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agesilaos wrote:When Alexander crossed into India Arrian says he took the hypaspists, the so-called asthetairoi and half the Agrianes and archers, or something along those lines; IF the phalanx had been reorganised on a kingdomwide rather than petty kingdom basis then it follows that the designation asthetairos can have had nothing to do with ethnicity, since there are no longer ethnically brigaded troops in the phalanx yet the asthetairoi are still a distinct group.

I'm at work so do not have access to any books. So ... at this point, once the army leaves Bactria, are the brigades of pezhetairoi ever referred to by their ethnic regions, as they were earlier in the campaign. I wonder whether, even if they were no longer composed of ethnically distinct soldiers, they retained their ethnic designation - perhaps based on the ethnicity of their commander? If that's the case, perhaps that's why they are "so-called" asthetairoi?

ATB

I've just caught up with this thread after some confusion (probably my fault ) over how the forum worked. Thanks for the input everyone.

marcus wrote:

agesilaos wrote:When Alexander crossed into India Arrian says he took the hypaspists, the so-called asthetairoi and half the Agrianes and archers, or something along those lines; IF the phalanx had been reorganised on a kingdomwide rather than petty kingdom basis then it follows that the designation asthetairos can have had nothing to do with ethnicity, since there are no longer ethnically brigaded troops in the phalanx yet the asthetairoi are still a distinct group.

I'm at work so do not have access to any books. So ... at this point, once the army leaves Bactria, are the brigades of pezhetairoi ever referred to by their ethnic regions, as they were earlier in the campaign. I wonder whether, even if they were no longer composed of ethnically distinct soldiers, they retained their ethnic designation - perhaps based on the ethnicity of their commander? If that's the case, perhaps that's why they are "so-called" asthetairoi?

ATB

It would make sense while campaigning in that area (a fairly mountainous region if I recall correctly) to make use of the troops that are most experienced in mountainous terrain, and if the asthetairoi were from upper Macedonia then they were the ones that fit the bill. So even though Alexander was trying to stop his units from being ethnically segregated he may have made an exception in this case.

The nomenclature of the asthethetairoi seems to have provoked some debate anyway, I will look forward to Agesilaos' article with interest. In case anyone was in doubt - my suggestion of beautiful companions was half in jest. The first half, to be precise.

Paralus gave me food for thought with his description of the late Phalanx. It really seems to have been bereft of all its earlier power, flexibility, and support, and this would seem to be the reason that the Romans were able to defeat them despite the Phalanx having such a devastating reach advantage.

One further quick clarification - I stated earlier that the classical hoplite fought with an overhand jabbing motion, whilst the Phalanx would have used a two handed underarm grip. No-one corrected me on this, so can I assume that I was more or less right?

keroro wrote:One further quick clarification - I stated earlier that the classical hoplite fought with an overhand jabbing motion, whilst the Phalanx would have used a two handed underarm grip. No-one corrected me on this, so can I assume that I was more or less right?

I think you're right, although to be honest I rather forgot about that point you raised.

Largely the justification for that supposition would be that it would have been all but impossible to wield the sarissa in an overhand grip; and judging by the very point (as it were) of the 'hedge' of spearpoints in the phalanx, it would have to have been underarm.

With the normal hoplite spear the phalanx's actions were more independent, and an overarm stab has more power behind it than an underarm one. With a 14-16-foot sarissa, the phalanx action is collegiate and has less individual offensive motion. Such a long spear was too unwieldy for it to be anything else.

That's what I understand, anyway.

ATB

agesilaos wrote: IF the phalanx had been reorganised on a kingdomwide rather than petty kingdom basis then it follows that the designation asthetairos can have had nothing to do with ethnicity, since there are no longer ethnically brigaded troops in the phalanx yet the asthetairoi are still a distinct group.

Yes and no. My view - "It was a process begun after fresh reserves reached him from Macedonia and Greece subsequent to Gaugamela ..." - was not meant to imply instant re-organisation. Far from it actually. I would expect that reserves will have found their way into "taxies" or "brigades" as they appeared on the scene and not along ethnic grounds. Thus a more gradual change. I doubt that Alexander will have pulled apart successful brigades in one fell swoop: I'd think that might be counter productive and lead to some serious unrest. Then again, given the temper of the army at the Beas…

The command structure was a different thing though. It appears that after riding himself of the house of Parmenio and pensioning off (before killing) Kleitus, he was intent on changing the supposed ethnically based structure that existed under Philip.

By Opis though, Alexander’s intent and the results of the policy he followed were quite apparent. His “general” units of the phalanx were – if we are to follow Arrian – now well salted with “Asians trained in the Macedonian fashion”, if not necessarily armed in such fashion. The Macedonians were rather disturbed that their hitherto solely Macedonian phyles – not to mention proboscis – were to be so seriously disjointed.

It is ironic that – Alexander’s predation on Macedonian manpower aside – these changes lead to the de-skilling of a once invulnerable battlefield unit to the extent that Roman legions wound up facing monolithic hedgehogs of very limited maneuverability.

Aside from the Argyraspids, descriptions of the phalanx’s use under Hellenistic kingdoms rarely (if ever – the retreat at Magnesia comes to mid) matches that which Alexander inherited from Philip and made such ingenious use of throughout his anabasis.

marcus wrote:

keroro wrote:One further quick clarification - I stated earlier that the classical hoplite fought with an overhand jabbing motion, whilst the Phalanx would have used a two handed underarm grip. No-one corrected me on this, so can I assume that I was more or less right?

I think you're right, although to be honest I rather forgot about that point you raised.

Largely the justification for that supposition would be that it would have been all but impossible to wield the sarissa in an overhand grip; and judging by the very point (as it were) of the 'hedge' of spearpoints in the phalanx, it would have to have been underarm.

Scholars agree with you both, but the question leads to another one – what kind of shield was carried in the phalanx? I’ll begin by quoting J.E. Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity, page 124 :

One detail of equipment, moreover, may confirm Philip’s Homeric inspiration. The length of the Macedonian sarissa required that it be wielded with both hands, leaving no hand free for the large round shield the Greeks carried in their phalanx. The shield of the Macedonian phalangite may therefore have been attached to his body with a strap around the neck and shoulder: he marched with it on his back and pulled it around front for combat. Classical Greeks, in contrast, used shields with handgrips only. Like the phalanx that used it, this Macedonian strap may have been borrowed from the Iliad, for that is how shields were carried in epic:

Ajax and Teucer aimed at him together, and Teucer
hit him with an arrow in the shining belt that encircled his
chest to hold the man-covering shield.

Sekunda and Warry, Alexander the Great: His Armies and Campaigns 334-323 BC (Page 39) share your thoughts on the sarissa, “Sarrissa may have been shorter during Alexander’s reign, but even so one presumes that they would have been held underarm with both hands.” However, they disagree with Lendon on the shield:

The infantrymen on the Alexander Sarcophagus all use hoplite shields. Most modern authorities believe that the infantry under Alexander continued to use the peltai they had used during the first years of Philip’s reign, but this view runs against the archaeological evidence, and against some evidence contained in the texts. In one battle during the Balkan campaigns Arrian (1.1.19) tells us that the Thracians intended to launch carts down a hillside to break up the advancing phalanx. Alexander ordered the phalanx to crouch down and link their shields closely together. The carts slid over the shields and not one man perished. It is difficult to see how this operation could have been successfully performed without large shields. Curtius mentions similar ‘tortoise’ tactics being used during the campaign against the Uxians and the storming of the Persian Gates.

First of all, I’m not sure what the authors mean by “this view runs against archaeological evidence” but I would suggest that the use of large shields by the sarrisa-wielding phalanx runs against common logic! Those wide-diameter shields had a leather tube in the center through which the arm was threaded, and a leather grip near the rim. It would be absolutely impossible to hold such a shield in battle formation and also hold a sarissa underarm with both hands! As Sekunda and Warry point out, the infantrymen on the Alexander Sarcophagus have large shields, however, they are NOT fighting with sarissae in phalanx formation, but with swords. Why not consider that Lendon may be correct in describing the shields used ONLY when the phalanx was arrayed for battle, and that hoplite shields would have been used under other circumstances? After all, the infantry wasn’t deployed in strict formation when cities were being attacked or in any other circumstance except battles on open plains. (There’s even been discussion here as to whether the sarissae were carried by the army after Gaugamela ... in Alexander’s reign, that is.) So if Alexander wasn’t expecting to immediately draw his army up in ranks for battle while traversing the mountains during the Balkan campaign, then surely his infantry would have been properly equipped against a possible ambush or surprise attack, hence the larger shields?

Well, just my thoughts on this small matter. . .

Best regards,

Interesting Amyntoros, that you have Soldiers and Ghosts. not something I'd thought you interested in. I too have a copy, strangely enough. I agree with Lendon. It is rather difficult to imagine the Macedonian phalangite weilding a four to five metre sarissa whilst lumping a hoplon into battle. Impossible as you say.

Further, there are other aspects at play here. If the "archaeological evidence" comes down to art, one needs to ask is the art a realistic work or an impression? As well, the Macedonian army contained troops named as "shield bearers" who are differentiated from the technical useage of the term "Hypaspists" (those who scaled the ladders at the "Camel's Fort" under Perdiccas in Egypt- literally under the shields they were carrying - for instance). The Hypaspists too seemed to have adopted different armaments depending on the action in which they were involved. For some such actions a shield more reminiscent of the hoplon, a shorter spear and sword may well have been used.

Ah yes, the shields. I hadn't thought to ask about these. I've always assumed that the petzhetairoi shield was fixed to the upper left arm, though I have no idea why I had that picture in my head. A strap round the arm and back to hold the shield and allow it to move from front to back would make sense where it was possible get the phalanx into formation.

One further thing - One can well imagine that the Hoplon gave good protection from archers, hence the Spartan quip about preferring to fight in the shade at Thermopylae, but how did the petzhetairoi manage. With a small shield they should have been vulnerable, but I don't believe that any of the sources mention excessive Macedonian casualties from missile fire. Considering that the persians were so fond of carrying bows this seems a bit strange.

A general observation from all of this - the Macedonians under Alexander were very, very flexible, and able to adapt to just about any situation. The common modern picture of the Phalanx is that it was rigid and inflexible, but this seems to be very far from the truth, at least in Alexander's reign.

Thanks for everyone's input here BTW.

keroro wrote:With a small shield they should have been vulnerable, but I don't believe that any of the sources mention excessive Macedonian casualties from missile fire. Considering that the persians were so fond of carrying bows this seems a bit strange.

Hi Keroro.

I believe they were more vulnerable to missile fire than, in fact, the sources state. Generally, in ancient engagements, the archers let fly when the enemy formations were within effective killing range of the bows used. This was not – as is often portrayed in films – thousands of yards distant. It was more likely some 120 yards, though some have argued 200. Either way, with a closing phalanx (and cavalry), they will have needed to loose those arrows, make way for the slingers to volley and then both retire well out of the way of the fast approaching horizontal hell of the hedgehog. In this, I think Stone’s rendering of the missile fire is close. As well, I don’t think I’d like to rely for arrow protection on the phalangites behind waving their vertical sarissas as Hammond has suggested.

The amount of casualties may reflect the amount of ordinance able to be let fly in the time in range.

keroro wrote:A general observation from all of this - the Macedonians under Alexander were very, very flexible, and able to adapt to just about any situation. The common modern picture of the Phalanx is that it was rigid and inflexible, but this seems to be very far from the truth, at least in Alexander's reign.

The picture to which you refer might be that of the post Alexander phalanx. By the time of his death Alexander was well under way with plans to not only replace his superannuated Macedonians with Asian units, he was also inserting Asians into his phalanx battalions. Given that Antipater did not ever arrive with the expected Macedonians, the effectiveness of the mixed phalanx was far reduced. Indeed the Diadochoi took to separating the Asians from the Macedonians who were, by now, in both short supply and serious demand.

The phalangites of both Alexander, and his father, were well trained. They were the professional army of the Balkans when Alexander inherited them. They did not learn the moves displayed at Pellium (in 335) in the short time Alexander commanded them.

The effectiveness and skill of the experienced Macedonian phalanx is amply demonstrated by the Argyraspids (Alexander’s Hypaspists and not a few Philip’s as well) at both Paraetecene and, more so, at Gabiene. Against those “trained and armed in the Macedonian fashion” at Paraetecene, the Argyraspids charged the Antigonid line and pushing back and disjointing the opposing phalanx were, in large part, responsible for the deaths of 3,700 and 4,000 casualties.

At Gabiene, Diodorus describes them as causing disarray amongst the Antigonid line with repeated charges that drove their opponents back, taking the rest of the phalanx with them, and greatly helping to occasion some 5,000 deaths. At this time, Eumenes’ left had been put to flight and with Eumenes himself under severe duress from one wing of Antigonus’ cavalry, the other Antigonid cavalry got in behind the Argyraspids who, in quick fashion, formed up in a square and battled their way back off he field by dusk. Just in time for dinner followed by recriminations and to hand Eumenes over to Antigonus for desert - which happened to be their wives and belongings.

Such a level of skill was to much harder to find in the Diadoch period and that of their inheritors. The Macedonian phalanx suffered something of a severe de-skilling. It resembleled the inverse square law: as the pike grew the skill flew.

The Battle of Magnesia (189) stands in stark contrast. There Antiochus’ phalanx – 16,000 strong and in brigades 32 deep – were left stranded after Antiochus’ headlong charge through the Roman lines. Thus denuded of cavalry at the flanks they stood their ground. As Appian describes it:

The Macedonian phalanx, which had been stationed between the two bodies of horse in a narrow space in the form of a square, when denuded of cavalry on either side, had opened to receive the light-armed troops, who had been skirmishing in front, and closed again. Thus crowded together, Domitius easily enclosed them with his numerous light cavalry. Having no opportunity to charge or even to deploy their dense mass, they began to suffer severely; and they were indignant that military experience availed them nothing, exposed as they were on all sides to the weapons of the enemy. Nevertheless, they presented their thick-set pikes on all four sides.

They challenged the Romans to close combat and preserved at all times the appearance of being about to charge. Yet they did not advance, because they were foot-soldiers and heavily armed, and saw that the enemy were mounted. Most of all they feared to relax their close formation lest they might not readily bring it together again.

The Romans did not come to close quarters nor approach them because they feared the discipline, the solidity, and the desperation of this veteran corps; but circled around them and assailed them with javelins and arrows, none of which missed their mark in the dense mass, who could neither turn the missiles aside nor dodge them.

After suffering severely in this way they yielded to necessity and fell back step by step, but with a bold front, in perfect order and still formidable to the Romans. The latter kept their distance and continued to circle around and wound them, until the elephants inside the Macedonian phalanx became excited and unmanageable. Then the phalanx broke into disorderly flight.

One really must ask the question why elephants were within the phalanx? Interesting also that, in a last ditch defence of the Seleucid Empire – larger at this stage than that which was left to Darius in 331 at Gaugamela – Antiochus “The Great” could amass a paltry 70,000.

Hi Paralus,

Paralus wrote:I believe they were more vulnerable to missile fire than, in fact, the sources state. Generally, in ancient engagements, the archers let fly when the enemy formations were within effective killing range of the bows used. This was not – as is often portrayed in films – thousands of yards distant. It was more likely some 120 yards, though some have argued 200. Either way, with a closing phalanx (and cavalry), they will have needed to loose those arrows, make way for the slingers to volley and then both retire well out of the way of the fast approaching horizontal hell of the hedgehog. In this, I think Stone’s rendering of the missile fire is close. As well, I don’t think I’d like to rely for arrow protection on the phalangites behind waving their vertical sarissas as Hammond has suggested.

I agree, a sarissa would seem to be a poor defence against an arrow. Against sling fire they might have been slightly better. I think I need to get a cast of thousands and a budget of millions together and try this out for myself.

Paralus wrote:The picture to which you refer might be that of the post Alexander phalanx. By the time of his death Alexander was well under way with plans to not only replace his superannuated Macedonians with Asian units, he was also inserting Asians into his phalanx battalions. Given that Antipater did not ever arrive with the expected Macedonians, the effectiveness of the mixed phalanx was far reduced. Indeed the Diadochoi took to separating the Asians from the Macedonians who were, by now, in both short supply and serious demand.

That is indeed the picture I'm referring to. I think that many people are aware of the phalanx/legion battles at the end of the hellenistic age. It's interesting to read some of the accounts of these battles though. It appears that Pyrrhus never lost a battle to the Romans (though he took some pretty bad casualties of course), and the Romans do seem to have been incapable of breaking through, or standing against, a well trained phalanx of Macedonians. They also seem to have had some psychological effect on the Romans, but then a solid mass of spikey Iron coming towards you will tend to cause some psychological discomfort.

Paralus wrote:The effectiveness and skill of the experienced Macedonian phalanx is amply demonstrated by the Argyraspids (Alexander’s Hypaspists and not a few Philip’s as well) at both Paraetecene and, more so, at Gabiene. Against those “trained and armed in the Macedonian fashion” at Paraetecene, the Argyraspids charged the Antigonid line and pushing back and disjointing the opposing phalanx were, in large part, responsible for the deaths of 3,700 and 4,000 casualties.

At Gabiene, Diodorus describes them as causing disarray amongst the Antigonid line with repeated charges that drove their opponents back, taking the rest of the phalanx with them, and greatly helping to occasion some 5,000 deaths. At this time, Eumenes’ left had been put to flight and with Eumenes himself under severe duress from one wing of Antigonus’ cavalry, the other Antigonid cavalry got in behind the Argyraspids who, in quick fashion, formed up in a square and battled their way back off he field by dusk. Just in time for dinner followed by recriminations and to hand Eumenes over to Antigonus for desert - which happened to be their wives and belongings.

The Argyaspides must have had such interesting lives. And equally interesting deaths. I love to imagine them with silver shields and silver beards, smashing straight through whatever was put in fromt of them. I'm sure there's a novel to be written about them sometime.

Paralus wrote:The Battle of Magnesia (189) stands in stark contrast. There Antiochus’ phalanx – 16,000 strong and in brigades 32 deep – were left stranded after Antiochus’ headlong charge through the Roman lines. Thus denuded of cavalry at the flanks they stood their ground. As Appian describes it:

The Macedonian phalanx, which had been stationed between the two bodies of horse in a narrow space in the form of a square, when denuded of cavalry on either side, had opened to receive the light-armed troops, who had been skirmishing in front, and closed again. Thus crowded together, Domitius easily enclosed them with his numerous light cavalry. Having no opportunity to charge or even to deploy their dense mass, they began to suffer severely; and they were indignant that military experience availed them nothing, exposed as they were on all sides to the weapons of the enemy. Nevertheless, they presented their thick-set pikes on all four sides.

They challenged the Romans to close combat and preserved at all times the appearance of being about to charge. Yet they did not advance, because they were foot-soldiers and heavily armed, and saw that the enemy were mounted. Most of all they feared to relax their close formation lest they might not readily bring it together again.

The Romans did not come to close quarters nor approach them because they feared the discipline, the solidity, and the desperation of this veteran corps; but circled around them and assailed them with javelins and arrows, none of which missed their mark in the dense mass, who could neither turn the missiles aside nor dodge them.

After suffering severely in this way they yielded to necessity and fell back step by step, but with a bold front, in perfect order and still formidable to the Romans. The latter kept their distance and continued to circle around and wound them, until the elephants inside the Macedonian phalanx became excited and unmanageable. Then the phalanx broke into disorderly flight.

One really must ask the question why elephants were within the phalanx? Interesting also that, in a last ditch defence of the Seleucid Empire – larger at this stage than that which was left to Darius in 331 at Gaugamela – Antiochus “The Great” could amass a paltry 70,000.

We see the folly of relying too heavily on one unit, and of failing to protect your flanks. We also see the folly of putting a load of elephants in the middle of your own densely packed infantry. As far as I know, the seleucids tended to use elephants that were heavily armoured and they acted as mobile fortresses rather than being used to break the enemy line. It would have helped that they were probably Indian elephants, and therefore very tame (compared to the north african species).

Initial part of full article posted as 'defining one's terms' these little matters require alot of ink

Agesilaos
I can live with the criticism of my ideas as "daft" but I did want to clarify that nowhere (unless my memory fails) did I say that I took asth- as coming from assista or agchisteia (which I do understand to mean closest kinsmen). I was thinking instead of asson or assoteros -tatos + hetairos. Hence the spatial closeness does not conflict with (or duplicate unnecessarily) the ethnic designations. Having said that, I am not entirely certain that asth- must come from asson, assista, astoi, or aristoi. It may simply be the corruption of a Macedonian word, the meaning of which has not been preserved. The idea of kinship may have some meaning for Upper Macedonians, not in the sense that the infantrymen themselves were related by blood but that the their ruling houses were related by blood to the Argeads (this would be most likely to be true of Lyncestians and Elimeiots). I'd be interested in seeing your arguments in greater detail. I certainly have no fixed position on the matter.
I am assuming that pothos.org has no rule against betraying one's own identity. I simply find it hard to refer to myself in the third person.
I note that your message of Mar. 19th says that "defining one's terms" has be "posted". As a forum neophyte, I'm not sure I know what this means. That is, where I can I find (and how can I access) your posting?

ptrogus wrote:I note that your message of Mar. 19th says that "defining one's terms" has be "posted". As a forum neophyte, I'm not sure I know what this means. That is, where I can I find (and how can I access) your posting?

Ptrogus,

I've located Agesilaus' post and "replied" to it, so as to bring it up to the top of the message list.

(Added 30 April: except it's not any more. But it's still near the top, and it's called "Defining One's Terms". PTrogus - I tried to send you a Private Message but it hasn't sent, so I hope you will have checked back in the forum soon, to see this message!)

ATB

Ptrogus, thanks for the salutary clarification. 'defing one's terms' was the by-line to a bit what I wrote concerning Arrian's use of the term 'taxis' and that would be the title that would appear in the forum listing.

I have not finished my piece on the asthetairoi yet in no small part due to leaving the half started oevre in the pub and losing Bosworth's article along with my own scribblings. I notice this was your first posting and were it not to compound my hubris I would wish you a warm welcome from the whole community, as it is I extend these feelings from my own little corner of it perched by the Eurotas.