Book Club: Conquest and Empire

[Fiona]

2:5 From Halicarnassus to Cilicia

Another chapter full of difficult geography, almost impossible to understand without a good map, and one thing this book does not have is a good map.
Does anyone else have the same problem, that if you use a map that shows all the places, you don’t get the details of terrain that would help make sense of Alexander’s movements, but if you use one that shows that kind of detail, you forget where you are in relation to anywhere else?
Well, anyway, such difficulties aside, I thought this chapter did a great job of trying to explain where Alexander was going. I thought it really gave a clear picture of the moves of the autumn, winter and spring of 334 to 333, and how they made sense according to the season.
Another thing that struck me was how well Professor Bosworth writes as if he did not have the benefit of hindsight. He puts himself in Alexander’s shoes very well, and shows us the kinds of things he would probably have been worried about, reminding us that at this stage, it could all have gone pear-shaped and victory was by no means assured.
I get the impression of Alexander wanting speed and being willing to sacrifice thorough conquest for the sake of speed, and I am thinking that this is good strategy on his part, being careful not to get bogged down. He certainly seems to have covered a huge distance in this period.
It had not really sunk into my head before that Antigonus stayed behind for the rest of the campaign as satrap of Phrygia. It’s interesting that de Selincourt, editing Arrian, notes that he doesn’t get much of a mention because he was Ptolemy’s rival later. He was in this area a long time then, and probably got to know the people well. I wonder if this satrapy was the heart of his later acquisitions. But I thought we had left Calas behind as satrap of Phrygia?
I see Nearchus was made satrap of Pamphylia too, but I don’t think he stayed there the whole time, because he was in India.
And what are all these other places – Lycia, Anatolia, Pisidia – are they satrapies too, or just areas? And where do Paphlagonia and Cappadocia fit in?
I note that Professor Bosworth seems quite baffled, as who wouldn’t be, about quite what was going on with Alexander Lyncestes, and also that he seems to accept the story of the Gordian Knot. Good propaganda again, probably!
Fiona

[jan]

Hello Fiona:

I do not know if this is the correct place to ask this question, but do you or anyone here know whether any or all of the sources are on digital ebooks. Sony advertises an ebook and has said that they would put requested materials on their reader. I would like to suggest that an ebook reader be developed that would include all the original sources as well as other later historians. I did look this up at google to see what I could find, and I found that Heckel can be found on an ebook of some kind available at Amazon. But my request is that all the original sources be compiled on one reader and made available to the public. Does anyone know?

Thanks, Jan

[Paralus]

Such sites exist already. A selection:

• Academy Reading Room
  Alexander Sources
  The ever useful Attalus
  Forum Romanum
  Bill Thayer's Lacus Curtius
  Perseus

Should keep you busy for a bit.

[Paralus]

Antigonus stayed behind for the rest of the campaign as satrap of Phrygia. It’s interesting that de Selincourt, editing Arrian, notes that he doesn’t get much of a mention because he was Ptolemy’s rival later. He was in this area a long time then, and probably got to know the people well. I wonder if this satrapy was the heart of his later acquisitions. But I thought we had left Calas behind as satrap of Phrygia?

Calas was appointed satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. Balacrus had Cilicia and Antigonus Phrygia.

Ptolemy does do a reasonable job of airbrushing Antigonus from history. Not satisfied with the fact that Antigonus was appointed satarap of Phrygia and that he no longer features in the anabasis, he leaves out the campaingn that, if Curtius is correct, secured Alexander's rear. Curtius (IV.1.34-35) records - albiet briefly - the activity:

The recapture of Lydia was now being attempted by the generals of Darius who had survived the battle of Issus, together with all the troops who had followed them as well as some young Cappadocians and Paphlagonians enlisted for the purpose. [35] Alexander's general, Antigonus, was in command of Lydia and, although he had dispatched to the king most of the soldiers from his garrison, he nevertheless showed his contempt for the barbarians by taking the field with his men. In that theatre, too, the fortune of the two sides remained unaltered: the Persians were defeated in three battles in various locations.

This makes the campaign (by sea) of the Persians along the Asia Minor coast (Ionia) a more dangerous enterprise for Alexander. Persian army elements (post Issus) and the fleet were directing their efforts to regain control of the vital routes through Ionia and Anatolia. Antigonus - if Curtius is correct above and has not slipped Lydia for Phrygia - had an overriding command at least for the campaign. Curtius IV.5.13-18 records more of these campaigns.

Phrygia along with Pamphylia and Lycia were absolutely central to Antigonus' later bid for power. It seems he'd gradually wound up in control of this entire area by the death of Alexander. Certainly we hear that Nearchus returned east and Alexander did not (that I know of) replace him. Antigonus is confirmed satrap of Phrygia, Lycia and Pamphylia in the Babylonian settlement. Pamphylians and Lycians are found in Antigonus' armies when their composition is enumerated: "Of the infantry, more than nine thousand mercenaries were placed first, next to them three thousand Lycians and Pamphylians, then more than eight thousand mixed troops in Macedonian equipment, and finally the nearly eight thousand Macedonians" (Diod.19.29.3). Defeat, at the hands of Lysimachus and Seleucus, in this heartland at Ipsos terminated the Antigonid Asian empire.

And what are all these other places – Lycia, Anatolia, Pisidia – are they satrapies too, or just areas? And where do Paphlagonia and Cappadocia fit in?

Anatolia is the overarching name of what is now central Turkey (Asia Minor). Cappadoccia was the thoroughly unpacified satrapy of Eumenes centred on the Halys River and north of the Cilician gates. It is essentially the central high plateua of what today is Turkey. The heartland of the ancient Hittites.

Pahplagonia is part of what was termed "Hellespontine Phrygia" along the southern coast of the Hellespont and part of the Black sea (near Heracleia) and is also termed Bythnia. On the basis of Memnon (FGrH 434; 1/12.4) it seems this was not a place the Macedonians ever really controlled after the defeat of Calas:

Doedalsus was succeeded by Boteiras, who lived for 76 years, and was in turn succeeded by his son Bas. Bas defeated Calas the general of Alexander, even though Calas was well equipped for a battle, and kept the Macedonians out of Bithynia. He lived for 71 years, and was king for 50 years.

Leonnatus is given this satrapy at the Babylonian settlement and, in 319/18 after Antipater's death, we find Arrhidaeus garrisoning the cities of his satrapy Hellespontine Phrygia. The action is centred on Cyzicus and so Bythnia seems not to be in Macedonian hands and Calas must have met defeat sometime after his appointment but well after Issos (early 320's?). He was replaced in this role by a certain Demarchus (Arr. Succ. 1.6). Possibly due to his loss of Bythnia or his relationship with Harpalus?

[jan]

Thank you, Paralus, as I have only begun, but what fascinating reading material...so happy that I asked and you provided...Yes, I will be busy for hours, no doubt...much obliged...Jan

[Fiona]

Ptolemy does do a reasonable job of airbrushing Antigonus from history. Not satisfied with the fact that Antigonus was appointed satarap of Phrygia and that he no longer features in the anabasis, he leaves out the campaingn that, if Curtius is correct, secured Alexander's rear. Curtius (IV.1.34-35) records - albiet briefly - the activity:

I remember - these were the actions Alexander got news of when he was in Sidon, weren't they, and I don't think Arrian mentions them, which seems to fit with Ptolemy airbrushing Antogonus out. But Curtius does mention them, and Ptolemy wasn't a source for him, if I have got that right, so that fits too.

This makes the campaign (by sea) of the Persians along the Asia Minor coast (Ionia) a more dangerous enterprise for Alexander. Persian army elements (post Issus) and the fleet were directing their efforts to regain control of the vital routes through Ionia and Anatolia. Antigonus - if Curtius is correct above and has not slipped Lydia for Phrygia - had an overriding command at least for the campaign. Curtius IV.5.13-18 records more of these campaigns.

After Issus, I bet there was trouble flaring up all over the place, for the remnants of that great army weren't going to disappear. It's easy to imagine people trying to pull together some kind of resistance, and that'd be more likely to happen where Alexander wasn't, but where his satraps and governors were.
There are so many books about Alexander, but I've never seen one that looks at the story from the fleets' points of view. They keep popping up, almost as asides, but I should think it would be very illuminating to read something that focused on the activity at sea.

Phrygia along with Pamphylia and Lycia were absolutely central to Antigonus' later bid for power. It seems he'd gradually wound up in control of this entire area by the death of Alexander. Certainly we hear that Nearchus returned east and Alexander did not (that I know of) replace him. Antigonus is confirmed satrap of Phrygia, Lycia and Pamphylia in the Babylonian settlement. Pamphylians and Lycians are found in Antigonus' armies when their composition is enumerated: "Of the infantry, more than nine thousand mercenaries were placed first, next to them three thousand Lycians and Pamphylians, then more than eight thousand mixed troops in Macedonian equipment, and finally the nearly eight thousand Macedonians" (Diod.19.29.3). Defeat, at the hands of Lysimachus and Seleucus, in this heartland at Ipsos terminated the Antigonid Asian empire.
]
Anatolia is the overarching name of what is now central Turkey (Asia Minor). Cappadoccia was the thoroughly unpacified satrapy of Eumenes centred on the Halys River and north of the Cilician gates. It is essentially the central high plateua of what today is Turkey. The heartland of the ancient Hittites.

Pahplagonia is part of what was termed "Hellespontine Phrygia" along the southern coast of the Hellespont and part of the Black sea (near Heracleia) and is also termed Bythnia. On the basis of Memnon (FGrH 434; 1/12.4) it seems this was not a place the Macedonians ever really controlled after the defeat of Calas:

This is so helpful, I've written it all down in my notebook for future reference. Thank you so much. Every map I look at has a different selection of places on it, and they aren't consistent with the relative importance of places, either. Description like this is so very useful.
I see now that when we get to Phrygia, and then go to Gordium, and are told that it is in Hellespontine Phrygia, the Hellespontine is not an optional adjective, but it's there because we have come back so far north that we're out of Phrygia and into Hellespontine Phrygia.

One day, I'll find the map of my dreams, with borders, and satrapies' names in one colour and tribal areas in another and cities in another. And it would show the rivers and the mountains and the important roads, and very faintly in the background it would show the borders of the modern countries. And of course it will have every place on it that is mentioned in any of the sources...<dreams>
Thanks for all your help, Paralus, you are a star.
Fiona

[Paralus]

After Issus, I bet there was trouble flaring up all over the place, for the remnants of that great army weren't going to disappear. It's easy to imagine people trying to pull together some kind of resistance, and that'd be more likely to happen where Alexander wasn't, but where his satraps and governors were.

"Great army" is somewhat overstating matters. The sources, in typical fashion, provide numbers for the Persians displaying more incontinence than the average aged care nursing home. I rather suspect that Alexander faced a Persian host not greatly larger than his own forces; probably similar to that which faced down Cyrus in 401.

Darius, despite the stories paralleling Herodotus’ Demaratus, got behind and across Alexander’s lines and chose a site demonstrably unsuited to the ridiculous numbers accorded him. Those numbers necessitated the battlefield equivalent of Madison Square Garden yet he chose the close confines of that building's ticket office. Arrian’s description of Alexander’s complete surprise resonates with the truth of the matter: he’d been caught and had to turn and face Darius with unconquered territory at his back. As well, Darius chose a defensive position and palisaded the river. Not the actions of a man with 600,000 at his back facing some 40,000. Arrian’s and, more so, Callisthenes’ description (Polybios 12.17.1 – 22.7) of Alexander’s march up the plain shows how well Darius chose his ground.

All that said, Curtius clearly describes Persian forces operating in Ionia / Asia Minor in the aftermath of Issos and these are the rump of the escapees from Issos plus others still loyal to the Great King. Miletus had to be recaptured by the Macedonians and, plainly, the area wasn’t an Alexander-focussed San Francisco of the sixties.

There are so many books about Alexander, but I've never seen one that looks at the story from the fleets' points of view. They keep popping up, almost as asides, but I should think it would be very illuminating to read something that focused on the activity at sea.

The problem is the source material: there isn’t too much to go on. There are some papers that cover such though and I may have them. If so I’ll email them (PM me if it’s changed)

Thanks for all your help, Paralus, you are a star.
Fiona

Don’t know about a star possibly a large candle running lower on wax! Happy to help.

[Paralus]

There's one in every thread.... eventually.

Surely there's a way to prevent such "autobots"? Then again, given the rootkit infection my PC acquired over the last two weeks, I'm not surprised.

[Fiona]

2:6 The Campaign of Issus

I thought we got a vivid picture here of the fear and tension in the Macedonian camp during Alexander’s illness in Tarsus, though I don’t know why Professor Bosworth is so sure that Harpalus’ defection will not have been the only one. He also seems convinced that Harpalus’ reinstatement proves that his defection can’t have been for treachery or embezzlement, once again assuming that Alexander would only do the logical and sensible thing. Now to me, it seems quite possible that Alexander might forgive even treachery or embezzlement out of loyalty to a friend.

The short and fast-paced campaign in Cilicia gives me the image of Alexander restored to health and whizzing about with fresh energy. I thought the explanation of the difference in treatment of Mallus and Soli was very interesting.

The build-up to the battle was good too. We got the picture of how the two armies were moving, and where, it was all described very clearly. Bosworth, like most writers, thinks the numbers of Darius’ force are exaggerated, but says there is almost unanimity that Alexander was outnumbered. Paralus told us in a recent post, though, that he rather suspected that

“Alexander faced a Persian host not greatly larger than his own forces; probably similar to that which faced down Cyrus in 401.”

So clearly there is disagreement about just how badly Alexander was outnumbered.

Then there is the interesting part about why Darius moved from his position near Sochi and came into the mountainous terrain. If it was a question of logistics and supplies, that would be an argument in favour of his having very large numbers, wouldn’t it? But given that, for reasons that seemed good to him, he moved, why move into such a narrow area? That would seem to be an argument in favour of smaller numbers.
To quote from Paralus’ post again, he said:

“As well, Darius chose a defensive position and palisaded the river. Not the actions of a man with 600,000 at his back facing some 40,000. Arrian’s and, more so, Callisthenes’ description (Polybios 12.17.1 – 22.7) of Alexander’s march up the plain shows how well Darius chose his ground.”

Alexander’s surprise was well-described, and I liked how Bosworth drew our attention to the possibility that Alexander left the allied infantry to guard the southern passes, because of their not getting mentioned in the battle narrative. That was well-spotted!

He brings out vividly Alexander’s rapid and careful response to the new situation, and then moves on the describe the battle itself. He’s quite brief here, I thought, and has an interesting emphasis on the effects of the terrain, bringing out the Macedonians’ touch-and-go moment at the stream, as well as the horrible effects of fighting for space for the Persians and their allies as they tried to flee. There’s also lots of detail about the actions of the survivors, which was interesting because of the part played in their containment by Antigonus that we saw in the last chapter.
As a final thought, I notice the complete acceptance of Barsine as Alexander’s mistress, which you don’t see everywhere.
Fiona

[Paralus]

Aside from the stated figures – which run in favour of Darius in the fashion of Philippine electoral returns for Marcos and need to be treated similarly – the “evidence” for the huge Persian host turns on Ptolemy’s description of the dead at battle’s end. Here we have dead horsemen and infantry clogging gullies as the Macedonians pursue. Given the nature of the ground these gullies will hardly be Apollo 15’s Hadley Rille; rather the washes and creek beds running from the coastal ranges. Thus it is not inconceivable that the dead cluttered these and that Ptolemy (and others) needed to ride over them.

Polybios, quoting from Kallisthenes, describes the army (12.17.6 – 18.2):

“Darius and his officers determined to draw up their whole phalanx on the ground occupied by his encampment, as it then was, and to defend his front by the river, which flowed right along his camp." But he afterwards says that Darius "stationed his cavalry close to the sea, his mercenaries next along the river, and his peltasts next resting on the mountains." Now it is difficult to understand how he could have drawn up these troops in front of his phalanx, considering that the river ran immediately under the camp: especially as their numbers were so great, amounting, on Kallisthenes's own showing, to thirty thousand cavalry and thirty thousand mercenaries. Now it is easy to calculate how much ground such a force would require.

He then on goes to calculate the width required by this front line (30,000 Greeks, Kardakes and cavalry) and concludes that the cavalry alone would fill the available space. In all this – correct – mathematical fulminating he at no stage addresses the nub of the issue: the Persian forces are wildly exaggerated and approached nothing like the numbers Kallisthenes would have us believe.

Logistics, in ancient times, are not what they are today. Armies fed “off the land” and examples of Alexander splitting his forces so as the meet those needs are related. The battle of Paraetekene was fought for the wintering (and feeding) rights of the area of Gabiene. In the end Eumenes, who won that battle and the rights, had to split his army of some 37,000 so as to ensure that supply.

The Greek allies guarding the passes is a good guess but guess it remains. “Grecian mercenaries” are described in the rear line towards the sea and the far right but no “League” troops. It is possible they form a part of these dispositions but are misnamed. Some argue that they are in the main phalanx line but this is clearly not the case: only the Macedonian national levy makes up the main battle line (as with all other “majors”). Others have suggested that they “fall out of the source tradition”. Whatever one makes of it, Alexander clearly did not consider them “frontline” troops and at Guagamela utilises them as the – much needed – reserve phalanx.

[Fiona]

Aside from the stated figures – which run in favour of Darius in the fashion of Philippine electoral returns for Marcos and need to be treated similarly – the “evidence” for the huge Persian host turns on Ptolemy’s description of the dead at battle’s end. Here we have dead horsemen and infantry clogging gullies as the Macedonians pursue. Given the nature of the ground these gullies will hardly be Apollo 15’s Hadley Rille; rather the washes and creek beds running from the coastal ranges. Thus it is not inconceivable that the dead cluttered these and that Ptolemy (and others) needed to ride over them.

Agreed, that is very believable, and I think your words, like creek beds and gullies sound more realistic than a ravine, which is Bosworth's word, following, I think, the translator of Arrian.
A ravine sounds extremely deep, like a gorge.
I have a feeling that, unless you are a geographer, terms like this are very subjective, and the understanding of them probably varies from place to place, so it is probably very hard to translate the original Greek word (whatever it might be) with a word that will mean the same thing to all readers.
Thank you for all these other thoughts on the numbers, the line-up and the logistics.
Fiona

[jan]

HI Paralus,

I have been reading your list of suggested topics and I had a computer problem tonight...I will see if I can have success now and will explain the problem to you...I am hoping that these lists are virus free as the problem had been with my spyware which I just disinstalled to see if there is a change now...will explain after I learn what happens now...Jan GRRRRR

[amyntoros]

Aside from the stated figures – which run in favour of Darius in the fashion of Philippine electoral returns for Marcos and need to be treated similarly – the “evidence” for the huge Persian host turns on Ptolemy’s description of the dead at battle’s end. Here we have dead horsemen and infantry clogging gullies as the Macedonians pursue. Given the nature of the ground these gullies will hardly be Apollo 15’s Hadley Rille; rather the washes and creek beds running from the coastal ranges. Thus it is not inconceivable that the dead cluttered these and that Ptolemy (and others) needed to ride over them.

Agreed, that is very believable, and I think your words, like creek beds and gullies sound more realistic than a ravine, which is Bosworth's word, following, I think, the translator of Arrian.
A ravine sounds extremely deep, like a gorge.
I have a feeling that, unless you are a geographer, terms like this are very subjective, and the understanding of them probably varies from place to place, so it is probably very hard to translate the original Greek word (whatever it might be) with a word that will mean the same thing to all readers.

So very true - the subjectivity, that is. Growing up I lived near the river Don and you could, if you had a strong arm, throw a ball over to the other side. Now, despite the fact that I've seen the considerably wider Hudson river on a regular basis, whenever I see the word river in a book I still mentally picture the equivalent of the Don. So when I bought a video which shows a Persian tribal people using "mattress" rafts stuffed with hay to cross a river, the width and strength of the river came as a surprise. (As did the method of crossing - no "paddling" of the rafts, but rather slingshotting them around a whirlpool-like current.)

What we need on Pothos are more photographs of terrain! Yeah, I know it will have changed just about everywhere over the past 2,000 years, but it'd still be nice ...

Best regards,

[marcus]

What we need on Pothos are more photographs of terrain! Yeah, I know it will have changed just about everywhere over the past 2,000 years, but it'd still be nice ...

I know exactly what you mean. What we need on Pothos is an easier way of attaching photographs!

But you are right about needing more of an idea about the terrain. I am steadily building up my collection of pictures that would help with that, but I have to work out the best way of making them available - maybe a public Facebook album would do the trick to start with.

BTW - when I crossed the Oxus it was so wide that my wide-angle camera lens couldn't really get it all in. Surprisingly (to me), the Jaxartes was not so bad ... maybe it was where we crossed it?

ATB

[SKY]

re: the subjectivity of rivers, etc.

ever been to the Jordan RIVER - i thought i could jump across it.