Alexander vs. Memnon of Rhodes; Lucky escape?

[susan]

Scott
I've sent you an email with more references.Susan

[ScottOden]

The difference was Memnon was in control at Halicarnassus, while Alexander controlled Issus/Gaugamela. Alexander could not stop Memnon from coming and going as he pleased; once he'd inflicted as much damage on Alexander as he possibly could (and lost as many men himself as he dared), Memnon withdrew to Cos. His intent, I think, was not to defeat Alexander at Halicarnassus, but to delay him while he implemented plans to move the war's theater of operations to Greece and Macedonia. Darius, in his pitched battles, kept trying to force a dramatic victory. Memnon better understood that Alexander was a force of nature to be endured, not an enemy to be fought -- as with an uncontrollable fire, it's better to deprive it of fuel than try to face it head on. Memnon's ultimate strategy, and this is only my opinion based on what I've read, was to let Alexander exhaust himself, burn himself out. Then, Memnon could move in for the kill. It would be interesting to see what might have happened had Memnon not died.All the Best,Scott Oden

[marcus]

Well, the mercenaries, having been posted on the hill/hillock to the rear, couldn't help but see what the outcome was.To consider that the mercenaries were 'more expendable' than the Persian cavalry *might* be imposing more of a medieval point of view on the situation. All the same, the Persian commanders are very likely to have been keen to see the upstart thrown back by their own forces, rather than by a load of Greeks who might have been tempted to renounce their allegiance - the Hellenic Crusade idea wouldn't have been a secret and the Persians might have feared that altruism would win over gold.I doubt we'll ever know - I think, however, that it's quite clear that Memnon was not in command and therefore the disposition of the troops was not his job.All the bestMarcus

[marcus]

However, the add-on to this is that, while Memnon did indeed control the citadel at Halicarnassus, he had already given the city to Alexander, by retreating from the walls. But, as Scott says, Memnon had not been 'defeated' as such.In one of your posts, Jan, you say Darius was 'soft'. I don't think he was - it took enormous courage to leave the battlefield, to hand the battle to Alexander and therefore to keep the empire pretty much intact for another two years. Be careful when you read or hear people calling Darius a coward for leaving the battlefield at Issus (or Gaugamela, for that matter).All the bestMarcus

[yiannis]

Greek mercenaries had formed the nucleus of Persian heavy infantry for over a century from the time of Granicus, soon after the Greek/Persian wars. After the Pelopponesian wars and the devastation that followed, there was never a shortage of "hired arms" to be recruited in Greece. They fought as mercenaries for the Persians, Carthagenians aginst the Greeks of Sicily (wasn't it Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse who used to execute captured Greek mercenaries figthing for the Carthagenians as "traitors"?), Thracians etc.
They effectivelly put out the revolt in Egypt but often caused problems to the Persians with their "unpredictable behavior".
In any case, it's a mystery to me, why the Persians failed to deploy such a force with a proven value on the field. Poor generalship? Probably yes.On the other hand sources fail to agree on their number. They caould be anything from 5000 to 20000 at Granicus. In my mind since 2000 of them were send as prisoners to work in the mines, there shouldn't be more that 5000 at Granicus. In any case these were the mercenaries of the Asia Minor satraps, not of the imperial army and there must have been more on service in different provinces...

[dean]

Hello,
Marcus, you say that it took immense courage to leave the battlefield at Issus or Gaugamela. I don't see the bravery in leaving.I would personally have thought that it would have taken more courage to stay- so maybe I am not fully understanding your reasoning.You seem to posit that because he left the battlefield he was doing it to postpone the final defeat.Please fill me in because I don't see what he gained by running. It just seems like chess- he was in check but simply on the run- 2 or 3 moves from
check mate. Best regards,
Dean.

[MJ]

Hello,
Your discussion about ALexander vs. Memnon has been very interesting but it seems to me that you have somewhat forgotten about the quality of soldiers whom ALexander and Memnon had at their disposal. It is not only that the Persians, even the Persian cavalry, were not a match for the Macedonian phalanx and the hetairioi. Even the finest Greek infantry, the Thebans, were completely annihilated at Cheronaea by Alexander's heavy cavalry while Philip himself engaged the Athenians. By the way, that cavalry, those haughty, aristocratic, "golden-youth" units fought pretty well under Alexander, weren't they? It seems to me that the direct confrontation between ALexander and Memnon could be somewhat similar to Cheronaea, although I appreciate Memnon's skills, including his masterly co-planning of the fleet operations. And, Yiannis, please believe me: the Polish cavalry did not charge against Nazi German tanks in 1939 (although there were some charges against Nazi infantry and artillery). "Charge against tanks" is a myth, created by Italian movies during WWII, and popularized, unfortuantely, by some Polish movies after the war.
Greetings, MJ.