Phoebus wrote:I was making no such comparison between any first or second time.
If we're just talking about the first battle, then I'm not sure what the issue is. The Athenians broke; we know this. The Thebans, on the other hand, were fighting nearby their city, and the Sacred Band in particular was far less likely to have broken (like the Athenians) or surrendered. Given this... what is the point of raising Alexander's conduct here.
The issue is that you have irretrievably conflated the battle of Chaeronea of 338 with the subsequent Theban revolt. These are two quite separate actions. The brutality of the second is, though, unarguably worse than the former.
The allied battle line, for the Thebans to have been “fighting nearby their city” will have stretched some seventy kilometres. At, say eight deep, that makes the allied hoplite contingent near to 560,000 men. Now, whereas some will tell you that’s fine for Persian “hordes”, it is plainly out of the question here.
Having driven the old “national road” and had a look for myself, the Sacred Band (and the other Thebans) were, in no way, nearby their seventy km (by modern road) distant city. For all practical purposes, they were as “close” as the fleeing Athenians were to Athens.
The battle was fought close to the town and acropolis of Chaeronea with the Achaean, Boeotian and Theban contingents holding the line right of the centre and the Sacred band, abutting the banks of a perennial watercourse, the Cephisus, on the far right. The casualties inflicted on this end of the line are done so by troops with Alexander at their head. The Sacred Band is massacred (leaving aside the possibility, on archaeological evidence, of 46 surviving) and the Boeotians lost “many”. The only other clue are the Achaeans who, at the onset of the Lamian War, claimed their severe losses here as the reason why they could not participate (Pausanias, 7.6.5)
Phoebus wrote:Where the garission towns are concerned, I agree with your views insofar as how those settlements turned out. I simply feel that Alexander had other plans for them.
As far as those towns were concerned, Alexander had left them to their own devices when he departed for and then from India. If the stories retailed are correct, he was off to Arabia and the western Mediterranean. They would not likely see or hear – directly – from the king for some goodly amount of time. Any spreading of “Hellenic” cultural mores was, in my opinion, of a seriously secondary concern. You yourself have hinted at it:
Phoebus wrote:Part of the plans Alexander had for the future involved large-scale population transplanting. Combine this with the military aspect (above), and one might guess that any social egalitarianism may have come about courtesy of the dillution of native culture and language in favor of a Hellenic standard. Pretty scary, if you ask me.
Scary indeed. The idea that the army will have owed its ongoing existence and future to its owner and paymaster, Alexander.
Alexander had already trained some 30,000 from these areas – and thoroughly removed them from their “surrounds”. He had taken his draft of native troops and now his garrison towns, complete with Hellenic cultural recreaction for the implants, would see to his fractious borders.
Had he lived, these means to an end (in my opinion) will have continued in the same vein: defence and the supply of recruits. His father had been doing similar throughout the Balkans for some decades before this.