Tactike theoriai – manuals or philosophy

[Paralus]

Perhaps you might make yourself clearer.

Well I'd thought it was quite clear!

And that is to ignore other evidence to the contrary. Thukydides has no mathematical problems nor need of any basic file of eight with Theban depths as he demonstrates in his description of Delium (4.96.4):

The Thebans formed twenty-five shields deep (ἀσπίδας δὲ πέντε μὲν καὶ εἴκοσι Θηβαῖοι ἐτάξαντο), the rest as they pleased.

"Other evidence" meaning that aside from Nemea and thus Delion, my example. I then went on to say that...

Rather, I was replying to your rhetorical question "why 16 and not some other number?" Your answer is that hoplites formed up in files eight deep. Clearly the Thebans did not and not only on the single occasion of Delium. It is to be noted that Thukydides does not remark upon this depth in any way, he simply reports it. To Thukydides, then, this was not something to discourse on.

Again, referring to Delion as I make clear ("not only the single occasion of Delium") going on to observe that Thukydides has no comment on Theban depth there. My point had nothing to do with the terrain at Nemea (though I acknowledged terrain as the determinant) but everything to do with depths at Delion which you mentioned ("The 'as they pleased' at Delium simply means the allies didn't follow the Thebans in forming up in an excessive depth").

The “as they pleased” does not indicate any uniformity of depth either. The allies – each of them (ἕκαστοι) – formed in a depth of their choosing. They each individually chose a depth.

Delium where Thuc IV.93,25 says they were "...drawn up in the order in which they intended to fight." i.e. battle or close order, and that this was 25 shields deep.

There’s obviously an error in “Thuk. 4.93,25” I’m assuming you mean 93.2-5? We are told (93.1) that the Thebans ‘then formed and prepared for action’. Thukydides uses τάσσω for this forming up - 'formed into order of battle' - just as he does when later (93.4) saying the Thebans formed 25 shields deep. In between he notes that having formed up and prepared for battle the Thebans appeared over the hill and “halted in the order which they had determined on” (ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα τεταγμένοι ὥσπερ ἔμελλον); that order being the order of battle in which they had been drawn up at 93.1 which Thukydides then describes for his readers. He also notes that the Athenians formed their entire heavy infantry into a formation eight deep. Again he uses τάσσω (ἐτάξαντο). Presumably he is ‘comparing like with like’ and the Athenians fought eight deep.

[Paralus]

Many a claim of ‘special pleading’ in this thread. If I and Agesilaos are supposedly guilty, were certainly are not alone. Just a quick few…

I would not describe Polybius as the ‘most qualified’ Greek military historian – certainly not more so than Xenophon, an actual General, whilst there is considerable doubt as to whether Polybius served in any active military capacity.

Comparisons are fraught but Polybios was not an “actual General”? He was, at the time of the war against Perseus, the hipparch (cavalry commander) of the Achaean League (Plb.28.6.9).

Thucydides does not appear to have been what might be termed 'a military man', and doesn't comment on depths in any of his battle descriptions....which would be superfluous given the audience he was writing for in any event.

Thukydides, too, is not military either. The man entrusted with the northern command about Amphilpolis – one of the most sensitive theatres for Athens – is somehow not ‘military enough’? Given he is not one to blow his trumpet, we do not know just what else he took part in but, to be elected general (‘actual’ or not) presupposes experience. It is widely agreed that he took part in Perikles' reduction of Samos (given the nature of the account).

Thukydides most certainly ‘comments’ on depths. He has done so at Delion and from memory he does so also for Matiniea (the famous variant depths of the Spartans) and at Syracuse where the Athenians form a square (6.67.1-2). Here the Athenians are eight deep and the Syracusans are in battle order sixteen deep (ἔταξαν – τάσσω again).

Despite this, Sparta quickly rallied and recovered under Archidamus - and the defeated army remained in Boeotia, a continuing threat, until a truce was negotiated under Jason of Pherae.

With allies who are openly showing pleasure at the Spartans' catastrophic defeat? (Hell. 6.14.15) An army that decamped immediately it was dark so as to get past Kithaeron by night? Xenophon paints this latter as the fear of Theban treachery but it is far more likely that a quick and secretive departure was the reason.

On a different matter:

The Spartan cavalry at Mantineia are likened to a phalanx because they are formed up in close order not because of their depth.

Hardly the natural meaning of : "...the enemy [Spartans] had drawn up their cavalry like a phalanx of hoplites in a line six deep..."[Hell VII.5.23] How do cavalry form 'close order'? Why mention the depth? It means what it says. The cavalry were drawn up in a line six deep (like hoplites). Therefore hoplites fought in a six deep half-file.

Before becoming too dogmatic (either way), it is as well to realise that your argument relies upon a thoroughly modern conjecture regarding the text. The MSS says nothing about ‘six deep’; rather it reads ephexēs (antiparetaxanto hōsper hoplitōn phalagga bathos ephexēs). This would simply mean that the cavalry was drawn up is deep rows one after another – like a hoplite phalanx. The modern conjecture is to emend ephexēs to eph’ hex to give 'six deep'. This, then, says very little about hoplite depths.

[Xenophon]

So let me get this right, you think that parembole and paragoge ARE different manoevres, but Xenophon's not ever using parembole but only paragoge, is not because the manoeuvre he is describing is, in fact paragoge, but that he means parembole and the words had changed meaning in the two hundred years between Xenophon and Polybios?

Not different manouevres, different terminology, though there might have been some slight technical differences....I gave the LSJ meanings for both words in my previous post. That words can change their meaning over 200 years, or that one term might replace another is also possible - consider the meaning of "gay" to what it was just 50 years ago, or in military parlance the modern use of "Task Force" to describe the all arms combat group formerly called "brigade group" in WW II, or in drill the alternate use of "about turn" and "about face" to mean the same thing

There is no doubt whatever what Xenophon meant by 'paragoge( and its variants)'. literally: "leading by or past, carrying across, X.An.5.1.16". Led up by the side or more loosely," in Tactics, deploying from column into line, X.Lac.11.6" [LSJ], and that is its meaning at Cyro II.3..21, and all translations I can find ( other than your interpretation) agree this. Moreover, your interpretation of 'paragein', and its variant 'paragon' is inconsistent in your diagram - the first two times you use it mean bringing up a single file, then for no apparent reason, you use it to mean bringing up a 'double half-file....and Xenophon doesn't say 'double' here'.

This is not so surprising, I suppose, since you describe one of history's most decisive battles as indecisive! And how by some rather lame 'special pleading'; Xenophon is clear that only the Theban left and Lakedaimonian right actually engaged, so these are the only forces to consider when judging the proportion of casualties.

Once again, you do not appear to have read what I wrote, viz: "From a military standpoint, it was an indecisive battle -- though the deaths of the King and many of the 'Homioi' was a deep psychological shock that would ultimately lead to Sparta's demise.."

The battle changed nothing, militarily it was a draw - the Lakedaemonian army was intact in its camp, still threatening Thebes, though its attack was now blunted. The Thebans dared not attack the camp, nor offer further battle, but cast about for allies. Jason of Pherae came, but despite Theban urgings would not agree to attack the Lakedaemonians ( a likely expensive proposition, and probably for political reasons too ). Archidamus son of Agesilaos duly relieved the army, and they went home at the end of the campaigning season. The main effect was political and psychological - the Arcadians of Mantinea and Tegea broke their alliance with Sparta, and urged the Thebans to invade the Peloponnese. Sparta promptly invaded Arcadia. King Agesilaos kept the field until mid-winter, hoping for a chance to avenge Leuktra, but the reluctant Thebans didn't deliver their promised aid. Agesilaos was ultimately forced to withdraw, harried by the Arcadians ( the scenario of his famous 'anastrophe' manouevre to withdraw intact). The brave Boeotians turned up at Mantinea after Agesilaos had gone home. It was only the following year, with more Spartan allies coming over, that with overwhelming numbers a reluctant Epaminondas invaded Lakonia - the first time in six centuries that this had happened. Incidently, the Thebans couldn't have "been at the gates" of Sparta - she had no walls nor gates at this time. The open city was successfully defended and Epaminondas withdrew - more indecisive fighting. The following year, 369 BC, the Boeotians invaded the Peloponnese again to no avail, and the year after, the Spartans won an overwhelming military victory over the Arcadians at the "Tearless battle", but this was politically indecisive as the Arcadians built Megalopolis to block the invasion route...... The indecisive struggle continued until 362 BC, when Epaminondas came for the last time. After a failed thrust at Sparta, there occurred the indecisive battle of second Mantinea, where Epaminondas was killed. The struggle petered out.

The real reason Sparta's centuries long hegemony of the Peloponnese came to an end was the splitting away of Arcadia, which cut Sparta off from its Messenian helots, in turn weakening her irretrievably. In the short term Leuktra did not change the military situation by one iota, precisely because the Lakedaemonian army was NOT 'shattered'. It remained intact with only the Spartiate homioi badly mauled. As I said, it was only many years later that the political/psychological effects that could be traced back to Leuktra became apparent.....

There were four Morai on the Spartan side, those which Kleombrotos had been sent with to Phokis (Hell.VI 1); a mora had sixteen enomotiai according to Xenophon Lak.Pol 11 iv

ἑκάστη δὲ τῶν ὁπλιτικῶν μορῶν ἔχει πολέμαρχον ἕνα, λοχαγοὺς τέτταρας, πεντηκοντῆρας ὀκτώ, ἐνωμοτάρχους ἑκκαίδεκα.

Thus a mora has 576 men, working on a twelve deep file this is 48 files, four such 192 which allowing for a certain rounding of figures gives 400 Spartiate officers, who presumably form the file leaders and closers a la Sokrates of Xenophon's Memorabilia's description. The 300 Spartiates over are the Hippeis which are attested separately at the battle. 400 died which looks like all the front rank and two thirds of the Hippeis, a further 600 of the leavening fell, which makes 1,000 from 2,300 or 43.5% but this was no rout

I would dispute your numbers here, which come from the pseudo-Xenophon's "Constitution." ( it would give a number for the whole Spartan army of less than 3,500 - an impossibly small number.) There are very good reasons for thinking the 'Mora' of this period numbered 32 enomotia, but here is not the place to discuss numbers of a 'Mora' that would naturally fluctuate with age-classes called up. Your numbers should be doubled and your percentages halved. I would agree that some 700 or so of the 1,000 Spartiates present fell - the largest number to die in a single day in Sparta's history - which was disastrous enough.

As for you 300 alleged Theban casualties, if you want them then you will have to accept the 4,000 Spartan casualties claimed by the same source (or twice the numbers they started with!); Diodoros is pretty worthless, as his source Ephoros, was found to be by Polybios XII 25f. Pausanias (IX 13 v-vi) gives the Theban casualties as 47, probably from 2,000 or 2.03%.

The casualties reports vary quite significantly. The fact that one side knows its own casualties (Thebans: 300) does not mean that they have the remotest idea about their enemies beyond the wildest propaganda speculation (Spartans 4,000? - roughly the total present). Boeotian sources seem to admit 300 casualties dead, and Spartan sources 1,000 dead. These admitted casualties are the most likely accurate.

Looks pretty decisive to me, the effects were; Spartan hegemony was instantly broken the next campaigning season saw the allies at the gates of Sparta, Messenia liberated and Megaloppolis founded. Better check that grip on reality

As so often, this is incorrect in every detail:
1) The Spartan hegemony was not "instantly broken". All that Leuktra [371 BC] had achieved militarily was to gain Thebes some time. The end of that season saw not one but two Lacedaemonian armies in the field threatening Boeotia ( she was outnumbered by just one). Fortunately the time gained allowed Jason of Pherae to arrive with a large Thessalian army, which deterred any further Spartan offensive that year, along with the lateness of the season. ( see above) The problem was that Jason had his own agenda, and he negotiated a 'truce' for his own ends. The fate of Thebes was still balanced on a knife edge. Next year saw Arcadia throw off Spartan hegemony, perhaps in part inspired by the knowledge that Sparta's elite 'homioi' were no longer invincible... and it was that which changed everything, not the battle of Leuktra 'per se'.

2) The next campaigning season did NOT see the allies at Sparta's non-existent gates. It was King Agesilaos who took the offensive, and hung on in Arcadia well into next winter. The promised Boeotian help only materialised after Agesilaos went home ( see above). Only in the winter of 370/369 BC did the allies venture into Lacadaemon. Messenia was not immediately liberated, but had to wait until 369 BC.

3) Megalopolis was not founded in the campaigning season of Leuktra, but after the heavy defeat of the Arcadians at the "Tearless battle", some 3 years later [368 BC] and of course such a large city was not built overnight, but over the course of years....

Perhaps it is Agesilaos who should "get a grip on reality". A good start would be to check his information and start giving references......

Leuktra changed nothing militarily in the short term, nor even the medium term, but in the long term Sparta's ultimate demise could be traced back to the psychological effects on other Greeks of the ending of Spartan 'invincibility'.

From a military standpoint Leuktra was 'indecisive' - as Epaminondas knew only too well, hence his subsequent caution.

[Xenophon]

Paralus wrote:

"Other evidence" meaning that aside from Nemea and thus Delion, my example. I then went on to say that...

Rather, I was replying to your rhetorical question "why 16 and not some other number?" Your answer is that hoplites formed up in files eight deep. Clearly the Thebans did not and not only on the single occasion of Delium. It is to be noted that Thukydides does not remark upon this depth in any way, he simply reports it. To Thukydides, then, this was not something to discourse on.


Again, referring to Delion as I make clear ("not only the single occasion of Delium") going on to observe that Thukydides has no comment on Theban depth there. My point had nothing to do with the terrain at Nemea (though I acknowledged terrain as the determinant) but everything to do with depths at Delion which you mentioned ("The 'as they pleased' at Delium simply means the allies didn't follow the Thebans in forming up in an excessive depth").

The “as they pleased” does not indicate any uniformity of depth either. The allies – each of them (ἕκαστοι) – formed in a depth of their choosing. They each individually chose a depth.

What other evidence ? I have referred to the known number of allusions to depth in our sources. The depth of a city state's file was 'fixed', because of the necessity to have fixed file leaders and closers - emphasised by all sources. They couldn't just pick any old number for file depth, as you and Agesilaos would realise if you thought it through. We have two references to Theban hoplites, 25 deep in close order and 50 deep in open order. We have two references to 16 deep ( Syracusans and at Nemea - which is 2x8 be it noticed and implies one 'standard' file behind another. There are at least 8-10 reference or more to "8 deep" - more if we take the two references to half-files 4 deep as references to files 8 deep. Two references to Spartan later formation of 12 deep, and a couple of exceptional situations to street fighting etc.

Apart from Thebes 'deep' formations used on two occasions, seemingly later abandoned ( not apparently in use at Chaeronea) and Sparta's late adoption of 12 deep, all our actual evidence suggests that Hoplite phalanxes generally stood 8 deep. "As they pleased" therefore means; not the way the Thebans formed, but as the allies chose - which was almost certainly 8 deep. It is also translated ( e.g. LSJ) as "...the formation of the others varied." ( from that of the Thebans). It does NOT say "They each individually chose a depth" - there is no mention of 'individual' depths, this is a mis-interpretation. Moreover, I have yet to see an explanation from either of you as to just how a hoplite phalanx could just 'pick up' like a schoolboy football team on the day - the whole idea is a nonsense.

... Presumably he is ‘comparing like with like’ and the Athenians fought eight deep.

Not at all Thucydides makes particular notice that the 25 shields deep is in "...the order in which they proposed to fight." i.e. battle/close order - twice. Not so the allies, nor the Athenians, who are not described as being in battle order. In fact having told us the Athenians are 8 deep ( but does NOT say in battle order ) he then goes on to later describe them as forming such:

"All the hoplites of the Athenian army were arranged in ranks eight deep; in numbers they equalled the hoplites of the enemy; the cavalry were stationed on either wing. No regular light-armed troops accompanied them, for Athens had no organised force of this kind. Those who originally joined the expedition were many times over the number of their opponents; but they were to a great extent without proper arms, for the whole force, strangers as well as citizens, had been called out. Having once started homewards, there were but few of them forthcoming in the engagement. [2] When the Athenians were ranged in order of battle and on the point of advancing, Hippocrates the general, proceeding along the lines, exhorted them as follows:—....."
[Thuc IV.94.2]
In other words, they originally formed up 8 deep, and later formed 'battle/close order/pyknosis' in half-files for the assault on the foe, just as we are told elsewhere in our sources, and the whole is consistent.....no looking at these words in isolation, but with what we are told elsewhere in other sources - a holistic approach.

I grow weary of a methodology whereby individual passages are 'nit-picked' in isolation, with meaning obscured by linguistic acrobatics, ignoring other evidence....the evidence should be seen as a whole. This flawed logic approach is called 'salami slicing'. The protagonist is unable to refute the whole, so takes a small slice and tries to throw doubt on it, in the hope that this will tar the whole.
Instead of this, why don't you and Agesilaos come up with an alternative, practical, 'technike tactike' for the hoplite phalanx, consistent with ALL our evidence ?? Who knows, you may be able to 'overthrow' the conclusions of Anderson, Connolly and myself which have stood for the last 40 years or so.....

[Paralus]

Apart from Thebes 'deep' formations used on two occasions, seemingly later abandoned ( not apparently in use at Chaeronea) and Sparta's late adoption of 12 deep, all our actual evidence suggests that Hoplite phalanxes generally stood 8 deep.

We have three attestations for Thebes' deeper formations: Delion, Nemea and Leuktra. This does not mean these are the only occasions; only those where we happen to be told over a span of more than half a century. As for Chaeronea, there is no testimony either way and absolutely no determination can be made.

"As they pleased" therefore means; not the way the Thebans formed, but as the allies chose - which was almost certainly 8 deep. It is also translated ( e.g. LSJ) as "...the formation of the others varied." ( from that of the Thebans). It does NOT say "They each individually chose a depth" - there is no mention of 'individual' depths, this is a mis-interpretation.

I would have to disagree. It states that the 'others' were as 'each happened to be'. The 'each happened to be' is redundant if there were uniformity. But I'm afraid this is more 'nit-picking' although such has its place as the cavalry at Mantinea II shows.

Not at all Thucydides makes particular notice that the 25 shields deep is in "...the order in which they proposed to fight." i.e. battle/close order - twice. Not so the allies...

Again, I disagree and don't know how you see this. Why not so the allies?? The Boeotians form up into battle order at 93.1. This presumably includes the allies. They then proceed over the hill and "halt in the order they had determined on" (93.3). I'm assuming you're saying that here Thukydides first tells us that the Thebans were 25 deep in "battle/close order"? If so, then so too are the allies for there is no mention of Thebans only; just 'Boeotians' (i.e., the army).

As to the Athenians, you see the last notice of them being in order as a different thing to the first two notifications (although they are not mentioned in the particular passage - see Perseus: "The armies being now in line and upon the point of engaging"). Thukydides has just described the Athenians being sent word to form into battle order (the Boeotians as well), their commander joining them, that the Athenians had so formed into eight deep. The Perseus rendering seems quite unremarkable but, even should we add in "When the Athenians" it need mean nothing more than that the Athenians were now in battle order though I can see why you see it otherwise.

[Xenophon]

Many a claim of ‘special pleading’ in this thread. If I and Agesilaos are supposedly guilty, were certainly are not alone. Just a quick few…

Here we go again....nothing to do with the subject, taking issue with minor matters just for the sake of it.......

I would not describe Polybius as the ‘most qualified’ Greek military historian – certainly not more so than Xenophon, an actual General, whilst there is considerable doubt as to whether Polybius served in any active military capacity.

This is not "special pleading", rather a reply to such. Agesilaos claimed Polybius was the pre-eminent military expert over Xenophon, and hence should be preferred when it came to linguistics. ( Eh?...what has military experience to do with linguistics. Even if Polybius was the more "expert" or "experienced" why would that make his language preferable ?)

Comparisons are fraught but Polybios was not an “actual General”? He was, at the time of the war against Perseus, the hipparch (cavalry commander) of the Achaean League (Plb.28.6.9).

Please read what I wrote more carefully....I said 'active'....many scholars are of the view that Polybius never fought in an actual battle. Even if he did, his military experience in war was clearly much less than that of Xenophon, so Agesilaos' statement that Polybius was the "most qualified" Greek military historian is clearly incorrect. There is no special pleading by me here, only Agesilaos, in illogically trying to justify preferring Polybius' language over Xenophon's - not to mention possible changes in language over the intervening 200 years. In fact there are detectable linguistic difference between Xenophon's early works and his later ones.

Thucydides does not appear to have been what might be termed 'a military man', and doesn't comment on depths in any of his battle descriptions....which would be superfluous given the audience he was writing for in any event.

Thukydides, too, is not military either. The man entrusted with the northern command about Amphilpolis – one of the most sensitive theatres for Athens – is somehow not ‘military enough’? Given he is not one to blow his trumpet, we do not know just what else he took part in but, to be elected general (‘actual’ or not) presupposes experience. It is widely agreed that he took part in Perikles' reduction of Samos (given the nature of the account).

Again, thiscomment is not 'special pleading'. What I meant is that Thucydides is generally considered a general historian, rather than a particularly military one. The comment does not affect anybody's case, so is not 'special pleading'.

Thukydides most certainly ‘comments’ on depths. He has done so at Delion and from memory he does so also for Matiniea (the famous variant depths of the Spartans) and at Syracuse where the Athenians form a square (6.67.1-2). Here the Athenians are eight deep and the Syracusans are in battle order sixteen deep (ἔταξαν – τάσσω again).

Thucydides mentions actual depths on some 5or so occasions that I'm aware of, and doesn't on many other occasions. On each of those there is no 'comment' whatever....no explanation of why they utilised that particular depth, for example. The battle between Athenians and Syracusans at .6.67 is a case in point. He tells us the Athenians were 8 deep, and that they deployed only half their force, the rest deployed in hollow square to protect the camp, and act as a general reserve. He also tells us the Syracusans deployed 16 deep, or 'double depth', but not why - there are no comments on these dispositions. The obvious surmise is that the battlefield terrain was restricted, and the experienced Athenian army only fronted enough troops to fill it, whilst the inexperienced Syracusans ( this was apparently their first battle) crowded their troops in, in 'double phalanx'. They also needed to find room for their 1,200 cavalry, although since they played no part in the main battle they were likely in the rear.The inexperienced Syracusan phalanx was unsurprisingly beaten, their retreat covered by their cavalry. Incidently another battle where 'depth' proved more of a liability than an asset....

Despite this, Sparta quickly rallied and recovered under Archidamus - and the defeated army remained in Boeotia, a continuing threat, until a truce was negotiated under Jason of Pherae.

With allies who are openly showing pleasure at the Spartans' catastrophic defeat? (Hell. 6.14.15) An army that decamped immediately it was dark so as to get past Kithaeron by night? Xenophon paints this latter as the fear of Theban treachery but it is far more likely that a quick and secretive departure was the reason.

That other Peloponnesian states should resent Spartan hegemony would hardly be surprising, but even if they were loyal, the ever-suspicious Spartans would suspect them. At all events the discipline of the Lakedaemonian army remained intact. They continued to obey orders, even if they may or may not have been unenthusiastic about further attacks on Thebes. That they continued to be a 'threat in being' is proven by Epaminondas' lack of action and timidity. The Thebans did not dare take the offensive, being outnumbered probably, and resorted to trying to obtain allies...as I have related previously.

You are getting a little careless with your facts - have you been drinking from Agesilaos' cup ?
The Lakedaemonian army did not 'decamp immediately'. It remained in place for weeks at least - long enough for Thebes to send ambassadors to Athens for aid, and subsequently to Jason to be begged to come to Thebes aid, and for him to march there, and then to Theban dismay, refuse to join an attack on the Spartans. Apart from his own agenda, he had a clear respect for their fighting ability [Xen VI.4.23]. He then negotiated a truce. Long enough too for Archidamus to gather an army of relief, and march as far north as Megara. You are also showing a certain military naivete regarding the circumstances of their eventual departure. Certainly their departure was quick and secretive. And of course it was from fear of Theban treachery. Their commander would have been a fool to depart any other way, and the Lakedaemonians might otherwise have shared the fate of the British under Col. Monro as they withdrew under a truce from Fort William Henry in 1757 ( depicted in the film "Last of the Mohicans" ). Few commanders in history have fallen for this one, and it has been standard military practice all over the world that in 'breaking contact' with the enemy, it should be done as secretly as possible....think Gallipoli, or HMS Amethyst in the Yangtze incident. Trusting the truce would have been absolute folly, as Col. Munro discovered to his cost...

On a different matter:

The Spartan cavalry at Mantineia are likened to a phalanx because they are formed up in close order not because of their depth.

Hardly the natural meaning of : "...the enemy [Spartans] had drawn up their cavalry like a phalanx of hoplites in a line six deep..."[Hell VII.5.23] How do cavalry form 'close order'? Why mention the depth? It means what it says. The cavalry were drawn up in a line six deep (like hoplites). Therefore hoplites fought in a six deep half-file.

Before becoming too dogmatic (either way), it is as well to realise that your argument relies upon a thoroughly modern conjecture regarding the text. The MSS says nothing about ‘six deep’; rather it reads ephexēs (antiparetaxanto hōsper hoplitōn phalagga bathos ephexēs). This would simply mean that the cavalry was drawn up is deep rows one after another – like a hoplite phalanx. The modern conjecture is to emend ephexēs to eph’ hex to give 'six deep'. This, then, says very little about hoplite depths.

Which MSS are you referring to ? There are two 'families' of textual transmission and 8 different texts. Several of these are described as difficult for mediaeval copyists to transcribe. Not surprising then that we have slightly differing texts. On what basis do you suggest the emendation is "modern", and if so what is the reason ? It strikes me that the textual amendment that gives 'six deep' can hardly be co-incidental when it is consistent with other evidence. Furthermore most of the translations I can find have 'six deep' ( except the Daykins version) so the emendment, if it is such, seems widely accepted for whatever reason. Once again, it would appear complex Textual analysis will be necessary to resolve matters.

Anyway, even if this piece of evidence now has some doubt cast on it, it is unimportant compared to Xenophon's specific statements elsewhere that the Spartan enomotia formed in files of 12, but 'doubled down' to half-files for combat.... not to mention all the other evidence.

[Xenophon]

Apart from Thebes 'deep' formations used on two occasions, seemingly later abandoned ( not apparently in use at Chaeronea) and Sparta's late adoption of 12 deep, all our actual evidence suggests that Hoplite phalanxes generally stood 8 deep.

We have three attestations for Thebes' deeper formations: Delion, Nemea and Leuktra. This does not mean these are the only occasions; only those where we happen to be told over a span of more than half a century. As for Chaeronea, there is no testimony either way and absolutely no determination can be made.

Agreed.I was referring to the two occasions that we are told a specific depth - Delium ( 25) and Leuktra (50) - we are given no depth for Nemea.

"As they pleased" therefore means; not the way the Thebans formed, but as the allies chose - which was almost certainly 8 deep. It is also translated ( e.g. LSJ) as "...the formation of the others varied." ( from that of the Thebans). It does NOT say "They each individually chose a depth" - there is no mention of 'individual' depths, this is a mis-interpretation.

I would have to disagree. It states that the 'others' were as 'each happened to be'. The 'each happened to be' is redundant if there were uniformity. But I'm afraid this is more 'nit-picking' although such has its place as the cavalry at Mantinea II shows.

Not at all Thucydides makes particular notice that the 25 shields deep is in "...the order in which they proposed to fight." i.e. battle/close order - twice. Not so the allies...

Again, I disagree and don't know how you see this. Why not so the allies?? The Boeotians form up into battle order at 93.1. This presumably includes the allies. They then proceed over the hill and "halt in the order they had determined on" (93.3). I'm assuming you're saying that here Thukydides first tells us that the Thebans were 25 deep in "battle/close order"? If so, then so too are the allies for there is no mention of Thebans only; just 'Boeotians' (i.e., the army).

Let me revise my comments after re-reading in the light of your remarks. It is indeed the "Boeotian" army as a whole which forms up in 'battle/close order' at 93.1, but only the Thebans who are 25 deep in close order the allies ( all Boeotian) were not. "...The Thebans were formed in ranks of five and twenty deep; the formation of the others varied."[93.4]
which likely means 'varied from the Theban depth', but possibly means that the various allied lochoi stood at varying depths, as Thucydides says of the Spartans at first Mantinea [ V.68]. If depths varied, then as we agree, in both cases it is most likely due to terrain conditions -- for example a lochos might have to fill a space between two buildings or a barn and a brook.....I am not suggesting that a depth of 8 was uniform, simply that it seems to have been the generic norm, other factors permitting.
Given that the Boeotian line had to be roughly the same length as the Athenian, which was 8 deep we may surmise the allies averaged 8 deep too.

This, of course, has no bearing on the question of open order files closing up into close order half-files for combat.

As to the Athenians, you see the last notice of them being in order as a different thing to the first two notifications (although they are not mentioned in the particular passage - see Perseus: "The armies being now in line and upon the point of engaging"). Thukydides has just described the Athenians being sent word to form into battle order (the Boeotians as well), their commander joining them, that the Athenians had so formed into eight deep. The Perseus rendering seems quite unremarkable but, even should we add in "When the Athenians" it need mean nothing more than that the Athenians were now in battle order though I can see why you see it otherwise.

For the avoidance of confusion, we should distinguish between deploying from column into phalanx, and subsequent 'closing up' into battle order/pyknosis.
Hippocrates orders his men into line at 93.2, and shortly after joins them, and they are 8 deep.Subsequently they seem to have closed up into 'battle order, as per the bold section of the quote in my previous post. and Hippocrates starts giving his address, but gets only halfway down the line before being interrupted by the Theban attack....

[Paralus]

'Ere we go, 'ere we go, 'ere we go, 'ere we go....

In town for a few days with our exchange student from York so phone and brief.

On the 'six deep' thing, this is a long standing conjecture and like many such, pervasive. Marincola notes it in his Landmark translation stating that it is in contrast to the manuscripts' (plural) text. As I wrote, the text says nothing about six deep and the cavalry were in deep rows like a phalanx.

Interesting that you would so defend one piece of 'ta hola' so intently. This is little different to the emendation of 'asthetairoi' to 'pezhetairoi' for the same reasons: it is consistent with the other evidence; a pre conceived notion. The cavalry, in so many rows deep, resembles the look of a phalanx. Accurate depth is not necessary for the comparison to stand.

[agesilaos]

Xenophon there might be fewer side tracks if you refrained from littering your posts with snide comments and false accusations; you don’t spit in my face and get to enjoy corn on the cob, to paraphrase the Blues Brothers.

Here is what I wrote

...the issue is whether ‘paragoge’ the word used by Xenophon in his dinnertime manoeuvres can mean ‘half-file insertion’ . The answer is no and we can find proof in Polybios’ description of Philopoeman’s cavalry reforms X 23 v

[5] ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἐκτάξεις ἐφ᾽ ἑκατέρων τῶν κεράτων ἢ διὰ παρεμβολῆς ἢ διὰ παραγωγῆς τῆς παρὰ τοὺς οὐραγούς.
next to deploy into line on both wings, either by filling up the intervals in the line (parembole) or by a lateral movement (paragoge) on the rear.


Since the most qualified Greek historian recognises these as two entirely different manoeuvres it would be best to follow his lead.

This is your comment

This is not "special pleading", rather a reply to such. Agesilaos claimed Polybius was the pre-eminent military expert over Xenophon, and hence should be preferred when it came to linguistics. ( Eh?...what has military experience to do with linguistics. Even if Polybius was the more "expert" or "experienced" why would that make his language preferable ?)

Looks like a clear case of ‘strawmanism’. Let me walk you through what I am actually saying which is that both Xenophon and Polybios spoke Greek like natives, there is no reason at all to pre-suppose a linguistic shift of seismic proportions (which without the references you are always accusing others of not providing, can only be termed ‘special pleading’, a more accurate description would break the rule on foul language!). Given that both authors know what they wanted to say and had the language to express it (‘parembole’ is used twice by Aeschines [389-314BC] ‘Against Timarchus’ [346 BC] I 166 and ‘Against Ctesiphon’ [336BC] III 205, in both cases warning the jury that Demosthenes will attempt to ‘slip in’ some quite extraneous matters. There is no reason to think the word was a novel coining, so it is likely Xenophon knew it too.)

It is not a ‘question of linguistics’ merely one of being able to say what you mean, the natural position is to have Xenophon mean ‘paragoge’ when he uses that word and that Polybios, upon whose Taktike the later ones are allegedly founded, distinguishes ‘paragoge’ and ‘parembole’ because they mean different things, and so, since ‘parembole’ DOES mean ‘insertion’ Xenophon’s ‘paragoge’ does not describe this manoeuvre no matter how much bombast and wishful thinking you throw at it.

Strange that you don’t reference any of the alleged ‘reasons’ for doubling the size of a mora; but if you want to discard that part of ‘Lak.Pol’ why trust any of it? Just as Polybios is now not as competent as Xenophon, now Xenophon is to be dubbed Pseudo and dimissed, but only in parts i.e. those parts that do not suit; as a method it is lamentable.

So let’s assume you are right (a massive suspension of disbelief for some I am sure) in this case a mora of 1152 would be 96 files 12 deep, four of these 384 files; since there are only c.400 Spartiates once the Hippeis are taken into account this means that only the front rank were Spartiates, so much for Sokrates brick wall, but it gets better because you insist they fought six deep, now only every other man in the front rank is a Spartiate, bit of a leaky wall? Again these 768 files would occupy 768 yards. The Theban ‘embolon’ was 50 deep and perhaps 2,300 or so strong, counting the Sacred Band as separate from the city levy, which is a frontage of 46 yards, if Kleombrotos’ line was 16 times as long as the Thebans’ he must have been a real dunce to suppose he had to manoeuvre to outflank them! My version, half the numbers and double the depth ie the one Xenophon states, still leaves the Spartans with a frontage four times as long. This in turn would indicate that Epaminondas was targeting the Spartan King directly intending only to strike one mora. The Theban cavalry would prevent any out flanking on his left and the other Boeotians must have been in close enough attendance to face off the other morai. And yet more than one mora’s worth of Spartiates fell; did they take it in turns to face the Thebans? The only possibility is a rout probably with the Spartiates standing (the accounts, which are suspect talk of ‘wounds on the front’). So my figures are right, the maths don’t lie.

Similarly the founding of Megalopolis, the invasion of Lakonia etc are contingent upon the victory at Leuktra and may, thus be fairly seen as consequences thereof.

Just who are these Boeotian sources? Granted Plutarch is one, but he does not give the casualties, although he gives the Spartan strength a 10,000 hoplites and 1,000 cavalry; Diodoros the Sicilian most probably used Ephoros the Kymaian who praises the Spartans rather more than a pro-Boeotian would, in fact his a worthless agglomeration of literary confection. Pausanias may have been a Lydian, but he has a detailed description IX 13 ii-xii, in which he names all seven Boetarchs for instance and his figures for the dead are more than a thousand Lakedaimonians, the same as Xenophon, and forty-seven Thebans; at IX16 v he views the shields of Spartans who fell in the Temple of Demeter. Xenophon famously fails to name Epaminondas here and at VII 5 viii only praises his taking up camp in Tegaea! The famously qualified military man was clearly ignorant of the tactical innovation which had laid Sparta low, conversely it was just his bias that prevented him giving a Theban any credit. Best be wary of his judgements, then.

I know Sparta had no Gates as such it is just a turn of phrase.

[agesilaos]

Bugger. forgot to mention that the terrain was clearly no restriction and therefore any influence on depth at Nemea; both armies used an oblique advance to the right; therefore ther was clear terrain to allow it; also both armies fought on the same battle field and were of comparable size yet the Spartan alliance did not adopt any great depth, so the anti-Spartan force must have considered depth an advantage of itself. They were not undone by this but by the Thebans exceeding the agreed depth AND accentuating the right ward drift in the same way the Spartans did.

Terrain affects both sides, but cannot be a factor in the choice of depth here, Xenophon accentuates the selfish decision of the Thebans and typically ignores the fact that the Spartans weretreating their allies as sacrificial pawns in equal measure, maybe more so as they were not allowed a voice in the Spartan deliberations.

The Syracusan case does seem to be downto the terrain, though I cannot say for sure as I have not re-read it yet; but the conclusion that their depth got in the way is BS, better troops with higher morale will beat untried troops no matter the depth, all else being equal.

[agesilaos]

There is something amiss with the idea that the Spartan army remained for weeks in Boeotia threatening Thebes. Xenophon supplies some facts;

1) A messenger was sent to Sparta after the bodies had been recovered under a truce and he arrived during the last day of the Gymnopaedia and there was a days delay while the news was communicated VI 4 xvi.
2) The Thebans sent both to Athens and Jason of Pherai who was in Phokis VI 4 xxi
3) That the Spartans sneaked away from Leuktra as soon as Jason had established a further Truce, VI 4 xxv
4) The troops sent from Sparta met the defeated at Aegosthena near Megara, VI 4 xxvi

We can add a few more facts from Googlemaps;

1) The distance from Sparta to Megara is 75 miles
2) That from Leuktra to Megara is 58 miles
Thus the messenger had to travel 128 miles, let us say a two day trip. The force under Archidamos has to cover 75 miles which could be covered in two days but we would be safer to allow three and add a day for the gathering of the troops, so six days.

The defeated Spartans had to travel 58 miles or two days’ march. It would seem that they ‘threatened Thebes’ from behind their palisade for a full four days! Time enough for Jason’s lightning march across Phokis and a day’s negotiation.

One should also note that the Spartans sneaked away without their allies for whom they have to wait at Megara VI 4 xxvi.

This is all in Xenophon, rather different from the picture our Xenophon paints!.

edited for format only(paragraphs)

[Paralus]

It is clear that the Spartan army did little 'threatening' at all whilst a runner was sent to the ehpors. Equally clear is that the Spartans could not trust in those allies present with them who, as Xenophon notes, were having discourse with the Thebans. They could not fight and they could not leave hoping that the allies would stand by them. Thus, on conclusion of the truce, the Spartans decamp as soon as it is dark - allies or not - and head home shields between legs.

The ancient Xenophon's account of Leuktra is most unsatisfying. For the greater part it is a list of excuses for the catastrophic defeat in the field of Spartan arms. These excuses range from the drinking of Kleombrodos - who had to be talked into fighting - and his officers; the baggage handlers being forced (by the Spartans!!) to add "mass" to the Theban army (!); the weakness of the Spartan cavalry; the disposition of the Spartan infantry resulting "in the phalanx being not more than twelve men deep" whilst the Thebans were at least fifty deep and, finally, sheer outrageous fortune. Eveything went in Thebes' favour and everything against Sparta. Xenophon could not bring himself to describe the military innovation which destroyed the Spartan myth nor even to name the two Thebans involved. Far better to excuse than to expound.

Agesilaos had isolated Thebes on the battlefield: no allies outside of the Boeotian confederation. He expected the Spartan army to crush them. In the event, the Spartan army itself was crushed and the blame, inevitably, must fall on Kleombrotos the wine drinker and Theban lover who had to be convinced to fight.

[Xenophon]

'Ere we go, 'ere we go, 'ere we go, 'ere we go....

In town for a few days with our exchange student from York so phone and brief.

On the 'six deep' thing, this is a long standing conjecture and like many such, pervasive. Marincola notes it in his Landmark translation stating that it is in contrast to the manuscripts' (plural) text. As I wrote, the text says nothing about six deep and the cavalry were in deep rows like a phalanx.

Interesting that you would so defend one piece of 'ta hola' so intently. This is little different to the emendation of 'asthetairoi' to 'pezhetairoi' for the same reasons: it is consistent with the other evidence; a pre conceived notion. The cavalry, in so many rows deep, resembles the look of a phalanx. Accurate depth is not necessary for the comparison to stand.

A 'long standing' conjecture' ? I thought you said it was 'modern', meaning recent ? So Marincola is suggesting the emendation is not an alternate textual version? I take your point about 'pezhetairoi' and 'asthetairoi'....one translator makes an emendment and others blindly follow it. This may be the case here indeed. But two things strike one as odd about the text or texts without the emendment. Firstly, in the Cavalry Commander, Xenophon tells us that the (Athenian) cavalry form in files led by 'dekadarchs' and 'half-files' led by pempadarchs - just like his hoplites. [incidently, this does NOT mean ten deep, or imply a file of 10, i.e. a squadron 10x10, because he also tells us that deep cavalry formations are useless, since unlike infantry they can't support by pushing.]

This being the case, why would Xenophon need to specifically tell us that the Spartan cavalry formed up in files "like a phalanx of hoplites" if this was the norm for the cavalry of the southern Greek states? The emendment would make more sense, because it actually conveys something. Secondly so because it was made long before it was realised that Spartan hoplites actually fought six deep at this time. Do you know the reason the emendment was made in the first place?

Nor do I defend it intently, just because I raise questions. To do otherwise would be to blindly follow.....which you rightly criticise.

In any event, as I said earlier, if this emendment IS doubtful, then it is of no consequence for its value as evidence was merely a corroborative passing detail, not actually part of the case.

[Xenophon]

Agesilaos wrote:

Xenophon there might be fewer side tracks if you refrained from littering your posts with snide comments and false accusations; you don’t spit in my face and get to enjoy corn on the cob, to paraphrase the Blues Brothers.

I don't accept this in the slightest....I do not ever consciously make snide comments or false accusations....but I do find it wearisome constantly having to correct careless and wrong information. Nor is it I who shows complete discourtesy and disrespect by referring to others posts as "BS".

I see that Agesilaos will not abandon his 'special pleading' over the use of the words 'parembole' and 'paragon' ( of which paragoge is a variation). Perhaps he would like to share with the rest of us what he perceives the essential difference to be.I quoted their ( in context) LSJ definitions earlier. The difference in meaning is like the difference between 'jog' and 'run' - two words to describe much the same thing.

since ‘parembole’ DOES mean ‘insertion’ Xenophon’s ‘paragoge’ does not describe this manoeuvre no matter how much bombast and wishful thinking you throw at it.

Oh really? Let us look at a relevant situation where we have two different words that mean much the same. In Aelian 31.1 we have 'parembole' to describe the rear half-file 'interjecting' between the files by closing up. At 31.3 we have 'entaxis'/insertion to describe troops moving up alongside the files in exactly the same way - only this time it is light infantry infiltrating the files. Two different words to describe essentially the same thing, with a minor difference.


Let us look at the facts:

1. Xenophon simply never uses the word 'parembole'

2. He uses 'paragon' and its variations many times, which means 'bring up by the side' (of), leading by, and deploying from column into line.'He simply prefers to say, "leading up by the side"/paragon rather than "interject"/parembole, or even "entaxis" insert. All these words describe troops moving up in file into the intervals between existing files.

3. All translations of the relevant part of the "Cyropaedia' ( see my diagram) that I can find agree this meaning ( except Agesilaos )

Agesilaos' translation is therefore "special pleading" in order to support his 'reconstruction' of this famous passage, which is the real 'bombastic wishful thinking' here. and his reconstruction is wrong in every respect.

Strange that you don’t reference any of the alleged ‘reasons’ for doubling the size of a mora; but if you want to discard that part of ‘Lak.Pol’ why trust any of it? Just as Polybios is now not as competent as Xenophon, now Xenophon is to be dubbed Pseudo and dimissed, but only in parts i.e. those parts that do not suit; as a method it is lamentable.

I didn't go into Spartan military organisation because to do so would be a digression on a digression, and is hardly an overly relevant subject to Hellenistic manuals.

A slip on my part; it is not the "lacedaemonian Constitution" that is by 'Pseudo-Xenophon' but rather the "Athenian Constitution". My Bad.

To adopt such a black and white position as you suggest would be folly. We do not discard all of Thucydides because he is demonstrably wrong about Mantinea. The fact that a source gets one, or even a few things wrong, is no reason to assume everything in that source is wrong.

Your next lengthy paragraph is again completely wrong. The fact that the 'pempadarch'/platoon sergeant fought alongside his 'Spartiate' officer in the front rank does not make for a 'leaky wall' any more than it would today. The four Spartan 'morai' would have numbered around 4,780, drawn up 6 deep for battle, or a frontage of 800 or so shields/yards - so we are all but agreed. The 4,000 or so Thebans, 25 deep in close order in their column would have numbered some 160 shields/yards, concentrated against the part of the line where Kleombrotos stood. That Mora would have had a frontage of 192 or so shields, plus perhaps another 25 shields/yards for the Hippeis. This would be consistent with Epaminondas' tactic of 'cutting off the snake's head'. On this much at least we agree. There is no rout, as I have previously demonstrated - how could there be if the Spartiates all fell "with their wounds to their front"??
( a 'topos' meaning no-one ran and was struck down from behind).

The founding of Megalopolis, some 3 years later had little or nothing to do with Leuktra, and everything to do with the defection of the Arcadians as Spartan allies - due to the ascendancy of the 'anti-spartan' factions, and the subsequent defeat of the Arcadians at "The Tearless Battle". There is no evidence to suggest the change in Arcadian politics had anything to do with Leuktra, and any link is just modern assumption based on hindsight.

Give me a reference that says Arcadia asserted its independence because of Leuktra, even by implication?

Following Leuktra, the 'King's Peace' which guaranteed the independence of the cities was re-affirmed by all save Thebes, and it was on this basis that Mantinea and Tegea began to assert their independence [XH VI.5.3-9]. Confrontation with Sparta was the result, and Arcadia's understandable plea for Boeotian help - which was NOT forthcoming so long as Agesilaos was in the field, right into mid-winter.

Leuktra was no 'decisive victory', The lakedaemonian army was not 'shattered' or destroyed ( indeed its caualties were swiftly replaced), as subsequent Theban actions demonstrate only too well !!

The famously qualified military man was clearly ignorant of the tactical innovation which had laid Sparta low, conversely it was just his bias that prevented him giving a Theban any credit. Best be wary of his judgements, then.

And just what "tactical innovation" would that be ? Xenophon may be biased, but so are you. Best be wary of your judgements then, I think, and doubly wary of discounting Xenophon,bias and all, who was around at the time and knew a good deal more of 'phalanx warfare' than any modern......

[Xenophon]

Agesilaos wrote:

Bugger. forgot to mention that the terrain was clearly no restriction and therefore any influence on depth at Nemea; both armies used an oblique advance to the right; therefore ther was clear terrain to allow it; also both armies fought on the same battle field and were of comparable size yet the Spartan alliance did not adopt any great depth, so the anti-Spartan force must have considered depth an advantage of itself. They were not undone by this but by the Thebans exceeding the agreed depth AND accentuating the right ward drift in the same way the Spartans did.

As you would expect I don't agree that terrain played no part in the depths of the respective forces at Nemea. Like Paralus, I believe that terrain was the greatest 'modifier' of depth. Despite the usual 'fuzziness' about the detail, the allies seem to have probably numbered some 24,000 or so, and the Spartans 18-20,000. Nemea is interesting because it is one of a number of battles that allows us to test the 'files,half-files hypothesis' objectively because the width of the battlefield is known. The terrain was an alluvial plain between sea and mountains that arise abruptly. Its width is 3.5-4 km . Drawn up 16 deep in 'open' order their phalanx would have occupied a front of 3 km or so, leaving a bare 1 km for their 1,550 cavalry and possibly some lights in the foothills on their left.Each flank was anchored.

This expains why they formed 16 deep ( though the Thebans would renege on this arrangement.)

Xenophon does not tell us the depth of the Spartan army, but since its phalanx must been a very similar length to the allies, it was likely 12 deep in 'open' order, and hence it too likely some 3 km long, with its flanks anchored. There were only 600 Spartan cavalry.

Now consider the situation if those depths were 'close order' Each phalanx line would only have been some 1,500 metres long, leaving that distance again of open flat plain to the mountains - a scenario made for the allied cavalry to sweep around the open Lakedaemonian flank. But the cavalry played little or no part, and the logical reason is that the phalanxes filled the plain. Plus the allies could have filled the plain by forming 8 deep, but that didn't happen either.

Only the 'files in open order' hypothesis explains what happened at Nemea. Incidently, the Theban 'deep formation' and its rightward drift were the direct cause of the allied loss.