pothos.org

Agesilaos wrote:

I will let the question of numbers rest for the dormant thread, but there is nothing contradictory in plural ‘agemata’ being applied to the Hypaspists (or part thereof), the sense of the word has moved on from its original meaning to signify an elite unit, one might cite as a poor analogy the flank companies of Napoleonic battalions, light/voltigeur/jager and grenadier.

In a sense, yes, in Macedon the leading unit of the phalanx also happens to be the King’s guard, but there is still only one Agema – until after the later re-organisation when the newly re-organised ‘ile basilikoi’ of the Companion cavalry are re-styled Agema too.

Were ‘agemata’ a copyist’s error then one should be able to explain how the error arose, since there is no clear reason, dittography or a possible corruption, for instance, and given that the sentence makes good sense, the text should stand.......... We can, however, ask what is meant by this aberrant plural; Paralus’ anachronistic use of ‘agema’ for the ile basilikos is superficially attractive, but in these early chapters Arrian, reflecting Ptolemy’s usage, seems blissfully unaware of later developments in nomenclatura, to such an extent that the common phalangite is a hoplite

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Simple enough! In the course of transmission, the text has been copied many times, and one copyist or another, perhaps peering at the text by candlelight has simply misread ‘agemata’ plural for ‘agema’ singular. As I said, this occurs only once in the whole text, increasing significantly the probability that this is a simple error.Not to mention that in the very next line, referring to the very same troops, as I said, the singular 'Agema' is used. Nor does the sentence make good sense – agemas/agemata being plural could mean many ‘agemas’ not necessarily two.....
'Hoplite' is derived from 'opla' - equipment, and means any armoured heavy infantryman who fights in close order, hence is just as appropriate for 'sarissaphoroi' as the earlier classical Greeks, and indeed the Hellenistic manuals refer to the phalangites as 'hoplites'

That is hardly conclusive, so must remain a possibility, however, the Hypaspists are divided into agema, basilikoi and alloi on other occaisions;

No, only one other occasion that I am aware of – on the Hydaspes at V.13.4 , as you noted.From my word analysis I am reasonably certain of this. By then the Hypaspists had been enlarged from [probably] 2,000 to 4,000 organised into 4 chiliarchies, namely, the ‘Agema to Basilikoi’, the original ‘Hypaspists Basilikoi’ and the newly raised two chiliarchies referred to as ‘allous/other’ Hypaspists ( presumably they would have to earn the ‘King’s own’ or ‘Royal’ title)
A simple copyists error at Thebes, and the later re-organisation are by far the simplest explanation for this conundrum, far more likely than multiple agemas, or an anachronistic reference to a cavaly ile , when no cavalry are mentioned in this part.

The rear rank theory won’t wash either unless one believes the Hypaspists were as a man armed differently from the phalanx in pitched battles. Aside from the impossibility of such a manoeuvre, there is no recorded drill for this potentially useful trick, just what is the Hypaspist meant to do?........

Such evidence as we have – Neoptolemus serving in the Hypaspists with shield/aspis and dual purpose spear/ longche; the trial of Amyntas where part of his ‘Hypaspist’ gear is a ‘longche’, possibly the Aghios Athanasios frieze, though the rimless shields might imply alternately armed sarissaphoroi, and the Alexander sarcophagus, all point to the hypaspists being armed differently.

Even if they were ‘sarissa’ armed, it is no great trick to “about turn” with pike held vertically – all Macedonian pike phalanx manoeuvres were carried out thus, and the pike only lowered when contact was imminent. Aelian’s spoken commands would allow for an about turn to be made, and Arrian ‘Ars Tactica’ 21 also describes ‘about turn’ for a Macedonian phalanx.

Indeed , the units of the second line specifically had orders to about turn ( the rear of the ‘box’) if need be [Arrian ‘Anabasis’III.12]

.....Drop his sarissa and chase after chariots with a sword he may not have? Or, maybe ask the charioteers to wait while he re-equips from the stores? How much more likely Alexander told off a small group stationed them behind the lines with the appropriate equipment, ie javelins. The chariots reaching the second line was, after all the plan.

The ‘small group’ in your scheme of things is likely to be only a couple of hundred strong ( it being a sub-unit of the Agema), re-inforced by an unknown but possibly large number of grooms, nor was this Plan ‘A’ to deal with the chariots – which was to have the screening light troops deal with them. The back-up Plan ‘B’ was to leave gaps if any got through, to be dealt with behind the line. The likeliest way of doing this was by means of a simple about turn by the rear ranks of hypaspists who would then hurl their longche/dual purpose spears to take the chariots out.

At V 13 iv Seleukos is NOT the commander of the agema but of the Hypaspistai basilikoi

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Oops! Quite right.......

....If four chiliarchies is an unwieldy command then one must wonder at Alexander continually lumbering Krateros with either a similar command by my view, or an even larger one on Xenophon’s in all the Persian battles.

But Krateros was not in command of a single, giant, unit. His overall command of several ‘taxeis’ of the infantry of the left wing was supported by having subordinate ‘taxis’ commanders. In the case of the hypaspists, an overall commander for them would have inserted an unnecessary layer of command. A right wing infantry overall commander with subordinate ‘chiliarchy’ and ‘taxis’ commanders , reflecting the left wing infantry command structure, was less unwieldy - the simplest and best.

Since you are both (I presume others do read these threads, but will address my fellow posters) impressed by the ‘ships as siege tower’ line. This is simply not what Arrian says, the rest of the fleet was off attacking the walls elsewhere and the two ships take advantage of the Tyrians’ distraction to throw their ‘gephyrai’ ‘bridges’ from their prows onto the breach, no daisy chain of trieremes was formed nor were the forces with Alexander reinforced. Such support would be awkward in the extreme, boarding was not a simple manoeuvre (it would seem that Athenian marines would go into battle seated on the deck and, on the evidence of Thucydides, trained to throw javelins whilst in such a position) the awkwardness of approaching another ship with its outriggers, oars still in action to keep the ship against the wall and high stern would preclude the scenario you envisage. What we have, in Arrian, is a ‘coup-de-main’ by a small and elite force. Alexander attacks the walls at every point forcing the Tyrians to spread their forces and then overwhelms them at his chosen ‘point d’appui’.

Except that we are told that the assault force consisted of Coenus ‘taxis’ – 1,500 or 2,000 strong, plus the Hypaspists also at least 2,000 strong – not a small force. At II.24 it is the whole of Coenus’ taxis and the Hypaspists that are in the town.
An earlier attack, some three days previously on the ‘point d’appui’ had failed and Alexander brought up artillery to widen the breach so that two ‘assault ships’ could attack the breach simultaneously (II.22) Nowhere does Arrian say that the entire remaining vessels were elsewhere; “some” of his triremes were round attacking the harbours (II.23) whilst others with archers and catapults cruise around the island. Your comments about Thucydides are usually interpreted to apply to the seated oarsman rather than the standing marines, and boarding, even when opposed, was not difficult. In fact, throughout the period, boarding was the commonest naval tactic, with predominantly ramming tactics the preserve of the most skilled and experienced navies such as Athens or Rhodes. Nor would the ‘assault ships’ be under oars when the gangways/bridges were launched, since if so they would quickly have fallen in, with the ships being moved alternately forward and back by wave action. The vessels must have been anchored or secured by grapnels or similar before the gangways/bridges were launched, so as to be stable and secure. Bringing up other vessels with more troops would be a simple matter.

With regard to the Agrianes, they are never styled ‘peltastoi’ only ‘psiloi’, they are distinct from the general ‘psiloi’ by virtue of their greater elan not any superior fighting style. Since we are all in agreement that they were psiloi it seems odd that just because Arrian styles them thus in this passage you (and most translators it must be admitted!) wish to change a clear and valid Greek construction to fit a modern theory; had anybody else attempted such I dare say we would all be on them faster than a dingo on a baby.

The original ‘psiloi’ were the servants of hoplites, unshielded, slinging stones or throwing them by hand, together with javelins, By the 5th C BC, these had been superceded as light infantry by tribal Thracian shielded light infantry ‘peltasts’, and later still by their Greek imitators. Alexander’s Agrianes and other Thracian javelinmen are certainly of the tribal peltast type, though described as ‘light infantry/psiloi’. By referring to them as 'peltasts' I am simply defining them as shielded javelinmen who function as light infantry/psiloi.

Xerxes’ Persians certainly fought in a ‘sparabara’ ‘takabara’ combination, an Eastern way of war for centuries. But Dareios III seems not to have used this tactical system. Graneikos and Gaugamela are both cavalry fights and at Issos the only front line Persian infantry are the Kardakes who seem to be a kind of ersatz hoplite rather than the former close order archer/ spearman.

‘Kardakes’ seem to be similar to Greek ‘epheboi’ - young men under training - rather than a specific troop type and our sources describe them as both ‘hoplites’ and ‘peltasts’ at Issus and even as providing slingers elsewhere...perhaps a discussion best left to its own thread ! The existence of traditional ‘Immortals’ in Darius’ army, nowhere described as re-armed, implies that ‘old style’ Persian troops still existed, as do references to hordes of other Persian troops.

The ‘mixed phalanx’ contains not just Persian archers but also Cossaean and Tapurian javelinmen, I doubt you are suggesting these fought in close order, shoulder to shoulder, in their mountain fastnesses. Alexander ordered them into the phalanx to boost its distant strike potential whilst planning to attack a skirmishing cavalry enemy and to make best use of those few Macedonians remaining. The formation reflects the wishes of el Supremo not the fighting styles of the component parts. In Eumenes’ armies Peucastas also appears with a multitude of Persian archers
these do not appear in the main battle line but must be in the undifferentiated light infantry screen, XIX 27-8 and 40.

Arrian’s description at VII.23 refers only to Persians, armed with either bows or ‘light javelins’ with throwing thongs.[whence come Cossaeans and Tapurians?]
This is, in effect, a revival of the traditional Persian formation – missile troops behind a front line of ‘sparabara’ now replaced by Macedonian pikemen. I agree that Persian armies contained both ‘close order heavy’ and ‘open order light’ infantry archers, the latter often provided by subject peoples.....

Paralus wrote:

You've done rather a bit of reading to collect all those notices. Unfortunately none address the issue. Firstly, the cavalry was not the object of the question for it is always organised by individual ile and later hyparchies by which it is then dispatched.

Agreed.

The question was directed at your statement that "other sub-units of a taxis of the Phalanx are similarly detached on occasion". Secondly, what I wrote was "whilst the agema can be considered part of “the hypaspists” it was also considered separate". Thus, whilst the agema was a part of the hypaspists it was also considered a separate unit. This unit being a single, identifiable corporate entity. None of what you've adduced above demonstrates that there were similar identifiable individual units of the phalanx. These are all ad hoc arrangements where Alexander selects individuals of the regular phalanx units not regular sub units. Taking half the archers is not taking as specific sub unit of the archers; ditto "some" and half the mounted archers. None of these are a named distinct unit like the agema. I doubt anyone is suggesting there was a sub unit of the phalanx called the "kouphatatoi"

Ah, all becomes clear....we began by speaking of detachments, but you mean 'units within units', Russian doll -like. I'd agree that the Agema was the permanent whole sub-unit of the Royal Hypaspists, and that the detachments drawn up from other infantry units such as taxeis of the phalanx were of an 'ad hoc' nature, but certainly NOT that they were selected on an individual basis - to select, say, a couple of thousand men on a 'schoolyard pick-up' basis would take forever. As at Sphacteria, when an ad hoc Spartan garrison was required, the required number would have been selected by tolling off sub-units ( in that case enomotia) e.g. "Coenus, which is your most nimble syntagma ( or whatever) ?": "That would be Enyalius' men, sir ! " :"Right I'll take them!"....and so on with other taxeis until the required number were selected.

On the subject of the agema and the cavalry, Arrian is quite clear that, at Gaugamela, Alexander formed a wedge with his cavalry and the infantry in his vicinity. This infantry - on his left side - can only be the agema and the hypaspists. They - together - drive into the gap. As the melee develops it is likely, to me, that some mixing would become inevitable (hence the individuals on the sarcophagus and the infantryman at Alexander's elbow on the Mosaic). This is not to say that the agema acted as hammipoi.

One must be careful when using the term wedge. It did not just apply to triangular formations, but in a more generic sense meant any formation deeper than it was wide, so could include columns etc. Here, though, it is evident that a triangular wedge is meant ( for the formation was a column earlier). Alexander attacks "at the double" [III.14]rather than the gallop. First the cavalry are in action, having presumably outpaced the infantry, and then the phalanx "in close order"... "added its irresistible weight", presumably catching up the cavalry once the fighting starts. Thus, in addition to the individual cavalry 'ile' wedge formations, a natural large wedge would form with cavalry at the point and the broader linear phalanx formation behind. Since the cavalry attacked first, there is little or no opportunity for intermingling, and I think 'inevitable mixing' would be difficult if not physically impossible under the circumstances. Arrian specifically tells us that the infantry phalanx were in close order, and there is not so much as a hint of any necessary disordering which might lead to individual infantry getting mixed up with the cavalry fight - we should certainly have heard of it if it occurred, as in other battles. Moreover, intermingling of cavalry and phalanx was a recipe for disaster, as occurred at Leuctra when the Spartan cavalry were forced into their phalanx.

We know that the sarcophagus is not, and was not, intended to be a 'realistic' representation, though the mosaic does have some incredibly realistic detail, almost photographic. The infantryman at Alexander's elbow has only a portion of his head visible, including part of a 'kausia'. He could be anyone - servant, agriane, hamippoi, but without that most basic piece of armour, the helmet, is most unlikely to represent a soldier of the Agema.

Paralus wrote:

agesilaos wrote:
The most notable thing about the ‘Sarcophagus’ is the complete lack of any Macedonian rimless shields, it was carved by a Greek and uses Greek conventions.

Yes. As I noted above, I believe the Aghios Athanaios fresco is far more indicative of these troops. And, whilst on the sarcophagus, let me just answer Xenophon: I believe I noted my concerns as to its historical accuracy mentioning aspide carrying Persians as one example? That said, I would agree with Agesilaos here.

After almost 200 years of being generally beaten by 'aspis' equipped Greeks, it would be hardly be surprising if some, at least, Persian troops had not adopted 'aspides', especially Guards whose King could afford to do so. It is thus a possibility.

Nor is the sarcophagus the only contemporary Macedonian monument to show 'peltai'(rimless) and 'aspides'(rimmed) shields equally prominently - there is the monument at Veria ( see Markle "A Shield Monument from Veria and the Chronology of Macedonian Shield Types" )

I think we would all agree that the King when fighting on foot did so with his Agema and Hypaspists, and the most conclusive evidence for their equipment is the equipment/opla found in the Philip tomb - two rimmed aspides, many spears, longche and javelin heads, but nothing identifiable as coming from a sarissa, nor a rimless 'pelta' ( which is what makes me think, inter alia, that the Aghios Athanasios frieze depicts sarissaphoroi , carrying their known alternate weapon of longche/dual purpose spear). There may well be a social element here too. Earlier, Macedonian infantry had been tribal peltasts, led by chieftains who were able to afford 'hoplite' equipment including aspis( as proven by archaeological excavations at Archontiko ). 'Hoplite' equipment would thus come to be associated with the wealthy - the Kings, chieftains and their retinues, hence the Hypaspists continuing this long tradition.

Paralus wrote:

Not to digress into tactics, but a few points need clearing up.

Xenophon wrote:
It is a terrible old saw that the Hypaspists, or Agema provided a 'lighter infantry link' between cavalry and phalanx. It is just not physically possible.

And I have not claimed so nor argued the "lighter infantry link".

Nor did I say you had, but since it is commonly repeated, I thought it best to quash the idea.

Xenophon wrote:
At Issus, as the army advanced, Alexander and the cavalry drifted right, doubtless with the Agema and Hypaspists marching hard to try and stay in contact. But contact must have been broken, for Alexander set off at the gallop at the Persian left-wing cavalry. No infantry could have kept up with galloping horses, or even trotting ones ( except very fit light infantry 'hamippoi' in the latter case). Worse still, the stretch to the right caused part of the phalanx to break up and become disordered.

I think you see far too much of Gaugamela in this action and I don't think that much of that is supported by the sources. If anything is clear in Arrian's description it is Alexander's wish to fill out the battle line as the plain widens (2.8.1-4; 8.9,2.9.2-4). Arrian says nothing of an advance to the right (as he clearly does at Gaugamela) and, in fact, gives incontrovertible orders for Parmenion "not to lose touch with the coast". Any planned move to the right, with the infantry obviously following, makes this order absolutely nonsensical for Parmenion would be left posted. What is decribed is Alexander feeding units into his right wing to "fill it up" and / or extend it rather than a march to the right. Arrian (or his source) makes much of the difficulties of the river. Many a modern scholar has attempted to explain just how Alexander "charged" across a river (as he naturally didn't do at Granicus) which was difficult to cross with palisades in easier crossing places (2.10.1). Whilst he may have forded at flat spot, one would naturally assume that further up - towards the hills - the river is likely more broken and swifter. It is difficult to see him charging across this river.

Having decidedly digressed into tactics ( each battle should probably have its own detailed thread, more future subjects !), perhaps one should begin with the fact that tactics between armies in linear array are essentially simple with just three options, or as it was taught to British subalterns prior to World War 1 : "Left hook, right hook, or bags of smoke and straight up the middle!" The choice of which is dictated by such factors as terrain, weather, enemy numbers and dispositions etc.

Greek armies almost invariably deployed with their most senior/strongest/best units on the right. ( Epaminondas was an exception...but I digress), and so the most common tactic was the 'right hook', or attempted outflanking of the enemy left by ones own right, compounded by a tendency for an infantry hoplite phalanx to drift to its right, as Thucydides famously remarks. Alexander stuck with this 'conventional' deployment and tactics of a 'right hook' in all his battles against the Persians. At Granicus, the battle on the river's edge ( Arrian's version) fortunately prevented the cavalry from causing any rightward stretch, and they successfully then proceed to roll up the Persians from the right. Both at Issus and Gaugemala things did not go so well, and Alexander's attempts to execute the 'right hook' led to a sundering of the two wings of the phalanx - the most disastrous thing that could happen to a solid phalanx. Luckily for him, he got away with it - twice !

To come back to Issus, a detailed reading of the sources reveals this. Alexander does indeed open out his forces as widely as possible, and orders Parmenion to 'anchor' his left wing on the coast. Having done this, Alexander then, perhaps understandably and inevitably,becomes fixated on what is happening to his front and right flank. Having formed up his 'battle frontage' he extends this to outflank the Persian left, despatching two 'Iles' of companions and a contingent of Agrianes, plus bringing up Greek mercenaries from the second line ( these presumably filled the hole left by despatching the Thessalians to Parmenion.)
Next followed a deliberate advance , so as to avoid a break occurring.[II.10] - except that Alexander, once in archery range, 'charges' across the river , or even charges AT the river with its archers on the far bank, who break and run. Arrian next says "...and the result was that Darius' Greek mercenaries attacked precisely at the point in the line where the gap was widest". Alexander's extension to his right, and likely the hypaspists and other infantry of the right attempting to follow him had caused the overstretched rubber band to snap. Plutarch [Alexander 20]supports this saying that "he ( Alex) managed to extend it ( his right wing) around the enemy's left, outflanked it...."

Arrian blames the slower moving phalanx here; "The Macedonian centre was was much slower off the mark"....as if the phalanx could charge like the cavalry !
"Moreover the steep banks of the stream ( enhanced with palisades) prevented them from maintaining an unbroken front".
In other words the 'gap' in the line caused by Alexander's movements was made worse.The situation was only saved by Alexander's 'hook' being successful and rolling up the Persian line in the nick of time.

In any case, the cavalry cross the river and break the Persian left on contact. The phalanx follows and, in the crossing of the river, become disjointed in their front rows. Arrian is clear that the cause of this is the river ("the banks were steep at many points" 2.10.5 - cf. the description at 2.10.1). Nowhere does he claim this breech was caused by Alexander's rightward advance.

Not so - see above - the sundering occurs because Alexander extends to his right to outflank the Persian left, and then charges, leaving the infantry behind to catch up( Arrian and Plutarch)and is exacerbated by the active defence of the river line by the Persians.............

At the crisis of the battle, with the phalanx in trouble and the Greeks pressing, the "battalions of the right" wheel left to take the attacking Greeks in the flank. These "battalions" can only be Alexander, the hypaspists and the lights with them.

Xenophon wrote:
Nowhere are we told that the Hypaspists and their Agema do anything other than form part of the Phalanx, and not even a hint that the Agema took off independently to join the fighting 'amongst the King's cavalry'. Nor should we expect such, for that was simply not the role of 'heavy' close order infantry.

Nor have I claimed such. Whilst the sarcophagus employs artistic license (and Greek norms as Agesilaos says) I do not find some mixing in a melee - especially Issus and Gaugamela - in any way fantastic. As is well known, battles take a life of their own.

Certainly battles take on a life of their own, and as to trying to chronicle what happened in detail, that is difficult if not impossible, even with eye-witness accounts. The Duke of Wellington was once approached to elucidate details of Waterloo, and scathingly wrote back "as well try to write the history of a ball".

Nevertheless, mixing of cavalry and phalanx was notoriously a prelude to disaster and to be avoided at all costs - as Leuctra demonstrated. It is difficult to imagine how individuals concentrating on sticking together could somehow end up in the midst of a swirling mass of horsemen.....

Xenophon wrote: Alexander's extension to his right, and likely the hypaspists and other infantry of the right attempting to follow him had caused the overstretched rubber band to snap. Plutarch [Alexander 20]supports this saying that "he ( Alex) managed to extend it ( his right wing) around the enemy's left, outflanked it...."

Arrian blames the slower moving phalanx here; "The Macedonian centre was was much slower off the mark"....as if the phalanx could charge like the cavalry ! "Moreover the steep banks of the stream ( enhanced with palisades) prevented them from maintaining an unbroken front". In other words the 'gap' in the line caused by Alexander's movements was made worse.The situation was only saved by Alexander's 'hook' being successful and rolling up the Persian line in the nick of time [...] the sundering occurs because Alexander extends to his right to outflank the Persian left, ( Arrian and Plutarch)and is exacerbated by the active defence of the river line by the Persians.............

This isn't really the place for a tactical discussion and perhaps this should be moved to its own thread. That said, the above is an extremely 'sympathetic' reading of the source material. You continue to use phrases such as Alexander's "extension to the right" and "extends to his right". This is to imply that Alexander is advancing to his right a la Gaugamela. This simply is not supported by the sources. A close reading of Arrian - and the other sources (who describe matters similarly if in their own fashion) - shows that Alexander, far from advancing rightwards, filled out his line on the right as the terrain widened. As he advanced with his "men in file at a walking pace" he continued to fill out the right with units that were no longer needed to deal with the Persians on the heights. Again, it is clear Alexander is not moving rightwards, he is adding units to his right wing. In so adding units (like so many Lego blocks) to his right he extends it in an effort to outflank the Persian left without having to advance to the right. Alexander, "just before the armies met", then rode along the line exhorting his troops (clearly not the whole line). An odd thing to do for a bloke intent on an advance to his right. Again, nothing indicates an advance rightwards as at Gaugamela.

You are correct in that Alexander, "when in bowshot" gallops TO the river. And that, one suspects, is where the charge petered as he crossed. Now, you are more familiar than I with the range of Persian bows but we cannot be talking much more that 150 or so yards?? The point was to frighten the Persians. In any case, Arrian makes absolutely plain that the cause of the rupture was the difficulty the phalanx had in crossing the river. Whilst Alexander's charge will have dissociated himself from the phalanx, it cannot have been terminal and the right clearly caught up. It is the left of centre (Ptolemy) which is penetrated. This will be due to the river and - almost certainly - the defensive works if the river was easily fordable here.

The salient point is that he ordered Parmenion to anchor the left on the coast and not to leave it. That immediately precludes any advance to the right. Thus Alexander, concerned about his right, extended his right wing. He did not do this by crabbing rightwards and inevitably leaving Parmenion posted; he did this by adding units to his right as he advanced as the sources relate.

Paralus wrote:

This isn't really the place for a tactical discussion and perhaps this should be moved to its own thread. That said, the above is an extremely 'sympathetic' reading of the source material. You continue to use phrases such as Alexander's "extension to the right" and "extends to his right". This is to imply that Alexander is advancing to his right a la Gaugamela.

No such implication, I think you have misunderstood. I am not suggesting Alexander advanced obliquely. We agree that during the advance phase, Alexander extended his line with additional units - Companions, Agrianes etc, as I described. He also kept the advance slow and steady - to avoid any rupture in the battle line, as we are told - twice. (Arrian II.10 )
"For a while Alexander's advance was slow and deliberate; every now and then he ordered a halt"........." still, however, Alexander moved forward at a deliberate pace, for a too-rapid advance might have thrown the line out of dressing and caused a break somewhere;"[De Selincourt translation, others differ slightly]

You are correct in that Alexander, "when in bowshot" gallops TO the river. And that, one suspects, is where the charge petered as he crossed. Now, you are more familiar than I with the range of Persian bows but we cannot be talking much more that 150 or so yards??

Indeed I would agree that maximum range for massed archery would be around that, with effective range around 100 yards or less. The answer to the question of what sort of obstacle the Pinarus stream was, is "not much". Across much of the plain it consists of a wide gravel bed where the stream has meandered over time, and is shallow - ankle to knee deep. Here and there erosion has cut into the banks creating metre or so high obstacles. An impression can be obtained from a photo on the 'Livius .org' site:
http://www.livius.org/a/turkey/issus/issus.html

Also, on Youtube, from the series “The Great Commanders” 1993, called Alexander and the battle of Issus :

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7-HKb0h5lFo‎

It has commentary by David Chandler and Peter Connolly, and is worth watching in full, even if one doesn't entirely agree with all the comments !

There are a number of shots of the river. This is confirmed by our sources, wherein Persian cavalry, Thessalians and Alexander's cavalry all seem to have little trouble crossing the stream at speed.Only the infantry struggled to maintain cohesion in the face of the metre or so high banks in places, and the palisades covering the easier crossing places ( the need for which also says something about the ease of crossing).

In any case, Arrian makes absolutely plain that the cause of the rupture was the difficulty the phalanx had in crossing the river.

I don't think this is what Arrian is saying. Alexander and his companions "rode at a gallop into the stream". Then, in the centre "some of the troops had broken away towards the right and and left a gap in the line". This is before contact by the infantry, and since the line had previously been solid, can only have occurred by troops consciously or sub-consciously moving into the gap vacated by Alexander and his companions. Perhaps the Hypaspists were 'sucked into' Alexander's wake, or it was necessary to go around some obstacle, or something similar. This break in the line is then made worse when the phalanx gets to the stream; "moreover, the steep banks of the stream prevented them from maintaining a regular and unbroken front " which of course Darius' Greek mercenaries take advantage of. The Chinnock translation is slightly different :
"For the Macedonian phalanx had been broken and disjoined towards the right wing; because Alexander had charged into the river with eagerness..........but the Macedonians in the centre did not execute their task with equal speed; and finding many parts of the bank steep and precipitous, they were unable to preserve the front of the phalanx in the same line."

However, the meaning is the same. The initial gap or break in the phalanx occurs because Alexander charges to execute his 'right hook', and is then exacerbated when the phalanx reaches the river and more gaps result. This sundering of the phalanx as a result of Alexander's right hook charge would occur again at Gaugemala. The sundering there was NOT the outcome of Alexander's oblique move away from Darius' prepared ground, but rather the result of Alexander's right hook charge, as at Issus.

Incidently, Alexander's real skill at all three battles is to get his cavalry to change direction, to roll up the Persian line in all three battles, facilitated by the Macedonian 'wedge' formations. All through history, especially with 'linear' formations, cavalry commanders discovered to their dismay that once launched, the cavalry moved in a straight line and could not alter direction.

The salient point is that he ordered Parmenion to anchor the left on the coast and not to leave it. That immediately precludes any advance to the right. Thus Alexander, concerned about his right, extended his right wing. He did not do this by crabbing rightwards and inevitably leaving Parmenion posted; he did this by adding units to his right as he advanced as the sources relate.

Agreed, and as I said earlier, I did not postulate a rightward oblique advance.
The phalanx as a whole struggles to maintain cohesion when the river and its obstacles are reached. However, Arrian is quite clear that an earlier gap appeared among the troops of the right wing phalanx, as a result of Alexander's charging forward out of the line...... and that was really my point. Twice he created a very dangerous situation, and was probably only saved from this at Granicus by the prolonged struggle at the river.

In a sense, yes, in Macedon the leading unit of the phalanx also happens to be the King’s guard, but there is still only one Agema – until after the later re-organisation when the newly re-organised ‘ile basilikoi’ of the Companion cavalry are re-styled Agema too.

Not my point at all; ‘agema’ once meant the physically ‘leading unit’, but that usage has developed to just mean an elite unit, this is certainly the case with the Hellenistic ‘agemata’, who accompany their general rather than deploy first, lead the march etc. Ptolemy simply adopted a different view of the unit we call the ‘agema’ at I 8 iii, he separated the constituent parts and made them plural ‘Guards’, Whereas later he decided that the ‘agema’ should cover the sum of its parts unless they were tasked separately. Nor is the suggested corruption of the text as simple as you want to make it; the manuscript reads ‘TADEAGHMATA’ the editors propose ‘TODEAGHMATE’ ie. omicron and epsilon have been misread twice, and resolved into alpha in both instances not just in the same line, but within ten letters of each other; such an error would challenge a drunken Stevie Wonder. Yes the plural encompasses any number of agemata over one, but the passage at 8 iv, in tandem with the tripartite separation described at III 11 with 13, and V 13, demonstrates that there were two ‘agemata’ here and that they are indeed the ‘Agema of the Macedonians’ and the ‘King’s Hypaspists’, who cannot be the normal Hypaspists as they are clearly separated from them at V 13 and once that passage is accepted those at III 11/13 and I 8 fall in to support the interpretation, making three instances. Note, it seems better practice to consider all passages together and if one has a clear statement and the acceptance of that statement clarifies the others without need for textual amendment or special pleading, the safest course is to accept that statement rather than attempt to explain away the other passages and then condemn the clear statement as an authorial or scriptorial error. Windmill or Giant?

Even if they were ‘sarissa’ armed, it is no great trick to “about turn” with pike held vertically – all Macedonian pike phalanx manoeuvres were carried out thus, and the pike only lowered when contact was imminent. Aelian’s spoken commands would allow for an about turn to be made, and Arrian ‘Ars Tactica’ 21 also describes ‘about turn’ for a Macedonian phalanx.

Indeed , the units of the second line specifically had orders to about turn ( the rear of the ‘box’) if need be [Arrian ‘Anabasis’III.12]

Sadly, the manoeuvre posited for the Hypaspists at Gaugamela is NOT a simple about face, it is an about face by half or quarter files, something not even covered by the manuals. Indeed, the fact that Alexander deploys in a double phalanx, implies that such a manoeuvre was impossible. Further, what are the men ahead of those turning to the rear to think, it would look much like a rout to those unable to hear the command (presuming those half file leaders could that were to advance to the rear); Charles the Bold pulled his chivalry back for another charge at Grandson or some battle against the doughty Swiss and his professional army interpreted the move as flight and quit the field at a rate of knots. Alexander had more sense and allowed for defence against envelopment. Nor can we suppose that he expected the psiloi to deal with the chariots, it is a two phase defence not a plan and a back-up, the phalanx open lanes because that is the drill he has told them to adopt, he clearly knew that the chariots would then need to be neutralised. Alexander foresaw the problems and issued his orders accordingly.

But Krateros was not in command of a single, giant, unit. His overall command of several ‘taxeis’ of the infantry of the left wing was supported by having subordinate ‘taxis’ commanders. In the case of the hypaspists, an overall commander for them would have inserted an unnecessary layer of command. A right wing infantry overall commander with subordinate ‘chiliarchy’ and ‘taxis’ commanders , reflecting the left wing infantry command structure, was less unwieldy - the simplest and best.

Yet, Alexander does not appoint an overall commander for the right, but does for the Hypaspists alone, to whit Nikanor, but he is similarly commanding a collection of units. There was hardly any fancy formation changing on the field so layers of command don’t really enter into it.

Except that we are told that the assault force consisted of Coenus ‘taxis’ – 1,500 or 2,000 strong, plus the Hypaspists also at least 2,000 strong – not a small force. At II.24 it is the whole of Coenus’ taxis and the Hypaspists that are in the town.i

Can you see what you’ve done here? That’s right you have used ‘taxis’ as a technical term. There is good reason to suppose that the ‘so-called asthetairoi’ were sub-sets of their parent units, as they seem to be the men later styled ‘the most agile’ – kouphatous - of the phalanx. Nor does Arrian mean that all the Hypaspists boarded Alexander’s ship, only all that did board were Hypaspists, a usage paralleled during the crossing of the Hydaspes where ‘half the hypaspists’ cross with him in a triakonter. ‘taxis’ me no ‘taxeis’.

You will have to supply the references to late Achaemenid ‘Immortals’, not ‘melophoroi’ mind.

That will do for now.

agesilaos wrote:Can you see what you’ve done here? That’s right you have used ‘taxis’ as a technical term. There is good reason to suppose that the ‘so-called asthetairoi’ were sub-sets of their parent units, as they seem to be the men later styled ‘the most agile’ – kouphatous - of the phalanx. Nor does Arrian mean that all the Hypaspists boarded Alexander’s ship, only all that did board were Hypaspists, a usage paralleled during the crossing of the Hydaspes where ‘half the hypaspists’ cross with him in a triakonter. ‘taxis’ me no ‘taxeis’.

This thread has more legs than an octopus; all going in different directions.

Before digressing... again... into asthetairoi, I do not see the parallel at all in that last. Whilst taxis can be - and is - used for everything including the kitchen sink in Arrian, he does not use it in either description of the hypaspists. Logic and plain physics dictate that the entire hypaspist corps were not, like so many sheep in Australia's live cattle exports, squashed into the one ship. Here "only all that did board were Hypaspists" is correct and these will not, perforce, be many. At Hydaspes Arrian is rather more explicit. He enumerates the individuals accompanying Alexander and then states that "half the hypaspists" also were aboard (τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν οἱ ἡμίσεες). This can hardly mean all the "half" that did board were hypaspists for these are, explicitly, half of the hypaspsists. We do not know what hypaspists are meant but, if Seleukos commands a supposed sub unit called the "royal hypaspists" it is half of these. You've given no number for this but, at the greatest as a sub unit of the agema, it might be a 16x16 man corps. The fly in the ointment is that the rest of the hypaspists occupy a single ship and, incontrovertibly and uncomfortably, they were all present for the battle - agema and regular.

You would need to make the case for the asthetairoi being distinct subunits of phalanx taxeis. The 'kouphatatoi', I'm afraid, won't do the job for me: every time these are mentioned they are ad hoc selections. If you include such in your rationale then you may as well include the 'selected' individuals of other passages (including of the hypaspists). Also, passages such as 4.23.1 strongly indicate that the asthetairoi were complete phalanx units - not sub units. If the latter, we must suppose that Alexander sent half the army to Peukelaotis and set off himself with the Argrianians, archers, javelin men, half the Companion cavalry and three small sub units of infantry to confront the Aspasians, Ghouraians and Assakanians. Not likely I'd have thought.

Apologies but it's Derby Day and I need to follow the Old Bard's advice "get thee to a pubery"....

Welcome back ! .....you will have observed Paralus and I amused ourselves with a digression on Alexander's tactics and the dangers thereof while you were away....

Now where were we? Ah, yes......a response to yours in due course, unless Paralus beats me to it.......

Agesilaos wrote:

Not my point at all; ‘agema’ once meant the physically ‘leading unit’, but that usage has developed to just mean an elite unit, this is certainly the case with the Hellenistic ‘agemata’, who accompany their general rather than deploy first, lead the march etc.

Whilst the original Spartan Agema ( probably derived from a word meaning ‘guides’ see LSJ ) were simply the leading unit, the Macedonian Agema consisted of the leading sub-unit of the Hypaspists, and were also the King’s Guards. A second Agema only comes into existence in the Macedonian army with the expansions referred to around the time of Susa, in preparation for the Indian campaign, when a probably enlarged ‘Ile Basilike’ is referred to as ‘Ippeus to Agema’ ( Arrian IV.24.1. At V.2.5 Alexander takes the Hetairoi and foot agemati to Mt Merus
Later, at the Hydaspes, the cavalry agema are referred to as ‘etairoi to agema’ (V.12.2) and ‘agema twn ippeis’.
You’ll have to provide a reference for Hellenistic multiple ‘Agemata’ – in Polybius, Plutarch and Diodorus Books XVIII-XX, and Appian etc I can only find references to a single mounted Agema, usually a 300 strong squadron, or else the single foot Agema, such as Antigonid, Seleucid or Ptolemaic references – in other words, just like Alexander’s army. That the infantry Agema continued its role of leading the army on the march and forming the rightmost ‘post of honour’ when deployed on the field is shown by Plutarch’s account of Pydna, where the Agema leads out the Phalanx, forms the right wing and are the first to engage the Romans.

Ptolemy simply adopted a different view of the unit we call the ‘agema’ at I 8 iii, he separated the constituent parts and made them plural ‘Guards’, Whereas later he decided that the ‘agema’ should cover the sum of its parts unless they were tasked separately. Nor is the suggested corruption of the text as simple as you want to make it; the manuscript reads ‘TADEAGHMATA’ the editors propose ‘TODEAGHMATE’ ie. omicron and epsilon have been misread twice, and resolved into alpha in both instances not just in the same line, but within ten letters of each other; such an error would challenge a drunken Stevie Wonder.

I don’t have access to the original text, so you’ll have to elaborate on the rather cryptic explanation above. Are you saying the plural occurs twice in line I.8.3 ? Or are you also referring to the singular in I.8.4 ?
How easy it is to insert two incorrect letters into one word, I’ll illustrate by a personal example. If you look back in the thread you’ll see I have referred to Chinnock’s translation of Arrian as “Chinook’s”. This is because my stored electronic version is mislabelled, thus through a ‘typo’ I sub-consciously copy it, even though I’m well aware the correct name is “Chinnock.”

Nor does your rationalisation address why this word occurs only once in the whole source corpus, if it is not a scribal error, quite possibly by one or more Byzantine monks not familiar with Arrian’s Greek dialect. The idea that the plural refers to 'constituent parts' at I.8.3, and the whole is singular just one line later at I.8.4 I find singularly unconvincing (pun intended ! ) Note that there is NEVER any reference to more than a single Infantry Agema in all our sources and history from the rise of Makedon to the demise of the Hellenistic states at the hands of Rome – a period of almost 300 years and encompassing a number of different Hellenistic and Macedonian armies. It can only really be an error.

Yes the plural encompasses any number of agemata over one, but the passage at 8 iv, in tandem with the tripartite separation described at III 11 with 13, and V 13, demonstrates that there were two ‘agemata’ here and that they are indeed the ‘Agema of the Macedonians’ and the ‘King’s Hypaspists’, who cannot be the normal Hypaspists as they are clearly separated from them at V 13 and once that passage is accepted those at III 11/13 and I 8 fall in to support the interpretation, making three instances. Note, it seems better practice to consider all passages together and if one has a clear statement and the acceptance of that statement clarifies the others without need for textual amendment or special pleading, the safest course is to accept that statement rather than attempt to explain away the other passages and then condemn the clear statement as an authorial or scriptorial error. Windmill or Giant?

Rather than try to lump what are separate occasions together, and ‘average out’ the references, better to consider each reference in turn. I have already noted that the instances at I.8.3 and I.8.4 must be a reference to the same two units – the Agema of the Makedones, and the Royal/King’s own Hypaspists ( notwithstanding the all but certain mistaken reference to plural infantry agemas). At III.11.9 we are at Gaugemala and the position of the Agema in the line is referred to. At III. 13.6 it is the ‘Hypaspists Basilikoi’ who are reported as destroying those chariots that broke through ( more of this anon) – no mention of the Agema, or any ‘other’ Hypaspists. There is no ‘third’ instance therefore. At V.13.4, at the Hydaspes, the Hypaspist arm has been enlarged, and likely consists of the Agema, the original ‘Hypaspists Basilikoi’, and the new chiliarchies of ‘other’ Hypaspists, as I have related in a previous post above. The latter certainly did not exist in earlier campaigns, so you are not comparing ‘like with like’ situations.Certainly nowhere is the term 'Agema' demonstrably used of the 'ypaspistae basilikoi'/Royal hypaspists

Sadly, the manoeuvre posited for the Hypaspists at Gaugamela is NOT a simple about face, it is an about face by half or quarter files, something not even covered by the manuals. Indeed, the fact that Alexander deploys in a double phalanx, implies that such a manoeuvre was impossible.

Unfortunately for this premise, the manuals do in fact refer to such a formation/manouevre e.g. Arrian ‘Tactica’ 29:
“Again, the phalanx is called ‘two edged’ when it has each half of the men in its files facing away from each other so as to be back to back.”
However, even if we did not have specific evidence for this formation/manoeuvre it would be surprising if such a formation did not exist. “Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence” as the saying puts it. Moreover, even if there were no such drill, there is no reason such a manoeuvre couldn’t be carried out ‘ex tempore’, or even on the men’s individual initiative.
Sir Francis Bacon’s dictum also seems to apply, for while you put forward the posit that turning around to deal with the chariots was ‘impossible’ for want of a drill, you happily accept that the ranks opened up to let the chariots through, even though the manuals don’t mention anything at all about a drill for this !!
In the immortal words of Mr Spock; “Illogical, Captain!”

Further, what are the men ahead of those turning to the rear to think, it would look much like a rout to those unable to hear the command (presuming those half file leaders could that were to advance to the rear); Charles the Bold pulled his chivalry back for another charge at Grandson or some battle against the doughty Swiss and his professional army interpreted the move as flight and quit the field at a rate of knots. Alexander had more sense and allowed for defence against envelopment. Nor can we suppose that he expected the psiloi to deal with the chariots, it is a two phase defence not a plan and a back-up, the phalanx open lanes because that is the drill he has told them to adopt, he clearly knew that the chariots would then need to be neutralised. Alexander foresaw the problems and issued his orders accordingly.

Yet, this surmise is clearly wrong, for the manuals ( and Arrian’s narrative account - twice [III.12.1 and III.13.6) both say 'turning about' was done !
Each battle is a unique set of circumstances, Charles’ situation was nothing like Alexander’s, and the fact that one professional army routs in what is only broadly similar circumstances certainly doesn’t mean that A.’s army was at risk of the same – especially when the battles were almost 2,000 years apart and the manoeuvres not even the same !

That Alexander was concerned about envelopment, I would certainly agree. Heavily outnumbered, he adopted a ‘box’ formation, or more accurately, an elongated rhomboid, similar to that of Xenophon’s 10,000 in like circumstances [Xen. Anabasis III.2 ff]
As to “it is a two phase defence not a plan and a back-up,” I don’t propose to split hairs, and will concur, for they amount to the same thing – Alexander couldn’t know how many, if any, chariots would get through, or where.

Let us now examine some of the physical factors concerning the charge of the chariots.
Arrian III.14 “Meantime the foreigners launched their scythe-bearing chariots against Alexander
himself, for the purpose of throwing his phalanx into confusion; but in this they were grievously deceived.
For as soon as some of them approached, the Agrianians and the javelin-men with Balacrus, who had been posted in front of the Companion cavalry, hurled their javelins at them ; others they seized by the reins and pulled the drivers off, and standing round the horses killed them.
Yet some rolled right through the ranks ; for the men stood apart and opened their ranks, as they had been instructed, in the places where the chariots assaulted them. In this way it generally happened that the chariots passed through safely, and the men by whom they were driven were uninjured. But these also were afterwards overpowered by the grooms of Alexander's army and by the royal shield-bearing guards.[ Ypaspistai basilikoi]” ( Chinnock translation)

There are 100 such chariots facing Alexander’s wing, each 4 horse vehicle with scythes roughly 30 feet wide [ 4 horses wide, allowing 6 ft per horse, plus scythes extending beyond that] – the width of 10 men in close order – so en masse, roughly 1,000 yards frontage minimum. They were opposed by half the Agrianes and Cretan archers ( 500 men each or thereabouts), plus Balacrus’ javelineers, probably 1,000 or so, who, deployed 4 deep, and 6 ft or so apart would occupy a similar frontage ( using the manuals formations).[III.12] Your proposed sub-unit of the (probably) 512 strong Agema – let us assume half i.e. 256 =16men front x16 deep – would occupy a mere 32 yard frontage at ‘normal’ distance of 6 ft per man ( same when closed up into ‘close order’/pyknosis 3 ft intervals, 8 men deep). Guess you must be assuming the grooms did all the fighting, for which a few Guards claimed the credit !! Incidently, by my reckoning, the whole of the Hypaspists would have had a frontage of around 750 yards (assuming 3000 men 8 deep at 6 ft per man in ‘normal’/open order; or 4 deep at 3 ft per man ‘close order’ for action). Since whether any, or how many, or where, the “ Some few of the vehicles succeeded in passing through...” (De Selincourt translation), we must assume this occurred randomly along the whole frontage – so your scenario, even allowing the whole Agema and a 64 yard frontage would have had to work like a game of electronic “pong” – rather unrealistic along a 1,000 yard front, even allowing for an awful lot of grooms to bar the progress of the chariots......
Using different figures for frontages etc, the discrepancy is still so huge as to make your sub-unit of the Agema countering the chariots quite impossible, grooms or no grooms !

Yet, Alexander does not appoint an overall commander for the right, but does for the Hypaspists alone, to whit Nikanor, but he is similarly commanding a collection of units. There was hardly any fancy formation changing on the field so layers of command don’t really enter into it.

....we are referring to the period post-Nicanor, when the Hypaspists are further expanded to probably 4 chiliarchies. Nicanor doesn’t seem to have had a successor as overall commander.

Except that we are told that the assault force consisted of Coenus ‘taxis’ – 1,500 or 2,000 strong, plus the Hypaspists also at least 2,000 strong – not a small force. At II.24 it is the whole of Coenus’ taxis and the Hypaspists that are in the town.

Can you see what you’ve done here? That’s right you have used ‘taxis’ as a technical term. There is good reason to suppose that the ‘so-called asthetairoi’ were sub-sets of their parent units, as they seem to be the men later styled ‘the most agile’ – kouphatous - of the phalanx. Nor does Arrian mean that all the Hypaspists boarded Alexander’s ship, only all that did board were Hypaspists, a usage paralleled during the crossing of the Hydaspes where ‘half the hypaspists’ cross with him in a triakonter. ‘taxis’ me no ‘taxeis’.

I don’t see a problem with this – like many Greek ( and English) words ‘taxis’ has a generic meaning -‘unit’ generally - and a specific meaning, such as “Coenus’ taxis”, depending on context. It is clear that our sources use ‘taxis’ in the specific sense of a ‘unit’ comprised of one sixth of the phalanx , probably 2,000 strong ( discussion deferred to dormant thread.) Paralus has already pointed out the unlikelihood of ‘taxis’ in this sense referring to small units able to fit on a triakonter !!

You will have to supply the references to late Achaemenid ‘Immortals’, not ‘melophoroi’ mind.

‘Immortals’ is perhaps a bad choice of words, since it is Herodotus’ word and not Persian. Some scholars believe that Herodotus' informant has confused the name Anûšiya ('companions') with Anauša ('Immortals'). The Royal Guard of Darius III,(Melaphoroi) with their apple-butted spears are clearly equipped the same as those earlier with their ‘pomegranate’ butted ones, and are usually equated by most scholars. I'd concede that this Royal Guard might have re-armed with aspides to become 'heavy' infantry ( interpreting the sarcophagus ) but even so, the Persian levies likely would have retained their traditional armament, though Darius III had more sense than to oppose such troops to Macedonian 'hoplites'...........

edits: correction of Greek name for 'King's squadron' to Ile Basilike and correction of agemati to singular reference

agesilaos wrote:Ptolemy simply adopted a different view of the unit we call the ‘agema’ at I 8 iii, he separated the constituent parts and made them plural ‘Guards’, Whereas later he decided that the ‘agema’ should cover the sum of its parts unless they were tasked separately.

It is, as I said earlier, bad writing and redundant in the extreme to refer to these two subunits as the agema and the agema which is exactly what the plural means. If by agemata here Arrian/Ptolemy is indicating the two units - the agema and the royal hypaspists - it would be far more sensible to write exactly that. He is clearly capable of it for, on your own reading, he does this exact thing a sentence later (and at Hydaspes). Your hypothesis would see Arrian simply saying "agema" to refer to the whole rather than a plural (as everywhere else). There is, as I've said, no logical reason for there to be an "agema and the other agema" or agemata. There is even less reason for Ptolemy being given a third part of a unit of 125 (or 128) or 250 (or 256) men in a division of forces in India (4.24.10). Accepting the royal hypaspists here as a 125-256 man unit means believeing Alexander sent Ptolemy off with 2,000 archers, 1,000 Agrianians, half the cavalry and two units of light troops (I do not accept Philip and Philotas as hypaspist commanders) and 42.66 to 85.33 "heavy" infantry. It is just as absurd should we accept that Philip and Philotas are hypaspist commanders. They cannot be chiliarchs (they are not described as such such as Nearkhos and Antiokhos) and so must be pentikosiarchs. Thus Alexander felt the need to add 43 or 85 of his guard troops to Ptolemy's 1,000 "heavies". There is no logical reason for him to do such. He will have kept the agema with himself as he so conspicuously does with the cavalry agema in other army divisions.

A far more natural reading is that two totally distinct units are meant: the infantry agema (as Arrian/Ptolemy refers to it later to so distinguish it) and the cavalry (anachronistically).

agesilaos wrote:Yes the plural encompasses any number of agemata over one, but the passage at 8 iv, in tandem with the tripartite separation described at III 11 with 13, and V 13, demonstrates that there were two ‘agemata’ here and that they are indeed the ‘Agema of the Macedonians’ and the ‘King’s Hypaspists’, who cannot be the normal Hypaspists as they are clearly separated from them at V 13

The royal hypaspists being stationed in a rear line I've dealt with elsewhere. It makes no sense given that Arrian clearly states that the agema was posted hard alongside the cavalry followed by the rest of the hypaspists. Nothing here states that the royal hypaspists have been separated and, were they so separated, one might expect Arrian to say so as you yourself argue. On your interpretation the "agema" encompasses both unless listed individually. They are not for when Arrian notes the second phalanx he makes no reference to any hypaspists (a very surpising omission by either Arrian or his source). Rather, what we have is the very business as usual the agema of the hypaspists and "the rest of the hypaspists" (τὸ ἄγημα ἐτέτακτο τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ οἱ ἄλλοι ὑπασπισταί). The rest encompassing all hypaspists other than the agema. Even were this unit in the rear, what use a 16x16 man unit here - particularly if it is a "Guard" unit?? (I note Xenophon has posted on the frontages and use of such a small unit as I write this).

Time to do the Melbourne Cup form. The account balance is in need of serious repair having taken a battering on Derby day. Had Catkins a skin cancer the size of the thing taken from my neck, the photo finish will have been reversed. Oh for a pimple. Rugby - indolent sideline officials and error ridden referees - need not be discussed.

Agesilaos wrote:

Nor is the suggested corruption of the text as simple as you want to make it; the manuscript reads ‘TADEAGHMATA’ the editors propose ‘TODEAGHMATE’ ie. omicron and epsilon have been misread twice, and resolved into alpha in both instances not just in the same line, but within ten letters of each other

....if I understand you correctly, the word as written in the manuscript text is not in fact an actual Greek word, but has to be emended by the editors to make one ? In other words, a certain scribal error!

No the MS have a perfectly servicable Greek plural, the editors emend that to a sigular and add padding to match the line length, 'te' is normally separated from the 'kai' it foreshadows, it does not make sense as an emphatic 'te', 'the agema and the very hypaspists themselves'; certainly editorial interference.

First some language points, which I hope will not be taken amiss; note that the ‘King’s Squadron’ is the ‘ile basilike’ – fem sing.-rather than ‘basilikoi’ which is masculine plural, I only point this out because others may carry the error into their academic work and spelling still matters in Classics. Your explanation of ‘agemati ‘ at V 2 v, is mistaken; the ‘agema’ is specifically the Foot guard – pezikos – but is, in any case a dative singular. And, finally, I did not mean that the diadochoi had ‘agemata’ divided like Alexander’s but just used the plural because that is how English works, I was thinking of the cavalry ‘agemata’ of Eumenes’ and Demetrios’ army, it was clearly ambiguous.

I am referring solely to I 8 iii; the MS reads ‘TADEAGHMATAKAITOUSUPASPISTAS’ which is plural, the editors emend it to ‘TODEAGHMATEKAITOUSUPASPISTAS ’,the surrounding letters do not interfere with the reading ie an alpha followed by a delta or a kappa is unlikely to be misread as another letter.

Rather than try to lump what are separate occasions together, and ‘average out’ the references, better to consider each reference in turn. I have already noted that the instances at I.8.3 and I.8.4 must be a reference to the same two units – the Agema of the Makedones, and the Royal/King’s own Hypaspists ( notwithstanding the all but certain mistaken reference to plural infantry agemas). At III.11.9 we are at Gaugemala and the position of the Agema in the line is referred to. At III. 13.6 it is the ‘Hypaspists Basilikoi’ who are reported as destroying those chariots that broke through ( more of this anon) – no mention of the Agema, or any ‘other’ Hypaspists. There is no ‘third’ instance therefore. At V.13.4, at the Hydaspes, the Hypaspist arm has been enlarged, and likely consists of the Agema, the original ‘Hypaspists Basilikoi’, and the new chiliarchies of ‘other’ Hypaspists, as I have related in a previous post above. The latter certainly did not exist in earlier campaigns, so you are not comparing ‘like with like’ situations.Certainly nowhere is the term 'Agema' demonstrably used of the 'ypaspistae basilikoi'/Royal Hypaspist

And here lies the methodological failing of this position; how do you evaluate the information in these separate references; your position is to refer them to an orthodoxy imposed by pre-conceived ideas, how else can you say definitively that there cannot be plural ‘agemata’ unless you have already decided there was only one? This method then furthers its interpretation by approaching the next reference in the light of its first mis-interpretation and finally invents an expanded Hypaspist corps, for which there is no evidence to further explain away the inconvenience of a clear division of the body into three. ‘It’s historical method, Jim, but not as we know it!’

Unfortunately for this premise, the manuals do in fact refer to such a formation/manouevre e.g. Arrian ‘Tactica’ 29:
“Again, the phalanx is called ‘two edged’ when it has each half of the men in its files facing away from each other so as to be back to back.”
However, even if we did not have specific evidence for this formation/manoeuvre it would be surprising if such a formation did not exist. “Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence” as the saying puts it. Moreover, even if there were no such drill, there is no reason such a manoeuvre couldn’t be carried out ‘ex tempore’, or even on the men’s individual initiative.
Sir Francis Bacon’s dictum also seems to apply, for while you put forward the posit that turning around to deal with the chariots was ‘impossible’ for want of a drill, you happily accept that the ranks opened up to let the chariots through, even though the manuals don’t mention anything at all about a drill for this !!
In the immortal words of Mr Spock; “Illogical, Captain!”

Unfortunately, this is not what is supposed, in your view to have happened at Gaugamela, this is a parade ground manoeuvre or even just a way of lining up rather than an actual evolution. Alexander did not set up with a ‘two-edged phalanx’ but with a ‘doubled phalanx’ with two lines both facing the same way. Indeed I cannot recall a single instance of a phalanx adopting this theoretical posture, nor any commander being fool enough to order it; should either face have to fall back the whole formation is immediately in chaos.

We can now turn to your posited ‘ex tempore’ desertion of their ranks; I think you cannot really be serious here, how do their comrades know what is happening? Who decides when there are sufficient forces to deal with the situation? And what are they going to do with their sarissa?

I choose to believe that the ranks opened because we are told they did in a narrative historian and that it had been specifically ordered by Alexander (and presumably practised). It is also a manoeuvre mentioned by Xenophon (the Laconophile Athenian, not the forum member!), as a rule I place more faith in what is said to have been done on the battlefield rather than in the musings of theoreticians more concerned with the beauty of numbers than battlefield reality; thus when an improbable evolution does not make it into their books it is quite logical, therefore, to doubt it especially when it is not mentioned in the sources either.

The list of battles where an unexpected manoeuvre causes panic is a very long one and not one I am going to rehearse.

Now we come to the classic wedding of a ‘strawman argument’ and a false accuracy; I have consistently said that the reaction force would be armed with javelins or longchai if one prefers, so why would they adopt a formation suitable for sarissai?

Is it strange that we all pooh-pooh the numbers given for the men in the Persian army and then blithely accept those given for the chariots; that aside the rest falls because the Hypaspistai Basilikoi were deployed in open order just like the Agrianes, and I would guess in the same strength ie, a pentekosiarchy (I reckon the ‘agema’ as a chiliarchy with two pentekosiarchai, one ‘of the Makedones’ and the other the ‘the Royal Hypaspists’) their role is to stiffen the grooms, in whom Alexander would not have placed too much confidence.

Of course one may decide that Alexander relied on ad hoc solutions conjured up by the rank and file, but I tend to give him the credit of being able to organise a battle himself. That the grooms needed a stiffening is apparent from Alexander placing them in this role rather than as a camp guard where he used the Thracians, who would have been well-suited to destroy the chariots, Alexander clearly judged that the camp could not be held by the grooms and their ilk and did not want to distance his elite troops so far as to make them unable to join the battle (this is pure speculation, of course).

Neoptolemos seems to have been archihypaspist after Nikanor, but to have dropped out due to Ptolemy’s bias, at Sittacene Alexander seems to be creating more levels of command and thus giving him the possibility of rewarding more men; it would be strange if he decided to scrap one of the premier honours.

I don’t see a problem with this – like many Greek ( and English) words ‘taxis’ has a generic meaning -‘unit’ generally - and a specific meaning, such as “Coenus’ taxis”, depending on context. It is clear that our sources use ‘taxis’ in the specific sense of a ‘unit’ comprised of one sixth of the phalanx , probably 2,000 strong ( discussion deferred to dormant thread.) Paralus has already pointed out the unlikelihood of ‘taxis’ in this sense referring to small units able to fit on a triakonter !!

The problem is that ‘taxis’ has ONLY a generic meaning and the mock technical meaning has been imposed by modern scholars, though even Tarn recognised that Arrian (and thus probably Ptolemy use the word ‘as a handmaiden for all uses’)

Let’s agree to leave discussion of the Achaemenid army for another thread, though I am not going to start it!

agesilaos wrote:Alexander did not set up with a ‘two-edged phalanx’ but with a ‘doubled phalanx’ with two lines both facing the same way. Indeed I cannot recall a single instance of a phalanx adopting this theoretical posture, nor any commander being fool enough to order it; should either face have to fall back the whole formation is immediately in chaos.

I agree entirely. The battle line was a double phalanx: the Macedonian array in the fore and, one has to suppose by deduction, the 'allies' and likely mercenaries as the rear phalanx; both facing the enemy. The rear phalanx is ordered to about face should envelopment occur.

agesilaos wrote: as a rule I place more faith in what is said to have been done on the battlefield rather than in the musings of theoreticians more concerned with the beauty of numbers than battlefield reality; thus when an improbable evolution does not make it into their books it is quite logical, therefore, to doubt it especially when it is not mentioned in the sources either.

Again, no argument with that.

agesilaos wrote:Now we come to the classic wedding of a ‘strawman argument’ and a false accuracy; I have consistently said that the reaction force would be armed with javelins or longchai if one prefers, so why would they adopt a formation suitable for sarissai?

Xenophon, I'm sure, will deal with this in time. I would only add that these units (hypaspists and the agema) always fought in the phalanx battle line: they are close order troops not light troops. On this latter notion, the editor of the footnotes in the Landmark is, in my view, consistently incorrect in describing the agema as "light armed troops". Your question might better be posed as why adopt a formation suitable for hoplites? The answer is because I believe they are armed as those in the Aghios Athanasios frieze are.

agesilaos wrote:Is it strange that we all pooh-pooh the numbers given for the men in the Persian army and then blithely accept those given for the chariots; that aside the rest falls because the Hypaspistai Basilikoi were deployed in open order just like the Agrianes, and I would guess in the same strength ie, a pentekosiarchy (I reckon the ‘agema’ as a chiliarchy with two pentekosiarchai, one ‘of the Makedones’ and the other the ‘the Royal Hypaspists’) their role is to stiffen the grooms, in whom Alexander would not have placed too much confidence.

Again, I cannot for the life of me see the sense in this. Their role - the agema - is the protection of the king. This is precisely the reason they are stationed alongside the ile basilike in the battle line. There is no valid reason - stiffening or otherwise - for the king to remove half his guard troops (and even less to give Ptolemy a third of a half of them!). Alexander has posted a rear phalanx and this phalanx will not have been at anything but a small remove from the front phalanx - it is there to protect its back in the event of envelopment. The numbers of chariots aside, the description is clear that what chariots there were on the left were launched against Alexander's cavalry, especially himself and those about him. This obviously includes the near part of the phalanx: the hypaspists. Although it is not in their recorded orders, Alexander certainly expected this rear phalanx to deal with those which passed through the infantry line. He gave orders, as you say, for the infantry to facilitate this. The rear phalanx cannot possibly have simply awaited for the arrival of the royal hypaspist chariot removal crews who were busy elsewhere stiffening the grooms. It is logical in the extreme that Alexander expected the rear phalanx to deal with these "drive throughs" just as it is, to me, illogical that he would place half of his foot guards in between the two phalanx lines to do a job the rear phalanx was eminently capable of.

There is something amiss with this little tid-bit of Arrian's battle description and it wouldn't surprise if Aristoboulos possibly stuffed it up (or Arrian for that matter who elsewhere, drifting between sources, has Krateros in two places at the one time for Granikos).

agesilaos wrote:Neoptolemos seems to have been archihypaspist after Nikanor, but to have dropped out due to Ptolemy’s bias, at Sittacene Alexander seems to be creating more levels of command and thus giving him the possibility of rewarding more men; it would be strange if he decided to scrap one of the premier honours.

Indeed it would. I don't know that we can blame his complete and utter absence on Ptolemy's bias though - he seems never to come up anywhere. Most odd.

I am not saying the Hypaspists, nor even the agema were light troops, only that they were flexible enough to adopt different roles; the Hypaspists assaulting Tyre were hardly equipped with sarissai and fighting sixteen deep, nor were Koinos’ unit, Alexander would be unlikely to be constrained by our ideas of how his troops should be employed.

Aghios Athanios does, indeed provide excellent evidence, and system 1988 http://s1246.photobucket.com/albums/gg6 ... ystem1988/ has posted pictures on the ‘off-topic forum’, there you will observe that the guards outside are sarissa armed, whereas those in the symposia have longchai; but carry rimless shields: a split in weaponry echoed in the variants of the Kleitos the Black killing.

Were the second line meant to deal with the chariots, which would, as you say, appear logical, then the Hypaspists action is contrary to orders. I prefer to see Alexander posting the second line as protection from a very possible enveloping attack, in that role they may not have been available to repulse the chariots (in the event they would have been) and so Alexander caters for the planned admission of the chariots into his ‘square’; foresight is the father of good generalship.

When mounted, as he was in all the major battles the task of acting as a bodyguard falls to the ile basilike, the ‘somatophylakeia’ of the agema comes into operation when the king is afoot or at court. In such circumstances Alexander is making the best use of his resources. The grooms are surely there because of their experience in horse-handling and the hypaspists to do the killing, I do not envisage each in a separate body but spread in small groups along the front of the second line to defend their rear in case the enveloping attack materialises before the chariots are launched.

I agree that Arrian is not always helpful in his battle descriptions but he is yards ahead of Curtius and miles ahead of the formulaic tosh of Diodorus.

It is hard to think of a reason, other than Ptolemaic peevishness, for Neoptolemos’ rank not being noticed, one could reject Plutarch’s testimony, but since it may go back to Hieronymos or another contemporary it seems better to accept it and see him as Nikanor’s successor.

I am sure Xenophon is sharpening his Python quotes as we speak