Agesilaos wrote
.... and Epaminondas forming up fifty deep at Leuktra, depth clearly mattered and this is not a question of ‘line versus column’, which is a horse and musket debate concerning the fire power of the line v the shock value of a column; this is a case of deep and shallow phalanxes fighting in the same way with the same weapons; the Spartans had no missiles to hurl at the oncoming Thebans other than sharp words. Nor were the Greeks alone in finding depth beneficial, when pikes returned to general use we find them fighting in great depth, fifty being typical even when developments in firearms led to less massive pike blocks they generally still formed and fought ten deep.
Xenophon countered
If you think ‘line versus column’ is a horse and musket debate only, you are sadly mistaken – it has applied all through military history, and if you think that depth is a good thing in hoplite warfare, I suggest you read all of Xenophon, who was a real Hoplite general. His views on depth are quite scathing, see e.g. Cyropaedia VI.3.22:-
....and he was right, of course, because in fact no Theban column broke through a Spartan line. At Tegyra, after the fall of their leaders, the Spartans deliberately opened up to let the Theban column escape, and at Leuktra, similarly it was the death of the King and the leading Spartiates around him that caused the Spartans to fall back – the Theban column did not break the Spartan line, 6 deep. At Second Mantinea, the Thebans caused the Mantineans to flee before contact, but the battle ended in a draw when Epaminondas was killed.“And do you think, Cyrus,” said one of the generals, “that drawn up with lines so shallow we shall be a match for so deep a phalanx?” ( the lochoi are drawn up in files 12 deep, which would fight 6x6 in close order)
“When phalanxes are too deep to reach the enemy with weapons,” answered Cyrus, “how do you think they can either hurt their enemy or help their friends?
[23] For my part, I would rather have these hoplites who are arranged in columns a hundred deep drawn up ten thousand deep; for in that case we should have very few to fight against. According to the depth that I shall give my line of battle, I think I shall bring the entire line into action and make it everywhere mutually helpful.”
Agesilaos;
Alot to reply to, but I cannot allow this myth that the Spartans were not shattered by the Theban column at Leuktra to continue. It is true that Xenophon, the arch Lakonophile enters into his own 'special pleading' to say that the spartans must have put up a fight because they would not otherwise have been able to recover the body of Kleombrotos (Hellenika VI ixff for his bowdlerised account). Plutarch 'Pelopidas 20 gives the reason for this; the Sacred Band (as Lochos is normally translated here) ran ahead of the main body and caught the Spartans before they could either extend their flank or contract it; they were outnumbered until Epaminondas arrived with the depth of the column (embolon) and the Spartans were shattered and fled.
The casualties tell their own story, the greater part come when a phalanx breaks the Spartiates suffered 57% losses (400 from 700) and the engaged wing 1000 from 2400 (four 600 strong morai) or 42% these are not likely from a long even fight they are a rout.
Xenophon:
Myth? I do wish you would cite references for your bald assertions. Essentially we have two versions of Leuktra, what we may term a 'pro-Spartan' one given by Xenophon ( which is the more complete one ) and a 'pro-Theban' given by the patriotic Boeotian Plutarch in his 'Pelopidas', and another, somewhat inaccurate, brief account in Diodorus [XV.53 ff], clearly written from a Boeotian source. Diodorus [XV.56.2] suggests that after a long and stubborn fight, the Spartans "fled in utter rout" and Plutarch [Pelopidas XXIII.4] says there was "such a flight and slaughter of the Spartan as had never been seen before".agesilaos wrote:Alot to reply to, but I cannot allow this myth that the Spartans were not shattered by the Theban column at Leuktra to continue.
It is true that Xenophon, the arch Lakonophile enters into his own 'special pleading' to say that the spartans must have put up a fight because they would not otherwise have been able to recover the body of Kleombrotos (Hellenika VI ixff for his bowdlerised account).
Easy to see you are hardly an objective observer ! If Xenophon's account is 'bowdlerised', then that of Diodorus and Plutarch is even more so ! Even so, Diodorus acknowledges that the fight was a long one and that the Lacedaemonians were forced back "only with great difficulty"[ XV.56]. Xenophon[Hell VI.4.14] tells us the "beheaded snake", bereft of command, "gave way" to the Theban masses ( without, be it noted, having their line broke) withdrew in orderly fashion behind the ditch of their camp, and debated whether to renew the battle, but ultimately acknowledged defeat in the usual way - requesting the return of their dead. That the battle was indecisive in a military sense, and the defeat due to the shock of so many 'Homioi/aristocrats' dying, is certain. Despite this, Sparta quickly rallied and recovered under Archidamus - and the defeated army remained in Boeotia, a continuing threat, until a truce was negotiated under Jason of Pherae.
Plutarch 'Pelopidas 20 gives the reason for this; the Sacred Band (as Lochos is normally translated here) ran ahead of the main body and caught the Spartans before they could either extend their flank or contract it; they were outnumbered until Epaminondas arrived with the depth of the column (embolon) and the Spartans were shattered and fled.
The casualties tell their own story, the greater part come when a phalanx breaks the Spartiates suffered 57% losses (400 from 700) and the engaged wing 1000 from 2400 (four 600 strong morai) or 42% these are not likely from a long even fight they are a rout.
Again, where do you get this stuff ? None of our sources says the Lacedaemonians were "shattered" - what Boeotian propaganda had to say I have quoted above. Xenophon's account is to be preferred, because after the battle the Lacedaemonian army was still intact, still in its camp, and still a threat to Thebes until a truce was negotiated. Moreover Xenophon and Diodorus are broadly agreed on the shape of the fight - it was a long struggle, and bitter, as the Spartans attempted to recover their mortally wounded King, just like the struggle around Leonidas, the last King to die in battle. There is also Polyaenus' famous anecdote of Epaminondas shouting "grant me one pace forward, and we'll have victory". [II.3.2]. Evidently at that point, not only had the Theban column failed to 'shatter' the Spartan line, they were unable even to push them back.
As to casualties, you rightly point to the fact that it was the death of so many 'homioi/aristocrats' about their King that shocked those present, and later the city itself, for they were all officers. I don't agree your numbers though, especially for the strength of the 'morai'. This was the cause of their defeat - the beheading of the snake. However, if we step back and take an overall view of the casualties, a rather different picture emerges. Peter Krentz did an analysis of hoplite battle casualties ( 1985) and concluded that typically, the winning side suffered something of the order of 5% casualties or less on average, and the loser of the order of 14% casualties killed, with a ratio of winner to loser of 1:2 through 1:3. Overall, Leuktra conforms to this, with 300 or so Boeotian casualties(5%), and 1,000 or so Lacedaemonian ones, but mostly Spartans ( 10%) This is less than the average 14% - and so was not particularly 'bloody' at all. This points to an orderly withdrawal, as do subsequent events, and therefore Xenophon's account is the most reliable. There was no 'rout', no 'shattering' other than in Boeotian propaganda. From a military standpoint, it was an indecisive battle - though the deaths of the King and many of the 'Homioi' was a deep psychological shock that would ultimately lead to Sparta's demise..
Xenophon added
The Thebans, it seems, were just as secretive as the Spartans about matters military. We are told the depth of their columns only twice. Delium where Thuc IV.93,25 says they were "...drawn up in the order in which they intended to fight." i.e. battle or close order, and that this was 25 shields deep. The other is Leuktra, where Xenophon tells us the Spartans were 12 deep ( evidently in open order) and that the Thebans were in "...massed formation at least 50 shields deep."[Xen Hell VI.4.12] and since he is comparing like with like, these must have been in open order too. We are not told their depth at Nemea, simply that they were "..exceedingly deep" , according to the disapproving Xenophon[Xen Hell IV.2.18]
From the two examples we have, it would appear the Thebans formed up 50 deep, halving to 25 in close order, entirely consistent with all the other evidence for combat taking place in half-files in close order.
Thucydides does not appear to have been what might be termed 'a military man', and doesn't comment on depths in any of his battle descriptions....which would be superfluous given the audience he was writing for in any event.
Agesilaos:
This is not so surprising, I suppose, since you describe one of history's most decisive battles as indecisive! And how by some rather lame 'special pleading'; Xenophon is clear that only the Theban left and Lakedaimonian right actually engaged, so these are the only forces to consider when judging the proportion of casualties. There were four Morai on the Spartan side, those which Kleombrotos had been sent with to Phokis (Hell.VI 1); a mora had sixteen enomotiai according to Xenophon Lak.Pol 11 iv
ἑκάστη δὲ τῶν ὁπλιτικῶν μορῶν ἔχει πολέμαρχον ἕνα, λοχαγοὺς τέτταρας, πεντηκοντῆρας ὀκτώ, ἐνωμοτάρχους ἑκκαίδεκα.
Thus a mora has 576 men, working on a twelve deep file this is 48 files, four such 192 which allowing for a certain rounding of figures gives 400 Spartiate officers, who presumably form the file leaders and closers a la Sokrates of Xenophon's Memorabilia's description. The 300 Spartiates over are the Hippeis which are attested separately at the battle. 400 died which looks like all the front rank and two thirds of the Hippeis, a further 600 of the leavening fell, which makes 1,000 from 2,300 or 43.5% but this was no rout As for you 300 alleged Theban casualties, if you want them then you will have to accept the 4,000 Spartan casualties claimed by the same source (or twice the numbers they started with!); Diodoros is pretty worthless, as his source Ephoros, was found to be by Polybios XII 25f. Pausanias (IX 13 v-vi) gives the Theban casualties as 47, probably from 2,000 or 2.03%. Looks pretty decisive to me, the effects were; Spartan hegemony was instantly broken the next campaigning season saw the allies at the gates of Sparta, Messenia liberated and Megaloppolis founded. Better check that grip on reality
Xenophon:
This is not so surprising, I suppose, since you describe one of history's most decisive battles as indecisive! And how by some rather lame 'special pleading'; Xenophon is clear that only the Theban left and Lakedaimonian right actually engaged, so these are the only forces to consider when judging the proportion of casualties.
Once again, you do not appear to have read what I wrote, viz: "From a military standpoint, it was an indecisive battle -- though the deaths of the King and many of the 'Homioi' was a deep psychological shock that would ultimately lead to Sparta's demise.."
The battle changed nothing, militarily it was a draw - the Lakedaemonian army was intact in its camp, still threatening Thebes, though its attack was now blunted. The Thebans dared not attack the camp, nor offer further battle, but cast about for allies. Jason of Pherae came, but despite Theban urgings would not agree to attack the Lakedaemonians ( a likely expensive proposition, and probably for political reasons too ). Archidamus son of Agesilaos duly relieved the army, and they went home at the end of the campaigning season. The main effect was political and psychological - the Arcadians of Mantinea and Tegea broke their alliance with Sparta, and urged the Thebans to invade the Peloponnese. Sparta promptly invaded Arcadia. King Agesilaos kept the field until mid-winter, hoping for a chance to avenge Leuktra, but the reluctant Thebans didn't deliver their promised aid. Agesilaos was ultimately forced to withdraw, harried by the Arcadians ( the scenario of his famous 'anastrophe' manouevre to withdraw intact). The brave Boeotians turned up at Mantinea after Agesilaos had gone home. It was only the following year, with more Spartan allies coming over, that with overwhelming numbers a reluctant Epaminondas invaded Lakonia - the first time in six centuries that this had happened. Incidently, the Thebans couldn't have "been at the gates" of Sparta - she had no walls nor gates at this time. The open city was successfully defended and Epaminondas withdrew - more indecisive fighting. The following year, 369 BC, the Boeotians invaded the Peloponnese again to no avail, and the year after, the Spartans won an overwhelming military victory over the Arcadians at the "Tearless battle", but this was politically indecisive as the Arcadians built Megalopolis to block the invasion route...... The indecisive struggle continued until 362 BC, when Epaminondas came for the last time. After a failed thrust at Sparta, there occurred the indecisive battle of second Mantinea, where Epaminondas was killed. The struggle petered out.
The real reason Sparta's centuries long hegemony of the Peloponnese came to an end was the splitting away of Arcadia, which cut Sparta off from its Messenian helots, in turn weakening her irretrievably. In the short term Leuktra did not change the military situation by one iota, precisely because the Lakedaemonian army was NOT 'shattered'. It remained intact with only the Spartiate homioi badly mauled. As I said, it was only many years later that the political/psychological effects that could be traced back to Leuktra became apparent.....
There were four Morai on the Spartan side, those which Kleombrotos had been sent with to Phokis (Hell.VI 1); a mora had sixteen enomotiai according to Xenophon Lak.Pol 11 iv
ἑκάστη δὲ τῶν ὁπλιτικῶν μορῶν ἔχει πολέμαρχον ἕνα, λοχαγοὺς τέτταρας, πεντηκοντῆρας ὀκτώ, ἐνωμοτάρχους ἑκκαίδεκα.
Thus a mora has 576 men, working on a twelve deep file this is 48 files, four such 192 which allowing for a certain rounding of figures gives 400 Spartiate officers, who presumably form the file leaders and closers a la Sokrates of Xenophon's Memorabilia's description. The 300 Spartiates over are the Hippeis which are attested separately at the battle. 400 died which looks like all the front rank and two thirds of the Hippeis, a further 600 of the leavening fell, which makes 1,000 from 2,300 or 43.5% but this was no rout
I would dispute your numbers here, which come from the pseudo-Xenophon's "Constitution." ( it would give a number for the whole Spartan army of less than 3,500 - an impossibly small number.) There are very good reasons for thinking the 'Mora' of this period numbered 32 enomotia, but here is not the place to discuss numbers of a 'Mora' that would naturally fluctuate with age-classes called up. Your numbers should be doubled and your percentages halved. I would agree that some 700 or so of the 1,000 Spartiates present fell - the largest number to die in a single day in Sparta's history - which was disastrous enough.
As for you 300 alleged Theban casualties, if you want them then you will have to accept the 4,000 Spartan casualties claimed by the same source (or twice the numbers they started with!); Diodoros is pretty worthless, as his source Ephoros, was found to be by Polybios XII 25f. Pausanias (IX 13 v-vi) gives the Theban casualties as 47, probably from 2,000 or 2.03%.
The casualties reports vary quite significantly. The fact that one side knows its own casualties (Thebans: 300) does not mean that they have the remotest idea about their enemies beyond the wildest propaganda speculation (Spartans 4,000? - roughly the total present). Boeotian sources seem to admit 300 casualties dead, and Spartan sources 1,000 dead. These admitted casualties are the most likely accurate.
As so often, this is incorrect in every detail:Looks pretty decisive to me, the effects were; Spartan hegemony was instantly broken the next campaigning season saw the allies at the gates of Sparta, Messenia liberated and Megaloppolis founded. Better check that grip on reality
1) The Spartan hegemony was not "instantly broken". All that Leuktra [371 BC] had achieved militarily was to gain Thebes some time. The end of that season saw not one but two Lacedaemonian armies in the field threatening Boeotia ( she was outnumbered by just one). Fortunately the time gained allowed Jason of Pherae to arrive with a large Thessalian army, which deterred any further Spartan offensive that year, along with the lateness of the season. ( see above) The problem was that Jason had his own agenda, and he negotiated a 'truce' for his own ends. The fate of Thebes was still balanced on a knife edge. Next year saw Arcadia throw off Spartan hegemony, perhaps in part inspired by the knowledge that Sparta's elite 'homioi' were no longer invincible... and it was that which changed everything, not the battle of Leuktra 'per se'.
2) The next campaigning season did NOT see the allies at Sparta's non-existent gates. It was King Agesilaos who took the offensive, and hung on in Arcadia well into next winter. The promised Boeotian help only materialised after Agesilaos went home ( see above). Only in the winter of 370/369 BC did the allies venture into Lacadaemon. Messenia was not immediately liberated, but had to wait until 369 BC.
3) Megalopolis was not founded in the campaigning season of Leuktra, but after the heavy defeat of the Arcadians at the "Tearless battle", some 3 years later [368 BC] and of course such a large city was not built overnight, but over the course of years....
Perhaps it is Agesilaos who should "get a grip on reality". A good start would be to check his information and start giving references......
Leuktra changed nothing militarily in the short term, nor even the medium term, but in the long term Sparta's ultimate demise could be traced back to the psychological effects on other Greeks of the ending of Spartan 'invincibility'.
From a military standpoint Leuktra was 'indecisive' - as Epaminondas knew only too well, hence his subsequent caution.
Xenophon again
The Lakedaemonian army did not 'decamp immediately'. It remained in place for weeks at least - long enough for Thebes to send ambassadors to Athens for aid, and subsequently to Jason to be begged to come to Thebes aid, and for him to march there, and then to Theban dismay, refuse to join an attack on the Spartans. Apart from his own agenda, he had a clear respect for their fighting ability [Xen VI.4.23]. He then negotiated a truce. Long enough too for Archidamus to gather an army of relief, and march as far north as Megara. You are also showing a certain military naivete regarding the circumstances of their eventual departure. Certainly their departure was quick and secretive. And of course it was from fear of Theban treachery. Their commander would have been a fool to depart any other way, and the Lakedaemonians might otherwise have shared the fate of the British under Col. Monro as they withdrew under a truce from Fort William Henry in 1757 ( depicted in the film "Last of the Mohicans" ). Few commanders in history have fallen for this one, and it has been standard military practice all over the world that in 'breaking contact' with the enemy, it should be done as secretly as possible....think Gallipoli, or HMS Amethyst in the Yangtze incident. Trusting the truce would have been absolute folly, as Col. Munro discovered to his cost...
Agesilaos:
Strange that you don’t reference any of the alleged ‘reasons’ for doubling the size of a mora; but if you want to discard that part of ‘Lak.Pol’ why trust any of it? Just as Polybios is now not as competent as Xenophon, now Xenophon is to be dubbed Pseudo and dimissed, but only in parts i.e. those parts that do not suit; as a method it is lamentable.
So let’s assume you are right (a massive suspension of disbelief for some I am sure) in this case a mora of 1152 would be 96 files 12 deep, four of these 384 files; since there are only c.400 Spartiates once the Hippeis are taken into account this means that only the front rank were Spartiates, so much for Sokrates brick wall, but it gets better because you insist they fought six deep, now only every other man in the front rank is a Spartiate, bit of a leaky wall? Again these 768 files would occupy 768 yards. The Theban ‘embolon’ was 50 deep and perhaps 2,300 or so strong, counting the Sacred Band as separate from the city levy, which is a frontage of 46 yards, if Kleombrotos’ line was 16 times as long as the Thebans’ he must have been a real dunce to suppose he had to manoeuvre to outflank them! My version, half the numbers and double the depth ie the one Xenophon states, still leaves the Spartans with a frontage four times as long. This in turn would indicate that Epaminondas was targeting the Spartan King directly intending only to strike one mora. The Theban cavalry would prevent any out flanking on his left and the other Boeotians must have been in close enough attendance to face off the other morai. And yet more than one mora’s worth of Spartiates fell; did they take it in turns to face the Thebans? The only possibility is a rout probably with the Spartiates standing (the accounts, which are suspect talk of ‘wounds on the front’). So my figures are right, the maths don’t lie.
Similarly the founding of Megalopolis, the invasion of Lakonia etc are contingent upon the victory at Leuktra and may, thus be fairly seen as consequences thereof.
Just who are these Boeotian sources? Granted Plutarch is one, but he does not give the casualties, although he gives the Spartan strength a 10,000 hoplites and 1,000 cavalry; Diodoros the Sicilian most probably used Ephoros the Kymaian who praises the Spartans rather more than a pro-Boeotian would, in fact his a worthless agglomeration of literary confection. Pausanias may have been a Lydian, but he has a detailed description IX 13 ii-xii, in which he names all seven Boetarchs for instance and his figures for the dead are more than a thousand Lakedaimonians, the same as Xenophon, and forty-seven Thebans; at IX16 v he views the shields of Spartans who fell in the Temple of Demeter. Xenophon famously fails to name Epaminondas here and at VII 5 viii only praises his taking up camp in Tegaea! The famously qualified military man was clearly ignorant of the tactical innovation which had laid Sparta low, conversely it was just his bias that prevented him giving a Theban any credit. Best be wary of his judgements, then.
I know Sparta had no Gates as such it is just a turn of phrase.
Agesilaos again
There is something amiss with the idea that the Spartan army remained for weeks in Boeotia threatening Thebes. Xenophon supplies some facts;
1) A messenger was sent to Sparta after the bodies had been recovered under a truce and he arrived during the last day of the Gymnopaedia and there was a days delay while the news was communicated VI 4 xvi.
2) The Thebans sent both to Athens and Jason of Pherai who was in Phokis VI 4 xxi
3) That the Spartans sneaked away from Leuktra as soon as Jason had established a further Truce, VI 4 xxv
4) The troops sent from Sparta met the defeated at Aegosthena near Megara, VI 4 xxvi
We can add a few more facts from Googlemaps;
1) The distance from Sparta to Megara is 75 miles
2) That from Leuktra to Megara is 58 miles
Thus the messenger had to travel 128 miles, let us say a two day trip. The force under Archidamos has to cover 75 miles which could be covered in two days but we would be safer to allow three and add a day for the gathering of the troops, so six days.
The defeated Spartans had to travel 58 miles or two days’ march. It would seem that they ‘threatened Thebes’ from behind their palisade for a full four days! Time enough for Jason’s lightning march across Phokis and a day’s negotiation.
One should also note that the Spartans sneaked away without their allies for whom they have to wait at Megara VI 4 xxvi.
This is all in Xenophon, rather different from the picture our Xenophon paints!.
Paralus
It is clear that the Spartan army did little 'threatening' at all whilst a runner was sent to the ehpors. Equally clear is that the Spartans could not trust in those allies present with them who, as Xenophon notes, were having discourse with the Thebans. They could not fight and they could not leave hoping that the allies would stand by them. Thus, on conclusion of the truce, the Spartans decamp as soon as it is dark - allies or not - and head home shields between legs.
The ancient Xenophon's account of Leuktra is most unsatisfying. For the greater part it is a list of excuses for the catastrophic defeat in the field of Spartan arms. These excuses range from the drinking of Kleombrodos - who had to be talked into fighting - and his officers; the baggage handlers being forced (by the Spartans!!) to add "mass" to the Theban army (!); the weakness of the Spartan cavalry; the disposition of the Spartan infantry resulting "in the phalanx being not more than twelve men deep" whilst the Thebans were at least fifty deep and, finally, sheer outrageous fortune. Eveything went in Thebes' favour and everything against Sparta. Xenophon could not bring himself to describe the military innovation which destroyed the Spartan myth nor even to name the two Thebans involved. Far better to excuse than to expound.
Agesilaos had isolated Thebes on the battlefield: no allies outside of the Boeotian confederation. He expected the Spartan army to crush them. In the event, the Spartan army itself was crushed and the blame, inevitably, must fall on Kleombrotos the wine drinker and Theban lover who had to be convinced to fight.
Xenophon
I didn't go into Spartan military organisation because to do so would be a digression on a digression, and is hardly an overly relevant subject to Hellenistic manuals.
A slip on my part; it is not the "lacedaemonian Constitution" that is by 'Pseudo-Xenophon' but rather the "Athenian Constitution". My Bad.
To adopt such a black and white position as you suggest would be folly. We do not discard all of Thucydides because he is demonstrably wrong about Mantinea. The fact that a source gets one, or even a few things wrong, is no reason to assume everything in that source is wrong.
Your next lengthy paragraph is again completely wrong. The fact that the 'pempadarch'/platoon sergeant fought alongside his 'Spartiate' officer in the front rank does not make for a 'leaky wall' any more than it would today. The four Spartan 'morai' would have numbered around 4,780, drawn up 6 deep for battle, or a frontage of 800 or so shields/yards - so we are all but agreed. The 4,000 or so Thebans, 25 deep in close order in their column would have numbered some 160 shields/yards, concentrated against the part of the line where Kleombrotos stood. That Mora would have had a frontage of 192 or so shields, plus perhaps another 25 shields/yards for the Hippeis. This would be consistent with Epaminondas' tactic of 'cutting off the snake's head'. On this much at least we agree. There is no rout, as I have previously demonstrated - how could there be if the Spartiates all fell "with their wounds to their front"??
( a 'topos' meaning no-one ran and was struck down from behind).
The founding of Megalopolis, some 3 years later had little or nothing to do with Leuktra, and everything to do with the defection of the Arcadians as Spartan allies - due to the ascendancy of the 'anti-spartan' factions, and the subsequent defeat of the Arcadians at "The Tearless Battle". There is no evidence to suggest the change in Arcadian politics had anything to do with Leuktra, and any link is just modern assumption based on hindsight.
Give me a reference that says Arcadia asserted its independence because of Leuktra, even by implication?
Following Leuktra, the 'King's Peace' which guaranteed the independence of the cities was re-affirmed by all save Thebes, and it was on this basis that Mantinea and Tegea began to assert their independence [XH VI.5.3-9]. Confrontation with Sparta was the result, and Arcadia's understandable plea for Boeotian help - which was NOT forthcoming so long as Agesilaos was in the field, right into mid-winter.
Leuktra was no 'decisive victory', The lakedaemonian army was not 'shattered' or destroyed ( indeed its caualties were swiftly replaced), as subsequent Theban actions demonstrate only too well !!
The famously qualified military man was clearly ignorant of the tactical innovation which had laid Sparta low, conversely it was just his bias that prevented him giving a Theban any credit. Best be wary of his judgements, then.
And just what "tactical innovation" would that be ? Xenophon may be biased, but so are you. Best be wary of your judgements then, I think, and doubly wary of discounting Xenophon,bias and all, who was around at the time and knew a good deal more of 'phalanx warfare' than any modern...
Agesilaos;
No sources or argumentation only assertion and incidentally doubling the Theban numbers too. The only statement of Theban strength is the 6,000 in the worthless account of Diodoros. Despite that it may not be far from the mark; Thebes had provided 2,000 hoplites to the Federal Army in the late fifth century and populations seem to be on the decline in the Fourth although Sparta is a very special case and should be discounted as the factors affecting the dwindling numbers of homoioi did not apply elsewhere. At the Nemea ten Athenian Tribes supply 6,000, Korinth 3,000 and Boeotia less Orchomenos, 5,000 as opposed to 8,000, 5,000 and Boeotia a putative 10,000 (according to Federal rules, but the Athenians ought to be 10,000 too). It has to be said that the situation was rather different too but one would expect a full levy from Korinth and the Spartan allies of whom the Sikyonians supply 1,500 as opposed to 3,000 and the Tegaians 1,200 against 1,500 (working from the fact that they faced four of the ten Athenian tribes (600 per tribe 16 deep = 150 files times eight is 1200). Xen Hell. IV 16ff. Making 4,000 for the left wing embolon in 371 somewhat hopeful.
Ditto
And just what "tactical innovation" would that be ?
That would be massing the best troops in depth on the left to face the enemy’s best troops, co-ordination with the cavalry, and the oblique advance protecting his weaker right. As for bias, I chose to be ‘Agesilaos’ not ‘Pelopidas’, I just don’t let my personal feelings obscure the facts (too much!).
Xenophon
Agesilaos wrote:
agesilaos wrote:There is something amiss with the idea that the Spartan army remained for weeks in Boeotia threatening Thebes. Xenophon supplies some facts;
1) A messenger was sent to Sparta after the bodies had been recovered under a truce and he arrived during the last day of the Gymnopaedia and there was a days delay while the news was communicated VI 4 xvi.
2) The Thebans sent both to Athens and Jason of Pherai who was in Phokis VI 4 xxi
3) That the Spartans sneaked away from Leuktra as soon as Jason had established a further Truce, VI 4 xxv
4) The troops sent from Sparta met the defeated at Aegosthena near Megara, VI 4 xxvi
An excellent idea of Agesilaos, to make at least a rough estimate of how long the Lacedaemonian army likely remained in Boeotia, still threatening Thebes.
Before doing so, we need to make a few minor corrections.
2) The desperate Thebans firstly sent to Athens, where they were spurned. Only subsequent to their embassy's return did they send to Jason,([XH VI.4.20] "The Thebans now sent in all haste to their ally Jason...") who was evidently not in Phocis, but north of it, or perhaps in the border districts[XH VI.4.21] "... in fact he took his mercenary force and his bodyguard of cavalry and, although the Phocians were engaged in a bitter warfare against him, proceeded by land through their country into Boeotia, appearing in many of their towns before it was reported to them that he was on the march. At any rate, before they could gather troops together ...”
Had he been in central Phocis, for example, then all the cities would have long since been mobilised.
3) The Spartans did not "sneak away", they simply took the standard precautions when breaking off from an enemy - see my earlier comments on Gallipoli, Col Munro at Ticonderoga etc. To do otherwise would have been military folly.
We can add a few more facts from Googlemaps;
1) The distance from Sparta to Megara is 75 miles
I make the distance Sparta to Aegosthena, just south of the Cithaeron range, using an ancient Greece overlay on Google Earth to be about 140 to 150 miles/225 to 240 kilometres aprox.
2) That from Leuktra to Megara is 58 miles
Similarly I make Leuktra to Aegosthena in the territory of Megara 12-15 miles/19-24 km aprox, via the Cithaeron pass which we are told the Lacedaemonians took.
The distance from Thebes to Athens is 43 miles/70 km aprox. A messenger on horseback, without relays of horses ( no Persian Royal Road here ! ) could expect to cover 20-30 miles per day. A specially trained horse perhaps 50 miles or more a day.
Thus the messenger had to travel 128 miles, let us say a two day trip. The force under Archidamos has to cover 75 miles which could be covered in two days but we would be safer to allow three and add a day for the gathering of the troops, so six days.
The defeated Spartans had to travel 58 miles or two days’ march. It would seem that they ‘threatened Thebes’ from behind their palisade for a full four days! Time enough for Jason’s lightning march across Phokis and a day’s negotiation.
We can now refine Agesilaos’ estimates somewhat. First the embassy to Athens. In view of the urgency, we may allow perhaps just one day to get the 43 miles to Athens. The messenger was immediately rebuffed by the Athenian Council (XH VI.4.19) and left. His return journey on a tired horse we may allow 2 days for. A messenger was then despatched to Jason for which we should allow at least 2 days to cross Phocis, some 75 miles or more roughly. He then undertook a forced march across Phocis back to Thebes, which would have taken something like 3 days, assuming no time taken to prepare for the march. He then negotiated a truce between Boeotians and Lacedaemonians which probably took at least two days. So the minimum time the Lacedaemonians remained in their camp was 10 days, or more likely a little longer.
Meanwhile, a messenger went to Sparta, about 150-160 miles via the safer central route down the Peloponnese ( avoiding dangerous Argos and the shorter coastal route) – 3 to 4 days, plus a day or two to mobilise and prepare the army. Archidamus then marched by the central route, picking up Tegean and Mantinean allies on the way, and assuming forced march rates, could have reached Aegosthena, (roughly 140 -150 miles) in 4 or 5 days – which again comes to about 10 days minimum. There, the two Lacedaemonian armies rendezvoused, the encamped army having marched 12-15 miles over the range by night.
I fear Agesilaos has rather misread Xenophon. The Polemarchs ordered that “....all troops should have their baggage packed..” and it was the whole army which headed off on their night march, which would have seen them at Aegosthena some 12-15 miles over the mountains next morning. The allies for whom Archidamus waited were other Peloponnesian allies who weren’t picked up on the forced march, and were following on (XH VI.4.18). Once the whole army was together, Archidamus returned via Corinth, where he disbanded the allies for that season, and returned home.One should also note that the Spartans sneaked away without their allies for whom they have to wait at Megara VI 4 xxvi.
And what of Epaminondas and the Boeotian army during this ten days or more ? They did not dare attack the Lacedaemonians until Jason arrived, and evidently felt they could not do so without his help. Nor did they surround the Spartan camp, or interdict their lines of communications, for messengers came and went and probably supplies too. They may have retired to Thebes, but more probably stayed in their camp at Leuktra, in their “Mexican stand-off” with the Lakedaemonians for the next 10 days minimum,or more likely a little longer. They clearly dared not take any offensive action, beyond guarding the route to Thebes, a wholly defensive act. Once Jason’s truce was in place, they took no further action whatever, but went home.
Clearly Leuktra was a classic “indecisive” battle in a military sense, despite the efforts of some historians to paint it otherwise, with both armies back home, and the 'status quo' unchanged.
And next season ? Anti-Spartan factions took control of some of the Arcadian cities, and asserted their independence. Naturally they appealed for help to Thebes. King Agesilaos took the field, and campaigned well into the following mid-winter, grimly hoping Epaminondas and his Boeotians would answer Arcadian pleas and give him a chance to avenge Leuktra. The Thebans timidly waited until Agesilaos returned home before poking their noses into the Peoloponnese.....evidently they didn't think they had won a 'decisive victory'.
Paralus
The forum name is clearly well chosen: read one Xenophon, read 'em all. This - "the Lacedaemonian army likely remained in Boeotia, still threatening Thebes" - is something of a religious mantra. The argument is based solely on a description of the Theban forces who are painted as being thoroughly incontinent at the prospect of their defeated foe. Secondly we are treated to the picture of these same incontinent Thebans sending "desperately" to both Athens and Jason of Pherai for aid against these encamped and resolute Spartans. One wonders just how these timid creatures managed to win Leuktra and give the Spartans a caning in the process!An excellent idea of Agesilaos, to make at least a rough estimate of how long the Lacedaemonian army likely remained in Boeotia, still threatening Thebes.
Unsaid is the fact that the Spartans - utterly defeated as the realists amongst them recognised - sat squat within their encampment and moved not one inch whilst "threatening" Thebes. Unmentioned by Xenophon of Brisvegas is the fact that these Thebans were outnumbered somewhat severely. The only figures we have for the armies are 11,000 for the Spartans and 6,000 for the Boeotians (Plut. Pel. 20.1; Diod. 15.52.2). These two sources have already been marginalised as 'pro-Theban' (and if that is so, Xenophon reads as "sir the dog ate my hoplites") but there is nothing in those figures to really question. Spartan armies sent to Boeotia in the immediate years prior this campaign number 18,000 or so (Diod. 15.32.1; 34.1). As for Thebes, this was a full citizen levy and those Boeotian allies still with her.
Which brings us to the next point. Agesilaos had played his hand well. In the discussions over the peace between Sparta and the Athenian Confederacy, Agesilaos had neatly isolated Thebes. After Athens renounced war and agreed, Thebes was utterly alone; her former ally (along with her confederacy) now on the sidelines. Agesilaos and Sparta expected that this would be a decimation of the hated Thebes. As it turned out, Thebes won and, in the process, dealt the Spartan core of the army a fearful belting. The surprise of the 'backs against the wall' victory is palpable.The Theban command, in receipt of a request for a truce to collect the dead, can only have expected that the Spartans will have sent to Sparta for aid / advice as well. Their first thought is to send to Athens - that flighty, erstwhile ally - to restore the former alliance. Athens, only too well aware that a dominant Thebes was not a welcome prospect, declined any interest. Their second was to send to Jason to ask for alliance against the Spartans. If there were to be further campaigning - especially with expected reinforcements from the Peloponnese, alliances were crucial: Thebes could not carry such a war alone (Philip did no such thing either decades later).
As for Thebes' supposed craven indolence in waiting "until Agesilaos returned home before poking their noses into the Peoloponnese" this, as Xenophon of Brisvegas would say, is to utterly ignore the military and political realities. Thebes, having just fought a battle for its existence, was in no position to invade the Peloponnese. Such an invasion could never take place until Thebes had an ironclad alliance in place that would supply the necessary manpower. As just explained, she did not possess that manpower on her own. That would be the purview of Epameinondas in the aftermath.
Whatever else might be said, the disasters that enveloped Sparta over the following few years can all be laid at the door of Leuktra. There could be no decent land alliance and grand campaign against Sparta without it. This was no mora defeated by Iphikrates' peltasts nor was it Shpacteria. This was a comprehensive and catestrophic defeat of homoioi arms in pitched battle. It was, for Sparta, the Titanic's iceberg: the SS Lakadaemonia ,while still afloat, was on severely limited time and its allied passengers were inevitably abandoning ship.
Agesilaos
Paralus has dealt with the Rhetorical flourishes, so I can concentrate on the actual argument in a spirit of co-operative enquiry. First I have to confess to a massive cock up, the distance from Sparti to Aigosthena is 203 km which is 126 miles ( I use the ‘Get Directions’ app on Google maps set to pedestrian to get these distances) let’s just set some down
1) Thisvi – Aliki 16km/10miles (Thisbae – Kreusis)
2) Aliki – Leuktry 21km /13 miles
3) Leuktry - Athens 76 km/47 miles
4) Leuktry – Sparti 239 km/148 miles
5) Sparti – Aigosthena 203 km/126 miles
6) Sparti – Marathonas 260 km/162 miles
The one missing distance is from Kreusis to Aigosthena and with good reason. There is no pass available to move to Aigosthena from Aliki (nor Paralia Livadostratas, which is where some maps locate Kreusis but this lacks any route to Thisvi whence Kleombrotos moved on Kreusis). Xenophon tells us that the Spartans returned to Kreusis (VI 4 xxv). As both Kreusis and Aigosthena are ports 13 miles apart by sea. Kleombrotos had captured twelve triereis and these may have been used to ferry the army to Aigosthena.
Twelve ships could only carry 600 men, though, which on my figures would make three trips (4 morai at 600 plus 300 hippeis minus 1,000 battle losses) with 50 men per ship. The round trip @ 5mph would take about five hours, so the Spartan contingent could be shipped out in a day (two if you want larger numbers), the allies would have to wait or trust the truce and march.
Another factor to consider in whether the whole army decamped at nightfall or just the Lakedaimonians, is the length of time it would take for extracastrementation and the length of the marching column.
1) Spartans alone @ 1700 on a four cubit interval and four abreast (they were retracing a mountainous route unlikely to allow a wider frontage) 850 metres. Allowing a march rate of 2mph (we are told they moved off in the dark, in fear and by a difficult road; Xenophon seems to make this the road to Aigosthena from Kreusis but there is no such road), the tail would be 16 minutes from the head of the column and the whole could reach Kreusis by daybreak
2) If they were 4,400, 2.2 km the length of the column is now 41 minutes.
3) The whole army, assuming 9,000 would stretch for 4.5 km and be 1 and a half hours long
4) None of these include servants who might double the lengths
I remain to be convinced that when Xenophon describes Archidamus as waiting for all the allies to assemble he means those due to join the new expedition. The relevant states all lay en route viz
The passage concerning the sending of an embassy to Jason readsAnd the Tegeans served with him zealously; for the followers of Stasippus were still alive, who were favourable to the Lacedaemonians and had no slight power in their own state. Likewise the Mantineans from their villages1 supported him2 stoutly; for they chanced to be under an aristocratic government. Furthermore, the Corinthians, Sicyonians, Phliasians, and Achaeans followed him with all zeal, and other states also sent out soldiers. And the Tegeans served with him zealously; for the followers of Stasippus were still alive, who were favourable to the Lacedaemonians and had no slight power in their own state. Likewise the Mantineans from their villages supported him stoutly; for they chanced to be under an aristocratic government. Furthermore, the Corinthians, Sicyonians, Phliasians, and Achaeans followed him with all zeal, and other states also sent out soldiers. IV 4 xviii
The word you have as ‘Now’ is μέντοι which means ‘indeed, however or to be sure’, which, since they sent to him in all haste would make both embassies leave at the same time.But to Jason, who was their ally, the Thebans sent in haste, urging him to come to their aid; for they were debating among themselves how the future would turn out.
πρὸς μέντοι Ἰάσονα, σύμμαχον ὄντα, ἔπεμπον σπουδῇ οἱ Θηβαῖοι, κελεύοντες βοηθεῖν, διαλογιζόμενοι πῇ τὸ μέλλον ἀποβήσοιτο.
This makes the mission to Athens less important to the timings; two days to get to Jason seems fine but if his forced march only proceeds at 25 miles a day he is hardly busting a gut, assuming you still believe an average march was 21 miles. I would think two days again would be nearer the mark, he has a small professional force and he traversed Phokis before they could muster (I agree he must have been on the border). I see no reason for the Truce not to have been concluded in a day, neither side was strong enough to be keen on renewed fighting.
Pausanias IX 14 i has
After the battle Epaminondas for a while, having proclaimed that the other Peloponnesians should depart home, kept the Lacedaemonians cooped up in Leuctra. But when reports came that the Spartans in the city were marching to a man to the help of their countrymen at Leuctra, Epaminondas allowed his enemy to depart under a truce, saying that it would be better for the Boeotians to shift the war from Boeotia to Lacedaemon.
It may be that the allies were no longer present when the Truce was settled. That the orders to be prepared to march were given by the polemarchs at dinner and were changed at short notice may point to the Spartans alone being involved, the allies would be unlikely to dine with their masters, I think and I am sure the camps were separate (though that may be a dream).
There may only be five days before the Spartans withdrew, then and one for them to either be shipped to Aigosthena or march along a coastal track. Can the six days fit with the relief expedition.
The messenger bearing the sad tidings has 148 miles to travel, two and a half days at 60 miles per day, unlike the Theban he would be able to exchange mounts as he would have been a Spartan officer. The mustering of the army need not have taken longer than a day; the Spartan troops were already gathered for the Gymnopaedia, messengers would be sent to the allies to muster en route as soon as the decision to move had been taken, the army could move on the morning of the fourth day after the battle and march the 126 miles to Aigosthena in three days; the Spartan army had marched the 160 miles to Marathon in that time and this was a similar emergency.