pothos.org

Jeez !! .....As usual, I am many posts behind, and I have much to say regarding what you two have posted. Please have a moratorium for a day or two and allow me to 'catch up' to you prolific posters.

As Agesilaos says, there is much to disagree with !!!!

I hope I would say 'there is much with which I disagree' a moritorium for a week would suit me fine, by that time I can get the KGB maps; which will probably not chage much but may be handy. The only corollary I wold ask is that everything now gets referenced, Paralus has been better than both of us at this, I will post Shuckburgh's translation (I think Evelyn is a man like waugh of that name) but it seems a closer translation than the Loeb. We could also agree to have a poll after two weeks, maybe we are not the only three reading this

Xenophon wrote:As Agesilaos says, there is much to disagree with !!!!

Having drunk from the fountain of historical infallibility, I find nothing to disagree with in anything I've posted. This is as it should be, debate without end. Amen.

agesilaos wrote:I will post Shuckburgh's translation (I think Evelyn is a man like waugh of that name) but it seems a closer translation than the Loeb.

Done. And yes, one should not leap to gender conclusions! The online text begins here; with thanks to the Perseus Digital Library.


18.21: Flamininus, in his camp near the temple of Thetis, being uncertain as to the position of the enemy, sent out ten troops of cavalry and a thousand light infantry in advance, with instructions to keep a careful look-out as they traversed the country.[2] As these men were approaching the ridge of the hills they came upon the Macedonian reserve without expecting it, owing to the dimness of the light. [3]After a short interval of mutual alarm, both sides began irregular attacks on each other, and both despatched messengers to their respective chiefs to give information of what had occurred; [4] and when the Roman began to get the worst of it in the encounter, and to suffer heavily at the hands of the Macedonian reserve, they sent to their camp begging for supports. [5] Flamininus accordingly despatched the Aetolians under Archedamus and Eupolemus, as well as two of his own tribunes, [6] with a force altogether of five hundred cavalry and two thousand infantry, after properly exhorting them to do their duty. On their arrival to the support of the skirmishing party already engaged, the aspect of affairs was promptly changed. [7] For the Romans, inspired by the hope which this reinforcement gave, renewed the contest with redoubled spirit; [8] while the Macedonians, though offering a gallant defence, were now in their turn hard pressed, and being forced to make a general retreat, retired to the highest points in the hills, and despatched messengers to the king for help.

18.22: But Philip, who had not expected, for reasons indicated above, that a general engagement wouldtake place on that day, happened to have sent a considerable part of his troops out of camp foraging. [2] But when informed of what was taking place by these messengers, the mist at the same time beginning to lift, he despatched, with due exhortation, Heracleides of Gyrton, the commander of his Thessalian cavalry; Leon, the general of his Macedonian horse; and Athenagoras, with all the mercenaries except those from Thrace. [3] The reserve being joined by these troops, and the Macedonian force having thus become a formidable one, they advanced against the enemy, and in their turn drove the Romans back from the heights. [4] But what prevented them, more than anything else, from entirely routing the enemy was the gallantry of the Aetolian cavalry, which fought with desperate fury and reckless valour. [5] For the Aetolians are as superior to the rest of the Greeks in cavalry for fighting in skirmishing order, troop to troop, or man to man, as they are inferior to them both in the arms and tactics of their infantry for the purpose of a general engagement. [6]The enemy being held in check therefore by these troops, the Roman were not forced back again quite on to the level ground, but, after retiring to a short distance, faced round and halted. [7] But when Flamininus saw that not only had the cavalry and light infantry retired, but that, owing to them, his whole force was rendered uneasy, he drew out his entire army and got them into order of battle close to the hills. [8] Meanwhile one man after another of the Macedonian reserve ran towards Philip shouting out, "King, the enemy are flying: do not let slip the opportunity. The barbarians cannot stand before us: now is the day for you to strike: now is your opportunity!" [9] The result was that he was induced to fight in spite of his dissatisfaction with the ground. For these hills, which are called Cynoscephalae, are rough, precipitous, and of considerable height; [10] and it was because he foresaw the disadvantages of such a ground, that he was originally disinclined to accept battle there; but, being excited now by the extravagantly sanguine reports of these messengers, he gave the order for his army to be drawn out of camp.

18.23: Having got his main body into order, Flamininus gave his attention at the same time to relieving his advanced guard, and to going along the ranks to encourage his men. [2] His exhortation was short, but clear and intelligible to the hearers: for, pointing to the enemy with his hand, he said to his soldiers: [3] "Are not these the Macedonians, my men, whom, when occupying in their own country the pass to Eordaea, you routed in open battle, under the command of Sulpicius, and drove to take refuge on the hills with the loss of many of their comrades? [4] Are not these the Macedonians whom, when defended by what seemed an impassable country in Epirus, you dislodged by sheer valour, and forced to throw away their shields and fly right into Macedonia? [5] Why then should you feel any hesitation when you are to fight the same men on equal ground? Why look anxiously to the past, rather than let that past minister courage to you for the present? [6] Therefore, my men, rouse each other by mutual exhortations, and hasten in your might to the struggle! For, with God's will, I am persuaded that this battle will quickly have the same issue as the contests in the past." [7] With these words he ordered his right wing to remain where they were, and the elephants in front of them; while with his left, supported by the light infantry, he advanced in gallant style to attack the enemy. [8] And the Roman troops already on the field, finding themselves thus reinforced by the legions on their rear, once more faced round and charged their opponents.

18.24: Meanwhile, when he had seen the main part of his army in position outside the camp, Philip himself advanced with his peltasts and the right wing of his phalanx, commencing the ascent of the hills with great rapidity, [2] and having left instructions with Nicanor, surnamed the Elephant, to see that the rest of the army followed at once. As soon as his first files reached the summit, he deployed his men into line by the left, and occupied the range of high ground: [3] for the Macedonians who had been sent in advance had forced the Romans a considerable distance down the other side of the hills, and therefore he found the ridges unoccupied by the enemy. [4] But while he was still engaged in getting the right wing of his army into line, his mercenaries came on the ground, having been decisively repulsed by the enemy. [5] For when the Roman light infantry found themselves supported by the heavy, as I said just now, with their assistance, which they regarded as turning the scale in their favour, they made a furious charge on the enemy, and killed a large number of them. [6] When the king first came on the ground, and saw that the fighting between the light armed was going on near the enemy's camp, he was delighted: [7] but when, on the other hand, he saw his own men giving ground and requiring support, he was compelled to give it, and allow the necessities of the moment to decide the fortunes of the whole day, in spite of the fact that the greater part of his phalanx was still on the march and engaged in mounting the hills. [8] Receiving therefore the men who had been already engaged, he massed them all upon his right wing, both infantry and cavalry; while he ordered the peltasts and heavy armed to double their depth and close up to the right. By the time this was effected the enemy were close at hand; [9] and, accordingly, the word was given to the phalanx to lower spears and charge; to the light infantry to cover their flank. [10] At the same time Flamininus also, having received his advanced party into the intervals between his maniples, charged the enemy.

18.25: The charge was made with great violence and loud shouting on both sides: for both advancing parties raised their war cry, while those who were not actually engaged shouted encouragement to those that were; and the result was a scene of the wildest excitement, terrible in the last degree. [2] Philip's right wing came off brilliantly in the encounter, for they were charging down hill and were superior in weight, and their arms were far more suited for the actual conditions of the struggle: [3] but as for the rest of the army, that part of it which was in the rear of the actual fighters did not get into contact with the enemy; while the left wing, which had but just made the ascent, was only beginning to show on the ridge. [4] Seeing that his men were unable to stand the charge of the phalanx, and that his left wing was losing ground, some having already fallen and the rest slowly retiring, but that hopes of saving himself still remained on the right, Flamininus hastily transferred himself to the latter wing; [5] and when he perceived that the enemy's force was not well together—part being in contact with the actual fighters, part just in the act of mounting the ridge, and part halting on it and not yet beginning to descend,*— keeping the elephants in front he led the maniples of his right against the enemy. [6] The Macedonians having no one to give them orders, and unable to form a proper phalanx, owing to the inequalities of the ground and to the fact that, being engaged in trying to come up with the actual combatants, they were still in column of march,[7] did not even wait for the Romans to come to close quarters: but, thrown into confusion by the mere charge of the elephants, their ranks were disordered and they broke into flight.

18.26:The main body of the Roman right followed and slaughtered the flying Macedonians. [2] But one of the tribunes, with about twenty maniples, having made up his mind on his own account what ought to be done next, contributed by his action very greatly to the general victory. [3] He saw that the division which was personally commanded by Philip was much farther forward than the rest of the enemy, and was pressing hard upon the Roman left by its superior weight; he therefore left the right, which was by this time clearly victorious, and directing his march towards the part of the field where a struggle was still going on, he managed to get behind the Macedonians and charge them on the rear. [4] The nature of the phalanx is such that the men cannot face round singly and defend themselves: this tribune, therefore, charged them and killed all he could get at; [5] until, being unable to defend themselves, they were forced to throw down their shields and fly; whereupon the Romans in their front, who had begun to yield, faced round again and charged them too. [6] At first, as I have said, Philip, judging from the success of his own division, felt certain of a complete victory; [7] but when he saw his Macedonians all on a sudden throwing away their shields, and the enemy close upon their rear, he withdrew with a small body of foot and horse a short distance from the field and took a general survey of the whole battle: [8] and when he observed that the Romans in their pursuit of his left wing were already approaching the tops of the hills, he rallied as many Thracians and Macedonians as he could at the moment, and fled. [9] As Flamininus was pursuing the fugitives he came upon the lines of the Macedonian left, just as they were scaling the ridge in their attempt to cross the hills, and at first halted in some surprise [10] because the enemy held their spears straight up, as is the custom of the Macedonians when surrendering themselves or intending to pass over to the enemy. [11] Presently, having had the reason of this movement explained to him, he held his men back, thinking it best to spare the lives of those whom fear had induced to surrender. [12] But whilst he was still reflecting on this matter, some of the advanced guard rushed upon these men from some higher ground and put most of them to the sword, while the few survivors threw away their shields and escaped by flight.

* I have given the meaning which I conceive this sentence to have; but the editors generally suspect the loss of a word like ἄπρακτα or ἀπραγοῦντα after τὰ μὲν συνεχῆ τοῖς διαγωνιζομένοις. This is unnecessary if we regard συνεχῆ as predicative, and I think this way of taking it gives sufficient sense. Polybius is thinking of the Macedonian army as being so dislocated by the nature of the ground, that, while some parts were in contact with the enemy, the rest had not arrived on the scene of the fighting.

Paralus wrote (back on Wednesday 14 May !!):

“Whilst I agree with you re Hammond, we are not certain of the field. What we are absolutely certain of is that it was not suitable for Philip's phalanx as Polybios - again - makes as plain as the nose on one's face. Polybios notes that the Macedonians almost drove the Romans down onto the "level ground" before being forced to retire to the heights (18.22.6). Thus there was some distance from the tops of the ridges to the "level ground".

Agreed – we are not certain of the field, though it must be fairly close to the pass which the modern road now traverses; say within a kilometre or two. Further discussion of possible and probable sites will have to await better topographical information. It was not a suitable field to deploy the phalanx fully because the battlefield was ‘cramped’ with not enough room for the whole phalanx to deploy normally, as Philip’s manoeuvres demonstrate. ( And not, apparently, because it was boulder strewn or covered in gullies or other physical ‘difficulty’ – as modern cultivation implies)

“Thus we may have instances where to preserve frontage - as the lucid dreamers relate - the sixteen man phalanx 'doubles down' to eight in close order (Xenophon incorrectly claims Kallisthenes' description as demonstrating this).”

The idea that the manual in its three extant versions was the product of philosophers – ‘lucid dreamers’ – is an old fashioned one, stemming from the notes of the Loeb translator. As modern studies ( including this discussion! ) demonstrate, it was in fact a practical drill manual, representing the peak of sophisticated drill as devised for phalanxes. A flat statement of ‘incorrect claims’ with no evidence or explanation offered is simply irritating, and smacks of Monty Pythonesque style debate/argument [“Thats not an argument!”...”Yes it is.”....”No it isn’t, it’s just contradiction”.....], so I reply in kind....Oh yes it is !

“Deciding to re-encamp, he sends a 'holding force' to the intervening ridge tops so as to prevent any incursion by the enemy via those tops should he be nearby.”

I don’t think this is what Philip’s intention was. Rather, he meant to cross the pass and outflank the Romans ( his strategic aim), and indeed determinedly set out to traverse the pass that day. Thwarted by the weather he was forced to stop after a short distance and encamp. His concern was that the Romans, whose exact position south of the ridge he didn’t know might beat him to the pass and block him. ( and there was no point sending out recce parties in the mist) .
He therefore prudently sent an advance party to secure the pass by picketing the heights above it. Their task was to forewarn him of any Roman incursion, and to delay such to allow him to bring up the main army and force the pass.

“After doubling depth and contracting Philip's phalanx is some 312 yards in frontage. He also has something in the order of 1,500 mercenaries and 2,000 light troops on his right flank as well as the Macedonian and Thessalian cavalry. It was enough, as Polybios relates, to deal with the Roman left as it then pushed it back down the hill.”

...And right there is the problem with Paralus' hypothesis - and he is evidently aware of it! You calculate the frontage on the basis that every man-jack is present, and that there were 10,000 of them 32 deep. This is an inflated figure, even allowing the 2,000 Peltasts as additional to “the Phalanx” of 16,000 [as Livy says XXXIII.3.4], for then the total for Philip’s wing is still only a paper strength of 9,000 – with no allowance for the fact that field strengths are invariably below this for all sorts of reasons, and that this number was further reduced by absent foragers. Philip’s wing certainly didn’t number 10,000 ( half the phalanx plus the Peltasts) leaving just a maximum of 8,000 for the left wing – Polybius confirms this by stating that “the greater portion of the phalanx was still on the march and approaching the hills.”[XVIII.24.7] so that Philip’s force MUST have numbered less than half, or 9,000 – logical enough given the absent foragers. Let us say they were roughly 8,000; at 32 deep that gives a frontage of 250 yards at best. This was the frontage of just one standard Legion, yet we can be sure they faced and pushed back both left wing legions, as we are told – i.e a frontage of at least 500 yards. Since we have reason, as Agesilaos astutely pointed out, to believe that the Roman Legions were overstrength ( there being 2,000 hastati per legion) and since when the Romans were ‘overstrength’ the Allied legions were too ( as they were against Philip’s son Perseus later), then the Roman frontage of the two Legions was possibly more like 2x 416 = roughly 800 yards. Even an unrealistically swollen phalanx of 10,000 on a 312 yard front could only face one Legion at best – and if it were so, the phalanx would have been outflanked and destroyed at once!

There are other objections to Paralus’ proposed drill movements. Firstly, the manuals tell us there were only 3 formations – viz. ‘normal/open’ with 6 ft frontage per file, ‘close/pyknosis’ with 3 ft frontage per file, and ‘locked shields/synaspismos’ at 18 inches or 1 cubit per file. ( A deeper formation could be formed by placing units one behind the other)
When Paralus’ alternate files combine with their neighbours to 32 deep from open formation, the new files are no less than 12 ft or 4 yards apart, and Paralus has invented a new, unheard of, formation which might be called ‘double open’ !! Also, his leftmost file has to march some 938 yards to close up – and the Romans were evidently much closer than this. This whole proposed double manoeuvre is just too ‘big’ on every count.

Next, whenever the phalanx deploys 32 deep, Polybius tells us so – at Sellasia where two phalanxes advanced up a ridge one behind the other [details Polyb. II.65 et seq], or at Magnesia [details Livy XXVII.11 et seq, following Polybius], yet not a word about such a depth here. Moreover, why would Philip ‘quarter’ his frontage to make room for the left-wing, when he needed only to halve it ?

It won’t do either to try and ‘pad out’ the Macedonian frontage with their cavalry and light troops – though the suggestion shows that Paralus is aware of this fundamental flaw in his hypothesis. Not only was it impossible for these to take on ‘Heavy Infantry’ frontally, but they had their opposite numbers on the Roman left flank to contend with – a roughly equal force, judging by the earlier action, though perhaps slightly smaller overall. The Macedonian task was to protect the right flank of the phalanx from attack by the Roman light infantry and cavalry. We have also yet to account for the 6,000 Aetolian infantry ( who seem to have been all, or mostly peltasts, not fit to take a place in the main battle line [Polyb XVIII.22.4] ); 400 Aetolian cavalry whom we know took part in the preliminary fighting, and other Greek allies -500 Cretans, 300 Apollonians “armed in the same fashion” and 1200 Athamanian infantry [Livy XXXIII.3.10]. We would expect these forces to be evenly divided on both flanks, but all Philip’s 2,000 cavalry were sent to join the preliminary fighting to the west, and it would have taken all the Aetolian cavalry and almost all the Roman cavalry (who probably numbered some 2,400 in total) to counter them. Some, at least, of the Aetolian infantry were on the Roman right flank, as we learn.[Polyb XVIII.27.4 ; Livy XVIII.10.6]

Agesilaos too recognises this fundamental flaw in Paralus’ postulation:

“The problem remains, that if the phalanx was initially 16 deep and doubled it ends up 32 deep and on too restricted a frontage not to be overlapped by the Roman left, and this does not seem the case....................... Do you agree that the portion of the phalanx with which Philip attacked has to have a frontage ,at least, equal to the Romans he drives back?”

( no reply from Paralus !)

Thus Paralus’ interpretation cannot be right, for it would have led to certain disaster all the quicker, nor does it make military sense, and all because he tries to interpet Polybius’ orders literally as two separate manouevres regarding the phalanx, but not literally the other two sets of orders referred to in the same passage!!

Agesilaos wrote ( Thursday last, May 15):

“Strange, as I read it all three of us have different positions;
Paralus thinks that Philip arrived on the ridge in marching/open order (4 cubits), sixteen deep and then doubled his depth to thirty –two and closed to fighting order (2 cubits) thus fighting on a 312 yard frontage.

You agree that they arrived and stood in open order sixteen deep but only have them close up and thus occupy twice Paralus’ frontage and half his depth

I posit that they arrived as you both say but then stepped down to eight to cover the ground in a fighting formation and that from there they doubled their depth to sixteen and closed up to arrive at the same final formation as Xenophon but with a ‘doubling of depth’ actually having occurred. That I then suspect they formed ‘synaspismos’, is only a suspicion, as I think I have continually maintained.”

A fair summary. Agesilaos and I both recognise that given the known frontages and the numbers, Philip’s attack must have been launched on the frontage of two Legions – 500 yards ( or possibly more if overstrength), and given his numbers, perhaps 8-9000 at most, this attack took place in ‘close order’ 16 deep – which is “double depth”. Agesilaos then posits them closing up to ‘close’ order 8 deep ( but this could only happen after the lights and cavalry had withdrawn), in order to comply with his and Paralus’ interpretation that Polybius’ “ordered [the peltasts and phalanx] to double their depth and close up toward the right.” involving two distinct drill movements, whereas it could be accomplished in one.The trouble is that two manouevres affecyt the formation twice, and both Agesilaos and Paralus have to invent explanations for this which are not mentioned by Polubius. Agesilaos’ solution has the virtue of possibility, though the phalanx would only ‘close up’ if action was imminent. If the Romans were close enough for this to have happened (within 200 yards), then there was no time to carry out TWO drill manoeuvres – opening out again to form 16 deep, and then closing up to the right, with the leftmost file having to cover about 500 yards to their right ! Furthermore, Polybius' account only refers to the Macedonians 'closing up' once ( to their right) not the two or three times Agesilaos' explanation calls for.

Paralus’ solution founders for reasons set out in my previous post, and which Agesilaos too refers to.

The simplest, and quickest solution, especially given the proximity of the Romans is that the Macedonian right wing gets into its attack formation by a single, simple drill movement of closing to the right which leaves them closed up to a 500 yard frontage and 16 deep, as the numbers dictate – which is ‘double depth’ and this is consistent with everything Polybius says, and doesn't say.

As to Macedonian sources, Polybius is unlikely to have interviewed any witnesses, writing as he was some two generations later. Being Achaean, he was somewhat anti-Macedonian, and so far as is known, never went there. That he knew little or nothing of the Macedonian viewpoint is shown by his comments on Andriscus’ rebellion [xxxvi.17.15], and by his treatment of Philip and his son Perseus as simple tyrants. He may have relied for his information on Macedon second-hand from Demetrias of Phalerum, whom elsewhere he dismisses as ‘a cheap explanation’. Hence his information is at best second-hand, and not from a contemporary Macedonian source. I rely here on Walbank’s commentaries.

Ageslios wrote:

“Yet you presumably insist on giving a mistranslation of ‘prosdexamenos’ full force since this would indicate a phalanx in open enough order to allow lights and cavalry pass to the rear.”

Huh? I don’t insist on any mistranslation. According to the LSJ ‘prosdexamenos’ means ‘to receive favourably; to admit’ and in context can only mean that Philip received/admitted his light troops into and through the phalanx ,ergo they must have been in normal/open order 16 deep, and not in close order 8 deep.

“...it seems far more likely that experienced troops, like those with Philip would understand the drill moves necessary to ‘double by depth’ and ‘close to the right’, the manuals list only those required for the steps to achieve this for training purposes, on the field the fewer commands that need to be given the better, this is why the set of moves get a name, it is not just for the pleasure of the military philosopher.”

To borrow Paralus’ concept, I don’t buy this for a second ! Different commands for training purposes and in the field ? That would defeat the whole point of training....
However, I do agree that Polybius is reporting the evolution, not giving the actual literal words – which don’t, as you and Paralus insist, necessarily mean two separate and distinct manoeuvres, but can refer to one. Polybius does NOT say “double their depth, and THEN close up to the right” and if he had I would have to agree your interpretation, but he does not, and consequently both your and Paralus’ solutions are not viable. I also agree the fewer commands the better ( one reason I don’t agree your complex manoeuvres, opening and closing several times.) A single simple by-the-book manoeuvre, closing up to the right, would achieve 16 deep in close order – which is ‘double depth’, and the formation we know Philip must have attacked in, and upon which you and I are in agreement.

Let me concede the point that ‘about turn’ in synaspismos/locked shields would be physically impossible for all practical intents and purposes, none of which really nullifies the point that a phalanx engaged to its front could not turn about and engage another foe to the rear – Polybius tells us so.[XVIII.26.4] “As it is impossible for the phalanx to turn about face or to fight man to man...et seq”

I agree with you that we shouldn’t digress into technical issues of ‘interjection’ and ‘insertion’ here. As I have explained, these were the two methods of ‘closing up’ while retaining the same frontage. The former might be called the ‘traditional’ method ( going back to hoplite phalanxes) – namely the rear half of the file coming up alongside the front half. The latter, appearing in the manuals, may be described as the more ‘modern’ method whereby every second man in the file stepped out and forward to form ‘close order’. For our purposes, the effect is the same, in both instances the depth is ‘halved’.

P.S.: Agesilaos wrote
:

“I am glad that you have abandoned the idea that the rear of the hypaspists could about face to deal with the scythed chariots...”

With this attempted witticism, you are not comparing like with like. Alexander’s hypaspists were in ‘open order’ and not engaged to their front at the time, whereas Philip’s phalanx were in close order and engaged. Furthermore, in my view the Hypaspists at the time were equipped as hoplites, not with pikes! So, no, I don't have any problems with the Hypaspists letting the chariots through, then turning to their rear to engage them........
(But let us not digress into that subject !)

Paralus wrote Thurs May 15):

“I take no issue with pretty much all of that; everything, that is, until "ending in close order 16 deep (‘double depth’)". The problem with that is the fact that Polybios' text is ignored in such a rendering. The phalanx did not simply close up to the right ending in double depth and close order. But wait, what's that there.... below... I spies me an explanation”

I always take heart whenever Paralus adopts a scornful or sarcastic style of debate....it is a sure sign that he is on the back foot !
Polybius’ text is not “ignored”. I simply don’t agree your interpretation of a single phrase, because that interpretation produces anomalous results....in fact my hypothesis is the only one entirely consistent with Polybius. Agesilaos has several ‘opening’ and ‘closing’ manoeuvres, but Polybius mentions only one, and your 32 deep on a frontage of 250-310 yards does not conform with what Polybius says about the phalanx engaging and forcing back the two left wing Legions on a frontage of at least 500 yards and perhaps as much as 800.

I could continue and refute this lengthy post point by point, but will save poor readers eyes! Suffice to say that I don’t ignore Polybius’ words, nor do I indulge in ‘linguistic callisthenics’. I simply don’t agree that those words MUST necessarily mean two distinct manoeuvres – which is not consistent with the rest of Polybius’ description. This is a common mistake, to take a sentence or passage in isolation, and not consider the whole holistically.
Nor am I putting a ‘gloss of convenience’ or a ‘gloss of presumption’ on Polybius’ words – merely interpreting them in a way that is consistent with the rest of the battle description. Rather it is Paralus and Agesilaos who put a ‘gloss’ on Polybius’ words, interpreting them as to insist on two manoeuvres, and hence both have to introduce ( different!!) explanations that are simply not in our source material at all !!
As another example of interpreting material in isolation, Paralus ( and others) would have it on the strength of XVIII.28 et seq that the phalanx normally fought 16 deep in close order, for having described it, Polybius goes on to say [XVIII.30]:

“From this we can easily conceive what is the nature and force of a charge by the phalanx when it is 16 deep”.

...which I have also seen translated as...

"From this we can readily conceive the nature and force of a charge of the 16 deep phalanx."

Notice that he does NOT say “16 deep in close order”. That is simply an (incorrect) assumption. He knew and would expect his readers to know that generally a phalanx 16 deep would move into ‘close order/pyknosis’ by halving their depth ( to 8 ) just before engaging. This is what all other evidence tells us.
So is Polybius mistaken here ? Not at all. He knew that the ‘standard’ drill meant 16 deep in ‘normal/open order’. We know this because he tells us so at [XII.19]
“A stade, allowing for the distances which must be kept on a march, and reckoning the depth at sixteen, admits of one thousand six hundred men, each man covering six feet. “
i.e. at 16 deep, the men are in ‘normal/open order” – consistent with, and just as the manuals all say. (hardly surprising, since many believe the manuals ultimately derive from lost parts of Polybius)
But what if he did mean “in close order” ? Given that he has just described Cynoscephalae where the phalanx did indeed charge 16 deep in close order, that too is possible. What he cannot have meant is that the phalanx normally fought 16 deep in close order, for not only does that contradict the evidence of the manuals, but also what he himself says! Looking at ALL the evidence holistically produces a different outcome than what one may conclude from one passage alone.
And this does not even touch upon the fact that 16 deep would be extremely wasteful and impractical, for more than two thirds of the pikes were not in action ( only the first five ranks or so protrude). Fighting 8 deep, with 5 ranks protruding, 2 ranks in reserve to replace casualties and the rear rank of ‘file closers’ to help maintain formation would be much more efficient. In ancient battles, frontage was far more important than depth, as several commentators explain, and the battle of Sellasia demonstrates...... WHOOPS! I’m digressing again, let us leave all that for another thread. Suffice to say, show me some evidence, other than the ambivalent passage of Polybius XVIII.30 referred to above, for a norm of 16 deep in close order !!

edited for punctuation and typos:

Paralus’ next post (Thurs May 15 ) goes back to the question of “unsuitability of the ground”. I’ll ignore the little swipe about taking Polybius literally – Paralus makes far too much of this, and I am sure he would agree that we cannot take every word of Polybius as literally true.
Some slight corrections.....
Paralus wrote:

“Secondly, there's no reason to assume any part of the left phalanx joined up with the advancing right.”

True, but part of the left wing were already descending the ‘face’ of the ridge, and apparently had all but linked up with the right.
Firstly, in Paralus’ own quotation in his post:

“Flamininus hastily transferred himself to the latter wing; and when he perceived that the enemy's force was not well together—part being in contact with the actual fighters, part just in the act of mounting the ridge, and part halting on it and not yet beginning to descend”

[my emphasis]
...and secondly a few lines earlier....
“...those next to the force actually engaged were still at a distance from the enemy and those on the left had only just surmounted the ridge and come into view of the summits.”
In other words, the vanguard of the left wing, being close behind the right wing were on the downslopes trying to link with the right wing who had ‘got away’ by virtue of their charge, others had halted on the ridge-line and were in the act of deploying, while the rear were still climbing the reverse of the ridge in column.

“Again, this is a very clear indication that where Philip had to deploy was far from satisfactory for a phalanx and ground which was was hardly the Salsbury Plain. His reaction was to contract his phalanx to suit this cramped ground.”

With this I’d agree – it is apparent that the battle-field had little more than a thousand yards or so width for the deployment of the main infantry forces, plus presumably some room for cavalry and light infantry flank guards, and when we get to the topography, this is what we should be looking for. Somewhere east of the pass, perhaps a kilometre or two, and with a thousand yards or so long ridge.....
The problem for Philip is that it needed a 2,000 yard/10 stade frontage to properly deploy a 16,000 man phalanx, and then a further 250 yards or so for the 2,000 Guard Peltasts. Given a battlefield only roughly half of this, if he wanted to bring his full phalanx into play, he could either ‘double his depth’ to 16 in close order and halve his frontage or else deploy his left wing directly behind his right.
I would bet he chose the former, so as to concentrate his best troops against the already formed Roman left wing, especially as these were already advancing up the slope against him. He probably saw that the Roman right wing, as yet, were not fully formed up, but were doing so behind the stationary screen of elephants. ( Incidently, by sending all his cavalry to his right to support the advance guard, Philip also shrewdly kept them well away from the elephants, with their ability to frighten horses unused to them ).
Agesilaos has rightly pointed out that contrary to the implication of Polybius that the whole Roman army was already deployed, it would have taken pretty much an equal amount of time for two masses of men of roughly equal numbers to deploy from their camps [ I doubt the exactness of some of Agesilaos’ more detailed calculations].

The question was, would Philip’s left get into line first and proceed to charge down the slope and emulate the right wing, smash into the Romans and complete the King’s victory, or would the Roman right succeed in deploying first and advance up the slope and scatter the Macedonians before they could form fully into battle order......and that’s one of the main reasons I suggest it was a “near run thing”.

Well, we all know who won the race against time to be ready first.....

We can consider this more when we switch and start to consider the battle from the Roman point of view. Agesilaos and Paralus have already made a major start on this, and I will hope to join them in the next day or two, provided they don’t race ahead in the meantime....

Xenophon wrote:

“Thus we may have instances where to preserve frontage - as the lucid dreamers relate - the sixteen man phalanx 'doubles down' to eight in close order (Xenophon incorrectly claims Kallisthenes' description as demonstrating this).”

The idea that the manual in its three extant versions was the product of philosophers – ‘lucid dreamers’ – is an old fashioned one, stemming from the notes of the Loeb translator. As modern studies ( including this discussion! ) demonstrate, it was in fact a practical drill manual, representing the peak of sophisticated drill as devised for phalanxes. A flat statement of ‘incorrect claims’ with no evidence or explanation offered is simply irritating, and smacks of Monty Pythonesque style debate/argument [“Thats not an argument!”...”Yes it is.”....”No it isn’t, it’s just contradiction”.....], so I reply in kind....Oh yes it is !

Firstly, if the post from which the above was clipped is read, it will be noted that I actually said "all (of the 'Tacticians') denote the basic unit of the phalanx as the sixteen man file. It is from this sixteen man file that all other evolutions of the phalanx proceed. Now, one supposes there must be a reason for that and it cannot simply be the result of a mathematician's 'lucid dream'." The point being that the 'manuals' are correct. "Lucid dreamers" is a throwaway at those who dismiss the drill reported.

As to the 'Pythonesque' argument, your view of Kallisthenes' description is another debate which would likely distract from what's going on here. As you'd already mentioned it (seemingly weeks back!), I simply register the fact that I disagree. We can get to that within this thread if required but possibly later?

I don't think there's any great remove between us on Philip's 'covering' force. Either way, it had to be tasked to hold those ridge tops and supply intelligence of the enemy should such come to hand.

Xenophon wrote:

“After doubling depth and contracting Philip's phalanx is some 312 yards in frontage. He also has something in the order of 1,500 mercenaries and 2,000 light troops on his right flank as well as the Macedonian and Thessalian cavalry. It was enough, as Polybios relates, to deal with the Roman left as it then pushed it back down the hill.”

...And right there is the problem with Paralus' hypothesis - and he is evidently aware of it! You calculate the frontage on the basis that every man-jack is present, and that there were 10,000 of them 32 deep. This is an inflated figure, even allowing the 2,000 Peltasts as additional to “the Phalanx” of 16,000 [as Livy says XXXIII.3.4], for then the total for Philip’s wing is still only a paper strength of 9,000 – with no allowance for the fact that field strengths are invariably below this for all sorts of reasons, and that this number was further reduced by absent foragers.

At the risk of taking Polybios 'too literally', I can only go on what the old boy writes: "Philip himself advanced with his peltasts and the right wing of his phalanx / αὐτὸς μὲν ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς πελταστὰς καὶ τὸ δεξιὸν τῆς φάλαγγος προῆγε". Polybios makes a distinction between the peltasts and 'the phalanx'. Thus Philip has taken half of the phalanx. I agree we do not know how many made into line before he deployed. As I wrote earlier, i did the figures based on the whole. I also agree with Agesilaos that the Romans also had not fully deployed. As to numbers, we can play the guessing game and all take a stab. I simply worked with the complete figures to avoid the to and fro. I believe I noted earlier that not all may have made it into line.

Xenophon wrote:There are other objections to Paralus’ proposed drill movements. Firstly, the manuals tell us there were only 3 formations – viz. ‘normal/open’ with 6 ft frontage per file, ‘close/pyknosis’ with 3 ft frontage per file, and ‘locked shields/synaspismos’ at 18 inches or 1 cubit per file. ( A deeper formation could be formed by placing units one behind the other)
When Paralus’ alternate files combine with their neighbours to 32 deep from open formation, the new files are no less than 12 ft or 4 yards apart, and Paralus has invented a new, unheard of, formation which might be called ‘double open’ !!

[...] Thus Paralus’ interpretation cannot be right, for it would have led to certain disaster all the quicker, nor does it make military sense, and all because he tries to interpet Polybius’ orders literally as two separate manouevres regarding the phalanx, but not literally the other two sets of orders referred to in the same passage!!

I find the first part of that a little disingenuous. Either that or you've failed to understand what I wrote. The 'manuals' clearly describe the drill Polybios describes Philip as using. In case it was missed earlier, I will quote it again (Ael. Tac. 29.6):

The depth is doubled by inserting the second file into the first, so that the file-leader of the second file will be posted behind the file-leader of the first file, and the second man of the second file will be the fourth man of the first file, and the third man of the second file will be the sixth in the first file, and so also for the next until the whole of the second file is integrated into the first file, and likewise the fourth file into the third and all the even-numbered files into the odd-numbered ones.

Now, I see no one is accusing Aelian of creating "a new, unheard of, formation which might be called ‘double open’". The form of depth doubling is clearly described and, if its use would lead to disaster, one wonders why it was ever practised.

Then, as I've been at pains to show, the phalanx closed up to the right - something it singularly had to do - as Philip had ordered (ibid, 33.1):

If we want to compact the phalanx on the right wing, we order the file on the extreme right wing to stand still and the rest to face spearward and close up to the right, then to face to the front to restore the line, and have the rearward ranks close up forward.

Thus, as Polybios writes, the phalanx doubled its depth (which, as Agesilaos correctly remarks, must the depth it's already standing in) and closes up to the right. This form of closing or compacting clearly is implicit in Aelian's discourse on same (11.2 & 5-6):

For, in the first place, some are drawn up with narrower intervals for some special purposes. Now, a man occupies four cubits (6 ft.) drawn up in normal order, two cubits in compact order (pyknosis), and one cubit with locked shields (synaspismos). [...] Compacting” (pyknosis) is used whenever the general wishes to lead the phalanx against the enemy, “locking shields” (synaspismos) when the defenders, hedged about as it were, have to receive the enemy's attack. Therefore, since there are 1,024 file-leaders drawn up along the front of the phalanx, it is evident that deployed they occupy 4,096 cubits (6,144 ft.) in length, that is, 10 stades and 96 cubits, 5 stades and 48 cubits (3,072 ft.) in compact order (pyknosis), and two and a half stades and 24 cubits (1,536 ft.) in “locked shield” order.

Disparaging remarks accusing one of having "invented a new, unheard of order" and the repeated claims of taking matters literally distract from the fact that Xenophon refuses to deal with the text as received: Philip "ordered the peltasts and heavy armed to double their depth and close up to the right". Two actions were required and two, as above, performed. If they began in open order the phalanx can only have finished 32 deep. To date we have this text (and my view of it) dismissed on the grounds that:

• Polybios wasn't there and can't have known the orders given
  Agesilaos and I have taken Polybios very literally
  Polybius’ words are not couched in the way actual orders were given
  I have not taken the two other orders literally in the same passage

None of which are in any way particularly persuasive. I haven't bothered with the disposition of the lights and the cavalry as Polybios is clear he amassed them on the right flank. The continued insistence that this is somehow being ignored or not taken literally is nothing more than a distraction. I would argue, once again, that it is preferable to deal with the received text that to find ways to explain it away. Perhaps we should all be free to pick and choose which passages to follow as written and which to gloss over?

Sellasia was a different animal. Polybios uses a different descriptive term for this and that, I'm certain, is a debate for another thread (not again??!!)

Why Philip chose this deployment can only be related to the field and what was on the plate before him.

Xenophon wrote:

Polybius does NOT say “double their depth, and THEN close up to the right” and if he had I would have to agree your interpretation,

Polybios wrote:

τοῖς δὲ πελτασταῖς καὶ τοῖς φαλαγγίταις παρήγγελλε διπλασιάζειν τὸ βάθος καὶ πυκνοῦν ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιόν.

There are two distinct commands, joined by 'kai' which means and, 'then' would be quite otiose as one cannot 'double the depth' and 'close to the right' at the same time without an awful mess ensuing. Nor is Parulus creating a new spacing of 'double open order', as no one is suggesting that the troops remained at that interval as they immediately 'closed up to the right.

What Polybios does NOT say is that the battlefield was cramped, he says it was uneven, precipitous and rocky. You will have to cite an ancient source for the Macedonian phalanx only closing up at 200 yards, I have never encountered such a remark.

Since there are TWO separate commands, and you accept that the charge was made sixteen deep, looks like you have to move into my camp, and accept an initial eight deep deployment (Polybios has nothing to say on the detail of Philip's initial deployment beyond the fact that it occurred as soon as the ridge had been reached and that it took place towards the left.

Well Polybios was certainly further removed from the Hanniballic War than he was from Kynoskephalai, maybe we should casually re-write that to suit, Walbank is clearly speculating if he dismisses the possibility of any Macedonian sources, Polybios' was made a hostage at Rome shortly after the whole of Perseus' Court apparatchiks, and the alleged deportation of 300,000 anti-Roman Macedonians; were I to write a history of contemporary Australia, I would not need to travel to the land of the Golden Doughnut, I need only venture to any local hostelry, Rome was awash with sources and of considerable stature and proximity to events of moment and Polybios had the patronage of Scipio Aemilianus a close relative of the conqueror of Perseus, who was himself under arrest in Abruzzo at Alba Fucens. It must also be remebered that Polybios was made a hostage because his father, Lykortas, was a member of the anti-Roman faction and had persuaded the league to remain neutral in the Third Macedonian War ( one might suggest that Polybios blamed the Macedonians for his exile, hence his antipathy in the 'Histories').

Couple lost in the to and fro....

Xenophon wrote:Agesilaos too recognises this fundamental flaw in Paralus’ postulation:

“The problem remains, that if the phalanx was initially 16 deep and doubled it ends up 32 deep and on too restricted a frontage not to be overlapped by the Roman left, and this does not seem the case....................... Do you agree that the portion of the phalanx with which Philip attacked has to have a frontage ,at least, equal to the Romans he drives back?”

( no reply from Paralus !)

The you my need to read this. You may disagree but to say the question was not addressed is a clear fallacy.

Xenophon wrote:Paralus wrote Thurs May 15):

“I take no issue with pretty much all of that; everything, that is, until "ending in close order 16 deep (‘double depth’)". The problem with that is the fact that Polybios' text is ignored in such a rendering. The phalanx did not simply close up to the right ending in double depth and close order. But wait, what's that there.... below... I spies me an explanation”

I always take heart whenever Paralus adopts a scornful or sarcastic style of debate....it is a sure sign that he is on the back foot !

I seem forever to explain this. I do not use emoticons for a number of reasons (not withstanding the fact that source references are rendered as "cool" and other such nonsense). The line was a humorous pointer to the fact that I (and others) had to read through another five or so paragraphs before alighting on the reasons that Xenophon dismissed this.

The statement has been repeated throughout that the regular close order of the Macedonian phalanx was 8 deep and formed by half file insertion. I disagree and reiterate that the field and its circumstances dictated just how the phalanx condensed. Half file insertion is disingenuously presented as the 'normal' or regular method of making the phalanx more dense. Yet when Aelian introduces "compaction" of the phalanx, his first (and entire) example is by closing to right or left with the resultant diminished frontages involved. He goes on later in his treatise to describe insertion as another method. Similarly he clearly describes doubling depth but this seems simply to be passed over.

At risk of repeating oneself, Philip ordered the phalanx to double depth and close up to the right. These deployed files are sixteen deep when the order is given. We are left with two options:

Philip took it his files understood they that they were already in 'double depth' and they'd simply close to right
Philip wanted those files to double to the right and then to close to right (as I have written)

If the first, there is absolutely no need for the order to 'double depth'. Philip need only order the phalanx to close to the right from open order, sixteen deep. No matter what Xenophon claims, a double order is reported by Polybios; two actions, not one. Representing this as a 'result' rather than actions smacks of linguistic massaging as do the claims that both Agesilaos and myself are not taking this 'holistically'. Philip is reported as having received his lights and cavalry and "massed" on his right flank. Polybios then proceeds to relay exactly Philip's deployment of his phalanx. I find the passage quite clear.

Paralus wrote:

“Firstly, if the post from which the above was clipped is read, it will be noted that I actually said "all (of the 'Tacticians') denote the basic unit of the phalanx as the sixteen man file. It is from this sixteen man file that all other evolutions of the phalanx proceed. Now, one supposes there must be a reason for that and it cannot simply be the result of a mathematician's 'lucid dream'." The point being that the 'manuals' are correct. "Lucid dreamers" is a throwaway at those who dismiss the drill reported.”

Thank you for clarifying that – we three would seem to be in agreement regarding the ‘practicality’ of the manual and its three versions contra the translator’s remarks....

Another 1500 words or so, and not one addresses the fundamental flaws pointed out by Agesilaos and myself. Astonishing!!
Instead, we have snippets of what I attempted to get across, cherry-picked out of context, so that Paralus may argue with them. One could be forgiven for thinking that he was more interested in not being wr....wro...you know, that word he can’t bring yourself to say, rather than shedding light on what likely happened, and illuminating what our sources say... I’ll again restrict myself to a few points, rather than post an equally lengthy refutation.

“I don't think there's any great remove between us on Philip's 'covering' force. Either way, it had to be tasked to hold those ridge tops and supply intelligence of the enemy should such come to hand.”

Perhaps so, in which case you expressesd yourself a little unclearly in saying :

“Deciding to re-encamp, he sends a 'holding force' to the intervening ridge tops so as to prevent any incursion by the enemy via those tops should he be nearby.”

( my emphasis)

What you say is that the Macedonian advanced force was there to prevent the Romans coming via the ridge tops. My point of clarification was that it was the pass, not the heights, which was the ground of tactical importance and which Philip was anxious to secure. This was because whilst troops could negotiate the heights, the all important supply wagons etc could not, and needed the pass.....

“ I agree we do not know how many made into line before he deployed. As I wrote earlier, i did the figures based on the whole. I also agree with Agesilaos that the Romans also had not fully deployed. As to numbers, we can play the guessing game and all take a stab. I simply worked with the complete figures to avoid the to and fro. I believe I noted earlier that not all may have made it into line.”

Yes, and as I said even allowing those maximum numbers, you still have Philip’s force 32 deep on a frontage of roughly 250-312 yards pushing back a similar number of men, on a frontage of 5-800 yards. That is not militarily feasible - refresh your recollection of Xenophon’s ‘Cyropaedia’ for an explanation as to why. You haven’t and still don’t offer any explanation for how this could be done.....

“I find the first part of that a little disingenuous. Either that or you've failed to understand what I wrote. The 'manuals' clearly describe the drill Polybios describes Philip as using.”

On the contrary, if there is any disingenuity or failure to understand, it is on your part. I did not criticise the drill moves themselve - which as you say, come from the manuals, but rather the impossible formation/order they end up in after the first part of your two drlll moves is performed – 32 deep ( not one of the three formations/orders/depths that were practised or known), with the files some 12 feet/4 yards apart, also something completely outside the drill manuals. Your ‘new’ formation of ‘double open order’ is some 1,250 yards long and some 64 yards deep !! (or 128 yards deep if the depth is expanded in the same ratio as the frontage/length!) And this manoeuvre is being done under the stress of battle for the first ( and only according to the sources ) time. Worse still, the Romans are but a few hundred yards away and advancing, or about to advance. This is just not credible. I have participated giving drill orders in ‘Trooping the Colour’ parades involving a 1,000 troops on the vast parade ground at Puckapunyal – far more men than the Guards do in London, and I assure you that the scale of what you propose is just too ‘big’ to be practical.
Agesilaos realises this, but takes comfort from the fact that they weren’t in this ‘new’ formation long ......damned right they wouldn’t be. Even the relatively simple ‘closing up’ starting with files 4 yards apart would be a ‘schemozzle’ on a parade ground, let alone on the rough ground of the ridge. It would be difficult enough in a formation half that size – 16 deep, with files just 6 feet apart initially, and one marvels at the discipline and training of Philip’s men to be able to carry this out in the conditions I have referred to.....
Massed drill has to be carefully choreographed, and well practised/rehearsed, and supervised by superb drillmasters....as the Duke of Wellington put it, “If 10,000 men were marched into Hyde Park, there are fewer than 10 men in Europe who could get them out again.”
That the phalanx could do what you suggest – a new, unheard of, formation on the spot - is just not credible.
Far more credible is that they stood in ‘standard/normal’ formation 16 deep at 6 ft intervals and closed up to their right into half their former frontage, to end 16 deep, double depth, in close order. At least this has the merit of being a ‘standard’ manoeuvre described in the manuals and presumably practised, along with closing up by halving depth rather than frontage.
Nor do I “refuse to deal with the text as received”; rather I recognise the ambivalence of what Philip supposedly ordered, and that it could only be practically achieved by a single, simple manoeuvre. Agesilaos' proposal has the merit of conforming to what is known from the manuals, but with its multiple openings and closings would be unnecessarily complex, and difficult to do practically, not to mention “not dealing with the text as received”, for Polybius refers to only one closing up, which resulted in the phalanx forming up in ‘double depth’.
You then proceed to accuse me of “dismissing” the text – illustrating this by cherry picking several things I have said completely out of context ! Nevertheless, it is correct that :
“Polybios wasn't there and can't have known the orders given
Agesilaos and I have taken Polybios very literally
Polybius’ words are not couched in the way actual orders were given
I have not taken the two other orders literally in the same passage”

The first three are true – and Polybius doesn’t even pretend to be relaying Philip’s exact words/orders, simply stating what happened, without specifying the exact HOW of what was done, but you and Agesilaos choose to interpret Polybius’ meaning as literally two distinct manoeuvres. The fourth is also true – in the same passage Polybius tells of two other sets of orders – again in general terms. Similarly, when describing Flamininus’ orders, these are given throughout in general terms.

You don’t find these points persuasive – even though they are all true, and you don’t dispute them ?
I take it they are not persuasive because they don’t agree with your interpretation ?

“I haven't bothered with the disposition of the lights and the cavalry as Polybios is clear he amassed them on the right flank. The continued insistence that this is somehow being ignored or not taken literally is nothing more than a distraction. I would argue, once again, that it is preferable to deal with the received text that to find ways to explain it away. Perhaps we should all be free to pick and choose which passages to follow as written and which to gloss over?”

It appears you have misunderstood – you included the Macedonian lights and cavalry to ‘flesh out’ and extend the Macedonian right wing and its frontage, because you recognised that 312 yards ( to take your figure) was not going to be a sufficient frontage to explain how Philip’s phalanx pushed back two legions, a similar number of men on at least a 500 yard, and perhaps 800 yard, frontage. In fact, as I pointed out, they could not materially assist the phalanx because they had a similar sized Roman light force to contend with on that flank. The result, under yur deployment, must be that your phalanx fronts only the extreme left wing Legion, leaving the other to smash into your left flank.......Game Over !!

I agree that it is preferable to stick with the received text wherever possible. Here it is you who ‘glosses over’ the uncomfortable fact that the text says that Philip’s phalanx faced, and pushed back, the TWO left wing Legions, and to do so must have had a frontage of 500 yards or more aprox!

The version I have proposed is completely consistent with the text – and much simpler than – the two ( different !! ) sets of complexities completely lacking in the text, which you and Agesilaos find it necessary to interpolate.

Occam's razor must surely apply.....

Gentlemen, to quote Sherlock Holmes: “When you have eliminated the impossible ( yours and Agesilaos explanations ) whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth “ ( improbable, apparently, to you and Agesilaos, but as plain as a sarisa staff to me ! )

P.S. :- Another 700 word plus post....is there no end to this cornucopia of words which I cannot keep up with even when I don't respond to every point?

Yup: read that 700 plus word post again.....no answer to Agesilaos' question ( and mine) of whether you agree that the action must have taken place on the two legion front. Just avoidance of the question - you could have been an Aussie politician, they do that all the time with awkward questions too !!

Agesilaos wrote:

“There are two distinct commands, joined by 'kai' which means and, 'then' would be quite otiose as one cannot 'double the depth' and 'close to the right' at the same time without an awful mess ensuing. Nor is Parulus creating a new spacing of 'double open order', as no one is suggesting that the troops remained at that interval as they immediately 'closed up to the right.”

This is not necessarily true in general. The English is a literal translation of the Greek, and just as in English can refer to a single action. How did they form up in double depth, closed up to half their former frontage ? – in this instance by turning right and closing up, thus producing a phalanx 16 deep in close order on a 500 yard front, as we agree must have been the case. Since the simplest of single actions is being performed – turn right and march - there are no two things happening simultaneously to get into a mess about, unlike the double manoeuvres both you and Paralus refer to. Nor is your excuse for Paralus sound; he has TWO manoeuvres happening, firstly the new formation, apparently an invention of Paralus since it appears nowhere in any source, of ‘double open order’ with files 32 men deep at 12 foot intervals, then followed by closing up to close order 3 ft intervals some 32 deep ( another new formation! ) – as I explained in my previous post, quite impossible....

Equally your ‘open order’ 16 deep, close order 8 deep, open order 16 deep, close order 16 deep ( and possibly synaspismos 8 deep) on a frontage of 1,000 yards, then 500 yards is complex, introduces manoeuvres/ drills not consistent with the text, would have timing issues with the Romans in close proximity, and is equally impractical – the old adage; “Order, counter-order, disorder” springs to mind, and hence must also be rejected !

The Sherlock Holmes quotation in my last post applies here too !

“What Polybios does NOT say is that the battlefield was cramped, he says it was uneven, precipitous and rocky. You will have to cite an ancient source for the Macedonian phalanx only closing up at 200 yards, I have never encountered such a remark. “

The ‘cramping’ is an inference from the fact that both armies main infantry lines frontage were roughly 1,000 yards or a bit more long. This may be because of some natural reason – to be examined when topographical information comes to light, or possibly, even if Philip could have continued deploying to his left along the ridge to the full 10 stades/2,000 yards 16 deep in open order needed, it would have taken him well beyond the frontage of the Roman battle line, and he therefore chose, for obvious reason,s to concentrate opposite them with the uphill advantage...

Obviously, the “200 yards” is not exact but is approximate and will vary. It means roughly ‘charge distance’. The manuals and Kallisthenes describing Issus all refer to the phalanx ’closing up’ to half depth “when the General wishes to lead the phalanx against the enemy” [Aelian 11.5]; “..called 'compact spacing' [pyknosis] ......is used when we are marching the phalanx upon the enemy.”[Asclepiodotus]. Elsewhere ( the reference escapes me for the moment - ah, wait, found it...it is Aelian 14.2, which Devine translates as "ready for fighting".) I have seen it that pyknosis is formed “on the point of engaging the enemy”, and of course Polybius quotes Kallisthenes as saying “finally as he approached the enemy”. Xenophon describes much the same for Hoplite phalanxes. Clearly, ‘close order/pyknosis’ was formed at the last minute as battle was about to be joined for logical and obvious reasons....

As to 'Macedonian sources' for Cynoscephalae, you may have noted I said “contemporary” Macedonian sources, for obviously it is POSSIBLE that Polybius consulted the Macedonian exiles of his own era, some 40 years later, for matters Macedonian, but he does not appear to have done from the evidence of his writings, as Walbank points out.

Paralus wrote:

The statement has been repeated throughout that the regular close order of the Macedonian phalanx was 8 deep and formed by half file insertion. I disagree and reiterate that the field and its circumstances dictated just how the phalanx condensed. Half file insertion is disingenuously presented as the 'normal' or regular method of making the phalanx more dense. Yet when Aelian introduces "compaction" of the phalanx, his first (and entire) example is by closing to right or left with the resultant diminished frontages involved. He goes on later in his treatise to describe insertion as another method. Similarly he clearly describes doubling depth but this seems simply to be passed over.

Whether you disagree or not is not really relevant, it is what the evidence suggests that counts. What is the function of a half-file leader if not to lead a half file in forming 'close order' ( or to reverse it back to 'normal/open order' ? Similarly a quarter-file leader if not to facilitate 'synaspismos' ? Not to mention what the source texts and the manuals in particular -several quoted by me- and there are many more for when/if we discuss this subject another day. You are distorting what Aelian says, and also not comparing the other versions. I referred to Aelian's description of 'halving' depth into close order earlier -' interjection' at 29.2 and 31.1. All refer to two forms of 'compacting/pyknosis' - closing up the frontage and retaining the depth - apparently uniquely used at Cynoscephalae - and the much more common 'halving' of depth and retaining the same frontage' , which also at this final evolution of phalanx drill also has two methods - bringing up the rear half-file, which is evidently the older traditional method, going back to Xenophon, and which from the presence of half-file leaders was still practised in Hellenistic armies. ( I have even referred to/ quoted the relevant section of Aelian that describes this.. The second, evidently newer method ( described only in this late Hellenistic manual in its various versions) was to have every second man step out and forward. Both methods resulted in a halving of the 'normal' 16 deep formation to 8 deep.......

I'll not repeat myself by stating yet again that Polybius is NOT reporting verbatim Philip's orders etc- which you apparently don't dispute. What he wanted them to do was form up on half the frontage, in close order and in 'double depth' 16 deep, as Polybius says. This they were able to do by a simple, single order. No need to interpret Polybius' words so as to involve imaginary impossible formations, no matter how 'clear' you may think Polybius' meaning, your interpretation leads to impossible results......

Xenophon wrote:Instead, we have snippets of what I attempted to get across, cherry-picked out of context, so that Paralus may argue with them. One could be forgiven for thinking that he was more interested in not being wr....wro...you know, that word he can’t bring yourself to say...

P.S. :- Another 700 word plus post....is there no end to this cornucopia of words which I cannot keep up with even when I don't respond to every point?

Yup: read that 700 plus word post again.....no answer to Agesilaos' question ( and mine) of whether you agree that the action must have taken place on the two legion front. Just avoidance of the question - you could have been an Aussie politician, they do that all the time with awkward questions too !!

Ignoring the personal and at the risk of further 'cherry picking', 'cornucopia of words' or 'avoidance of the question', let's once more unto the breach.

Agesilaos is free to task me on the notion of the Roman left and Philip's deployment should he feel unsatisfied with my reply. In short summary, as I've said before, the Roman left met Philip's phalanx on its ground - not the 'level ground' on which it deployed. Far from including the lights, mercenaries and cavalry to "‘flesh out’ and extend the Macedonian right wing and its frontage", I simply placed then where Polybios had them. I do believe they took part in the battle proper, though it might not do to push (gloss?) Polybios' words - "to the light infantry to cover their flank" - too far. I believe Philip's ground to be unsuited to his phalanx and hence the contraction. How the Romans found it I cannot know, only that attacking - in Philip's part of the field, that is, the ridge - up hill they found themselves at a distinct disadvantage. What their frontage was depends both on their deployment and the ground they ascended. A map will be a boon.

Xenophon wrote: Your ‘new’ formation of ‘double open order’ is some 1,250 yards long and some 64 yards deep !! (or 128 yards deep if the depth is expanded in the same ratio as the frontage/length!) [...] Agesilaos realises this, but takes comfort from the fact that they weren’t in this ‘new’ formation long ......damned right they wouldn’t be.

This has been dealt with. That you refuse to accept what has been written I can do little about. No one, repeat, no one suggests any new formation, only yourself; a straw man to repeatedly trot out.

Xenophon wrote: I did not criticise the drill moves themselve - which as you say, come from the manuals, but rather the impossible formation/order they end up in after the first part of your two drlll moves is performed – 32 deep ( not one of the three formations/orders/depths that were practised or known), with the files some 12 feet/4 yards apart, also something completely outside the drill manuals.

This method of doubling is related inthe above post. I will not rewrite it. One wonders why it is included....