Tactike theoriai – manuals or philosophy

[Xenophon]

Forgive, please, gentle readers, this somewhat tardy response to Agesilaos voluminous posts. The responses would have been quicker if he had posted references, so that I wouldn't waste much time hunting down references. In several instances Agesilaos' memory has played him false. In addition, I had put together responses to his three lengthy ones, but lost the lot due to a power failure. (SIGH!)....back to the drawing board....anyway I have laboriously reconstructed those responses because they are important in the light of Ageilaos' innacuracies.

Agesilaos wrote:

Evidence for the Lack of Training in States other than Sparta

Several authors mention the lack of preparation and organisation in the generality of Greek states.....etc

One can only admire the research, diligence, time and effort that has gone into this post. A pity then that this effort was not put to better use. The lengthy quotes here are all familiar, and they do demonstrate ‘lack of training’, by comparison to professional mercenaries or the aristocratic ‘homioi’/peers or full citizens of Sparta, who could devote themselves full time to soldiering, thanks to their being allocated estates worked by ‘helots’/serfs.
It is not disputed that most ‘hoplites’ were amateur militia, called up when the army was mobilised (which could be quite frequently, and hoplites might get their training from frequent campaigning). It is also not disputed that they were not as well trained individually in use of weapons, or physical fitness, as professionals such as Spartans or mercenaries, or that they were less disciplined and being ‘free’ and democratic, were understandably insubordinate by comparison to the unquestioning obedience prevalent in the Spartan army.
However, that is not what was under discussion, but rather the organisation and structure of the armies of city-states/poleis other than Sparta, and in particular Athens. One of Xenophon’s themes throughout his works is that he thought the Athenian army should be reformed along Spartan lines – he was a conservative and great admirer of all things Spartan, but especially its military. Naturally he plays up Spartan excellence and Athenian ‘bungling’ or amateurishness Similar views were held by Plato ( both Xenophon and Plato were students of Socrates). Since there is little or no disagreement here, I will confine myself to brief comments, putting them in context.

In Agesilaos’ first quote, Xenophon has been describing the Spartan army in the field, its organisation and drill/’taktika’, its camp and finally how the King, supported by two ‘ephors’/elders ensures due deference to the Gods by sacrifices etc. He ends by praising Spartan military efficiency as per the quotation.

In his second quote, supposedly the words of Jason of Pherae, Xenophon is again comparing the pros and cons of professional troops – in this case mercenaries. They are all physically fit men in their prime, whereas citizen militia include teenagers and old men (they seem to have been obliged to serve until 50 or longer) most of whom are not physically fit, as one would expect from a citizen militia.

That ‘dimoirites’ literally means ‘double-share man’ has never been disputed ( nor that ‘dekastateres’ is literally ten-stater man) but as I explained earlier, that does not preclude them from having more responsibility for their increased pay and serving as N.C.O’s – just as in all past and modern armies. In any event, even if such men are not (yet) the half-file leaders etc of the manuals, there are still file leaders (dekadarchs) and half-file leaders (pempadarchs) in hoplite armies – and not just Spartan ones – as referred to by Xenophon.

The remaining Xenophon quotations are merely examples of him unfavourably comparing the abilities of trained professionals to less trained amateurs etc ( Athenian Generals were elected, and sometimes had little command experience, though of course they had served as soldiers all their lives like other hoplites and probably held junior commands – which I shall return to later.)
Notwithstanding these general criticisms, Athenian commanders performed very well on occasion, and Spartan ones very poorly, so the question of amateur v professional was not clear cut.

Plato’s views as can be seen were very similar, including the amusing anecdote of the ‘hoplomachus’/skill-at-arms trainer or martial artist embarrassing himself with his ‘dorudrepanon’/sickle-spear. In Plato’s ideal city-state, the citizens would take a more serious approach to matters military. In his debate between Nicias and Laches, a valuable point is made that ‘weapon skills’ as taught by ‘hoplomachoi’ are useful in individual fighting, but are of less use in massed fighting in phalanx.

Aristotle, writing in Philip of Macedon’s day ( he was a tutor to Alexander) is making the point that other states now fielded ‘professionals’ fully trained, whether citizens like the 1,000 regular Argives of 421 BC, or the ‘sacred company’/hieros lochos of the Thebans prominent in the 370’s BC ( but whose antecedents went back to the Persian Wars), or states like Elis, Arcadia or indeed Philip’s own well trained Macedonians, or the increasing numbers of professional mercenaries, and hence the old Spartan advantage no longer prevailed.

This section of Agesilaos’ post, whilst of interest in giving insight into the attitudes of Athenian would-be military reformers is not really relevant to Agesilaos’ original assertion which readers might recall was :

“...in Athens we know of no rank below ‘taxiarch’, which signifies the commander of one of the tribal taxeis of 1,000, [June 9, repeated June 13 et seq for discussion]
...and...
“...the Athenians did not organise below this level, of course they lined up in files, but there was no formal structure therein.”

....which brings us back to the current subject :-
Athenian Lochoi
Let me begin by saying that Agesilaos’ methodology is flawed – he starts with the conviction that there were no ranks below ‘taxiarch’ in Athens, and no formal structure/organisation in the Athenian army and then seeks ‘evidence’ to support this conviction. When he encounters evidence to the contrary, he ‘explains it away’ by “special pleading” – that is, the arbitrary introduction of new or ad hoc elements to isolate the example, as here...
It is better to adopt the opposite approach – obtain and examine all the evidence, or as much as one can, and only then reach logical conclusions, instead of these examples of “special pleading”.

“The two examples you give are not examples of any more than that Athenians understood that a ‘lochos’ was a body of armed men; the Herodotean example is explicitly one of an ad hoc formation with its leader being termed ‘lochagos’ (in the Ionic form) in a general sense, similarly the reference to Lamachos’ lochoi....

....Is conditioned by the alliteration as much as anything and again need not mean anything more technical than ‘armed bands’; Lamachos is a general and Dikaiopolis an irreverent citizen, he is more likely to be disparaging the Athenian army than detailing its organisation.”

Cetainly ‘lochos’ was a generic term for ‘company’ or ‘band’ which could consist of as few as 24 men ( and later a file of 16) up to many hundreds of men. In Herodotus’ example the Athenian ‘lochos’ consisted of 300 picked men under a ‘lochagos’/company commander called Olympiodorus. Herodotus doesn’t say whether the ‘picked men’ were an elite unit of the army, and certainly doesn’t say they were selected on the spot ad hoc, and that they then decided to appoint a leader called a ‘lochagos’, which was ( according to Agesilaos) not a rank in their army !

Lammachus was a real Athenian General, later to take part in the Sicilian expedition where he was killed. In the play Lammachus appears and Dicaeopolis says :
“Oh, Lamachus, great hero! Your crest/plumes and your ‘lochoi’ terrify me.” [Aristophanes “Acharnians” 575]
....which would make no sense if there were no sub-units called ‘lochoi’ in the army, and that the word is used for mere poetic effect !
Moreover, Plutarch refers to Lammachus rebuking a ‘lochagos’, who replies that he won’t do it again, to which Lammachus retorts that there are no second chances in war,[Moralia 186 F] and the ‘special pleading’ applied to Aristophanes won’t apply here.

Agesilaos does the same sort of “special pleading” when referring to Aristotle’s Athenian constitution – the appointment of ‘lochagoi’ must be post Chaeronaea - but in fact Aristotle discusses the constitution all the way back to Theseus’ time ! He tells us that the division into 10 tribes ( hence 10 tribal ‘taxeis’) took place under Cleisthenes [in 510 BC], and at 61.1 tells us :
“They also elect by show of hands all the military officers—ten Generals[Strategoi], formerly one from each tribe, but now from all the citizens together, and the vote decides the assignment of duties to these......[goes on to explain duties of current generals].... They also elect by show of hands ten Regimental Commanders[taxiarchs], one of each tribe; these lead their fellow-tribesmen and appoint company-commanders [lochagoi].”

It is the method of choosing the Generals and their duties that has changed in the ‘reformed’ constitution, not the Colonels/Taxiarchs or company commanders/lochagoi.

Similarly, Athenian mercenaries are organised into ‘lochoi’ – but not citizen troops according to Agesilaos, but nowhere are we ever told this nor is it implied. This is yet another example of “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence”. However it turns out there IS evidence.

It is evident from his quotations that Agesilaos consulted Xenophon’s “Memorabilia”, but he apparently overlooked the following, where Xenophon explicitly tells us that Athenian citizen troops were organised into ‘taxeis’ and ‘lochoi’. [ Easily done when one is not reading through the whole thing]. Socrates has advised a young man to go and learn about generalship, which he does, and on his return he is asked questions :-
“But,” he continued, “in order that any one of us who may happen to command a regiment [taxis]or company[lochos] under you may have a better knowledge of warfare, tell us the first lesson he gave you in generalship. “The first was like the last,” he replied; “he taught me’ tactika’/drill — nothing else.” [Xen: Memo III.1.5]
...and....
[III.1.7-8 . ]
“It is well to understand ‘tactika’/drill too; for there is a wide difference between right and wrong disposition of the troops, just as stones, bricks, timber and tiles flung together anyhow are useless, whereas when the materials that neither rot nor decay, that is, the stones and tiles, are placed at the bottom and the top, and the bricks and timber are put together in the middle, as in building, the result is something of great value, a house, in fact.”
“Your analogy is perfect, Socrates,” said the youth; “for in war one must put the best men in the van and the rear, and the worst in the centre, that they may be led by the van and driven forward by the rearguard.”
C.f. Cyropaedia VI.3.25 and Cyropaedia VII.5.4 for exactly the same recommendations and analogies.

This clear understanding of organisation and drill does not suggest Agesilaos’ view of Athenian lochoi as mere irregular ‘armed bands’, but rather a regular phalanx organised into files with the best men at front and rear – recommended also in the Hellenistic ‘Technike Taktika’/drill manuals.

So let us summarise the evidence [so far]regarding Athenian sub-units from the Persian Wars – Herodotus is the earliest Greek historian – to the Macedonian/Hellenistic era:
 Acharnae stele oath of the Athenians, probably referring Marathon [490 BC] refers to sub-units

“Oath which the Athenians swore when they were about to fight against the barbarians.

I shall fight while I live, and I shall not put life before being free (eleutheros), and I shall not desert the taxiarchos/Colonel nor the enomotarchs/lieutenants , neither while they live nor when they are dead, and I shall not depart unless the officers /hegemones,[ possibly file leaders?] lead the way, and I shall do whatever the generals /strategoi command, ....”

Other Athenian oaths refer to‘hegemones/officers in the plural, indicating that there were sub-units of the ‘taxis’ also. ( Agesilaos didn’t address this evidence that I referred to)

 Herodotus IX.21 refers to Plataea [479 BC]and mentions Olympiodorus, a lochagos who commands a lochos of ‘picked men’, 300 strong

 Aristophanes “Acharnians” 575 ( see above) [425 BC] during the Peloponnesian Wars refers to General Lammachus commanding ‘lochoi’.

 Lammachus also rebukes an Athenian ‘lochagos’ in Plutarch’s Moralia [186F]

 Xenophon makes frequent mention of ‘lochoi’ and ‘lochagoi’ in his works generally, implying hoplites were all organised into such units, especially mercenaries and specifically refers to Athenian citizen troops organised into ‘taxeis’ and ‘lochoi’ [memorabilia III.1.5 ]

 Similarly, Aristotle,writing in Philip and Alexander’s day refers to Cleisthenes reforming Athens into ten tribes in 510 BC, and goes on to refer to the ten tribal ‘taxeis’, and the taxiarchs appointing ‘lochagoi’.

Doubtless other examples could be found by a more thorough search of the source material, but this should more than suffice.

By way of indirect evidence, it seems ALL hoplite armies were organised into ‘lochoi’ – at least all I can find reference to, including Thebes [ e.g. Xen Hell:VII.4.36 ], Mantinea, Argos, and Elis.

At Athens the picture is a consistent one, she sent out at various times field armies of up to 16,000 hoplites ( Plataea and Chaeronea), but had a total including young and old of around 30,000 ( beginning of Peloponnesian war). These were divided before 500 BC into ten ‘tribal’ regiments of 1000-3,000 hoplites, ( depending on the size of the call-up) and evidently sub-divided into ‘lochoi’ /companies and ‘enomotia’/platoons and ultimately files, generally 8 deep, and did so down into the Hellenistic era.
Just as Agesilaos’ reconstruction of the Cyropaedia’s ‘dinner drill’ unfortunately turned out to be mistaken in many ways, as he generously agrees, so Agesilaos’ initial assumption about the Athenian lack of units smaller than a ‘taxis’ , upon further joint examination, also falls down partly on common sense, but mainly because it turns out there is evidence of Athenian sub-units and their officers.

I must say I am pleased that by collaboration and joint diligence over searching for evidence, between us we have uncovered the facts about Athenian army organisation, so far as is known from our meagre sources. I must say I prefer this approach of jointly seeking facts to establish truth as per the continental legal system, to adversarial debate in the Engish legal tradition, which this forum is often plagued by.

[Xenophon]

Agesilaos wrote:

An Alternative View

Since there has been a quite reasonable demand for an alternative view of phalanx evolutions I shall give one.
Except that you do no such thing – other than to assert, without referring to a shred of evidence, that the phalanx ‘arrived’ on the battlefield in line and in close order, without a word of explanation of the evolutions it took to get there, or time involved, or distance..or.. anything concrete at all !!

The first thing is to disassociate the hoplite phalanx from the Hellenistic pike phalanx; they were two entirely different animals, not just in weaponry but in ethos.

I would say otherwise. It is readily apparent that the Macedonian phalanx evolved from, and in many ways was similar to, the ages-old hoplite phalanx. There was no ‘watershed’ revolution when Philip’s phalanx evolved.

Hellenistic phalanxes were supplied from central state arsenals, paid and regularly trained; hoplites trained at their whim and supplied, for the most part, their own arms. Only Sparta rose above the general amateur status until the middle third of the Fourth Century.

This is an extremely simplistic view, and in any event incorrect. At the time of the Persian wars this might have been true, but as can be seen from my previous post, there was much evolution between then and Philip of Macedon’s time ( say, roughly from 500 BC to 350 BC ). We see the introduction of ‘peltasts’, initially Thracian tribesmen, but then native Greeks, to take over the function of using servants as makeshift ‘psiloi/light infantry’ throwing javelins. With the Peloponnesian wars and subsequent Greek, Sicilian and Anatolian wars we see the increasing inclusion of ‘missile troops’ such as slingers and archers, and cavalry and in the phalanx itself we see a tendency to lighten equipment as the nature of hoplite warfare changes from citizen militias marching out from their cities for short campaigns, to longer campaigns including overseas expeditions and a gradual shift towards mercenaries ( e.g. the Athenian Sicilian campaign [415 BC] and many others in the fifth century BC; The Ten Thousand[401 BC], and their subsequent employment as Spartan mercenaries ), but the expense of professional mercenaries was the limiting factor, until it actually became a cause of war - the Phocian wars [ 448 BC and 355 BC] when Phocis seized the Delphic treasures to continue paying their mercenaries, and which led to the intervention of Philip into Greece [353 BC].

All this shows an increasing ‘professionalism’ and many more full-time hoplites,and this evolution away from part-time citizen militias occurs throughout the 5 C BC.As Aristotle's comments show, by the 4 C there were plenty of professional forces around, and the Spartan 'advantage' was minimal - their army as a whole was never entirely made up of full-time'Homioi/aristocratic peers, who provided the officers only by Xenophon's time, but contained many part-time citizens like other cities.
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Taking their lead from Sparta, other city states raised ‘professional’ full time forces – I have already mentioned Argos and its ‘thousand’ in 421 BC, and Thebes ‘Hieros Lochos/sacred company’ – but without the ‘Helot’ economy, finding the money to support these ensured they would not rival Sparta’s professionals in numbers. There was also the rise in ‘professional’ mercenaries, employed by every city ( including Sparta from the late 5th C BC – and who by 369 BC included Celtic and Spanish mercenaries loaned by Syracuse!)

So how did the hoplite army enter the field of battle? With as little to do on it, other than fight as possible; the higher officers would decide how deep the line was to be, the troops would assemble that deep and move towards the enemy, there would be the inevitable bunching on encountering obstacles but until the front ranks decided to run the irregularities would be quickly compensated for; once the sprint had started the formation would loosen yielding an advantage to those who resisted the urge to run and maintained their line, which could and did, cause some forces to simply melt away before contact.

This is no explanation at all !! The generals decided the depth and the soldiers would then ‘assemble’ in this depth ? How? The whole point of this discussion is to determine the ‘taktike/drill’, the mechanics of how this occurred. Files were not able to form at any old random depth, but had a ‘fixed’ depth, and overall depth and frontage was governed by the ground and its obstacles, not the whim of a general ! Let us take Agesilaos’ hypothetical ( but as we have seen, wrong ) Athenian army. The 1,000 or more soldiers of a ‘Taxis’ gather in ‘order of blob’ and are told “I’ve decided to fight 12 deep today, so just organise yourselves into groups of twelve [ or 8 or 16 as the case may be]....and, oh, you’d better decide who’s going to stand behind who....and elect a file leader for each file while you are at it....” - impossible! - and then Agesilaos waves a magic wand and transports them to the battlefield duly assembled into a linear phalanx made up of ‘ad hoc’ files! Xenophon tells us only the Spartans were capable of forming ‘ad hoc’ files [Constitution of Lacs: XI.7]

Where is the promised explanation ? How long did this process take ? How was it done ? Deployment alone could take up to an hour or more, assuming the army was organised down to files – which hoplite phalanxes were, as Xenophon and others emphasise over and over, with analogies to houses and bricks etc, or as Aristotle put it; “Without good order the Hoplite arm is worthless” [politics II].

How did the army get to the battlefield from its camp or city or whatever ? [ The Athenian army couldn’t have marched taxis by taxis, which even in close order would be on a front of at least 125 yards....there were no ‘Superhighways’ this wide in ancient Greece!....and such a broad front could not be kept up marching cross-country all day.] If you march on a narrower front, then you necessarily have ‘sub-units’ which must deploy side-by-side from column to form the linear phalanx. Thus we have Spartan ‘enomotia’ one behind the other in column of march, 3 files of 12 wide in ‘open’ order, and after deployment into line they close up to 6 deep for combat [Xen Lak XI.8] and for an actual example of this depth in battle, see Xen.Hell VIII.5.23 where the Spartans at second Mantinea deploy their cavalry “like a phalanx of hoplites in a line six deep.” (i.e. half-files from 12 deep files)

I’d agree that ultimately there would be a deployed phalanx line of, for example, 8,000 odd hoplites in a line typically over 2,000 yards long ( or over 1,000 in Agesilaos world) facing its opponents a couple of hundred yards away...but how did it come about ? This is the whole ‘raison d’etre’ for ‘taktike’/drill and organisation, and it is ignored.....Agesilaos then breezes over the difficulties of advancing around obstacles in close order. Nor do I think any phalanx ‘sprinted’ into battle – a jog or walk would be more like it [ see incredulity at the Athenians ‘running’ at Marathon, or the fact that Spartans ( and others) were said to march in step, or the ‘Cyrean’ mercenaries running in a counter-charge to the Theban charge at Coronea [Xen Hell IV.2.5]....I could discuss just this factor alone in depth – pun intended !]

“Only the Spartans are attested to perform any battle field manoeuvres, notably two counter-marches but never is the insertion of half files mentioned.”

Every part of this sentence is completely untrue. Whilst the ‘phalanx tactic’ was to form up in close order in a linear formation, and attack an opponent head-on and hand-to-hand, and this was how most battles were resolved, it is surprising how many involved manoeuvres despite this. [ I can give statistics] Spartans did more on battlefields than just countermarch – see any of their battles, from feigned retreat at Thermopylae; the attempted re-arrangement of the ‘Morai’ at Mantinea, the following outflanking move, and the subsequent wheel to sweep down their opponents line; the same manoeuvre at Nemea; the ‘original’ King Agesilaos’ escape from the Thebans by means of an ‘anostrophe’ near Mantinea [XH VI.5.18] or the failed manoeuvres at Leuktra as just a few examples of many. Nor was it only Spartans who manoeuvred – what of the Athenians double envelopment at Marathon, or their outflanking and surrounding the Thespians at Delium after the collapse of the Boeotian right flank [Thuc IV.96.3] or Epaminondas’ manoeuvres of the Thebans at Leuktra and second Mantinea [362 BC] and I can literally name dozens of hoplite battles decided by one side outflanking another.....

In his general historical works, Xenophon was not really able to go into technical details of drill and ‘taktika’ – other than casual references such as Spartan hoplites fighting 6 deep at second Mantinea above - and so wrote of these in the fictional “Cyropaedia”, according to J.K. Anderson ( Military Theory and Practice In The Age Of Xenophon” ch VI Tactical Training P.96) and I entirely agree. The “Cyropaedia” provides Xenophon’s thoughts on ‘taktike’ for Hoplites, but Agesilaos here makes no reference to it. In it, Xenophon describes hoplite drill, including forming up in half-files ( see my earlier Diagram several posts ago), with a ‘pempadarch’/half-file leader [ also called pentadarch] bringing up the rear half-file. This is very explicit, and, one might think, a conclusive reference to ‘close order/pyknosis’ being formed by bringing up half-files. This is also consistent with the hoplite ‘customary’ battle formation 4 deep in the “Anabasis”[I.2.15]. Diodorus too refers to a Spartan phalanx formed 4 deep [Diodorus XIII.72.6]. Xenophon also provides at least one other reference, mentioned above, to hoplite combat by half-files – at second Mantinea, when he tells us the Spartans “...had drawn up their cavalry like a phalanx of hoplites in a line six deep....”[ The Spartans formed in files of twelve at this time, this slight increase in depth perhaps being a reaction to the massively deep Theban columns.]

Just as every army before and since, whole units deployed on the flank of other whole units, in combat order long before they were likely to be struck by the enemy; at Mantinea the Spartans halted when the enemy were but 100 yards away, for a sacrifice, it is inconceivable that they were not already in battle order.

Yes, the ‘enomotia/platoons’ of a hoplite army deployed beside one another, to the left of the agema of a column of march [ e.g. Xen “Constitution of the Lacedaemians” XI].At 100 yards or so apart, I would expect the phalanx to have closed up into ‘pyknosis/close order’ of half-files, as per Xenophon and the diagram I posted and typically be four deep, or six deep for the later Spartan depth we are told of, so there is no disagreement on that score. This would occur after any light troops in front of the phalanx had withdrawn through the ‘open order’, which would have been impossible after ‘closing up’, with the hoplites shields pretty much touching and effectively being a solid wall.
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If by ‘whole units’ you mean your hypothetical whole ‘taxeis’, then I would heartily disagree, for even in close order [ on a front of at least 125 yards in close order, 250 yards in ‘open’ ] these would necessarily have to be in smaller units. As Xenophon tells us, it is in platoons/enomotia 30-40 strong that the Spartans deployed, in ‘open’ order. [ This has to be so, for the Laconian and other counter-marches could not be performed otherwise. Modern marching bands also use this method to reverse their formation, turning around and moving down the open order 'lanes'. The Spartans used it if an enemy approached from the rear to reverse their deployed phalanx. The Athenians, also organised in sub-units of ‘lochoi/companies’ and ‘enomotia/platoons,’ must have deployed similarly – and probably all phalanxes did.

Also, you have misremembered about Spartan sacrifices on the verge of battle. Thucydides makes no mention of this at Mantinea [Thuc V.63-75]. At Plataea, Pausanias sacrificed repeatedly, whilst his men endured long-range Persian archery, sitting or crouched behind their shields [Herodotus IX.61 ], so therefore at a distance of the order of 100 yards or so, and Xen refers to this customary sacrifice of a goat by the King when the “enemy being near enough to see”[Xen Lacedaemonians XIII.8]

No contemporary mentions intervals at all although several depths are mentioned Xenophon has the 10,000 form up four deep for Cyrus’ review I 2 xv

I have given a number of instances where Xenophon refers to intervals, or intervals have of necessity to be inferred for the evolutions described. In reality the “several” depths boil down to the almost universal 8, two occasions when cramped terrain forces a ‘double’ phalanx 16 deep, and the Spartans late change to a file depth of 12. The exception is the Thebans who on 3 occasions form a phalanx 25 or 50 deep ( which deep formations don’t actually break an opposing phalanx)

ἐκέλευσε δὲ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὡς νόμος αὐτοῖς εἰς μάχην οὕτω ταχθῆναι καὶ στῆναι, συντάξαι δ᾽ ἕκαστον τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ. ἐτάχθησαν οὖν ἐπὶ τεττάρων:
He ordered the Greeks to form their lines and take their positions just as they were accustomed to do for battle, each general marshalling his own men. In fact they formed the line four deep:

You offered up this translation earlier, suggesting that the ‘oun’ should be translated this way, but I cannot find any other translation which agrees with yours, which clearly distorts the meaning – indeed implies the opposite.

Brownson ( Loeb and LSJ) has:
“He ordered the Greeks to form their lines and take their positions just as they were accustomed to do for battle, each general marshalling his own men. So they formed the line four deep,”

The on-line Fordham university translation has:
“...He ordered the Hellenes to draw up their lines and post themselves in their customary battle order, each general marshalling his own battalion. Accordingly they drew up four-deep.”
This appears to be the Daykins translation from project Guthenberg.

Rex Warner ( Penguin) has:
“...stand in their normal battle order; each officer should see to the order of his own men. So they stood on parade in fours.”
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An older translation by Thomas Clark 1859 has an exact literal translation of this, word by word:

“He ordered the Greeks [so to be arranged/so to be marshalled] as [was the custom] for them in battle, and to stand in such order, but that each[ commander] was to arrange each of them of himself [ his own men]. They were therefore arranged in fours [arranged four deep]”

I also consulted a friend who has studied Greek, and she says your translation is rather forced, and does not convey the context/meaning correctly.

Not to put too fine a point on it, Agesilaos appears to have consciously or unconsciously distorted the translation so as to support his argument, and any of the above translations are to be preferred.
This is, of course, entirely consistent with the ‘dinner drill’ diagram, which ends up in close order of half-files, 4x4.

and eight deep for a meeting VII 1 xxiii


οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν ταττόμενοι οἵ τε ὁπλῖται ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ εἰς ὀκτὼ ἐγένοντο καὶ οἱ πελτασταὶ ἐπὶ τὸ κέρας ἑκάτερον παρεδεδραμήκεσαν
The men acted as their own marshals, and within a short time the hoplites had fallen into line eight deep and the peltasts had got into position on either wing.

Which is exactly what we would expect. The Ten Thousand used files 8 deep, and that is how they normally form up/fall in, only closing up to half-files for actual fighting, as elsewhere.

We also find the Allies at Nemea fixing on a depth of sixteen, with the Thebans going deeper still..

This was dictated by the size of the battlefield, which was the main factor in deciding depth, the idea being not to leave an open flank. Why 16 and not some other number? Because the hoplites were organised in files of 8, so what we have here is one file of 8 behind another, a double phalanx.

.... and Epaminondas forming up fifty deep at Leuktra, depth clearly mattered and this is not a question of ‘line versus column’, which is a horse and musket debate concerning the fire power of the line v the shock value of a column; this is a case of deep and shallow phalanxes fighting in the same way with the same weapons; the Spartans had no missiles to hurl at the oncoming Thebans other than sharp words. Nor were the Greeks alone in finding depth beneficial, when pikes returned to general use we find them fighting in great depth, fifty being typical even when developments in firearms led to less massive pike blocks they generally still formed and fought ten deep.

If you think ‘line versus column’ is a horse and musket debate only, you are sadly mistaken – it has applied all through military history, and if you think that depth is a good thing in hoplite warfare, I suggest you read all of Xenophon, who was a real Hoplite general. His views on depth are quite scathing, see e.g. Cyropaedia VI.3.22:-
“And do you think, Cyrus,” said one of the generals, “that drawn up with lines so shallow we shall be a match for so deep a phalanx?” ( the lochoi are drawn up in files 12 deep, which would fight 6x6 in close order)
“When phalanxes are too deep to reach the enemy with weapons,” answered Cyrus, “how do you think they can either hurt their enemy or help their friends?
[23] For my part, I would rather have these hoplites who are arranged in columns a hundred deep drawn up ten thousand deep; for in that case we should have very few to fight against. According to the depth that I shall give my line of battle, I think I shall bring the entire line into action and make it everywhere mutually helpful.”

....and he was right, of course, because in fact no Theban column broke through a Spartan line. At Tegyra, after the fall of their leaders, the Spartans deliberately opened up to let the Theban column escape, and at Leuktra, similarly it was the death of the King and the leading Spartiates around him that caused the Spartans to fall back – the Theban column did not break the Spartan line, 6 deep. At Second Mantinea, the Thebans caused the Mantineans to flee before contact, but the battle ended in a draw when Epaminondas was killed.

It is simply fallacious to assume that formations cannot move over real terrain other than in open order; Napoleonic units formed on a 22 inch frontage per man and manoeuvred quite happily over the fields of Europe, the ancient hoplite would have 36 inches according to the manuals (though there is no reason IMHO to apply their dictats to hoplite militia) are we to assume that obstacles have shrunk or that men have become less clumsy? If one group can cope with battlefield conditions then so can the other, without recourse to ‘half-file insertion.

I did not say that it was “impossible” to move in a long line in close order cross-country, merely that it is much easier, depending on the terrain, to move in ‘open order’, and this is what our evidence suggests happened. ( the fact that counter marches could take place proves that the phalanx formed initially in ‘normal/open order’, as does the need for light troops to withdraw through a phalanx), and for the easier dealing with obstacles such as trees etc in the advance to contact by lines over a kilometre long. From the 18 C on through the Napoleonic wars 'Light Infantry' also fought in 'open order' and without the need, as the phalanx had, to form a solid 'wall' of shields and men, in the 'Age of Reason' gaps could be left between units in order to maouevre cross country [ look at any prints]

The picture is somewhat different when we come to the sarissa phalanx: despite some agglomeration of earlier material it is these that the Taktikeis largely treat. Here we hear of a ‘marching order’ (which has no name, but as the most open is seen as the starting point for the theoretical discussion of the various intervals), compact order (pyknosis ; not used in a technical sense by any Classical writer) and ‘synaspismos’ ( also never used of a type of formation). We shall tackle these later as there is more evidence for the Hellenistic pike phalanx.

Once again this is simply incorrect – or rather perhaps depends on what you mean by ‘technical’ sense. A number of technical words are used to describe hoplite formations and evolutions, including ‘syntatagme’/put into battle array used by Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon [c.f. syntagma]; similarly ‘paratategme’/ post side by side, draw up in battle order; ‘synaspidou/synaspismos’ and other variations, meaning close order or locked shields – the two terms were synonymous for hoplites with 3 ft or so diameter shields, and is also used by all three [e.g. Xen Hell VII.4.22]; and ‘pyknothta/pyknosis etc’ drawing close, close order, locked shields [e.g. Thuc V.71] - the famous passage about the 'rightward drift'.

edited to add postscript:
P.s. another reference to the "usual sacrifice of a goat" is at Nemea whe it occurred with the enemy less than 200 yards away [Xen Hell IV.2.20}.....but I still don't see how this has any relevance to order of deployment, given the proximity of the enemy on each occasion, I'd agree that they were likely in Battle/close order, which isn't to say they weren't in 'open' order earlier.

[Xenophon]

Agesilaos wrote:

Another View of the Evolutions of the Macedonian Pike Phalanx

Whereas we can only extrapolate from the battle descriptions and artistic depictions of the earlier spear armed phalanx, when it comes to the Hellenistic pike phalanx, we also have the three ‘manuals’ which are the subject of this thread.

A bad, and incorrect start, for as we have seen Xenophon's 'Cyropaedia' in particular provides a kind of 'technike taktika', as well as references in his other works.

We can be reasonably certain that the Macedonians marched in an open formation on a four cubit (6 ft) frontage per file as Polybios uses this spacing for his botched dissection of Kallisthenes’ account of Alexander’s advance upon the Pinaros; this does not mean that Alexander used this order in this instance, of course only that a practical soldier knew it was the appropriate interval for marching.

Aren’t you overlooking that all the manuals also prescribe this distance as the ‘natural/normal order i.e. ‘open order’? And that at least one version of the manuals claims to cover the hoplite period also ?

As Paralus has noted there was more than one way to compact the phalanx. ....There are two problems with the translation here, the most important of which concerns the translation of the phrase ‘… paremballontes eis ta metaxu ton hopliton diastemata ek ton en tou bathei epistaton.’ As ‘…by interjecting in the spaces between the soldiers some of the rear-rank-men that constitute the depth’ this distorts what is being said which is that ‘interjecting into the spaces between the soldiers the epistates from those that form the depth.’ The epistates formed the even numbered men in each file as we are told elsewhere (Aelian 5.3, Askl. 2.2-3, Arr 6-7) so the translation ‘rear rank men’ here is somewhat slack as the title has a specific meaning in this context.

A well observed correction ....though it does not change the fact that a file of 16 in open order became two half-files of 8 in close order.

This method is used ‘when we wish to compact the frontage’, ‘pyknosein’ should not be restricted to ‘form pyknosis’, pyknosein never seems to have acquired that dedicated technical meaning.

Also in this section is the method for doubling by depth whereby the even numbered files merge with the odd numbered ones by interlacing. There can be no doubt that Aelian is talking about merging two whole sixteen man files, there is no mention of half files nor does he specify why one would wish to do this. However, since the method for compacting he has just given requires halving the depth and we know from Polybios that ‘marching order’ was on double the fighting frontage, it would make sense to march in double files which could then double by file into a fighting formation one file deep. Circumstantial evidence might be adduced from Alexander’s initial advance on the Pinaros which began thirty-two deep.

That is an assumption, not borne out by Aelian's words. At 29.3 we are told "Whenever we wish to restore them to their initial position [i.e. to open order 16 deep] we order those troops who have been interjected to counter-march to the places they held before." leaves no doubt that he is referring to interjected half-files returning to whole files in open order. It would make no sense at all, nor is there any evidence for, marching in 'double files' 32 deep as the norm - that is a contrivance necessitated by your conviction that fighting took place 16 deep as a general rule.

At Issus, if you stop and think it through, the 32 deep is far more likely to have been the left wing deployed behind the leading right wing - where the terrain was relatively narrow. As the ground opened up, the left wing drew up alongside the right wing [so 16 deep, the norm we are told for a Macedonian type phalanx] and finally "... and lastly, when they were nearing the enemy, eight deep."[Polyb XII.19] i.e. they went into close order half-files of 8 for the assault, just as the manuals say.

The final method is ‘parembole’ which receives one line in chapter 30 of Aelian


Parembole de estin, otan protetagmenon tinon eis ta metaxu diastemata ek ton epitetagmenon kathistontai autois ep’euthias.
It is ‘parembole’ when in the intervals between those posted in front of the formation we post those who had formerly been in the rear, in a straight line.


This is it for parembole which strikes me as a note to make the description complete rather than this being the most common method, Arrian gives a paraphrase of the definition at 26 iv and Asklepiodoros at 10 xvii.

................
Aelian 31 in Devine....

Most of this is alright so far as it goes, but is rather taken out of context. Put simply, the manuals describe three formations; the ‘natural/normal’ one [open order 6 ft frontage]; ‘pyknosis’/close order, used to assault the enemy[ 3 ft frontage]; and ‘synaspismos’/locked shields, a defensive formation [18 ins frontage] made possible by the pikemen’s side-on stance and smaller shields, said to be invented by Philip II. To change from one formation to another was done by filling the intervals between the files. The first method was to bring up the rear half-files, so that ‘pyknosis/close order’ was 8 deep (and in the case of ‘synaspismos/locked shields bringing up the quarter files to 4 deep). This method is described in the manuals , and is the ‘old’ method as per Xenophon and the diagram I posted earlier [called 'parembole/interjection here, not to be confused with 'entaxis/insertion' when light troops occupy the 'lanes'.]

The second, later method is the one Agesilaos describes where every second man[epistates] in the file steps out and forward to fill the intervals and this ‘new’ method is evidently the one used in late Hellenistic phalanxes. The end result is as before, ‘pyknosis/close order’ 8 deep. This begs the question of what method was used in Philip and Alexander’s day. Given that this was at the start of the pike phalanx era, we might expect that the ‘rear half file’ method was used as before, and this is confirmed when we learn that Alexander’s phalanx contained ‘dimoirites/half-file leaders’ [ the manuals specifically tell us that a ‘dimoirites’ was a half-file leader, regardless of the origins of the name in the hoplite period as literally ‘double pay man’] and quarter file leaders – ‘enomotarchs’.

For the sake of completeness one should mention that in addition to forming 'close order' on the same frontage, there was also a method of closing up by ranks i.e. halving the frontage but retaining the same depth of file [16]. So far as is known, this was only done once, at Kynoskephalae, due to constraints of terrain ( see separate thread)

What the ‘Kyrou Paideia’ says

I hold my hands up to getting the organisation of Xenophon’s fantasy files wrong but that is a side issue (no pun intended), the issue is whether ‘paragoge’ the word used by Xenophon in his dinnertime manoeuvres can mean ‘half-file insertion’ . The answer is no and we can find proof in Polybios’ description of Philopoeman’s cavalry reforms X 23 v

[5] ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἐκτάξεις ἐφ᾽ ἑκατέρων τῶν κεράτων ἢ διὰ παρεμβολῆς ἢ διὰ παραγωγῆς τῆς παρὰ τοὺς οὐραγούς.
next to deploy into line on both wings, either by filling up the intervals in the line (parembole) or by a lateral movement (paragoge) on the rear.


Since the most qualified Greek historian recognises these as two entirely different manoeuvres it would be best to follow his lead.

I would not describe Polybius as the ‘most qualified’ Greek military historian – certainly not more so than Xenophon, an actual General, whilst there is considerable doubt as to whether Polybius served in any active military capacity. I don’t know where Agesilaos gets this translation, [The Perseus one ?] but once again it is ‘forced’ so as to support Agesilaos’ argument. The Loeb has “..filling up the intervals or by bringing up men from the rear"; and alternately there is also “...filling up the intervals or bringing men up the sides into line.”

The LSJ lexicon defines ‘paragw’ and its derivatives thus:
The act of leading by, or up.
in Tactics, march the men up from the side, bring them from column into line, “π. τοὺς ἐπὶ κέρως πορευομένους . . εἰς μέτωπον”X.HG7.5.22, cf. Cyr.2.3.21, An.4.6.6; τὰς [τάξεις] εἰς τὰ πλάγιαib.3.4.14; ἔξωθεν τῶν κεράτων ib.3.4.21.

....and as can be seen, Xenophon uses it in this context a number of times, including the very passage alluded to.

As for the Polybius quote, the LSJ defines ‘paragoge’ the same way :
"in Tactics, deploying from column into line, X.Lac.11.6(pl.), Plb.10.23.5."
I would venture to suggest that these words and meanings are very similar, deriving from the Greek root word ‘para’ = side, or beside and many words derived from it occur in a military context e.g. on a trireme; parablemata/side screens and paraxereisia/side outriggers and on land paratategma/ post side by side, draw up in battle order [used by Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon] as well as' paragoge/deploy from column to line', a.k.a 'paragwgon/leading by or past'. Therefore Xenophon could have used either parembole ( if the word was in use in his day) or paragoge to mean filling up the intervals by bringing up the rear half of the file by the side, but consistently chooses the latter, which was evidently the norm some 200 years before Polybius [ who only uses it this once].

[Xenophon]

The Oath of Plataia

Peter Krentz has argued that this attribution is mistaken and that the oath refers to Marathon, although he is equally emphatic that the ‘enomotiarches’ are Spartan (‘1. A military officer called an enomotarches is well attested for Sparta and only attested for Sparta.’ ‘The Oath of Marathon ,not Plataia?’ Hesperia 76, 2007 pp 731-42).

It would seem that in following Krentz, you make the same mistake he does, namely to assume 'enomotia/platoon' only applied to the Spartan army as a sub-unit of the 'lochos'/company. How many times must it be said ?

"Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence".

I quoted the oath in an earlier post but for convenience will repeat it here:

"“Oath which the Athenians swore when they were about to fight against the barbarians.

I shall fight while I live, and I shall not put life before being free (eleutheros), and I shall not desert the taxiarchos/Colonel nor the enomotarchs/lieutenants , neither while they live nor when they are dead, and I shall not depart unless the officers /hegemones,[ possibly file leaders?] lead the way, and I shall do whatever the generals /strategoi command, ....”

Points to note:
- This stele comes from Athens, and as it specifically says, was sworn by Athenian soldiers ( not a version sworn by Spartans or Plataeans). Why would Athenian hoplites swear to obey junior Spartan officers, but not apparently Plataean ones, or their own?
- The Spartan army did NOT contain 'taxeis' or 'taxiarchs', nor 'strategoi' either, so it cannot be an oath to obey Spartan officers.
Logically this is Athenian soldiers promising to obey their officers from the most junior - enomotarchs/lieutenants to the unit commanders/Taxiarchs and Generals/Strategoi. This is strong evidence that the Athenian army also had sub-units called 'enomotia/platoons'

The Oath may once have been written and sworn in the fifth century BC but the text as we have it is certainly from the fourth and it is the political realities of that age that inform the inscription (Athens and Sparta standing against Thebes, and Plataia stands as the eternal victim of her larger neighbour). I am not convinced by Krentz’s somersaults. Follow the link and make up your own minds.

..and ...
Paralus wrote:

To that you can add the oft-quoted and misleading so called "Decree of Troezen".

That the oath is likely genuine is supported by the existence of other similar Athenian oaths referred to in our sources. The Decree of Troezen was probably carved in the 3 C BC, and purports to record a decree of Themistocles and the Athenian assembly prior to Salamis. It is controversial because some scholars think it 'contradicts' Herodotus - which it doesn't, actually

For our purposes, it doesn't matter if the Oath is genuine, relates to Marathon or Plataea, or comes from the 4 C.....it tells us unequivocally that enomotia existed in hoplite Athenian armies.

[Paralus]

This will be a debate that will consume pages; even more than it already has! Arguments have been called into question and method queried. Xenophon has praised the ‘collaborative’ approach to gathering and assessing the evidence (such as it is) and I agree. Xenophon has also drawn attention to forcing of evidence and translations (though I don’t necessarily sit with the latter). In that vein I offer just a couple from top of my head after a quick read of the recent posts.

Diodorus too refers to a Spartan phalanx formed 4 deep [Diodorus XIII.72.6].

Not at all on my reading. This is to force the evidence to suit a view. At no stage does Diodorus refer to a Spartan phalanx. Further, the bald claim totally ignores the context. Which context is Agis marching his army to the circuit walls of Athens. The actual passage(13.72.3-6) reads as follows:

Agis, the king of the Lacedaemonians, as it happened, was at the time in Deceleia with his army, and when he learned that the best Athenian troops were engaged in an expedition with Alcibiades, he led his army on a moonless night to Athens. He had twenty-eight thousand infantry, one-half of whom were picked hoplites and the other half light-armed troops; there were also attached to his army some twelve hundred cavalry […] When the Athenians learned what had happened, they issued orders for all the older men and the sturdiest of the youth to present themselves under arms. Since these promptly responded to the call, the circuit of the wall was manned with those who had rushed together to meet the common peril; and the Athenian generals, when in the morning they surveyed the army of the enemy extended in a line four men deep and eight stades in length, at the moment were at first dismayed, seeing as they did that approximately two-thirds of the wall was surrounded by the enemy.

This this no normal ‘battlefield’ deployment but rather one against a city – a siege that, in the end, Agis decided against. Secondly, to claim that this represents a Spartan phalanx deploying in an argued ‘regular close order’ of four deep is not correct. Diodorus claims that the four deep formation amounted to eight stades coverage of the circuit wall. This would amount to some 6,472 hoplites four deep and in close order. Diodorus states the infantry was 28,000 strong, half of whom were ‘picked hoplites’. We either assume the other half of the army, un-deployed, sat and watched including the other 7,528 hoplites or that the whole hoplite force deployed in close order (four deep). If the latter then they will have covered something more than 17 stades. It is really nothing more than a gloss to claim that this passage is evidence of Spartan hoplites regularly deploying four deep in close order. Despite Diodorus' seeming internal inconsistencies*, Agis was clearly attempting to cover as much of the circuit wall - or a particular area of it - as possible.

We also find the Allies at Nemea fixing on a depth of sixteen, with the Thebans going deeper still..

This was dictated by the size of the battlefield, which was the main factor in deciding depth, the idea being not to leave an open flank. Why 16 and not some other number? Because the hoplites were organised in files of 8, so what we have here is one file of 8 behind another, a double phalanx.

And that is to ignore other evidence to the contrary. Thukydides has no mathematical problems nor need of any basic file of eight with Theban depths as he demonstrates in his description of Delium (4.96.4):

The Thebans formed twenty-five shields deep (ἀσπίδας δὲ πέντε μὲν καὶ εἴκοσι Θηβαῖοι ἐτάξαντο), the rest as they pleased.

He also notes that the combatants met “at a run” (προσέμειξαν δρόμῳ) a la Marathon.

* Diodorus says the army was 28,000 strong 14,000 of whom were hoplites. This much is not unusual and might correspond well to what were the 'invasion' hoplite levies of the Archidamian War. From there, though, matters go a little astray. Diodorus describes the Athenian strategoi ordering that the circuit walls of Athens be manned. The curtain wall of Athens is something in the order of 6-6.5km (depending upon archaeological argument about the various stages). Diodorus' source is not likely to be talking of the entire wall but rather that from the Phaeleron wall around to the north long wall. This is, roughly speaking, about two thirds of the entire original curtain wall or about 4.3 km. Fourteen thousand hoplites deployed on a four deep close order frontage (3 feet) would occupy some 10,500 feet (3.2 km) or near enough to 17 stades. Roughly two thirds of 4.3 km?? Obviously Agis could not deploy these holplites to cover all the curtain wall outside of the long walls in close order for to do so would necessitate a depth of 2.9 men. The Spartan is most likely covering the area taking in the two 'great gates': the Dipylon and the Archarnian for it is from here that any Athenian response would issue and a resultant forced entry might just be made. If this passage indicates anything, it likely to be that four deep was the lower effective limit of hoplite formations.

**Edited to explain the inconsistencies mentioned in the post.

[Paralus]

The Decree of Troezen was probably carved in the 3 C BC, and purports to record a decree of Themistocles and the Athenian assembly prior to Salamis. It is controversial because some scholars think it 'contradicts' Herodotus - which it doesn't, actually

Other than the fact that Athens was abandoned whilst the Greeks marched to Thermopylae and the fleet sailed to Artemesion.

[agesilaos]

Alot to reply to, but I cannot allow this myth that the Spartans were not shattered by the Theban column at Leuktra to continue. It is true that Xenophon, the arch Lakonophile enters into his own 'special pleading' to say that the spartans must have put up a fight because they would not otherwise have been able to recover the body of Kleombrotos (Hellenika VI ixff for his bowdlerised account). Plutarch 'Pelopidas 20 gives the reason for this; the Sacred Band (as Lochos is normally translated here) ran ahead of the main body and caught the Spartans before they could either extend their flank or contract it; they were outnumbered until Epaminondas arrived with the depth of the column (embolon) and the Spartans were shattered and fled.
The casualties tell their own story, the greater part come when a phalanx breaks the Spartiates suffered 57% losses (400 from 700) and the engaged wing 1000 from 2400 (four 600 strong morai) or 42% these are not likely from a long even fight they are a rout.

The Spartan cavalry at Mantineia are likened to a phalanx because they are formed up in close order not because of their depth.

I find it rather rich that you call my translations forced when you want 'diasplazein' to mean something it never did just to preserve your faith in the Greeks habitually giving twice the depth that a unit was intended to fight in as its depth and refuse to see that Polybios, a native speaker and the author of a work on 'Taktike', cannot contrast 'parembole' and paragoge' unless they mean two different things; yes the translation was from Perseus, Shuckborough's which we have generally been using, for convenience (it is simple to focus from the translation to the greek which is crucial).

The rest I will address in the course of the week, in the detail it deserves.

[Xenophon]

This will be a debate that will consume pages; even more than it already has! Arguments have been called into question and method queried. Xenophon has praised the ‘collaborative’ approach to gathering and assessing the evidence (such as it is) and I agree. Xenophon has also drawn attention to forcing of evidence and translations (though I don’t necessarily sit with the latter). In that vein I offer just a couple from top of my head after a quick read of the recent posts.

I hope not! I have already spent far too much time and effort on this subject....in effect writing a book on it in response to Ageilaos' so far unsubstantiated [ by evidence] assertions of his own views, contra those of Anderson, Connolly and myself which have held for 40 years. Hopefully, rather than the somewhat negative attacks he has thus far put forward, he will make a more positive case, supported by evidence to support his conviction - if he can - rather than mere bald assertions without full explanation.

Diodorus too refers to a Spartan phalanx formed 4 deep [Diodorus XIII.72.6].

Not at all on my reading. This is to force the evidence to suit a view. At no stage does Diodorus refer to a Spartan phalanx. Further, the bald claim totally ignores the context. Which context is Agis marching his army to the circuit walls of Athens. The actual passage(13.72.3-6) reads as follows:

Ah ! More special pleading....this is a siege so it "doesn't count"....a poor argument. And the army isn't 'Spartan'? Well from its numbers, it includes allies, but is described (accurately) as "Lacaedemonian". Furthermore since I contend that fighting 'close order' in half-files was universal for hoplites, it makes no difference.

Agis, the king of the Lacedaemonians, as it happened, was at the time in Deceleia with his army, and when he learned that the best Athenian troops were engaged in an expedition with Alcibiades, he led his army on a moonless night to Athens. He had twenty-eight thousand infantry, one-half of whom were picked hoplites and the other half light-armed troops; there were also attached to his army some twelve hundred cavalry […] When the Athenians learned what had happened, they issued orders for all the older men and the sturdiest of the youth to present themselves under arms. Since these promptly responded to the call, the circuit of the wall was manned with those who had rushed together to meet the common peril; and the Athenian generals, when in the morning they surveyed the army of the enemy extended in a line four men deep and eight stades in length, at the moment were at first dismayed, seeing as they did that approximately two-thirds of the wall was surrounded by the enemy.

This this no normal ‘battlefield’ deployment but rather one against a city – a siege that, in the end, Agis decided against.

A "siege" ?...Come, come my dear fellow you cannot have thought this through. There was no possibility of taking the city with its walls manned by assault - taking even a small place like Plataea was fraught enough, and all but impossible. An 'investment' with a view to starving it out then ? Again impossible whilst Athens had access to the sea, not to mention that the Athenian field army would quickly return to its relief.

So what was Agis doing then ? He could have invested all the walls, as your arithmetic shows, he had enough troops. But the purpose of investment is to prevent entry and egress from the city, and in those days was carried out by setting up 'posts' at intervals in sight of one another and then ground between, not by forming up for battle. If one reads on, what Agis was doing is plain. He is 'offering battle' for two reasons. Firstly to prevent the Athenians sortieing out ( as they attempted to do with their cavalry ) while the remainder of his army is foraging, and generally ravaging Attica around Athens. Secondly he is challenging them to battle in the hope that they are foolish enough to take him up. They don't, sticking to the protection under their walls. Agis makes a show of attacking them, and then goes home after "ravaging the rest of Attica". He never had any intention of besieging the city - he was only there for a couple of days, just long enough to carry out his "razzia" on Attica.

Secondly, to claim that this represents a Spartan phalanx deploying in an argued ‘regular close order’ of four deep is not correct. Diodorus claims that the four deep formation amounted to eight stades coverage of the circuit wall. This would amount to some 6,472 hoplites four deep and in close order. Diodorus states the infantry was 28,000 strong, half of whom were ‘picked hoplites’. We either assume the other half, un-deployed, sat and watched including the other 7,528 hoplites or the whole hoplite force deployed in close order (four deep). If the latter then they will have covered something more than 17 stades. It is really nothing more than a gloss to claim that this passage is evidence of Spartan hoplites regularly deploying four deep in close order. Despite Diodorus' internal inconsistencies, Agis was clearly attempting to cover as much of the circuit wall as possible.

See above. Agis could have invested the city if he wanted. He didn't. He wasn't "attempting to cover as much of the wall as possible",( which he could have done) . He was 'masking' sorties from the city that might have interfered with his ravaging of the surrounding countryside - the rest of his army certainly weren't sitting around watching. He offered battle, in battle formation, more than once, as Diodorus tells us. The Spartan army "were extended in a line four deep", and Agis "drew up his army in battle order", challenging the Athenians to battle. As plain as a pike-staff, we have a Spartan hoplite phalanx formed up 4 deep in close order, as per Xenophon's description. ( see my diagram ante). This passage IS evidence for Spartan hoplites forming in half-files to fight, just as Xenophon says they did. Isolated, it proves nothing, but it IS an example that what Xenophon tells us was actually practised.....an example but one of many ( of which I have mentioned a number) if you will.

We also find the Allies at Nemea fixing on a depth of sixteen, with the Thebans going deeper still..

This was dictated by the size of the battlefield, which was the main factor in deciding depth, the idea being not to leave an open flank. Why 16 and not some other number? Because the hoplites were organised in files of 8, so what we have here is one file of 8 behind another, a double phalanx.

And that is to ignore other evidence to the contrary. Thukydides has no mathematical problems nor need of any basic file of eight with Theban depths as he demonstrates in his description of Delium (4.96.4):

The Thebans formed twenty-five shields deep (ἀσπίδας δὲ πέντε μὲν καὶ εἴκοσι Θηβαῖοι ἐτάξαντο), the rest as they pleased.

I don't take your point....it was you yourself who pointed out that terrain tended to dictate depth, and at Nemea that was certainly the case .....just compare total numbers with the size of the battlefield. The "as they pleased" at Delium simply means the allies didn't follow the Thebans in forming up in an excessive depth. On occasions when the file depth is given in our sources, it is overwhelmingly 8 deep, which seems to have been the norm with the exceptions, such as the Thebans on three or four occasions, as I noted. I have noted also Xenophon's scathing opinion of the practicality of such excessively deep formations. Significantly, nobody copied this tactic and the Thebans themselves don't seem to have used it at Chaeronea for example.

[Paralus]

I've done a 'redux' on the post you are replying to above; not to alter any argument but to explain Diodorus' inconsistencies, the mathematics of the wall and deployment and what was likely being attempted. I do not disagree that Agis wished to fight.

A "siege" ?...Come, come my dear fellow you cannot have thought this through. There was no possibility of taking the city with its walls manned by assault - taking even a small place like Plataea was fraught enough, and all but impossible. An 'investment' with a view to starving it out then ? Again impossible whilst Athens had access to the sea, not to mention that the Athenian field army would quickly return to its relief.

Which is not to say he was not thinking of such for Diodorus goes on to say that he decided not to lay siege and, eventually, departed.

Agis, deciding for the time not to lay siege to the city, pitched camp in the Academy...

I don't take your point....it was you yourself who pointed out that terrain tended to dictate depth, and at Nemea that was certainly the case .....just compare total numbers with the size of the battlefield. The "as they pleased" at Delium simply means the allies didn't follow the Thebans in forming up in an excessive depth.

That wasn't my point and, yes, I'm a firm believer in ground being the determinant in deployment (depth, etc) just as usage determines meaning in language. Rather, I was replying to your rhetorical question "why 16 and not some other number?" Your answer is that hoplites formed up in files eight deep. Clearly the Thebans did not and not only on the single occasion of Delium. It is to be noted that Thukydides does not remark upon this depth in any way, he simply reports it. To Thukydides, then, this was not something to discourse on.

[Xenophon]

Alot to reply to, but I cannot allow this myth that the Spartans were not shattered by the Theban column at Leuktra to continue.

Myth? I do wish you would cite references for your bald assertions. Essentially we have two versions of Leuktra, what we may term a 'pro-Spartan' one given by Xenophon ( which is the more complete one ) and a 'pro-Theban' given by the patriotic Boeotian Plutarch in his 'Pelopidas', and another, somewhat inaccurate, brief account in Diodorus [XV.53 ff], clearly written from a Boeotian source. Diodorus [XV.56.2] suggests that after a long and stubborn fight, the Spartans "fled in utter rout" and Plutarch [Pelopidas XXIII.4] says there was "such a flight and slaughter of the Spartan as had never been seen before".

It is true that Xenophon, the arch Lakonophile enters into his own 'special pleading' to say that the spartans must have put up a fight because they would not otherwise have been able to recover the body of Kleombrotos (Hellenika VI ixff for his bowdlerised account).

Easy to see you are hardly an objective observer ! If Xenophon's account is 'bowdlerised', then that of Diodorus and Plutarch is even more so ! Even so, Diodorus acknowledges that the fight was a long one and that the Lacedaemonians were forced back "only with great difficulty"[ XV.56]. Xenophon[Hell VI.4.14] tells us the "beheaded snake", bereft of command, "gave way" to the Theban masses ( without, be it noted, having their line broke) withdrew in orderly fashion behind the ditch of their camp, and debated whether to renew the battle, but ultimately acknowledged defeat in the usual way - requesting the return of their dead. That the battle was indecisive in a military sense, and the defeat due to the shock of so many 'Homioi/aristocrats' dying, is certain. Despite this, Sparta quickly rallied and recovered under Archidamus - and the defeated army remained in Boeotia, a continuing threat, until a truce was negotiated under Jason of Pherae.

Plutarch 'Pelopidas 20 gives the reason for this; the Sacred Band (as Lochos is normally translated here) ran ahead of the main body and caught the Spartans before they could either extend their flank or contract it; they were outnumbered until Epaminondas arrived with the depth of the column (embolon) and the Spartans were shattered and fled.
The casualties tell their own story, the greater part come when a phalanx breaks the Spartiates suffered 57% losses (400 from 700) and the engaged wing 1000 from 2400 (four 600 strong morai) or 42% these are not likely from a long even fight they are a rout.

Again, where do you get this stuff ? None of our sources says the Lacedaemonians were "shattered" - what Boeotian propaganda had to say I have quoted above. Xenophon's account is to be preferred, because after the battle the Lacedaemonian army was still intact, still in its camp, and still a threat to Thebes until a truce was negotiated. Moreover Xenophon and Diodorus are broadly agreed on the shape of the fight - it was a long struggle, and bitter, as the Spartans attempted to recover their mortally wounded King, just like the struggle around Leonidas, the last King to die in battle. There is also Polyaenus' famous anecdote of Epaminondas shouting "grant me one pace forward, and we'll have victory". [II.3.2]. Evidently at that point, not only had the Theban column failed to 'shatter' the Spartan line, they were unable even to push them back.

As to casualties, you rightly point to the fact that it was the death of so many 'homioi/aristocrats' about their King that shocked those present, and later the city itself, for they were all officers. I don't agree your numbers though, especially for the strength of the 'morai'. This was the cause of their defeat - the beheading of the snake. However, if we step back and take an overall view of the casualties, a rather different picture emerges. Peter Krentz did an analysis of hoplite battle casualties ( 1985) and concluded that typically, the winning side suffered something of the order of 5% casualties or less on average, and the loser of the order of 14% casualties killed, with a ratio of winner to loser of 1:2 through 1:3. Overall, Leuktra conforms to this, with 300 or so Boeotian casualties(5%), and 1,000 or so Lacedaemonian ones, but mostly Spartans ( 10%) This is less than the average 14% - and so was not particularly 'bloody' at all. This points to an orderly withdrawal, as do subsequent events, and therefore Xenophon's account is the most reliable. There was no 'rout', no 'shattering' other than in Boeotian propaganda. From a military standpoint, it was an indecisive battle - though the deaths of the King and many of the 'Homioi' was a deep psychological shock that would ultimately lead to Sparta's demise..

The Spartan cavalry at Mantineia are likened to a phalanx because they are formed up in close order not because of their depth.

Hardly the natural meaning of : "...the enemy [Spartans] had drawn up their cavalry like a phalanx of hoplites in a line six deep..."[Hell VII.5.23] How do cavalry form 'close order'? Why mention the depth? It means what it says. The cavalry were drawn up in a line six deep (like hoplites). Therefore hoplites fought in a six deep half-file.

I find it rather rich that you call my translations forced when you want 'diasplazein' to mean something it never did just to preserve your faith in the Greeks habitually giving twice the depth that a unit was intended to fight in as its depth and refuse to see that Polybios, a native speaker and the author of a work on 'Taktike', cannot contrast 'parembole' and paragoge' unless they mean two different things; yes the translation was from Perseus, Shuckborough's which we have generally been using, for convenience (it is simple to focus from the translation to the greek which is crucial).

The rest I will address in the course of the week, in the detail it deserves.

You'll have to be more specific with your allegation if you want me to respond - I've no idea what you are talking about.. Besides, you are the Greek speaker, not me.

Once again, I am amazed that what you read is not what I write !!
I did NOT say that 'parembole'(interjection; put in beside,insert) as used by Polybius and Plutarch and 'paragoge' ( lead up beside; deploy from column to line) were synonyms, merely that both were equally descriptive of the evolution involved. Polybius uses 'parembole' and its variations over 60 times, and 'paragoge' a mere twice; whilst Xenophon uses 'paragoge' over a score of times, but 'parembole' never...., but both authors are describing much the same thing.The translation of 'paragoge' I gave in the 'dinner drill'( see diagram previously) is perfectly correct, and all scholars I can find translate it this way.

[Xenophon]

I've done a 'redux' on the post you are replying to above; not to alter any argument but to explain Diodorus' inconsistencies, the mathematics of the wall and deployment and what was likely being attempted. I do not disagree that Agis wished to fight.

...but more importantly, to screen his 'ravagers' - the bulk of the army including all the peltasts from sorties from the city - as your reference to the city gates in your 'redux/expansion' re-inforces

A "siege" ?...Come, come my dear fellow you cannot have thought this through. There was no possibility of taking the city with its walls manned by assault - taking even a small place like Plataea was fraught enough, and all but impossible. An 'investment' with a view to starving it out then ? Again impossible whilst Athens had access to the sea, not to mention that the Athenian field army would quickly return to its relief.

Which is not to say he was not thinking of such for Diodorus goes on to say that he decided not to lay siege and, eventually, departed.

Agis, deciding for the time not to lay siege to the city, pitched camp in the Academy...

Yes, Agis never intended a siege on this occasion, and pitched camp instead. He was only there two days and one night - barely long enough to ravage the surrounding countryside.

Do I take it that we now agree the Lacedaemonians formed up in 'battle order' four deep ( i.e. half-files), with the intention of fighting the Athenian army if it sortied out ?

I don't take your point....it was you yourself who pointed out that terrain tended to dictate depth, and at Nemea that was certainly the case .....just compare total numbers with the size of the battlefield. The "as they pleased" at Delium simply means the allies didn't follow the Thebans in forming up in an excessive depth.

That wasn't my point and, yes, I'm a firm believer in ground being the determinant in deployment (depth, etc) just as usage determines meaning in language. Rather, I was replying to your rhetorical question "why 16 and not some other number?" Your answer is that hoplites formed up in files eight deep. Clearly the Thebans did not and not only on the single occasion of Delium. It is to be noted that Thukydides does not remark upon this depth in any way, he simply reports it. To Thukydides, then, this was not something to discourse on.

[/quote]

I still don't take your point. I gave some statistics for the general use of files of 8 - and referred to Thebes being an exception. You have misremembered our sources for the Nemea, which are Xen Hell IV.2 et seq mainly and Diodorus XIV.80 et seq, not Thucydides. Xen says the Boeotians "disregarded the depth of 16"[ Hell.IV.2.18] that had apparently been agreed, and formed deeper (but doesn't say how deep). He does comment on it and clearly disapproves of this , blaming this selfish act for the loss of the battle. However, on this occasion he does not comment on unusual depth 'per se', as he does elsewhere ( see previous posts), but clearly it is implied that too much depth was a bad thing, causing the loss of the battle.

edited to correct 'nested' quotes

[Xenophon]

Something of a postscript:
Paralus wrote:

If this passage indicates anything, it likely to be that four deep was the lower effective limit of hoplite formations.

Indeed it does, among other things. I pointed out , oh, many thousands of words ago, that the optimum formation was one deep enough not to be too easily broken through, yet long enough to overlap, and outflank, if possible, one's opponents. This depth, as re-discovered by modern re-enactors and riot police is four deep in close order. Columns/deep formations cannot generally break through this depth.

BTW, the likely reason that the Spartans increased their files to 12, and hence their half-files to 6 is because of the excessive depth of their Theban opponents.... but not because they feared their line, with its depth of 4 might be 'broken through' by deeper formations, but rather a depth of 4 might be worn down by attrition by a deeper formation in a long battle. The increase to 6 deep guarded against this.....and one need look no further than Leuktra to see this.

[Paralus]

I still don't take your point. I gave some statistics for the general use of files of 8 - and referred to Thebes being an exception. You have misremembered our sources for the Nemea, which are Xen Hell IV.2 et seq mainly and Diodorus XIV.80 et seq, not Thucydides. Xen says the Boeotians "disregarded the depth of 16"[ Hell.IV.2.18] that had apparently been agreed, and formed deeper (but doesn't say how deep). He does comment on it and clearly disapproves of this , blaming this selfish act for the loss of the battle. However, on this occasion he does not comment on unusual depth 'per se', as he does elsewhere ( see previous posts), but clearly it is implied that too much depth was a bad thing, causing the loss of the battle.

That's because you've confused battles, again. I was referring to Thukydides' description of Delium wherein Xenophon, naturally, has nothing to say! Thukydides does though (4.94.4-5; 95.1):

In the centre were the men of Haliartus, Coronea, and Copae, and the other dwellers about the Lake Copais. On the left wing were the Thespians, Tanagraeans, and Orchomenians; the cavalry and light-armed troops were placed on both wings. The Thebans were formed in ranks of five and twenty deep; the formation of the others varied. Such was the character and array of the Boeotian forces. All the hoplites of the Athenian army were arranged in ranks eight deep; in numbers they equalled the hoplites of the enemy; the cavalry were stationed on either wing.

As I wrote, there is nothing unusual in this for Thukydides; he makes no remarks about the depth of twenty-five of the Thebans. He does not opine on the difficulties of closing by 'half file' for this force.

[Xenophon]

Paralus wrote:

That's because you've confused battles, again.

...hardly my fault ! One minute we are talking about Nemea, and I read your reference to Delium as being in passing, merely another illustration of Theban depth. Perhaps you might make yourself clearer.

As I wrote, there is nothing unusual in this for Thukydides; he makes no remarks about the depth of twenty-five of the Thebans. He does not opine on the difficulties of closing by 'half file' for this force.

The Thebans, it seems, were just as secretive as the Spartans about matters military. We are told the depth of their columns only twice. Delium where Thuc IV.93,25 says they were "...drawn up in the order in which they intended to fight." i.e. battle or close order, and that this was 25 shields deep. The other is Leuktra, where Xenophon tells us the Spartans were 12 deep ( evidently in open order) and that the Thebans were in "...massed formation at least 50 shields deep."[Xen Hell VI.4.12] and since he is comparing like with like, these must have been in open order too. We are not told their depth at Nemea, simply that they were "..exceedingly deep" , according to the disapproving Xenophon[Xen Hell IV.2.18]

From the two examples we have, it would appear the Thebans formed up 50 deep, halving to 25 in close order, entirely consistent with all the other evidence for combat taking place in half-files in close order.

Thucydides does not appear to have been what might be termed 'a military man', and doesn't comment on depths in any of his battle descriptions....which would be superfluous given the audience he was writing for in any event.

[agesilaos]

So let me get this right, you think that parembole and paragoge ARE different manoevres, but Xenophon's not ever using parembole but only paragoge, is not because the manoeuvre he is describing is, in fact paragoge, but that he means parembole and the words had changed meaning in the two hundred years between Xenophon and Polybios?

This is not so surprising, I suppose, since you describe one of history's most decisive battles as indecisive! And how by some rather lame 'special pleading'; Xenophon is clear that only the Theban left and Lakedaimonian right actually engaged, so these are the only forces to consider when judging the proportion of casualties. There were four Morai on the Spartan side, those which Kleombrotos had been sent with to Phokis (Hell.VI 1); a mora had sixteen enomotiai according to Xenophon Lak.Pol 11 iv

ἑκάστη δὲ τῶν ὁπλιτικῶν μορῶν ἔχει πολέμαρχον ἕνα, λοχαγοὺς τέτταρας, πεντηκοντῆρας ὀκτώ, ἐνωμοτάρχους ἑκκαίδεκα.

Thus a mora has 576 men, working on a twelve deep file this is 48 files, four such 192 which allowing for a certain rounding of figures gives 400 Spartiate officers, who presumably form the file leaders and closers a la Sokrates of Xenophon's Memorabilia's description. The 300 Spartiates over are the Hippeis which are attested separately at the battle. 400 died which looks like all the front rank and two thirds of the Hippeis, a further 600 of the leavening fell, which makes 1,000 from 2,300 or 43.5% but this was no rout As for you 300 alleged Theban casualties, if you want them then you will have to accept the 4,000 Spartan casualties claimed by the same source (or twice the numbers they started with!); Diodoros is pretty worthless, as his source Ephoros, was found to be by Polybios XII 25f. Pausanias (IX 13 v-vi) gives the Theban casualties as 47, probably from 2,000 or 2.03%. Looks pretty decisive to me, the effects were; Spartan hegemony was instantly broken the next campaigning season saw the allies at the gates of Sparta, Messenia liberated and Megaloppolis founded. Better check that grip on reality