pothos.org

spitamenes wrote:

Paralus wrote: the "joiner tube" simply could not fail: to do so was to court disaster.

Well, no matter how well a weapon is built, in the field, they simply DO fail. Often enough for militaries to have a protocol on what to do in case of such an issue,in order to not court disaster.

Yes militaries do have such matters covered by protocols and drills. Problem is the sources - including the ideal phalanxes of the Tacticians - do not go into the detail of what actually transpires during a battle; the latter being more interested in spacing, formation and the tactical dance of the phalanx in chaging order. As well, militaries do not generally court disasters by introducing variables that can weaken a formation or, more importantly, its absolutely crucial weapon.

Whilst we have no direct evidence for it, there exists the possibility that the phalanx formation - five rows of levelled sarisae in front - provided for the transfer of unbroken sarisae to the fore. I'd suggested this at Gabiene which drew comment. Here the argyraspides form into a tactical sqaure when harrassed by Peithon's cavalry. Having just been involed in driving Antigonus' phalanx from the field - a phalanx pursuit of sorts where "they were not to be checked in their charge" - one would suggest that not a few sarisae will have been broken. As well, the formation of that square will have certainly required men not in the front ranks to become so along with men whose sarisae had been broken or lost. Here weapons surely were passed to the "fronts" to present the deterent of spears.

Few descriptions of the phalanx in battle suggest anything in this regard. Two that do are the defence at Atrax and Sellasia. During the former Livy (likely based on Polybios) writes (32.17):

[Flamininus] sent on cohort after cohort to break through, if possible, the massed body of Macedonians, which they call the phalanx. But in the narrow space-for the breach in the wall was by no means a wide one-the kind of weapon he used and his style of fighting gave the enemy an advantage. When the serried Macedonian ranks presented their enormously long spears it was like a shield-wall, and when the Romans after fruitlessly hurling their javelins, drew their swords they could not get to close quarters, nor could they hack off the spear-heads; if they did succeed in cutting or breaking any off, the splintered shafts kept their places amongst the points of the uninjured ones and the palisade remained unbroken.

Here, guarding a breach in the city wall and in great depth, the phalanx presents a "shield wall" flush with sarisa points. The Romans evidently attempt to hack off the sarisa heads but find splintered shafts in their place. The phalanx is almost certainly is "synaspismos" and totally closed up in defence. I'd suggest that this would prevent a transfer of fresh sarisae from the rear. Makes one wonder if the deterrent would be the same in offense on a regular battlefield - splinters aren't about to penetrate armour.

Polybios mentions a contentious procedure at Sellasia (2.69.9)

At length Antigonus ordered a charge in close order [sumphraxantes tas sarisas] and in double phalanx [epallelou phalaggos idiomati]; the enormous weight of this peculiar formation proved sufficient to finally dislodge the Lacedaemonians from their strongholds.

Here Doson has been forced back downhill by Kleomenes' phlalnx. The Macedonians stop the Spartans and Doson orders them to "close up their sarsas" in the "peculiar double phalanx" and deliver a "charge" and "thrust out" (epallelou phalaggos idiomati, bia prospesontes exeosan) the Spartans. A suggestion that this means the rear phalanx interposes into the forward phalanx, whilst bringing fresh men and sarisae to the fore, is seductive. That, though, is countermanded by the fact that these phalanges are already in this formation at 2.66.9:

Owing to the narrowness of the ground, the Macedonians were arranged in a double phalanx, one close behind the other (diphalaggian epallēlon tōn Makedonōn)...

Polybios uses epallelon consistently as "one close behind the other" throughout (11.11.7, 12.18.5) when referring to cavalry and infantry and this is clearly what is meant. The object of closing up is the sarisae. Perhaps the double phalanx compacted from the rear, man on man ("man press'd helmet"), as it is difficult to see it thrusting the Spartans uphill in the tightest formation of "locked shields".

Bit like a modern account not bothering to tell us how magazines are removed and replaced, triggers are squeezed and hammers cocked on guns, etc...

For Scott / Rocktupac:

I have totally forgotten about you question(s) to me regarding the "charge" of the phalanx. I can only plead untrustworthy memory due to being 35. Oops... seems dyslexia comes with it as well. Apologies for the rudeness.

In the above two instances of Gabiene and Sellasia two differing descriptions are provided. At gabiene Diodorus describes the argyraspides as being sumphraxantes or "packed closely" and as "falling upon" (epipesontes) those set against in a violent (biaioteron) manner. This coheres with Plutarch's "fell upon them in a rage" and one supposes it was not at a slow walk but somewhat quicker and with some rather seriously deadly intent.

At Sellasia the Macedonians stop the Spartans and then return serve - uphill. Here (as above) they violently thrust or force back the spartans and off the mountain and their fortress / stronghold (bia prospesontes exeosan ton okhuromaton tous Lakedaimonious).

In both cases the suspect is a word variously translated as "fall upon" (or attack). In both cases that is forceful and violent. Prospesontes is also used by Polybios at Raphia (5.84.8-9). Here Antiochus rides around the elphant battle on Ptolemy's left and charges or falls upon (prospesontes) Ptolemy's cavalry. Inside (that is, the other side) of the elephants the Greek thureophoroi also charge / fall upon (prosepontes) Ptolemy's guard troops of the agema and peltasts. Clearly the cavalry presopontes is a charge. What then of the Greek mercenaries?

Most of the technicalities of your post, Paralus, are unfortunately beyond me, but I'm having serious difficulty in envisaging the formation of the phalanx. I'm probably being dense, but perhaps you could enlighten me.

Your earlier quote from Polybius says that the men were positioned 3 feet apart. If this means that the rows were 3 feet apart (I am presuming that the phalanx was not a hollow square and Polybius is not refering to the sides), if the men were standing directly behind each other, 3 foot would allow room for the butt in front. Yet if they were standing behind each other, the sarissas would have to be held at different angles or different heights to clear the sarissa in front. Polybius' description suggests the sarissas were held level, rather than angled. If they were angled the fifth row would be virtually upright, rendering them ineffective until the rear rows moved forward to fill holes in the front rows. Yet the Pompey mosaic of Gaugamela does show spears or sarissas held almost upright, possibly though these men are not the phalanx or are on the move. However, if the sarissas were held level in 5 rows and the men were directly behind each other, the 5th row would have to be holding theirs at shoulder level, surely reducing their effectiveness.

The other options are offsetting the rows, or a chequer-board formation. If you offset the rows so that each man is standing slightly to the left or right of the man in front, this would give a serrated edge to the front of the phalanx. If the row behind were positioned slightly to the left, they would be able to avoid the butt of the man in front and move up closer than 3 foot. Perhaps 5 rows was the maximum before the next man on the front row. This would give a fairly dense penetrative force. If the rows were offset to the right, or to the right and left giving a wedged front to the phalanx, the presentation of the sarissas wouldn't be as dense. I am less certain how a chequer-board pattern would work. If the men of the second row stood between the men of the first row, the third and fourth row sarissas would would protrude either side of the second row, but to accommodate a fifth and sixth row, the men of the first row would have to be quite widely spaced. An offset to the left would produce the densest front, but would it be effective?

Am I unnecessarily overcomplicating this? Or was the phalanx not a square but a wedge?

Alexias wrote: Most of the technicalities of your post, Paralus, are unfortunately beyond me, but I'm having serious difficulty in envisaging the formation of the phalanx. I'm probably being dense, but perhaps you could enlighten me.

A time machine would be most handy.

Alexias wrote: …Polybius says that the men were positioned 3 feet apart. If this means that the rows were 3 feet apart (I am presuming that the phalanx was not a hollow square and Polybius is not refering to the sides), if the men were standing directly behind each other, 3 foot would allow room for the butt in front

This is where matters become “technical” and mind numbing at times. We have Polybios and the “Tacticians”. Without going into the provenance of the tactical “manuals”, they represent the “ideal” phalanx and in this world everything is mathematically, geometrically and physically perfect. Polybios writes from some experience and is the source for some of the Tacticians’ writings.

Polybios describes three orders (the “marching” or open order is at 18.29.9) of the phalanx; ditto the Tacticians. When Polybios says that a man occupies three feet he means both rank and file (so square). At the above quoted passage he is describing the normal Macedonian phalanx in “close order” for attack. He also describes, as you’ve said, some three feet of sarisa shaft to the rear of a phalangite.

Almost always used in a defensive formation is the “locked shields” (or “compact”) formation. In this formation the phalangites occupied only one and a half feet – again, square as Aelian (Tact. 11) makes plain:

The close order takes place when the commander contracts his distances and diminishes the extent of the phalanx, closing rank and file that is lessening both its length and depth; yet still leaving room for locomotion. The joining of shield to shield, or compact order, is effected when the entire phalanx is contracted still further in length and depth; so that on account of the contiguity of soldier to soldier, they cannot incline either to the right or to the left.

Thus the phalangites close up both by ranks (depth) and files (width). Both Polybios and the Tacticians attest to this procedure and so we presume that the phalangites were able to accommodate the protruding ends of the sarisa – most likely by the crabbing as you’ve alluded to (offset).

Funnily enough, Aelian claims that the pike could be held close to the butt (Tact. 15) and it is possible that this would be case in “locked shields”. It is also possible that this is what Polybios means at Sellasia: here the ranks of the rear of the “diphalangia” close up from behind, the sarisa being held closer to the rear.

Alexias wrote: Yet the Pompey mosaic of Gaugamela does show spears or sarissas held almost upright, possibly though these men are not the phalanx or are on the move. However, if the sarissas were held level in 5 rows and the men were directly behind each other, the 5th row would have to be holding theirs at shoulder level, surely reducing their effectiveness.

Polybios describes the sarisa as being “couched” or held in both hands for the attack. I can only assume the offsetting described above.

As for the “Alexander Mosaic”, the widely accepted view is that those are indeed the sarisae of the Macedonians – Sekunda even notes the bands at the joining of the heads and shafts (although Badian maintained they were Persian) . That they are projecting over the Persian indicates they are of the sixth rank and further back.

Thanks for that. The only problem with an offset formation to the left is that it would leave the right side of the phalanx exposed to attack. Presumably they would have to have a slightly different formation here.

BTW, I am not so sure about unbroken sarissas being passed forward to the men at the front. I could see it working occasionally in very close formation where there wasn't much room for manouever, but it wouldn't do a lot for the team spirit of the phalanx if the men at the front were doing all the hard work, taking all the risks, while the men at the rear were standing around weaponless.

If you watch the battle of Gaugamela in the Alexander movie they actually have some very good visuals of what an infantry unit is capable of pulling off in the field. I went through many many hours of drill in the navy and we had a lot of different formations that can be called out and executed very quickly, assuming the unit has the proper skills. Its very complex and actually quite amazing to watch if you see a skilled drill unit in action. The dicipline is outstanding. I bet you could find some interesting formations doing different routines online somewhere. The armies have changed dramatically since Alexanders time but when it comes to drill, all the fundamentals are still there. If you watch the units in the movie closely they go from a standard straight formation to an oblique left wedge in one maneuver. Which is pretty difficult, and I would guess they spent a lot of time pulling that off as well as they did. They had to have had a skilled team and not just extras for something like that.

And I'm sorry for butting in with my semi~pointless post. Butt I thought since the topic of phalanx formations was going on, it might be useful for anyone who has the movie to give the battle a closer look. Its interesting, and well executed for being in a hollywood action flick.
All the best,
Spitamenes.

Thanks for your post - I didn't have time to reply earlier. I will have to watch the movie again as I didn't notice the manoever before. Oliver Stone employed the same ex-soldier as military advisor (Dale something?) that he had used on Platoon, and he had the main actors at a bootcamp for two or three weeks learning to be soldiers, so maybe he had some of the ordinary soldiers, particulary those whom Alexander singled out in his pre-battle speech, there as well learing to drill.

The true test of drill, of course, is whether it withstands the stress of battle, but it must have required a lot of practice, and strength, to wield such a big and cumbersome weapon without impeding each other or stabbing your comrades in the gut with the butt end. What surprises me though is that there must have been a fair amount of room on a battlefield in order for the sarissas in the rear rows to be brought down from an upright to a level position.

It all happens quite fast in the movie, it took me a couple times before I even noticed the movements they were making. Of course, the only thing drills are used for nowdays is soldier discipline. So its not nearly as important now as it was then, therefore, not concentrated on as much. But in alexanders day, all the way up to just a century ago actually, it was a life and death exercise. When the ranks fail is when the battle begins to unfold for the worse. the Macedonians must have been revered for theyre outstanding drill techniques because of how hard it would have been to wield the sarissa with such precision. I remember reading, (but forgot where of course), about how the enemy was trembling just from watching the phalanx transform from march order to battle order in front of they're eyes. It must have been absolutely terrifying to know without a doubt that you would soon be battling such extreemely disciplined soldiers... (Oh to have that time machine mentioned earlier!)

Alexias wrote:Thanks for that. The only problem with an offset formation to the left is that it would leave the right side of the phalanx exposed to attack. Presumably they would have to have a slightly different formation here.

The flanks of the phalanx were always their weakness: external (Cynoscephalae and Raphia for example) or internal (Pydna for example). Thus the external flanks of the phalanx were always protected by medium / light infantry and cavalry (Alexander used the Companions, Agrianians, javelin men, mercenaries, Thracians and other cavalry). Cynoscephalae is a classic example (and why Polybios follows it with his discourse on the phalanx). Here only half the phalanx forms yet stil drives the Romans back toward their encampment with light infantry flank guards. It is only when the Romans get in its rear and the flank support falls away that it is decimated. The other half is torn to pieces by elephants and infantry after cresting the ridge as it is not formed. Raphia also shows what becomes of a phalanx (here the Seleucid cleruchoi and Argyraspides) when its flank is left exposed.

Alexias wrote:BTW, I am not so sure about unbroken sarissas being passed forward to the men at the front. I could see it working occasionally in very close formation where there wasn't much room for manouever, but it wouldn't do a lot for the team spirit of the phalanx if the men at the front were doing all the hard work, taking all the risks, while the men at the rear were standing around weaponless.

That's quite true and why it is only a speculation of mine. Clearly the front ranks of the phalanx were replenished by those behind. This is why the Tacticians stress the importance of the first few ranks and their experience (see Alexander's "mixed phalanx"). Thus when the file leader fell his second in file took his place - obviously sarisa and all. If a section of the phalanx front rank had suffered significant loss / breakage of sarisa then the integrity of the whole is an open question (a hedgehog without bristles is no hedgehog??). The enemy could not be allowed to penetrate the ranks of the phalanx for then internal flanks open up. This clearly occurred at Issos where one divsion (and likey one or more syntagma / speira) suffered severely at the hands of the Greek mercenaries.

Whilst there is definitely evidence for limited weapon replenishment in the cavalry, though, personally, I doubt anyone but Alexander would actually have received another's xyston; in the phalanx, during combat, things might have been just too adjacent and crowded for passing sarissai forward. Nor is a broken pike entirely useless, try being poked in the face with a broom handle, and the end would probably be shivered leaving sharp points of wood, the change in the centre of gravity would necessitate a grip further toward the butt so even broken it would reach quite far forward, ultimately the wielder of a broken weapon would just have to rely on his phalanx mates.

At the Aous it is mentioned by Livy, following Polybios, that the Romans could not hack through the sarissa hafts nor deflect them with their hands; all the instances of the opening of internal flanks come from terrain based disruption only at Magnesia is this not so and there it is the novel and suicidal interspersion of elephants that destroys the formation. We hear of hoplites reduced to using their teeth but never pikemen.

Great quote from Aelian by the way which does seem to imply that in changing to synaspismos the whole phalanx contracts and files are not inserted. This is distinct from the manouevre of Alexander's advance at issos, however, for which I am struggling to provide a powerpoint animation; here's to displacement activity!

agesilaos wrote:Whilst there is definitely evidence for limited weapon replenishment in the cavalry, though, personally, I doubt anyone but Alexander would actually have received another's xyston...

I would not disagree. In the case of cavalry I'd suggest that ilai "charged" as wedges under Alexander and replenishement - if it happened - was at the discretion of whomever was within reach; hetairoi or "groom". I doubt the source material on this latter - mostly Arrian's account of Granicus - because it is Alexander (hero) centric: the king can never be without a weapon. This is especially true of Arrian's account of Granicus. Here, if we are to belive his account, the small Macedonian cavalry arm of the right crossed a river held by 20,000 Persian cavalry. Arrian's entire description of this battle is that of a cavlry encounter won by the "heroic" king who shatters his xyston, asks for another and is saved by Cleutus. Arrian put the Macedonian victory down to their "cornel wood spears". In reality, cavalry battles - as we have them transmitted - were something of a melee (see Gabiene or Raphia) and I seriously doubt the presence of "grooms" in battle. Indeed, I think Heckel correct that at Gaugamela it was the paides basilikoi rather than the hypaspitae basilikoi that killed the chariot drivers along with the hippokomoi ("grooms") at the rear.

That the rest of the Macedonian army of the Granicus (including the Thessalians of the left) took no part is an absolute load of rubbish and clearly a result of the heroising history of Kallisthenes. According to Arrian some 2,000 (or slightly more) Macedonian cavalry destroyed the Persians holding the river - 20,000 strong. Right...

agesilaos wrote:...in the phalanx, during combat, things might have been just too adjacent and crowded for passing sarissai forward.

Clearly, though, replacement of men was expected. This for dead as well as wounded who might fall back and be replaced. Thus I *speculate* the replacement of weapons - if possible. This latter I see only in the "closed for action" (as Polybios says - 3 feet per man) attack formation.

agesilaos wrote:... all the instances of the opening of internal flanks come from terrain based disruption only at Magnesia is this not so and there it is the novel and suicidal interspersion of elephants that destroys the formation. We hear of hoplites reduced to using their teeth but never pikemen.

Absolutely. To this day I do not understand Antiochus' disposition of the phalanx and elephants at Magnesia: it invited disaster and disaster, never one to look a gift elephant in the tusk, sat itself in his front room and drank his best scotch. His charge on the right was successful and drove the Romans back and accross to their camp (this is likely why he could not continue to aid his centre: he'd the Roman camp on his right flank) but just how he saw that elephant riddled phalanx operating I cannot know. Clearly the ground did not suit (there can be no other reason for the phalanx to be deployed thirty-two deep) and he placed his Argyraspides out to the right of his phalanx with cavalry occupying the space inbetween. I've always though Antiochus Megas a decent Hellenistic commander and so there must have been reasons not recorded in what remains of our sources. There are days though...

agesilaos wrote:Great quote from Aelian by the way which does seem to imply that in changing to synaspismos the whole phalanx contracts and files are not inserted. This is distinct from the manouevre of Alexander's advance at issos, however, for which I am struggling to provide a powerpoint animation; here's to displacement activity!

Indeed, the text is clear: contract in width and depth; there is no implication. Aelian does, of course, relate perembole or insertion of files. The fact is that whilst the "Tacticians" relate file insertion and many other evolutions, the only clear description we have of the phalanx in operation (aside from Polybios' splenetic criticism of Kallisthenes where even he says that going down to eight deep from sixteen would double the width) is Philp V at Cynoscephalae who orders his phalanx (and "peltasts"= hypaspists) to "close up to the right and double their depth". The Tacticians clearly describe this (closing to the right) as the right file standing (for they are where they should be) and the other files turning to the right (by rank) and marching to the right before facing front.

Alexander's advance at Issos was a deployment from column into line. This was, indeed, perembole as "lines of infantry were marched from column to the sea and to the mountains" (to paraphrase). Here Alexander gradually marches files of infantry to the right and to the left eventually going from column to triphalangia to diphalangia to files to right and left. In the end it is clear he advances in battle order for quite some time - hence the stops, the dressing of the phalanx line and the "rests". This is exactly what he did at Hydaspes although there he was more concerned with the state of his hypaspists a two phalanx regiments given the approaching battle and the stress of the river crossing.

What's the difference between the paides basilikoi and the hypaspitae basilikoi?

spitamenes wrote:What's the difference between the paides basilikoi and the hypaspitae basilikoi?

The paides basilikoi are the "royal boys" or what are more often referred to as "pages" - the 14 or so old (and upward) sons of the Macedonian nobility.

The hypaspistae basilikoi are another matter. This, "royal hypaspists", is one of the terms used to describe the agema of the hypaspists. The hypaspists are comprised of two corps: the "regular" hypaspists (referred to by Curtius and Diodorus at Gaugamela and post Alexander as the Argyraspides) and the smaller agema which was very often under the immediate command of the king.

Arrian is at his most frustrating when dealing with the hypaspsists and their smaller "lead unit". Very often he will refer to the agema as the somatophylakes: most famous example being the 700 of the "somatophylakes" at 4.30.3 and the "somatophylakes and the hypaspists" 4.3.2. He also calls them hetairoi: Alexander takes Tyre with "his hetairoi" (2.23.6) who are described as "his hypaspists" at 23.4 and confirmed as such at Massaga ("he led up his hypaspists, who had captured Tyre for him in a similar way.. 4.26.6). He also uses the term agema: "[Alexander] took the agema, the hypaspists and the Agrianians..." (1.1.11); Gaugamela - "the agema of the hypaspsists and then the rest of the hypaspists" (3.11.9). Finally he uses Royal hypaspists - most famously in the likely muddled in transmission 5.13.4 where we have a plethora of "royal agemas", foot guards and royal hypaspists.

All as clear as mud.

It is most likely that the agema or hypaspistae basilikoi were the older sons of the nobility (18 +) for every individual named as such is of noble descent. Also Curtius would seem to back this up in describing the death of Lysimachus' brother Philipos (8.2.35-36):

But the king, frequently changing horses, pressed the retreating enemy relentlessly. The young noblemen who formed his usual retinue had given up the chase, all except Philip, the brother of Lysimachus, who was in the early stages of manhood and, as was readily apparent, was a person of rare qualities. Incredibly, Philip kept up with the king on foot although Alexander rode for 500 stades.

"Early stages of manhood" would neatly describe a young fellow of the age of 18 or so as with the Athenian ephebe.

The best discussion of this is Heckel's "Somatophylakia: The Macedonian Cursus Honorum" which I have if any are interested.

--------------------- by spitamenes » Mon Apr 18, 2011 11:08 pm

It all happens quite fast in the movie, it took me a couple times before I even noticed the movements they were making. Of course, the only thing drills are used for nowdays is soldier discipline. So its not nearly as important now as it was then, therefore, not concentrated on as much. But in alexanders day, all the way up to just a century ago actually, it was a life and death exercise. When the ranks fail is when the battle begins to unfold for the worse. the Macedonians must have been revered for theyre outstanding drill techniques because of how hard it would have been to wield the sarissa with such precision. I remember reading, (but forgot where of course), about how the enemy was trembling just from watching the phalanx transform from march order to battle order in front of they're eyes. It must have been absolutely terrifying to know without a doubt that you would soon be battling such extreemely disciplined soldiers... (Oh to have that time machine mentioned earlier!)----------------------


You may remember Thucidides's book "Fifth", paragraph 66....

system1988 wrote:--------------------- by spitamenes » Mon Apr 18, 2011 11:08 pm

It all happens quite fast in the movie, it took me a couple times before I even noticed the movements they were making. Of course, the only thing drills are used for nowdays is soldier discipline. So its not nearly as important now as it was then, therefore, not concentrated on as much. But in alexanders day, all the way up to just a century ago actually, it was a life and death exercise. When the ranks fail is when the battle begins to unfold for the worse. the Macedonians must have been revered for theyre outstanding drill techniques because of how hard it would have been to wield the sarissa with such precision. I remember reading, (but forgot where of course), about how the enemy was trembling just from watching the phalanx transform from march order to battle order in front of they're eyes. It must have been absolutely terrifying to know without a doubt that you would soon be battling such extreemely disciplined soldiers... (Oh to have that time machine mentioned earlier!)----------------------


You may remember Thucidides's book "Fifth", paragraph 66....

Hi all, I think that my quote was too laconic and so you have my apologies. While reading spitamenes's comments, the only hint of an army going to battle formation from simply marching I could think of was that of the Lacedemonians during the battle of Manteinia, against the allied forces of Argos and its allies. (book 5 par. 66)

"The next day the Argives and their allies formed in the order in which
they meant to fight, if they chanced to encounter the enemy; and the
Lacedaemonians returning from the water to their old encampment by
the temple of Heracles, suddenly saw their adversaries close in front
of them, all in complete order, and advanced from the hill. A shock
like that of the present moment the Lacedaemonians do not ever remember
to have experienced: there was scant time for preparation, as they
instantly and hastily fell into their ranks, Agis, their king, directing
everything, agreeably to the law. For when a king is in the field
all commands proceed from him: he gives the word to the Polemarchs;
they to the Lochages; these to the Pentecostyes; these again to the
Enomotarchs, and these last to the Enomoties. In short all orders
required pass in the same way and quickly reach the troops; as almost
the whole Lacedaemonian army, save for a small part, consists of officers
under officers, and the care of what is to be done falls upon many."


Of course this is not the Macedonian falanx formation. Another quote that came into my mind was March 326 BC when Alexander thought that the Ratza of Taxila named Ambhi intended to trap him and his army. Thus Alexander gave his army the order to assume battle formations. Unfortunately my time with the pc is limited so I do not have the luxury of mentioning to whom writer, Arrian or Curtius, we owe the mentioning of the Ambhi incident.

To all of you have a nice weekend!