pothos.org

As you might expect I think you are mistaken in your assessment here, Xeno; there are several different stages:

1. In the gloom the advanced forces bump into each other and the Roman force is driven back, I would assume that the macedonians outnumbered them as well as having the initial advantage of height
2. The Romans are driven back to the flat (we are told later that this retreat was further than that caused by the advent of the Macedonian reinforcements in XVIII 22 vi) and have called for reinforcements; Flamininus responds by sending 500 horse and 2,000 foot (21 v), these 2,000 are lights as it is later that Polybios says 24 v,

5 For when the heavy-armed Roman infantry had joined the light infantry, as I said, and gave them their support in the battle, they availed themselves of the additional weight thus thrown into the scale, and pressing heavily on the enemy killed many of them

5] προσγενομένων γὰρ τοῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων εὐζώνοις τῶν ἐν τοῖς βαρέσιν ὅπλοις ἀνδρῶν, καθάπερ ἀρτίως εἶπα, καὶ συνεργούντων κατὰ τὴν μάχην, προσλαβόντες οἷον εἰ σήκωμα τὴν τούτων χρείαν, βαρέως ἐπέκειντο τοῖς πολεμίοις καὶ πολλοὺς αὐτῶν ἔκτεινον.

On the addition ofthese lights the tables are turned and it is still a light infantry/cavalry action - an affair of outposts.
3. Philip sends all his mercenaries, save his Thracians, and his Macedonian and Thessalian cavalry into the fray, he is still responding as if it is a skirmish.
4. These turn the tide in favour of the Macedonians. It is quite clear that the fog has now dispersed. The Roman army can see their advanced group being defeated and it is their consternation that prompts Flamininus to begin bringing his legions out of camp; so had he been there Philip would have been able to see this, rather than abandon his own advanced troops he could have recalled them and withdrawn to the ridge, the Romans may have continued their deployment but , since Flamininus did not want a battle either there is a good chance that he would have stood down and remained encamped. Instead this force sent back messages, probably via Macedonian cavalry rather than barbarian foot, exaggerating their success and the moment of their action; not being there Philip was drawn into commiting his half formed army; that he had not already recalled his foragers shows that he was still thinking of the action as a minor clash.
5. Further proof that the fog had cleared is that when Philip reaches the ridge he can see that his advanced force is fighting near the Roman camp. Even now the legions have not joined the action, when they do the Macedonian vanguard is thrown back and that happens while Philip is still deploying his demi-phalanx, 24 iv. Only now is a general action inescapable and Philip has only half his forces.

I say Nikanor was negligent because what was clearly need was co-ordination on the ridge, there must have been another to whom he could delegate the simple task of sending the troops up to the heights, though I will concede that Philip had told him to send the men up poste-haste and he clearly saw that as his place, certainly early in the campaign Alexander's lieutenants acted with a freer hand, one thinks of Perdikkas' assault on Thebes and Amyntas' supporting him, for instance.

Now for some pedantry From me? But the composition of the initial Roman force may have been the cavalry from one legion and a thousand velites, ie Roman light troops, but Livy uses the neutral word 'pedites' - foot and Polybios 'euzonoi' - light foot, Polybios uses 'grosphomachoi' viz VI 21 vii

[7] παραγενομένων δ᾽ εἰς τὴν ταχθεῖσαν ἡμέραν διαλέγουσι τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς μὲν νεωτάτους καὶ πενιχροτάτους εἰς τοὺς γροσφομάχους, τοὺς δ᾽ ἑξῆς τούτοις εἰς τοὺς ἁστάτους καλουμένους, τοὺς δ᾽ ἀκμαιοτάτους ταῖς ἡλικίαις εἰς τοὺς πρίγκιπας, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτάτους εἰς τοὺς τριαρίους.

Which means 'javelin- fighters', grosphon being some sort of javelin, we are more used to 'paltai' or 'akontistai' from Arrian but there are as many words for javelin in Greek as the Eskimaux have for snow

As for those ten turmae I think it quite likely that these were the extraordinarii of one ala, ie those allied cavalry that were specifically chosen as scouts and the vanguard in the march; these were one third of the allied horse and the allies supplied three times as many cavalry as the Romans themselves so the numbers work both ways. Given that this was the role of the extraordinarii and that the use of a general word for the foot component might imply that they were not 'velites',it might be a safer assumption that the whole force was Latin allies, later re-inforced with the Aetolians on the left wing (there must have been some on the right as well as they are accused of halting the pursuit to pillage Philip's camp; there were 6,000 foot in all and 400 cavalry, Plutarch Flamininus, Polybios may have rounded the cavalry up to 500).

I wait with baited...breath... mmmh... traps?

I’ll (briefly??) respond to Agesilaos’ latest post before resuming with a major post continuing the narrative, with comments, especially where I differ from Agesilaos’ initial post.....

Point 1. Agreed – I believe I said much the same thing in my previous post.

Point 2. Agreed – I didn’t go into detail of the light troops action. I think we are interpreting “affair of outposts” differently. Typically at this period, a Roman “outpost” consisted of a cohort of 4-500 or so men, sometimes including a turma or two of cavalry, depending on the situation ( see Pydna for example). An “affair of outposts” therefore would involve just a few hundred of men on each side, perhaps a thousand or so in total. The initial stages of Cynoscephalae were on an altogether bigger scale, with the Romans numbering 1,000 infantry and 300 cavalry at the outset – the equivalent, as I said, of a Roman legion’s entire cavalry, with probably greater numbers of Macedonians. The Roman force rapidly escalated to 3,000 infantry and 800 cavalry and probably more later, and the Macedonians to almost all their light troops and cavalry – 2,000 cavalry and upwards of 5,500 allied tribal ‘peltasts’ ( not to be confused with the Guard Peltasts of the phalanx). These forces are a significant proportion of each army as a whole, and the action had already gone well beyond a ‘skirmish’. A skirmish is what our sources say occurred at Pherae, with just a few hundred cavalry on each side [Livy XXXIII.6.6; Polyb XVIII.19 ] Livy specifically says that the battle began with skirmishes between a few scouts, then “assumed larger proportions as reinforcements came to the aid of the defeated.”[ 7.6]( I hope that members won’t think I am being pedantic in turn, but I am trying to use the terminology in the same way as, and consistently with, our sources, which saves confusion.)

Point 3. Agreed, though as I say matters had moved well beyond what I, and our sources, consider a ‘skirmish’ or ‘affair of outposts’ – see above.

Point 4. As to when the fog/mist/low cloud began to disperse, Polybius says this wasn’t until the final Macedonian reinforcements were being sent [“as the mist was beginning to clear” Polyb XVIII.22.2] and Livy says almost the same – the ridge-line became visible, with the Macedonians having been driven back to it, and Philip sends all his remaining auxiliaries and cavalry bar the 2,000 Thracians to the rescue, and the Romans are duly forced back in turn to the valley floor.
Not to put too fine a point on it, as soon as visibility improved, Philip reacted, and not even the god-like Alexander could have seen through fog earlier, as I’ve already mentioned previously!!

When this occurred, a major action involving something like a quarter of the troops present on the field was already under way, and despite the fact that neither commander wanted a battle, neither could disengage at that stage and for both the only option was to reinforce. In order to successfully disengage, light troops needed a battle line to fall back to and through, so as to prevent the foe from following up. At this point, neither side had its battle line fully deployed.

In such circumstances an attempted disengagement would have been potentially disastrous, with a very real risk that the side that attempted it would end in rout.....and vigorously pursued by the enemy.

What makes you think that Philip did not immediately recall his foragers? Though our sources don’t specifically say so, it is implicit from the timings that they probably must have been recalled pretty much at the outset, as we would expect.

Point 5. I’d agree that once the battle lines were deployed, and each sides light troops, having screened their respective deployments, had withdrawn through their respective battle lines, that the battle was then inescapable, for any attempt to return to camp in an orderly fashion would have led to the other side 'falling on'. [digression: the main Roman battle line 4 legions strong, with each legion occupying some 250 yards frontage was roughly 1,000 yards long. Philip’s 8,000 or so right wing phalanx, or to use Agesilaos’ term ‘demi-phalanx’, had marched into the pass, and then turned left along the summits of the ridge. 16 deep in open order they too had a frontage of 1,000 yards or so.] That they were in this formation is proven by the fact that Philip ‘received’ his light troops [Polyb 24.8], which normally means through the line, and to do so the phalanx must have been in ‘open order’ of 6 ft per man frontage [ further digression: The Roman light troops would have also occupied about 1,000 yds frontage, plus their cavalry, and the Macedonians similarly. The Romans also withdrew - through the gaps between the maniples [Polyb 24.10]

As you rightly say, only one wing was present, with the left wing coming up. What Philip needed at this point was to gain time – which was not granted to him, for the legions of the Roman left wing were already advancing up the slope. As matters stood, he had the tactical advantage of being uphill from his foes, and his choice was simple; “Use it or lose it”, for if he awaited the Roman attack defensively he would lose this advantage. Accordingly, having despatched the light troops whom he had ‘received’ through his battle line to the right flank, his phalanx performed a drill manoeuvre. What Polybius seems to say is that they both “double their depth and close up toward the right”[24.8] which cannot be literally so, for that would quarter their frontage to a mere 250 yards, not to mention the difficulty and confusion of such a double drill move. What I believe is meant is that they ‘closed up’ into close order to their right, halving their frontage and leaving room for the left wing of the phalanx to deploy beside them, and evidently many of these were at hand. This would also leave them at ‘double depth’ 16 deep. (The phalanx normally fought 8 deep in close order). In this ‘double depth’ formation they lowered their sarisas and charged, on a frontage of 500 yds or so, against the two left wing legions on a similar frontage. The light troops to their right covered their flank. Their success was immediate, as Polybius notes, and the two Roman left wing legions were forced back. Flamininus, doubtless flustered, moved to the right wing to try and salvage the situation – which was not good for the Romans at this time.

As to Nikanor, he had direct orders from his King as to what was required of him – getting the left wing of the phalanx, the militia element which, as Agesilaos mentioned, included veterans and under-age youths awaiting call-up, forward to the ridge and deployed on the left, and the foragers, who came from the whole army, organised and incorporated ‘ad hoc’ into this phalanx. Even if he had been granted the ability to see the situation through or over the ridge, and the gift of prescience, he could hardly have disobeyed his King and gone up to the ridge – disobedience of a direct order in battle would doubtless have led to execution. He could not know that, as Polybius put it, there was “no-one to give them orders”. Again, this is Polybius using hindsight, nor can it be true, for the phalanx had a structure of officers according to the manuals, of whom someone must have led the left-wing phalanx. What is probably meant is that, not fully deployed and with some trying to 'link' with the King's right wing, and others forming up on the summit line, a degree of confusion prevailed.

But what if Nikanor had abandoned his post and task, gone up to the ridge, only to find that all was in order and he was not needed ?

If Alexander’s subordinates had a ‘freer hand’ and on occasion acted without orders, that is hardly the same as disobedience of a direct order from the King. All in all, I don’t think you can make a case of ‘negligence’ against Nikanor, and significantly no-one laid any fault at his door at the time....

As for the pedantry, I’d agree that Polybius generally, but not invariably, uses the word ‘grosphomachoi’ to denote ‘velites’, and the fact that he uses the more generic ‘euzanoi’ here, followed by Livy’s generic ‘pedites’ may mean that the light infantry consisted of a mixed force of Roman velites and Greek and Aetolian ‘peltasts’, or even Greek allies alone.
When I referred to 10 Turmae being the number of cavalry normally attached to a legion, I was simply referring to the relative size of the force (quite large) and did not mean to imply that this force was all Roman legionary cavalry. As you rightly point out, it would have been normal Roman practice to draw such a force from the ‘extraordinarii’, or from allies.
Accordingly, I’d agree entirely with your ‘pedantry’ !!

Trivia point: The many eskimaux words for snow is another 'myth' - for a start there are a number of eskimaux languages, and in most there are no more words related to snow than in English. OTOH, the arctic Sami language apparently does have as many as 180 'snow' related words; and up to 1,000 'reindeer' related words !!

Away for a week and I see the spiders have been busy creating a web of a thread with the promise of a plethora of diversions. With so much already said I should just sit back and watch. Instead I'll limit myself to a couple of points until I get the time to digest the lot and re read the two (really one) sources.

I am in broad agreement with Xenophon's overall position: this was classic 'encounter'. Neither army looked for battle here and force of circumstance compelled it. Philip had a clear objective in mind and to reach it he needed to skirt round the "Dogs Heads" to his west. This is what Hammond claims based on the manuscript reading of 18.20.8. On the morning in question he set off to do this only to be frustrated by the fog and encamp once more. He then sent off a force to occupy the ridges knowing that the Romans were somewhere on the other side. The resultant blundering into each other went, in short order, from a skirmish of "outposts" to a committed engagement of far more than that as Xenophon has shown. Philip's response is difficult to reconcile with continuing that "skirmish": the enemy position now known for absolute certainty, Philip meant to own that high ground and set out to do so. That neither commander expected it to go beyond control of the strategic ground (in case a full pitched battle were to follow) does not require belief that both meant such a battle to occur. These things are far more often than not out of a commander's control (especially in a time before any modern communication) - no matter how 'competent'. This is even the case in planned battles of the age: plans are made and orders given. Once the confrontation moves from plans and orders to stab and gut formal control becomes very tenuous. This is a classic example of Xenophon's 'encounter'.

As the initial confrontation spread both commanders found themselves in an escalation of inevitability. Xenophon is correct in that Philip could not simply abandon the heights and his committed forces - more each passing minute. I think Polybios gives the real reason for Philip's decision to engage at 18.24.6 where he "saw his own men giving ground and requiring support, he was compelled to give it". The giving into persuasion at 23.8-9 'apologia' might just be the Greek coming out in the old fellow.

It is not terribly clear just which path Philip's forces took up the ridges. Xenophon thinks they did this via the pass. Hammond says "directly" up the ridge and I think he is correct - straight up the slopes as time was of the essence. Polybios says that the phalanx mounted the ridge and deployed "into line by the left (ἀσπίδος παρενέβαλε), and occupied the range of high ground". Straight from Aelian: deployed into line "to the shield". Now it is seemingly agreed that Hammond has got the battle site, in general, correct. His topographical map does not allow much much lateral space at the tops of these ridges. According to Polybios the phalanx deployed into line to the left and, later, Philip orders it to double its depth and close to the right. The left of the phalanx must then march up behind it from camp and to its left, again, one thinks, deploying ἀσπίδος παρενέβαλε. Presumably, had there been time, it too will have doubled its depth and closed to its right. It did not have that time (as might not have the entire right of the phalanx - below) and was caught on the march cresting the ridges.Hammond's map allows for some 700-800 metres across the identified ridges. This would fit a contracted and deepened phalanx. Philip desired his entire 18,000 on this field requiring some 2,060 metres in close order eight deep. The same number at sixteen deep would need some 1030. At thirty-two deep we have about 515 metres. Room for horse and lights on the flanks on what appears a compact field. Again, I do not have a topo map of the area.

It is entirely possible that Philip did not have the entire compliment of the right wing of the phalanx in battle order at the time of his 'charge'. Polybios (24.8) says that Philip felt compelled to go to the assistance of his forces "in spite of the fact that the greater part of his phalanx was still on the march and engaged in mounting the hills". The greater part has to be more than half one thinks. Perhaps the Megalopolitan has confused himself?

Good to have you back, Paralus, even though I was unaware you had gone, hope it was an enjoyable absence.

I do not want to get bogged down in whether the opening stages are a ‘skirmish’ since all that is happening here is that we are defining things differently, Xenophon defines it according to the numbers engaged , I to whether the main battle lines are engaged, to my mind you can have 10,000 men chucking pointed sticks at each other in loose order and it is still just a skirmish, a mighty big one but still a skirmish, one the main battle line troops deploy and engage it becomes a battle; I think the sources would bear either out as valid; even here, we all agree the battle grew from a minor affair of, let us say detachments, which was escalated into a battle by each side reinforcing its detachment. By my reading Polybios does not consider Philip to be giving battle (against his better judgement) until he leads up the Peltasts and his right wing. This is simply an argument about definition, though and both positions are true by their own definition.

I cannot accept Xenophon’s suggestions as to the evolutions once Philip reached the ridge, though. The crucial sentence is XVIII 24 viii

. [8] προσδεξάμενος δὲ τοὺς ἀγωνιζομένους, τούτους μὲν ἥθροιζε πάντας ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας, καὶ τοὺς πεζοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἱππέας, τοῖς δὲ πελτασταῖς καὶ τοῖς φαλαγγίταις παρήγγελλε διπλασιάζειν τὸ βάθος καὶ πυκνοῦν ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιόν.

‘Prosdexamenos’ translated here as ‘received’ is used over eighty times by Polybios and on no occasion does it imply ‘received into the ranks’ (I am only half-way through checking though so maybe it will and I am rushing to press) what it generally means is ‘receive favourably’, which makes sense here too, the ‘agwnizomenoi’ – those that had been engaged – we received favourably [despite having been driven off] by Philip and stationed both foot and horse on the right flank; nothing says they passed through the phalanx. In verse 10, where the Romans ‘receive’ their advanced force’ through the gaps between the maniples, Polybios uses ‘dexamenos’ which is closely related , it is the same without the prefix ‘pros’ but the prefix makes all the difference.

Now, in order to make your interpretation of the moves on the ridge work one has to ignore much of what Polybios says. No matter how you cut it, ‘diplasiazeiv to bathos’ means to double ones depth from whatever depth one is currently standing in, it does not mean assume double normal depth and, since in your interpretation they are already sixteen deep ‘maintain your double depth’; this command is explained in Aelian ( chapter 11 somewhere, I will check when I find him) and it is not complex, especially if the troops were still in marching order where the interval between the ranks as well as the files is two yards or four cubits. Another major problem with this interpretation is that the left wing coming up to the same ground found it unsuitable to deploy upon; which makes it unlikely that the right wing could occupy that same ground in open order and manoeuvre across it.
‘Pyknosein’ - to close up – only implies to the normal order, or two cubits or one yard per man so your 8,000 would cover 500 yards, the equivalent of two legions on a three foot frontage (2400/6 =400yds; in fact there is a good chance that the legions were overstrength, 2,000 hastati were detached from one legion to garrison Thebes, I think, if this applied to the allies too we would have 4000/6=666 yds, if just the Roman contingent we get 3200/6= 533 yards and some of this would be facing the Macedonian flanking force of mercenaries and cavalry).

The normal fighting depth of the sarissa phalanx was sixteen the mathematics of this battle show it; the phalanx has to double its depth from how it was set up on the ridge; were it sixteen deep then the resulting 32 deep block would not just leave the Romans a legion’s worth of overlap it would impede the left wing coming up. My way, gives sufficient room and accords with what Polybios and the manuals say; this is not to say that I am not adding things which are not in the sources; but, I am saying that four legions cannot appear from camp like a rabbit from a hat, it would take time, time which Polybios’ narrative actually gives them, but he has them all set up so that he can deliver Flamininus’ speech. I also add a further evolution where Philip forms ‘synaspismos’ before attacking, this is not mentioned but is the implication of his force not being able to perform ‘metabole’ or about face and Plutarch’s mention of the power of the Macedonians’ interlocked shields.

I cannot find the site that had the map I posted, Paralus, but will post you and xeno the one for this area I downloaded, the contours are a bit unclear and the lettering is Greek but I am confident you will both cope, the bit we are looking at is top centre.

agesilaos wrote: Now, in order to make your interpretation of the moves on the ridge work one has to ignore much of what Polybios says. No matter how you cut it, ‘diplasiazeiv to bathos’ means to double ones depth from whatever depth one is currently standing in, it does not mean assume double normal depth and, since in your interpretation they are already sixteen deep ‘maintain your double depth’; this command is explained in Aelian ( chapter 11 somewhere, I will check when I find him) and it is not complex, especially if the troops were still in marching order where the interval between the ranks as well as the files is two yards or four cubits. Another major problem with this interpretation is that the left wing coming up to the same ground found it unsuitable to deploy upon; which makes it unlikely that the right wing could occupy that same ground in open order and manoeuvre across it.

Like Philip, I'm pressed for time. Of course it means double the depth they're standing in. Now, as I've said, I don't have a topo map (with scale) and it is just as likely that there is something in the order of 800-1,000 or more metres of width across that ridge. As the text stands, Philip certainly thought he could deploy both halves of the phalanx - in whatever frontage - eventually. Now, I agree with Xenophon in that the phalanx will have deployed "to the shield" in open order and I would claim, given the rushed deployment, in its normal drill. That is, sixteen deep. We do not know how many were ready to do so (see observation at the end of my earlier post). Even so, should the lot (10,000 including peltasts) be so ready they occupy 1,140 metres. This lot then occupy the available terrain (or the greater part of it) and so the order is given "to double their depth and close up to the right".

Xenophon wrote:What Polybius seems to say is that they both “double their depth and close up toward the right”[24.8] which cannot be literally so, for that would quarter their frontage to a mere 250 yards, not to mention the difficulty and confusion of such a double drill move. What I believe is meant is that they ‘closed up’ into close order to their right, halving their frontage and leaving room for the left wing of the phalanx to deploy beside them, and evidently many of these were at hand. This would also leave them at ‘double depth’ 16 deep. (The phalanx normally fought 8 deep in close order).

Here I partly agree. Polybios doesn't "seem" to say, he actually states it. This is no more difficult than "closing to the spear". Aelian describes this as the far right file holding position whilst the rest face to the spear and march forward and then facing to front (Tactica,32) thus closing up. Xenophon is correct that the doubling is by the second file inserting into the spaces between the ranks of the first (Tactica, 28). Thus Philip has ordered each second file to double into its right hand compatriot which deepened file then closes to the spear. The reason for this can only be the available ground, as Xenophon says, and the need to leave room for the rest of the phalanx.

If I read Xenophon correctly here, he seems to imply that Philip deployed into line to his left in files of eight. This seems rather odd as this formation, in open order, would occupy some 2,300 metres - far more than the ridge seems to give. This also is not the usual deployment and, had Philip meant to fight eight deep in close order, there still seems not enough room.

In general, I also agree with Xenophon that the light armed were received via the phalanx when in open order. This more so when a phalanx wide screen of lights are placed before the phalanx. The confusion here might have seen things go otherwise.

I don't see any evidence that the phalanx's charge was delivered in synaspismos. The phalanx is simply ordered to double depth and close up to the right after which it lowered spears and set off.

Agesilaos wrote:

But so much depends upon how one sees Alexander, personally I see him as much more under the influence of Parmenion and the old guard until Gaugamela or even Hydaspes; his father, no slouch militarily, declared that he had only found one general, Parmenion. I do not find the stories of his later poor judgement convincing; there is more Parmenion in those early battles than the sources betray. I think that Philotas actually had a point when he said that the victory at Issos was down to his father.

I meant to comment on this earlier – and say I agree with this assessment – that when one recognises that the historians, particularly Kallisthenes, Alexander’s propagandist, use the ‘trope’ of Parmenion as ‘dumb’ foil to Alexander’s brilliance so frequently, one strongly suspects that the truth might have been closer to the opposite – that Parmenion and his sons as commanders acted as ‘mentors’ to Alexander in the early campaigns, and the knowledge of this in part impelled Philotas’ alleged arrogance, and ultimately the ‘hubris’ of being “too mighty a subject” that led to his family’s downfall......

I tend to agree. Nice 'side thread' that. Elizabeth Carney has an interesting take in Alexander in Fact and Fiction. Chapter nine: Artifice and Alexander History.

agesilaos wrote:Good to have you back, Paralus, even though I was unaware you had gone, hope it was an enjoyable absence.

Forgot about this earlier. Yes, a most enjoyable absence...

Paralus wrote:

I think Polybios gives the real reason for Philip's decision to engage at 18.24.6 where he "saw his own men giving ground and requiring support, he was compelled to give it". The giving into persuasion at 23.8-9 'apologia' might just be the Greek coming out in the old fellow.

Indeed – I too commented on Philip being ‘compelled’ by the situation to act as he did, rather than being ‘persuaded’ by his commanders of cavalry and light troops, or his staff....as Paralus says, this latter is an ‘apologia’ for Philip’s reasons, having him reluctantly persuaded against his better judgement, when in fact he had no real choice.

It is not terribly clear just which path Philip's forces took up the ridges. Xenophon thinks they did this via the pass. Hammond says "directly" up the ridge and I think he is correct - straight up the slopes as time was of the essence. Polybios says that the phalanx mounted the ridge and deployed "into line by the left (ἀσπίδος παρενέβαλε), and occupied the range of high ground". Straight from Aelian: deployed into line "to the shield". Now it is seemingly agreed that Hammond has got the battle site, in general, correct. His topographical map does not allow much much lateral space at the tops of these ridges. According to Polybios the phalanx deployed into line to the left and, later, Philip orders it to double its depth and close to the right. The left of the phalanx must then march up behind it from camp and to its left, again, one thinks, deploying ἀσπίδος παρενέβαλε. Presumably, had there been time, it too will have doubled its depth and closed to its right. It did not have that time (as might not have the entire right of the phalanx - below) and was caught on the march cresting the ridges.Hammond's map allows for some 700-800 metres across the identified ridges. This would fit a contracted and deepened phalanx. Philip desired his entire 18,000 on this field requiring some 2,060 metres in close order eight deep. The same number at sixteen deep would need some 1030. At thirty-two deep we have about 515 metres. Room for horse and lights on the flanks on what appears a compact field. Again, I do not have a topo map of the area.

I mentioned the pass route for a couple of reasons. As any hiker will tell you, the quickest and easiest way to get to a height is to first ascend a ‘saddle’ (here, the pass) and then move up the ridge line, rather than to attempt to ascend a ‘face’ directly. Secondly my trusty Loeb Polybius reads “when the leading ranks reached the top of the pass, he wheeled to the left/shield side “[XVIII.24.3] translating ‘hyperbole’ as ‘pass’, one of the meanings in the LSJ , including a ‘passing over or crossing over place’ in mountains. This might possibly be construed as ‘summit’ or ‘ridge-line’ in this context also, so there may be an ambiguity – perhaps Agesilaos can shed some light here?
However Philip got there, I think it is clear that on reaching the ridge line, Philip’s column formed to the left and into line, as Polybius and Paralus describe – a quite standard manoeuvre for forming the phalanx. At this point there is no reason to think that the phalanx was in anything but ‘normal’ formation i.e. open order and 16 deep . Thus arrayed, it’s roughly 7-9,000 men [including the 2,000 Guard Peltasts, but exluding an unknown number of missing foragers] would have a frontage of approximately 1,000 -1,200 yards, corresponding to roughly the same frontage as the 4 Legions (plus Aetolian and other Greek allies) in battle line below the ridge. Philip, with his half-phalanx, now 'covered' the entire Roman battle line. ( and most cleverly done too).

In between the two battle lines, on the slopes, were the respective light troops and cavalry, again each on a frontage of roughly 1,000 -1,200 yards, or perhaps a little more.

Their screening task complete, both sides light troops and cavalry withdrew through the lines- regardless of nuances of the Greek ‘received’ this can only really have been done by falling back through the open order phalanx, given the numbers and frontages involved. Philip then ‘placed’ these troops on his right flank to protect the phalanx. ( His left would shortly be covered by the left-wing phalanx )

This battle line started to get decidedly ‘cramped’ as more and more of the 8,000 left wing phalangites deployed, or more including returning foragers, whether in orderly fashion or dribs and drabs.

Both to concentrate for an assault, and to make room for the left-wing demi-phalanx, now that his front was clear, Philip ordered his right wing to “double their depth and close up to the right”. Both could be accomplished by a single drill move; right/spearside turn, close up to the right and then left turn so as to ‘face front’ again. This would leave the phalanx in ‘close order’, 3 ft per man which was battle formation and also at ‘double depth’ ( 8 deep being the more usual fighting formation after closing up from open/normal order 16 deep) on a frontage of 5-600 yards or so. This was the same frontage as the two left-wing Roman Legions whom we are told they engaged.
That Philip’s phalanx stood at ‘double depth’ 16 deep is perhaps also suggested by the fact that after describing Cynoscephalae, Polybius gives the famous comparison of Legion v Phalanx, describing the phalanx as 16 deep while charging (i.e. ‘double depth’), and Polybius is writing this with Cynoscephalae in mind......A straw in the wind perhaps, but suggestive.

It is entirely possible that Philip did not have the entire compliment [sic]of the right wing of the phalanx in battle order at the time of his 'charge'. Polybios (24. says that Philip felt compelled to go to the assistance of his forces "in spite of the fact that the greater part of his phalanx was still on the march and engaged in mounting the hills". The greater part has to be more than half one thinks. Perhaps the Megalopolitan has confused himself?

Polybius need not have been confused.....if the phalanx ( 16,000 plus 2,000 Guard Peltasts) are divided into left and right wings of 9,000 each, then the ordinary phalanx troops of the right wing will number 7,000 as opposed to 9,000 of the left wing, and this is what Polybius may have had in mind, or alternately he may have been thinking that minus its foragers, the right wing was depleted by perhaps 1,000 or more men – who would arrive with the left wing; or perhaps both ! Thus the greater part was indeed yet to deploy.....

edited to correct typos

We agree that the light armed withdrew through the 'open order' phalanx deployed in its standard sixteen deep files. This is even more likely as 9,000 - 10,000 will have completely occupied the the ridge line and these troops will have withdrawn immediately rearward. This is somewhat confirmed by Philip, having received them, gathering them to the right flank of the phalanx.

Xenophon wrote:Both to concentrate for an assault, and to make room for the left-wing demi-phalanx, now that his front was clear, Philip ordered his right wing to “double their depth and close up to the right”. Both could be accomplished by a single drill move; right/spearside turn, close up to the right and then left turn so as to ‘face front’ again. This would leave the phalanx in ‘close order’, 3 ft per man which was battle formation and also at ‘double depth’ ( 8 deep being the more usual fighting formation after closing up from open/normal order 16 deep) on a frontage of 5-600 yards or so. This was the same frontage as the two left-wing Roman Legions whom we are told they engaged.

We both agree on the phalanx closing up "to spear" - for this is exactly what Polybios writes and Aelian describes. There, though, agreement ends (as if you didn't know!). That "both could be accomplished by a single drill move" leaving the phalanx in "battle formation and also at ‘double depth’" is an rationale to support the assertion that eight deep was "the more usual fighting formation" for the phalanx. To accept it as given necessitates ignoring Polybios' clear statement at worst or explaining his testimony away in some fashion. Here Agesilaos is absolutely correct: there is no getting away from the fact that two orders were given and that one of these was to "double depth". As Agesilaos says, this can only mean to double the depth the files are already deployed in, that being sixteen on which we both agree. Were Philip wanting to deploy sixteen deep in close order he obviously needed only to order the phalanx, already standing sixteen deep in open order, to close up to the right. The only other possible order for closing up would be to 'double down' by insertion which order was demonstrably not given. Even were the regular close order depth to have been eight men, there is absolutely no need for a redundant order to double file depth if the files are already at the required depth. Philip gave no order to 'double down' to close-order, instead he ordered the phalanx 1) to double its depth and 2) to close to the spear. Two distinct orders and, beginning in open order sixteen deep, resulting in a close order formation thirty-two deep as each second file turned to spear and stepped into the spaces between the ranks of the adjoining (file leader becomes second ranker, etc). This instantly renders the ranks into close order and the second order, resulting in those files already facing to spear marching to right, results in the files taking close order.

Xenophon wrote:That Philip’s phalanx stood at ‘double depth’ 16 deep is perhaps also suggested by the fact that after describing Cynoscephalae, Polybius gives the famous comparison of Legion v Phalanx, describing the phalanx as 16 deep while charging (i.e. ‘double depth’), and Polybius is writing this with Cynoscephalae in mind......A straw in the wind perhaps, but suggestive.

Well that is to miss the introduction. Polybios actually says the following:

In my sixth book I made a promise, still unfulfilled, of taking a fitting opportunity of drawing a comparison between the arms of the Romans and Macedonians, and their respective system of tactics, and pointing out how they differ for better or worse from each other. I will now endeavour by a reference to actual facts to fulfill that promise.

That he chooses to fulfill his promise here is simply because this is the first battle he's narrated were both tactical systems clashed on the field. Now, he has promised to compare the two systems ("the arms of the Romans and Macedonians, and their respective system of tactics") not the deployments in a particular battle or, indeed, of this battle. Just as he speaks of the usual Roman formation in this comparison (rather than say that of Cannae), so too he speaks of the usual Macedonian formation. He compares both regular systems not the Roman regular deployment as against a particular Macedonian deployment. Were he so doing it is unlikely that he failed to mention the unusual nature of the deployment.

I can see there is still some confusion here,

3] ἅμα δὲ τῷ τοὺς πρώτους ἅψασθαι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς εὐθέως ἐξ ἀσπίδος παρενέβαλε καὶ προκατελάμβανε τοὺς ὑπερδεξίους:

Translates ‘As soon as [ama de] the first ones [toi tous protous] had reached [apsasthai] from the pass [tes hyperboles] they directly filled the line to the left [eutheos ex aspidos parenebale] and occupied the heights first [kai prokatelambane tous hyperdexious].

The ‘trusty Loeb’ is here completely wrong as ‘parenbalein’ does not mean ‘to wheel’ but to ‘fill the line’ literally ‘to set beside’; as I wrote earlier, had Philip’s front ranks wheeled left they would end up facing away from the enemy, definitely a recipe for defeat! Hammond has to have Philip mount directly up the slope, because he correctly translates the Greek ‘parenbalein’ but is forced to ignore ‘tes hyperboles’ as he was convinced that he had found the Roman camps and identified the Thetideion with Zoodikhos Pirge, although there is a village called Thetideion on the map, further east.

There can be only one meaning to ‘diplasiazein to bathos’ and that is that the troops on the ridge doubled their depth so either they had moved to eight deep in normal (2 cubit frontage) order and then reverted to sixteen deep and closed to the right or they were standing around in a useless open order sixteen deep (the very formation in which the left were to be smashed) and moved to 32 deep even though there does not seem to have been enough room to do so, and the formation would not add anything and the resulting frontage would be half that of the two legions.

Philip arrived with his units sixteen deep in marching order and then halved their depth to eight in normal order viz

DIAGRAM (well there would be if it could maintain its format, will have to await scanner access , sorry)

It may be suggested that the files formed as half-files initially so that each left-hand file would consist of squaddies 9 to 16 and the right-hand 1 to 8, and there was a drill for this, but Aelian reserves this for those occasions when ‘we want to make the line more compact’ which I take to mean forming ‘synaspismos’ while maintaining the same frontage, otherwise the method would be the reverse of that used to double the depth so that the left-hand files contain soldiers 2, 4, 6, …16 and the right- hand 1, 3 , 5…15; this maintains the front to back ranking of the men much better and allows the optimum arrangement to be regained by doubling in the attested manner. Doing so in the first instance lead to a bastardised file going 1, 9, 2, 10, 3, 11…etc where many men considered among the weakest have intruded into the fighting front.

Polybios describes the phalanx as fighting sixteen deep because that was its normal depth; consider the hybrid phalanx described by Aristoboulos, that can only fight sixteen deep, or Issos where Alexander had to move to eight deep to cover the ground.

The nuances of the Greek are important especially when it is not a nuance but what the word actually means. The advanced forces did not fight across the whole front of the main battle lines only the Roman left sends heavy infantry in and that, coupled with the fact that Philip deploys them on his right and thus in the valley/pass, since the right of Philip’s phalanx had deployed ‘as soon as they had left the pass’ ; the swaying fight was therefore more to Philip’s right. Standing a phalanx in open order does not make sense it cannot fight in such a formation and Flamininus seems to hesitate in engaging it, indeed the Roman advanced force ceased its ‘hot pursuit’ of Philip’s force, presumably because of the phalanx being in battle array and a clear and present danger. Had the retreating lights and cavalry been pushing through an open order phalanx one would have to account the leaders of the pursuing Roman force poltroons of Flashmanic proportions not to sweep the whole untidy and defenceless, mess away.

Hammond’s map does not encompass my proposed battle field which is the ridge to the east of his. I have tracked down a better KGB map but will have to wait until I am paid to get it (first one in Greek then Russian! ).

I agree with Xenophon in that I don’t think that ‘the greater part of his phalanx which was yet to reach the hills’ can refer to the right wing troops Philip himself brought; when Polybios says that Philip ‘saw the majority of the army outside the camp he is including the Thracians, 1,000 at least, so plus the 2,000 Peltasts and 7,000 phalanx would leave 9,000 to follow, which makes the maths work out; for my part I doubt Polybios would worry about allowing for the foragers.

Love the pictures, Paralus, but if you are going after the Lacedaimonian Murray Cod, you are going to need a bigger boat…’Farewell and adieu to you fair Spanish ladies….’

agesilaos wrote: There can be only one meaning to ‘diplasiazein to bathos’ and that is that the troops on the ridge doubled their depth so either they had moved to eight deep in normal (2 cubit frontage) order and then reverted to sixteen deep and closed to the right or they were standing around in a useless open order sixteen deep (the very formation in which the left were to be smashed) and moved to 32 deep even though there does not seem to have been enough room to do so, and the formation would not add anything and the resulting frontage would be half that of the two legions.

Agreed: there is only the one meaning to ‘diplasiazein to bathos’ and it is as you say. Just as there can only be one meaning to "close up to the right". That meaning is that the phalanx was quite clearly in 'open order' lest there be no closing up to be done! That normal open order from the march is sixteen deep - whether it be described as "useless" or not. Nothing in the text indicates in any way that Philip deployed his troops eight deep and in the rush it is almost certain that a strictly 'as usual' deployment was utilised ("As soon as his first files reached the summit, he deployed his men into line by the left, and occupied the range of high ground").Indeed, as the mercenaries retreat to Philip's position the king "was still engaged in getting the right wing of his army into line". Thus the phalanx was still deploying into line and, by definition, in open order. Flaminius likely did not attack because he was - as you've indicated earlier despite Polybios' summary statement - organising his own line. The phalanx, closed up thirty-two deep, needs only the same number of yards per file as sixteen in open order.

On the battlefield, I'll await your map. Again, the adoption of the final order will be in response to the ground available. It fits Hammond's field.

You forget that as the left- hand file merges with the right, when 'doubling the depth' it vacates its space, so that a force in normal order goes from two cubit frontage to a four cubit one, hence the need to close up to the right (which is where the Romans have a formed force) were they in open order this would leave eight cubits between the files which would stretch back 32 yards, quite spacious for an area into which the left could not deploy. Your maths have slipped somewhat,too, take 320 men to spare my brain, 32 deep is 10 files closed up equals 10 yards, 16 deep is twenty files in open order equals forty yards.

True, Polybios does not say that Philip was eight deep to start with but unless he stood in a formation unfitted for combat, the opposing frontage necessitates that he did, his 9,000 (let's say), would be 9000/32 times one yard (equals two cubits) 281.25 yards the Romans were 2000/6 or 333 1/3 yards before we even consider the allied Ala which may have been the same strength and therefore the same frontage; 32 deep cannot work. 16 deep gives a frontage of 560 yards which is nearer the mark especially when one considers that some of the allies may still have been in action against Philip's flank guard. 8 deep in synaspismos is the same frontage as sixteen deep in normal fighting order (which I would call 'pyknosis' but sometimes that is also used for 'syaspismos' ; helpful old Greeks! ) but as that is only a guess of mine let us say that we are dealing with sixteen per file in normal order - well, these sixteen have just doubled and closed to the right, it is inescapable terefore that the were previously EIGHT deep, tah dah.

agesilaos wrote:You forget that as the left- hand file merges with the right, when 'doubling the depth' it vacates its space, so that a force in normal order goes from two cubit frontage to a four cubit one, hence the need to close up to the right (which is where the Romans have a formed force) were they in open order this would leave eight cubits between the files which would stretch back 32 yards, quite spacious for an area into which the left could not deploy. Your maths have slipped somewhat,too, take 320 men to spare my brain, 32 deep is 10 files closed up equals 10 yards, 16 deep is twenty files in open order equals forty yards.

No, I think my maths are fine. Taking one at a time....

Let's stick to Polybios. The Megalopolitan says Philip took the right hand part of the phalanx (8,000) and the peltasts (2,000), totaling 10,000 men, up the ridge. From line of march these deploy into file in open order: 16 deep at 1.83m gives 1,144 metres of frontage. Philip then orders the files to double their depth. Stepping back and across each second file inserts into its right hand neighbour.This leaves the frontage diminished by the one file width. The gap between files is now some 3.6 metres and the depth of each file is 30 metres. Thus is it absolutely imperative that Philip also issue the second part of that order: to close up to the right. The one absolutely must follow the other and this, pace Xenophon, is the only logical reason for Polybios plainly stating that Philip ordered the phalanx to both (two actions, not one) "double their depth and close up to the right". This phalanx is now a block of some 286 metres in frontage and 30 metres deep.

Philip has ordered this because of the ground available to his men - not the Romans down in the valley. The Roman left is ascending the valley after of the rapidly retreating Macedonian lights and mercenaries. Philip is going to meet them at some (not huge) distance down the slope from where he has formed up. He clearly expects that the left part is forming up in like manner and will follow in quick order. It did not. Despite the nature of the account, the Roman forces seem to have fought in two distinct actions: the left, met part way down the slope and pushed back and the right tackling the deployment into line of the Macedonian left.

Given the actions of Philip - as described by Polybios - one should be looking for for a Hammondesque battlefield rather than a Krannon or Pydna to fit notions of standard eight deep close order. It is far better to take the text as is rather than explain part of it away.

agesilaos wrote:True, Polybios does not say that Philip was eight deep to start with but unless he stood in a formation unfitted for combat, the opposing frontage necessitates that he did, his 9,000 (let's say), would be 9000/32 times one yard (equals two cubits) 281.25 yards the Romans were 2000/6 or 333 1/3 yards before we even consider the allied Ala which may have been the same strength and therefore the same frontage; 32 deep cannot work.

Again, it is not what area the Romans had to work with on the valley floor but the area Philip had. If the ground did not admit 18,000 in normal fighting depth and frontage he had to make adjustments.

I cannot understand your consistent descriptions of the phalanx deploying into line sixteen deep as "a formation unfitted for combat" and the like. This was normal practice. From line of march the phalanx deployed into battle line sixteen deep from which any other evolution proceeded. One might just as well question why it crested the ridge in "formation unfitted for combat" (in marching order) for this was exactly the undoing of the left!! Once into line (16 deep) on the ridge Philip could order it to 'double down' to eight deep in pyknosis or close up to the right sixteen deep. He did not. He issued orders to "double their depth and close up to the right" instead. The question is why? Polybios doesn't bother to tell us but it has to be the available ground.

Agesilaos wrote:

I do not want to get bogged down in whether the opening stages are a ‘skirmish’ since all that is happening here is that we are defining things differently, Xenophon defines it according to the numbers engaged , I to whether the main battle lines are engaged, to my mind you can have 10,000 men chucking pointed sticks at each other in loose order and it is still just a skirmish, a mighty big one but still a skirmish, one the main battle line troops deploy and engage it becomes a battle;

By such a definition Roman Legions apparently only ever ‘skirmished’, as did Persian infantry – both of whose infantry were primarily missile armed ( the Romans with pointy sticks chucked by 10,000 men in loose order!), and whose ‘main battle lines’ generally fought at a distance without ‘engaging’ at close quarters until final phases of battle.....

The crucial sentence is XVIII 24 viii

. [8] προσδεξάμενος δὲ τοὺς ἀγωνιζομένους, τούτους μὲν ἥθροιζε πάντας ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας, καὶ τοὺς πεζοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἱππέας, τοῖς δὲ πελτασταῖς καὶ τοῖς φαλαγγίταις παρήγγελλε διπλασιάζειν τὸ βάθος καὶ πυκνοῦν ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιόν.

‘Prosdexamenos’ translated here as ‘received’ is used over eighty times by Polybios and on no occasion does it imply ‘received into the ranks’ (I am only half-way through checking though so maybe it will and I am rushing to press) what it generally means is ‘receive favourably’, which makes sense here too, the ‘agwnizomenoi’ – those that had been engaged – we received favourably [despite having been driven off] by Philip and stationed both foot and horse on the right flank; nothing says they passed through the phalanx. In verse 10, where the Romans ‘receive’ their advanced force’ through the gaps between the maniples, Polybios uses ‘dexamenos’ which is closely related , it is the same without the prefix ‘pros’ but the prefix makes all the difference.

The battle/skirmish of the light troops and cavalry began ‘ahead’(or to the west) of Philip’s march line, beyond what would become the right flank of his battle line when the Romans bumped into the Macedonians securing the heights above the pass. As both sides reinforcements arrived, the fighting must have extended eastward, back toward Philip’s ultimate position and across and in front of it. On numbers alone, this fighting would eventually take place with lines of light troops 1,000 yards or more long, and the fighting must have extended back eastward as the combat grew. ( there is no mention of fighting either in the pass, or to its west). Secondly, in order to ‘support’ his lights Philip could only render assistance if he were formed to their rear ( forming somewhere to their left would not have helped in the slightest ), so Philip’s phalanx must have been to the rear of his cavalry and light troops, even if the light troops extended ( as they likely did given where the fighting began) beyond the right flank of the phalanx. It is even possible that the left of Philip’s phalanx as initially deployed went beyond the light troops, so that the phalanx was formed not directly behind the light troops, but somewhat obliquely. The fact that it was the legionaries of the left wing who joined in might also imply this - which would leave the Roman right wing and its opposite numbers in Philip's phalanx without light troops to their front. Thirdly, from his position on arrival, Philip looks down and sees the fighting going on with the Romans near their camp, down in the valley, which rapidly changes as the legionaries join the fray and drive back his troops toward the ridge line where the phalanx is deployed. All of this means that the majority ( at least) of Philip’s light troops must have withdrawn through the phalanx, which in turn means they must have been in open order at that point. Again this was perfectly normal, for a phalanx did not change to ‘close order/pyknosis’ until the enemy were close (1-200 yards) and contact imminent. Significantly too, the macedonian light troops opponents withdraw through the maniples of the Roman battle-line, which must have stood opposite Philip's phalanx.
Lastly, for a clincher we are told that “Receiving those who were engaged with the enemy he placed them all, both foot and horse on his right wing....”[Polyb XVIII.24.8] He would hardly need to send them off to guard his right flank if they were already there, and the bulk at least can only have been in front of the phalanx.

“Another major problem with this interpretation is that the left wing coming up to the same ground found it unsuitable to deploy upon; which makes it unlikely that the right wing could occupy that same ground in open order and manoeuvre across it.
‘Pyknosein’ - to close up – only implies to the normal order, or two cubits or one yard per man so your 8,000 would cover 500 yards, the equivalent of two legions on a three foot frontage (2400/6 =400yds; in fact there is a good chance that the legions were overstrength, 2,000 hastati were detached from one legion to garrison Thebes, I think, if this applied to the allies too we would have 4000/6=666 yds, if just the Roman contingent we get 3200/6= 533 yards and some of this would be facing the Macedonian flanking force of mercenaries and cavalry).”

This doesn't seem to be entirely correct. The left wing did not find the ridge line unsuitable to deploy on. They understandably had problems doing so ; “in part owing to the difficulty of the ground [the ridgeline] and because they were trying to reach the combatants and were still in marching order and not in line....but gave way thrown into confusion and broken up by the elephants alone.”[Polyb XVIII.25.6-7] In fact earlier we are told some went down, attempting to link with the successful advancing right wing, while others “halted on the heights” to await their still marching comrades at the rear of the column coming up and deploying.
I find your use of ‘pyknosis/close order’ as synonymous with ‘normal’ a little confusing. The Macedonian phalanx had 3 formations. The most common was ‘normal’ or open order; “which had no special name” of four cubits/6ft per man – all the manuals say so e.g. Aelian 11.2; Asclepiodotus IV.2
When about to contact the enemy, this formation usually halved its depth and doubled the number in the frontage to form ‘close order’ or compact order [pyknosis] of 2 cubits/3 ft per man. Thus a full phalanx on a frontage of 1,024 files 16 deep occupying a frontage of 4,096 cubits/10 stades/2,048 yards had 2,048 files 8 deep in close order ‘fighting formation’.

Something the Macedonian phalanx could do due to their side-on two-handed pike stance, and smaller shields ( average 66-75 cm diameter) that earlier hoplites, with a three-quarter stance and larger aspides ( average diameter 80-90 cm) could not, was close up still further into ‘synaspismos/overlapped or locked shields formation', with each man on a 1 cubit/18 in frontage, said to have been invented by Philip II. [ Peter Connolly did some experiments which demonstrated this formation was quite practical]. This ‘locked shields’ formation was usually 4 deep, with every pike in action, with 4,096 men on the same frontage as before. It was usually used for defensive purposes, as obviously manoeuvre or movement in such a dense formation was very difficult.
Incidently, you mentioned ‘synaspismos’ sometimes being used to mean ‘pyknosis’, and this is correct for the earlier hoplite phalanx and perfectly logical. This is because in close order of 3 ft/90 cm per man, the larger hoplite aspides would be just touching/slightly overlapped, to create a ‘locked shields’ formation.

But I digress. ( who me ?) To get back to Cynoscephalae, we agree that Philip’s right wing phalanx, once it was in ‘double depth’ i.e. around 8,000 men in a 16 deep close order fighting formation occupied a frontage of roughly 500 yards, and this was equivalent to the frontage of the left wing two legions ( 1 Roman and 1 Allied ). That rules out an attack 32 deep in close order, for then there would have been a frontage of only 250 yards or so – equivalent to just 1 Legion. It also rules out an attack 8 deep in close order for that would have been on a front of 1,000 yards or so – the frontage of the whole Roman 4 Legion battle line, not just the left wing.

“The normal fighting depth of the sarissa phalanx was sixteen the mathematics of this battle show it; the phalanx has to double its depth from how it was set up on the ridge; were it sixteen deep then the resulting 32 deep block would not just leave the Romans a legion’s worth of overlap it would impede the left wing coming up. My way, gives sufficient room and accords with what Polybios and the manuals say; this is not to say that I am not adding things which are not in the sources; but, I am saying that four legions cannot appear from camp like a rabbit from a hat, it would take time, time which Polybios’ narrative actually gives them, but he has them all set up so that he can deliver Flamininus’ speech. I also add a further evolution where Philip forms ‘synaspismos’ before attacking, this is not mentioned but is the implication of his force not being able to perform ‘metabole’ or about face and Plutarch’s mention of the power of the Macedonians’ interlocked shields.”

An error here is the assumption that the usual ‘fighting formation’ in close order/pyknosis was 16 deep. The ‘manuals’ for both Hoplite and Macedonian phalanxes, battlefield topography, and references in the various sources all refute this assumption, and prove that a phalanx normally formed up in files of a variety of depths ( usually dictated by available ground), but typically 8 for hoplites and 16 for Macedonians in ‘normal’ order of 4 cubits/6 ft per man, which then ‘closed up’ to half-files in fighting formation of ‘pyknosis’ with two cubits per man. I won’t go into a digression on hoplite phalanx formations and the original Xenophon ( What’s that, do I hear a faint sound of cheers?)

The picture is complicated by the fact that by Hellenistic times, in addition to ‘closing up’ by halving the depth of the files, it could also be performed by ranks, i.e. the files stay the same depth, but close up laterally, reducing the frontage by half – and that is exactly what was done at Cynoscephalae by Philip, the reason for it being the constraints of the battle ground size, but this evolution was exceptional, even unique.
e.g. Aelian 11.6 gives us the distances involved for a full phalanx 16,384 strong closing up laterally rather than by files: “Therefore since there 1,024 file leaders drawn up along the front of the phalanx it is evident that deployed they occupy 4,096 cubits/2,048 yds in length, that is 10 stades 96 cubits, 5 stades and 48 cubits in compact order/pyknosis and two and a half stades and 24 cubits in locked shield/synaspismos order.” Note the depth in this instance remains 16 deep.
This is the exception that proves/tests the rule, for normally a commander occupied the available frontage for his battle-line, therefore halved depth, rather than ‘shrink’ his frontage laterally and expose his flanks.

The ‘normal’ or usual depth that the Macedonian phalanx fought in was therefore 8 deep in ‘close/compact order/pyknosis’.

We can also rule out an attack in ‘synaspismos’ for a number of reasons – not least because that would involve an attack at ‘half depth’ whereas we are told they were ‘double depth’. The only source which mentions ‘synaspismos’ in connection with Cynoscephalae is Plutarch ,who confusingly ( and technically incorrectly) uses the term to refer to the phalanx’s usual close order fighting formation [ see confusion of terminology above] – he evidently thought the phalanx always fought in ‘synaspismos’.

Agesilaos has suggested this formation as implicit from Polybius’ “As it is impossible for the phalanx to turn right-about-face or to fight man-to-man.”[XVIII.26.4] This is not necessarily so, because once the phalanx lowered its pikes to horizontal and engaged the enemy, it was quite incapable of turning around, as Polybius says, regardless of what formation it was in. To do so required the pikes to be raised to the vertical – patently impossible to troops engaged with foes to their front. In practical terms, the attack must have been in close order 16 deep, since no other formation fits the known facts without difficulties.

‘Your way’ is problematic, because it would mean initial deployment would have to be 8 deep – and therefore a line of around 2,000 yards ( in the usual open order) twice as long as the Roman line and too big for the battlefield. Your solution, if I understand you correctly, is that the initial deployment was 8 deep in ‘close order’ [1,000 yards or so front], that this was doubled to 16 deep [ still on 1,000 yards frontage, but now in open order, and then ‘closed up’ to the right to ‘compact order’ ( the correct 500 yards frontage).....but then closed up again to ‘synaspismos’? ( just 250 yards frontage). That simply doesn’t work, unless you leave aside aside the improbable idea that the attack was delivered in ‘synaspismos’, when you end up the same as in my hypothesis – the attack was in ‘close order’ 16 deep, on a frontage of some 500 yards or so – on that at least we can agree ?
As to getting there by deploying in ‘close order’, then doubling depth to ‘open order’, then forming ‘close order’ again by laterally closing up, that is the ‘opposite’ of the way we are told phalanxes deployed, which was in ‘normal/open order’, (necessitated by lines having to negotiate obstacles, such as trees etc) only closing up for the charge into contact. There is also the need for a battle line to be in 'open order' so that screening light troops could withdraw/disengage before the main clash. I therefore think my hypothesis less problematic than yours !!

[ Digression: Your point about the of the Legions being oversized is well observed, with Livy’s reference to 2,000 Hastati [ XXXIII.1] ( a normal Legion at this time fielded 1,200 Hastati and was around 4,500 strong [Polyb XI.19.8]). Livy notes ‘overstrength’ legions on eight occasions between 200 an 168 B.C. for service in either Spain or Greece. The largest occurs for the year 169 BC, when the Senate apparently decreed that the two legions on the Macedonian front against Philip’s son Perseus should have 6,000 infantry and 300 cavalry [ L.XLIII.4] but this appears to be an exaggeration, for at XLIV.1.1 the figure of 5,000 is given – presumably following Polybius.
2,000 Hastati would imply a Legion of up to 6,000 ( In an overstrength Legion, which could vary a lot in size, the Hastati and Principes were increased, but not the Triarii )]