He took the throne as regent for Perdikkas's son Amyntas, who was a baby at the time, and then was elected to remain king, no doubt due to his tremendous successes in improving Makedonia's wealth, strength and prestige. He didn't have Amyntas killed -- that was done either by or for ATG -- or even imprisoned him, but rather married him to one of his own daughters, Kynnane, which is pretty gentle treatment for a possible pretender by Makedonian standards. You could say he usurped the throne, but I think that had more to do with no Makedonian wanting anyone's butt except his in it even when Amyntas reached adulthood.

Warmly,
Karen

While you are correct in what you say about Philip's route to accession, I have to say that I didn't read Phoebus' comment in the same way; after all, Philip did gain the throne over his own kin. Whether or not he "persuaded" the Macedonians that he was a better bet, or whether the Macedonians made the decision by themselves, Amyntas was well and truly overlooked or set aside ...

ATB

Hi Marcus, et al:

If we remove Alexander as a conspirator in his death, though, the main difference between the two would have been what each had to endure in his youth. Phillip gained his throne over his own kin. Alexander may have quarreled with his father, but if he did not murder him or assist in said murder then the level of cynicism would have been much different.

Perhaps Phoebus can correct me if I interpreted this wrongly -- I took it to mean that, assuming Alexander had no hand in the assassination of Philip, Philip had a higher level of cynicism than Alexander because he had to gain the throne over his own kin whereas Alexander did not. Did I get that right?

Warmly,
Karen

karen wrote:Hi Marcus, et al:

If we remove Alexander as a conspirator in his death, though, the main difference between the two would have been what each had to endure in his youth. Phillip gained his throne over his own kin. Alexander may have quarreled with his father, but if he did not murder him or assist in said murder then the level of cynicism would have been much different.

Perhaps Phoebus can correct me if I interpreted this wrongly -- I took it to mean that, assuming Alexander had no hand in the assassination of Philip, Philip had a higher level of cynicism than Alexander because he had to gain the throne over his own kin whereas Alexander did not. Did I get that right?

Warmly,
Karen

Well, I must admit that I don't remember reading that comment of Phoebus's in context, so thank you for reproducing it in full.

It's a difficult one, though. On the one hand, Philip displaced his baby nephew, and there were also various cousins (or even half brothers?), about whom I have just remembered(!), against whom he had to fight to keep his newly "won" throne.

It could indeed be argued that Alexander, on the other hand, didn't really have any comparable rivals. True, Amyntas son of Perdikkas was still alive - but by the time of Alexander's accession he didn't really have much of a claim, because Philip had displaced him with his own line (but Alexander had him killed anyway). Arrhidaios wasn't an obstacle, because it seems clear he was never really a contender, due to whatever his problem was - and the fact that he was allowed to live serves to underline his "irrelevance". There's the question of Caranus - but it's very much a moot point whether he ever existed (maybe the thrust of another thread?).

So, did Alexander have to climb over his own kin in the way that Philip had to? One could probably argue it either way.

(But I do still stand by what I said before, that I didn't interpret Phoebus's original comment in the way you did - but that's just interpretation.)

ATB

Jumping back a bit, to some other ideas in Phoebus' post:

Phoebus wrote: It's of course all speculation, but my thoughts draw on the evidence that Alexander leaves behind. Trained by Aristotle, allegedly a lover of Homer's, and apparently not cynical when pursuing the heroic ideal offered by his lineage, I wouldn't be surprised if Alexander initially did have a number of lofty ideas. People often forget that he was a rather young man when he embarked on his expeditions and conquests, and what effect his age may have had on his mindset.

I think that's a very good point, human nature doesn't change, and the young are very often idealistic. It's not that I particularly want to ascribe idealistic aims to Alexander, it's just that the evidence does seem to point that way. The whole idea of the visit to Troy, for example, seems to suggest a young man imbued with a sense of adventure, and a head full of romantic notions about Achilles. Announcing that they were going to liberate Ionia may have been propaganda, but I don't get the impression that the visit to Troy was. Maybe it depends what we mean by idealistic - but at this stage of his career, I don't see any evidence of the depressing pragmatism that I would associate with a campaign undertaken purely for land, wealth or resources. I think he was keen for conquest - but conquest for its own sake, for the sake of the glory, not so much for the material gains it would bring.
That's not to say he didn't come to appreciate the value of hard cash later on, or even that the motivating spirit behind his actions didn't change either - I think it did - but at the outset, when he's casting his spear onto Asian soil, he looks to me like a young man who is making his dreams come true.

Phoebus wrote: Once past Persia... I believe that's when Alexander truly caught that exploratory bug. After that, it's difficult to truly reconcile what he wanted. The subsequent conquests he was planning for wouldn't have brought him to new territories, and it's unlikely they would have interested him (as an adventurer) as much as his eastern trip (remember, he believed that the Nile eventually bottomed out in the Indian Ocean... and thus he technically had the "southern" fringe covered).

I agree about the exploration. There's a sense of haste and urgency about the Indian campaign, until the Beas, that makes me think he was well aware of the murmurings of discontent, and that what he really wanted was to push on and see the ocean. I don't know when it started, though - technically, he could have turned back in Sogdia, once they'd caught Bessus (I don't think Spitamenes' revolt had quite started at that point, had it?) and yet he pushed on north. OK, perhaps that was to secure the northern frontier, but maybe also it was just to see what it was like. Maybe it was earlier than that, in the mountains, maybe later, when he looked down onto the plains of Punjab, but all the time, the 'explorer' was growing.

Fiona

alexanthros wrote:Paralus have you read Thucydides?

Phoebus wrote:How about the events of Sikelia, then?

Two birds; one stone (tablet?)

The Athenians hurried on to the river Assinarus. They hoped to gain a little relief if they forded the river, for the mass of horsemen and other troops overwhelmed and crushed them; and they were worn out by fatigue and thirst. But no sooner did they reach the water than they lost all order and rushed in; every man was trying to cross first, and, the enemy pressing upon them at the same time, the passage of the river became hopeless. Being compelled to keep close together they fell one upon another, and trampled each other under foot: some at once perished, pierced by their own spears; others got entangled in the baggage and were carried down the stream. The Syracusans stood upon the further bank of the river, which was steep, and hurled missiles from above on the Athenians, who were huddled together in the deep bed of the stream and for the most part were drinking greedily. The Peloponnesians came down the bank and slaughtered them, falling chiefly upon those who were in the river. Whereupon the water at once became foul, but was drunk all the same, although muddy and dyed with blood, and the crowd fought for it.

At last, when the dead bodies were lying in heaps upon one another in the water and the army was utterly undone, some perishing in the river, and any who escaped being cut off by the cavalry, Nicias surrendered to Gylippus, in whom he had more confidence than in the Syracusans…(VII.84-85)

Yes Alexanthros, countless times.

Again Phoebus, it is attitude. The general aim of Greek warfare (pardon the pun) was not centred on annihilation. The times when such occurred it is remarked upon in a way that indicates that it was different or unusual. More usually, battle was brought on, the victor held the field and the vanquished surrendered – as the Spartans at Leuktra – by asking for a truce to collect their dead. The Peloponnesian War altered that in some ways and atrocities (Corcyra, Melos etc) took place: they are remarked upon by Thucydides in “set pieces” in his history.

Of all the Hellenic actions which took place in this war, or indeed, as I think, of all Hellenic actions which are on record, this was the greatest--the most glorious to the victors, the most ruinous to the vanquished ; for they were utterly and at all points defeated, and their sufferings were prodigious. Fleet and army perished from the face of the earth; nothing was saved, and of the many who went forth few returned home. (VII. 87)

With Alexander that became usual enough as to be no longer remarkable. It is better put by Bosworth in his essay Cortes and Alexander in Alexander in Fact and Fiction:

Nobody describes what it was like to spitted by a sarissa with its ferocious leaf-shaped blade fifty centimetres long. As a result, one becomes immune to the casualty figures…Consider the final scene at the Granicus, when the 20,000 Greek mercenaries were left stranded on the battlefield to be surrounded by Alexander’s victorious army, the phalanx pressing their front, the cavalry harrying the sides and the rear. The king disregarded their appeal for quarter, and a massacre ensued. Whether or not 90 per cent were cut down, as Arrian and Plutarch inply, there is no doubt that many thousands fell, and the circumstances would not have been pretty…

Few commanders have been more expert than Alexander in creating the conditions for mass slaughter, and his troops developed a terrible efficiency in killing.

This was not the general experience of Greek warfare. It was different; it was new. The Romans, of course, would take it further.

I hope you will not label me a pollyanna, Paralus, for noting that it did not become routine for Alexander to slaughter mercenaries, Greek or otherwise, as Bosworth implies. Quoting from a footnote by Hamilton in the de Selincourt (Penguin) translation of Arrian, emphasis added:

This massacre was a blunder, as was the sending of the Greek prisoners to hard labour, al thought in accordance with the decree of the Corinthian League. As early as the siege of Miletus Alexander realized this and allowed the 300 mercenaries, who were prepared to resist to the end, to enlist in his army.

I would contend that the general aim of warfare for Alexander was not centred on annihilation either, but on victory, else his reputation would be much worse than it is.

karen wrote:I hope you will not label me a pollyanna...

You? Pollyanna? I would'nt dare contemplate such a thing madam!

karen wrote:I would contend that the general aim of warfare for Alexander was not centred on annihilation either, but on victory, else his reputation would be much worse than it is.

My post was more concerning outcomes than aims. Whilst unremitting slaughter was not likely Alexander's aim per se, it is generally the outcome of his battlefield plans. The battle of the Hydaspes, for example, must have been near unbridled butchery by its closing stages. Ditto the "Persian Gates".

His marshals observed well and his troops were, indeed, well versed in killing. After his death his hypaspist corps, the Silver Shields, continued to demonstrate their rather frighteneing capacity for occasioning slaughter amonst the enemy. At Paraetacene they drove the opposing phalanx from the field and were instrumental in the 3,700 deaths and 4,000 wounded. At Gabiene Hieronymus, via Diodorus, describes them thus (19.41.1):

The Silver Shields, being in close order fell heavily upon their adversaries, killing some in hand to hand fighting and forcing others to flee. They were not checked in their charge and engaged the entire opposing phalanx showing themselves so superior in skill and strength that they slew over 5,000 of the enemy.

Thirty to forty years of doing similar makes one rather proficient I'd suspect.

Fiona wrote:Jumping back a bit, to some other ideas in Phoebus' post:

Phoebus wrote: It's of course all speculation, but my thoughts draw on the evidence that Alexander leaves behind. Trained by Aristotle, allegedly a lover of Homer's, and apparently not cynical when pursuing the heroic ideal offered by his lineage, I wouldn't be surprised if Alexander initially did have a number of lofty ideas. People often forget that he was a rather young man when he embarked on his expeditions and conquests, and what effect his age may have had on his mindset.

I think that's a very good point, human nature doesn't change, and the young are very often idealistic. It's not that I particularly want to ascribe idealistic aims to Alexander, it's just that the evidence does seem to point that way. The whole idea of the visit to Troy, for example, seems to suggest a young man imbued with a sense of adventure, and a head full of romantic notions about Achilles. Announcing that they were going to liberate Ionia may have been propaganda, but I don't get the impression that the visit to Troy was. Maybe it depends what we mean by idealistic - but at this stage of his career, I don't see any evidence of the depressing pragmatism that I would associate with a campaign undertaken purely for land, wealth or resources. I think he was keen for conquest - but conquest for its own sake, for the sake of the glory, not so much for the material gains it would bring.

Fiona, I don’t want it to appear as if I’m singling you out. I was going to post briefly and ask Phoebus to be so kind as to define “lofty ideas” but as you've contributed some thoughts of your own I'm now answering your post as well.

On events at Troy: they may seem like romantic notions to people today, but Alexander's behavior was entirely in accordance with the religious beliefs of Macedonians in this period. It's comparable to an act of "devotion" performed by a devout Christian leader (in later history) such as kneeling before a relic of the cross.

On depressing pragmatism (do you really think pragmatism is depressing?) and the lack of evidence at the start of the campaign : what then do you make of the destruction of Thebes? Like it or not, it was a politically brilliant act, even to the point of Alexander asking others what should be done with the city, thereby allowing or perhaps hoping for the blame to be directed elsewhere. Truth is, he alone was in command and he didn't have to defer to anyone else's opinions, nor did he have to implement the desires/decisions of others. Yet he "condoned" a Greek city being torn to the ground and the people sent into slavery, the result of which was that the rest of Greece no longer dared to challenge him in any way. Yes, similar acts had been done before, but this was hardly an example of lofty ideas. Personally, I find it to be one of the best examples of Alexander's pragmatism.

On conquest for the sake of glory: yes, it is evident in the histories, although much (most) of it is seen later in the campaigns when tales are told of Alexander's desire to outdo Herakles and Dionysos. I won't say that it didn't occur to Alexander earlier – arête was always important to him - but there were even more (I’ll say it again) pragmatic reasons for the campaign. Carol G. Thomas in Alexander the Great in his World explains, after discussing the growth of the military under Philip.

The new army was the tool for unification, expansion, and centralization under the leadership of a young king ruling from Pella. It was necessary for the stability of both the kingdom and the power of the Argead kings. Consequently, it must be permanently in place. Its function, of course, was the maintenance of the integrity of the kingdom whatever its size. As enlargement and pacification of additional lands occurred, new objectives would be needed. Sustaining suitable opportunities for his force became an item of primary importance on the royal agenda.

In other words, if you have a permanent standing army of a considerable size you have to keep it busy and, as Alexander demonstrated, you have to reward it well. The proposed conquest of Persia afforded the opportunity to do both.

Best regards,

Whilst unremitting slaughter was not likely Alexander's aim per se, it is generally the outcome of his battlefield plans. The battle of the Hydaspes, for example, must have been near unbridled butchery by its closing stages. Ditto the "Persian Gates".

You are all forgetting one thing. That Alexander was not making battles in the Greek teritorries (i exclude the Thebe's battle and massacre as it may had been out of Alexander's power to stop it, but that's another discussion) but in Asia, where the Greek rules of engagement did not apply. There Alexander and his army had to win every big battle or else they would be annihilated. I dont know if Darius would have slaughtered Alexander's army had they surrendered, but surely even if they were taken as prisoners, they were the main force of Macedonia. So then, Macedonia would have had no big force to go back and protect their borders, in case that Antipatros would lose a battle.

Paralus wrote:Again Phoebus, it is attitude. The general aim of Greek warfare (pardon the pun) was not centred on annihilation.

Again, the capabilities inherent in the Hellenic mode of warfare prior to Phillip (and some other contemporaries) did not allow for annihilation.

Where attitude is concerned, I'm not sure how your cited text addresses my point. I certainly don't see how the treatment of the Athenian stragglers at the hands of the Syracusans was better than what Alexander offered to the survivors of Granicus. As for the survivors, was their treatment--tortuous labor (often to the death), disfigurements, branding, and selling off to slavery--better than what the Granicus survivors received?

As for this being usual or unusual, I would point to how unusual it was for a Hellenic state to raise a force as large as the one sent to Sikelia--let alone lose one in its entirety. If Thucydides thought the results were extreme, he was well justified. But that has nothing to do with willingness to do something when the ability to do it is at hand.

Finally, where Bosworth's quote is concerned, I'll say this. Alexander has been dealt a poor hand in the sense that modern writers will always be able to pick and choose from a wide range of figures. In this case, I ask again what we consider to be logical numbers for the hoplites at Granicus.

Few commanders have been more expert than Alexander in creating the conditions for mass slaughter, and his troops developed a terrible efficiency in killing.

I reiterate: would his predecessors been that much less capable of large casualties had they been possessed of armies of similar size and with the same spectrum of effects to call on?

Cheers,
P.

Phoebus wrote:Again, the capabilities inherent in the Hellenic mode of warfare prior to Phillip (and some other contemporaries) did not allow for annihilation.

You have, then, modified your view equating the slaughter at the Granicus with the death toll at Leuktra?

Phoebus wrote:Where attitude is concerned, I'm not sure how your cited text addresses my point. I certainly don't see how the treatment of the Athenian stragglers at the hands of the Syracusans was better than what Alexander offered to the survivors of Granicus. As for the survivors, was their treatment--tortuous labor (often to the death), disfigurements, branding, and selling off to slavery--better than what the Granicus survivors received?

As for this being usual or unusual, I would point to how unusual it was for a Hellenic state to raise a force as large as the one sent to Sikelia--let alone lose one in its entirety.

Precisely the point I made. You have a propensity to agree whilst arguing the point. Why is that?

The fact is, the slaughter was unusual. It is, on the face of it, revenge bloodlust. Hence the quote which closes book seven. Thucydides, evidently, can't recall a state losing an entire armament: this is unusual.

The numbers of the entire force are likely over 30,000. Again, this is remarkable – as Thucydides describes it. What is not mentioned is that a good amount of it is not "fighting force". Shipwrights, armourers and others made up a goodly number. It is often forgotten, because such things did not seem overly to concern Thucydides, that the Athenian tactic of periplous of the Peloponnese (circumnavigating and whilst ravaging) will have involved in excess of 20,0000 individuals (based on Perikles’ 100 ships)

The “Hellenic state” too is a misnomer. Although raised by Athens, this is an imperial force raised from the empire. In the entire expedition some 2,950 Athenian hoplites took part. The slaughter at the Assinarus has been overplayed and, whilst large, will not have been as large as stated.

The other point worth the making is that Gylippus and the Syracusan command did not engineer this battlefield result as such. It was the result of what become a headlong retreat and the total disregard of military form when thirst took precedence.

The battle which sealed Athens' fate in the Peloponesian war, Aegespotami, saw no less that 180 Athenian triremes engaged. They were utterly defeated by a force that will have been of comparable size. Even given Athens' record and its insistence in cutting off the right hand of sailors from the enemy fleet, we have recorded only somwhere between 3-4,000 deaths of Athenian prisoners at Lampsacus. What we don't have is a rounding up and a slaughter of what must have been some 34,000 men.

Bosworth’s words are correct and germane. Whether or not any other commander with the resources will have done similar is hypothetical and largely irrelevant. Alexander had and did.