Tactike theoriai – manuals or philosophy

[Xenophon]

Paralus wrote 22 July page 7

Xenophon wrote:

Agesilaos wrote:
It is hard to see how the allies could be treating with the enemy and the Spartans not notice if they were all in one camp.

I agree ! But you have things back-to-front, I suggest. I dealt with this earlier ( see my post July 20th) as to why ( assuming Xenophon isaccurately reporting the gist of what was said) Jason would say this - even though it is very unlikely to be true.
They would have been in one camp, and overtures to the Thebans from allied contingents unlikely for this and the other reasons I referred to.

Methinks Xenophon (of Brisvegas) "doth protest too much" to 'return Bard'. Nothing precludes the allies making overtures to the Thebans. There are countless notations in the sources of interaction between opposing camps before and after battle. The most (in)famous example being Eumenes who was handed over without him suspecting Teutamos had done the deal.

As I have said previously, low level contacts between sentries, outposts, watering parties – even parleys between generals etc is vastly different from policy makers empowered to make treaties or pacts of friendship – which could presumably only emanate from the cities themselves. ( witness the reaction to the Argive commanders in the field attempting to make a peace truce with the Spartans without referring the matter home)

Eumenes situation was vastly different to that of the Spartans and their allies – you are trying to compare apples and pears. As to the likelihood of this, see my post 20 July.

On the matter of the allies and their negotiations, Xenophon (of Athens) can, of course, only be preserving the gist of anything that Jason might have said; anything he records can only be second hand at very best. 'Pacts of friendship' need not (and do not here) mean alliances made and signed on the spot. Deals were indeed done on the spot and the Spartans were seemingly quite good at it themselves (see Derkylidas' many truces in the field and Agesilaos' entreaties of frienship and truce in the same field). All it need mean is that some of the allies (those not displeased obviously) were negotiating their own way out of Boeotia without consulting the Spartans.

Again, if it were true, then why would Jason betray these ‘negotiations’ regarding a ‘pact of friendship’ thus warning the Spartans? And if it were true, or even believed, by the Spartans, why did they not do anything about it – take hostages, or arrest the allied leaders for example ? Evidently the Spartans gave Jason’s allegations short shrift.

The surviving polemarchs had obviously decided that renewing the battle was not on and they at no stage looked to do so. Had they decided to retreat, as Agesilaos has postulated and I agree, advice to do so from Jason coupled with notification of treacherous allies, not at all displeased with the result, serve that very well. One might say that is the Spartans' "Mandy Rice-Davies" moment. As does the fear of Theban treachery. Truces, as far as I can recall, were generally observed. I cannot recall a truce made after battle (in the 'Classical' period) that was not kept (Sparta and Athens actually kept a 'false peace' for a year before that of Nikias; the truce contracted at Pylos). In fact, I cannot call to mind (mind you I haven't looked) an instance where an army was attacked after having negotiated a truce on the field.

Try telling that to Proxenus, Menon, Agias, Clearchus, Socrates and the others murdered under a truce after Cunaxa, and the army was also immediately attacked. Or the Athenians promised their lives in negotiations by the Syracusans. Or the many breaches of that most sacred of truces, the Olympic Truce. After Leuktra, the Thebans had agreed a truce for burial of the dead, but on Jason’s arrival, wanted to attack, presumably in breach of it, and Jason had to negotiate a second truce. Philip of Macedon was also not above taking advantage of a truce to bury the dead [spondai], drawing up his army while the Illyrians buried their dead, and attacking the instant the last burial took place [Poly IV.2.5]

Harking back to Derkylidas above, it would appear Spartans seemed to trust most everyone in these truces even the barbarian Persian. Thebes, though, cannot be trusted.

....as they had proven by wanting to break the initial truce with the Lakedaemonians, and urging Jason to attack with them. This necessitated Jason to negotiate a second truce. No wonder the Lakedaemonians took security precautions.
One may be reasonably certain a truce will be observed, but only a fool acts that way. In a military situation, nobody can be trusted.

[Xenophon]

Agesilaos wrote 22 July page 7

“I am going to confine myself to the strength of the Spartan Mora, which seems crucial and does not involve linguistics........................ Now this is worse than disinformation – the query about the text refers to the number of Lochagoi – four- whereas Xen. Hell. VII 4 xx and 5 x, would imply that a lochos was half a mora in that the army previously described as six morai is now twelve lochoi. The emendation is forced, however as Lak.Pol is concerned with the pre-Leuktra army and it is likely that the crushing defeat and massive loss of citizens necessitated an organisational reform.”

I have already stated that I don’t propose to go into the complex subject of Spartan military organisation, and why – one digression too far, for a start. The matters in this post also demonstrate why. In my view, and that of others going back to Kromayer, these figures and estimates regarding the Spartan army are just hopelessly incorrect. They provide far too few Lakedaemonians for battles such as Mantinea ( 1 AND 2), Nemea, and leuktra to name but a few. Is it really credible that Sparta at the height of her power could muster only 6 Morai x 640 hoplites +300 hippeis = 4,140 men in total including all age groups, and a regular field army of less than 3,500 ? This at a time when Argos could field 7,000 hoplites, the much smaller Tegea 3,000, Elis 3,000, Sikyon 1,500 ?
Not to mention that at Nemea, Xenophon tells us explicitly that there were 6,000 Lakedaemonian hoplites present.
Nor is there any evidence whatever that Sparta reorganised the basis of her army post-Leuktra.
But no more about the Spartan army here !!

[Xenophon]

Paralus wrote 22 July:

It is intriguing that sources other than Xenophon are regarded as "rationalisation, and spin based on pro-Theban sources" (Pausanis) and dismissed as pro-Theban in general. This does not preclude picking those bits that cohere with the espoused view though. Xenophon (the Athenian) is, though, held up as the very epitome of source integrity. That the fellow was an arch Loconophile and that such may infuse his narrative seems to pass notice. Even this source, though, is questioned when not cohering to the view: his reporting of Jason's advice that the allies were conversing with the Thebans, for example, is "a very dubious claim". All else - including Xenophin's portrait of the Theban's incontinent search for aid against the defeated Spartans - is acceptable though.

I have already stated that I don’t “dismiss” any source at all ( unlike, say, Agesilaos with Diodorus’ account of Leuktra), and I find such blanket accusations irritating, the more so when repeated. My remark on Pausanias was in reference to a specific item, not general, and Pausanias’ account is clearly based on a Theban, or pro-Theban source and you have taken it completely out of context.

Would you deny that our secondary sources written hundreds of years later – Diodorus, Pausanias, Plutarch etc are based on pro-Theban sources? Nor do I hold up Xenophon as “the very epitome of source integrity” – these are Paralus’ words, not said by me anywhere.
Nor can Xenophon be described as an “arch-Laconophile”, which is a modern trope unsupported by evidence – he is too often critical of Sparta to be so labelled.

If I weigh up and decide on balance of probability which evidence is more credible than others, that is what every good ancient historian does. Where contradictory sources are evidence then the ancient historian uses them to separate the plausible from the less plausible. Paralus may take a viewpoint and then selecively present only evidence that supports that viewpoint, leaving out other evidence, judging by his comments, ( case in point his espousal of the idea that hoplites fought in full file depth, which ignores the very explicit descriptions in Xenophon of half-files – and for which, no explanation is offered) but my procedure is the opposite – gather all possible evidence and only then formulate a viewpoint based on credibility and balance of probability of ALL available evidence.

[Xenophon]

Paralus wrote 23/7
Paralus apologises , and then immediately follows with this diatribe of a post !!
Lamentably ,it sheds no light on the subject matter of this thread, or even on the huge digression on the battle of Leuktra.
Its sole purpose is to allege that my posts indicate bias. It is pure sophistry, argument for argument’s sake, whose method is to take quotes out of context and attach to them meanings they never had.

In future, since I don’t suppose you will refrain from posts such as this, please reference your quotes of me, so I don’t have to read the whole thread each time, trying to find where you got the quotes from.

The point is that throughout your posts you have done exactly what you say has been done to yourself to Plutarch, Diodorus and Pausanias. At beginning matters were somewhat balanced:

Xenophon wrote:what we may term a 'pro-Spartan' one given by Xenophon ( which is the more complete one ) and a 'pro-Theban' given by the patriotic Boeotian Plutarch in his 'Pelopidas', and another, somewhat inaccurate, brief account in Diodorus [XV.53 ff], clearly written from a Boeotian source.

At least you concede that this brief summary of the general accounts is unbiased.

So all accounts are somewhat biased to one side or the other. As the thread wore on sources aside from Xenophon were more biased than he ("If Xenophon's account is 'bowdlerised', then that of Diodorus and Plutarch is even more so !"). These sources then became vehicles for Theban "propaganda" ("what Boeotian propaganda had to say I have quoted above…"). That view is then neatly expressed in what might be termed a 'summary statement':

The quotation was a response to the accusation that Xenophon’s account was ‘bowdlerised’, that is to say expurgated and selective, and it is true that Diodorus’ and Plutarch’s accounts are more so. Plutarch’s account is very short, omits the cavalry action and much else supplied by Xenophon (perhaps understandable since his subject is Pelopidas). Diodorus too omits the cavalry action and much else and gets the rest badly wrong – so much so that Agesilaos labels it “fiction”.

As we move from the general to the particular, it becomes apparent that various parts and statements of the pro-Theban accounts are factually exaggerated, indeed false – propaganda in other words. For example, Diodorus’ “fled in utter rout” when it is apparent the Spartans withdrew in good order to their camp, or his “more than 4,000 Lakedaemonians fell in battle” – which incidently is close to the total of Lakedaemonians present. Similarly, Plutarch exaggerates Pelopidas’ importance and role, having him win the battle. That was the context I was referring to when I referred to ‘propaganda’, as anyone who cares to check can see.

I briefly stated the general case, and the subsequent references refer to particular 'propaganda' statements within those generally pro-Theban sources.

Xenophon wrote:I do not consider Xenophon's account a "list of excuses". That the hitherto invincible Spartiates/Homioi were defeated, and with such heavy casualties, required some explaining. Furthermore, without it we would have pretty much only secondary tales based on Theban propaganda.

By this time in the thread then, the sources outside of Xenophon are "secondary tales based on Theban propaganda". All the while the Thebans are presented as "timid" and "desperate"; a description informed by Xenophon's theme. Were either Diodorus, Plutarch or Pausanias alive today, they might well consider that this recurrent theme was intended purely to throw discredit on what what they've recorded.

Would you deny that the pro-Theban accounts we have, written hundreds of years later and drawing on earlier ones are secondary ? I have also given particular examples of Theban propaganda, so what I said is true, and hence not biased. “Timid” was used once, ina reference to the Thebans failure to respond to the Arcadians urgent pleas for help - preferring instead to destroy the hapless Thespians, their fellow Boeotians, and as their actions showed, the Thebans were indeed “desperate” to obtain help from allies, because they knew their victory was indecisive, and the Spartan threat still present. In that regard, the Spartans too were desperate for re-inforcements and relief – as I said, the situation was a “Mexican stand-off.”

Your whole post is a bowdlerised and expurgated version of what I wrote, and taken completely out of context.

For the record, whilst those sources immediately above are not free of bias (if only for the more primary source material they chose) Xenophon is hardly free himself of such bias. Yes the Athenian does criticise Sparta (Spartans far more than 'Sparta'). It is the subject and nature of those occasional critiques which matter. Spartans are most often criticised when they disappoint for an admirer is often the most disappointed when the idealised do not meet expectations. Sphodrias comes to mind for his attempt on the Piraeus as well as Phoebidas (and there are others but I am not at home and cannot check). Spartan irreligious acts attract his criticism (both those previous would also come under that).

It is Sparta’s policy against the Thebans, not individuals, that Xenophon criticises in regard to the Leuktra campaign, as I mentioned earlier, but will repeat the quote for convenience.
“[ V.4.1] “The Lacedaemonians, namely, who had sworn that they would leave the states independent, after seizing possession of the Acropolis of Thebes were punished by the very men, unaided, who had been thus wronged, although before that time they had not been conquered by any single one of all the peoples that ever existed; while as for those among the Theban citizens who had led them into the Acropolis and had wanted the state to be in subjection to the Lacedaemonians in order that they might rule despotically themselves, just seven of the exiles were enough to destroy the government of these men. How all this came to pass I will proceed to relate.”

In other words, the Spartans were punished for their wrongful actions by the Thebans – they “had it coming”. And Xenophon does indeed tell us in more detail than any other source just how this came about, making no excuses for the Spartan defeat – no “they would have won but for...” or similar. He simply factually sets out how the ‘invincible’ Spartans were tactically disadvantaged, and consequently defeated.
Here Xenophon is distinctly pro-Theban – hardly the ‘arch-Laconophile’ you would have him be.

[Xenophon]

Agesilaos wrote 23 July

Xenophon wrote:The left wing was composed of the Thebans i.e "the picked men/epilektoi", it was the Thebans who were the pick of the army Diod XV.55.2, and the "old codgers and striplings" are most likely to have been in the middle and rear ranks of the 50 deep phalanx. It is the reluctant allies who form the centre and right.

This, in fact has some bearing on the 'files and half-files question'. There were almost 1,000 Lakedaemian killed,including 400 Spartiates/Homioi, to say nothing of wounded. On a frontage of only 80 ( your numbers and formation, 4,000 x 50 deep), that means each Theban killed over a dozen Spartans, or half-a-dozen each if we allow the second rank to participate !!!! Credible? No way !!

With 6,000 Theban hoplites, we have a frontage of 120 killing 1,000 - still over 8 each !

If on the other hand, there were 6,000 Theban hoplites who closed up to 25 deep, we have a frontage of 240, and the number falls to four per Theban, or two allowing for second rank participation.....much more credible ! Especially if we may allow that allied lochoi adjacent to the Theban column likely took part.

Diodoros is the only source for this emergency levy and he first counts the whole army as 6,000 and then states that....

Whilst Diodorus in general is not the most reliable source, depending on who his source was in turn, he is often surprisingly sound on numbers. In a previous post I have set out reasons for thinking total Boeotian numbers were probably 7-9,000 hoplites plus cavalry, and Lakedaemonian ones 10,000 or so hoplites plus 1,000 cavalry, ( this is ‘communis opinio’ also among modern scholars) and why the actions of the Boeotarchs – evenly divided over giving battle – point to a disparity, but not a great one, in numbers. Moreover, Thebes alone had fielded 5,000 or more hoplites on a number of occasions; 6,000 in her hour of need is very credible. I have already explained why Diodorus might mistake this Theban total for the Boeotian total, but the fact that these 6,000 issued out from Thebes confirms they are all Theban.

...... 2 He selected from the entire army the bravest men and stationed them on one wing, intending to give to the finish with them himself.


This at the very reference you quote, are you proposing that when Diodoros says ‘from the whole army’ he really means from the Thebans alone and that those selected were not really the bravest? The point is pretty moot, however as Diodoros’ account should be consigned to the bin in toto; he has Kleombrotos leave Leuktra only to meet Archidamos and join armies to fight, most likely his source, Ephoros credited the Lakedaimonians with 40,000 men, the figure found in Polyainos. This mass then fills the plain and attacks in a crescent shape, rather than deployed obliquely or advancing only with the left wing the Boeotian right retreats while the left charges at the double, Kleombrotos is slain rather than being taken from the field alive; this is fiction and literary trope of no merit as Polybios commented XII 25f iiiff

All sources other than Diodorus ( whom you dismiss 'in toto') state that the column/embolon was made up of Thebans. The idea that they made up an ‘ad hoc’ column from the bravest/best from the whole Boeotian army would be very unlikely, and I have shown previously that Diodorus confuses 'Thebans' and 'Boeotians'.

You have my figures wrong, rather than a front of 80 it is only 40 files wide in my view as I count only 2,000 Thebans with the Sacred Band forming the cutting edge or front seven ranks; they face the hippeis 12 deep on a 25 man front and only 8 of each flanking mora. This leaves 40 files on the Theban left flank and fully 136 on the right. That they did not intervene could be down to two things the presence of supporting troops that would take them in flank if they attempted to flank the ‘embolon’ or the collapse coming more quickly than they could react, or a combination of both factors.

This is going from the sublime to the ridiculous! A column 40 files wide defeated the Lakedaemonians? A mere 2,000 Thebans present? ( since it seems all the Thebans present were in the column ) This is so unlikely as to be impossible.

Rather than increase Theban numbers unrealistically the simple answer to the high kill rate is that the Spartans broke and ran back across the ditch of their camp where they stood in its shelter; which is how the casualty stats stack up 2,600 Lakedaimonians lose 1,000, 38% losses to 2,000 Thebans losing 49 (taking Pausanias’ figure) 2.45% ; this screams rout, with the Spartan casualties maximised due to the attendant Theban cavalry and the Theban casualties lessened by the speed of the collapse (5% might be considered a more average loss for the victors in a prolonged struggle). Once the King was down along with his officers the Spartans broke as Epaminondas and the deep column hit; they were already in a mess having had their own cavalry flee through them according to Xenophon or being caught in the midst of an out flanking move that had been countermanded according to Plutarch Pelopidas

The Theban numbers are not increased “unrealistically” – see above, it is your numbers which are quite eccentric - not to mention selective use of conflicting figures for casualties, both for Thebans and Spartans, and again you find yourself in a minority of one. There was no “rout” – only Diodorus, whom you dismiss ‘in toto’ as ‘fiction’, claims this. The Spartans could hardly contemplate renewing the battle had they been routed, and I know of no reputable military historian who suggests they were.

If you have to treble the likely strength of the embolon, to such an extent that with the allies the Boeotians will outnumber the Lakedaimonian army the idea is clearly flawed.

I’m sorry to say, it is your ideas and numbers that are flawed. The Thebans did not outnumber the Lakedaemonians ( see above on likely numbers) The views I have put forward are not just mine but that of the majority of reputable ancient military historians.

[Xenophon]

Agesilaos wrote 24/7/2014

Back to 'paragein' and its meaning, it is bound to be repeteive when your response is to pretend that LSJ covers its meaning in one line and quite laughable to stress an English preposition when a full reading of the entry would demonstrate that the word can be translated with many different ones. But rather than attack your 'method' I will simply prove my case using the writer you hold in high esteem, Xenophon.

I don’t ‘pretend’ anything. It was me who pointed out the multiplicity of meanings of ‘paragon’, and when I have given meanings, I have always been careful to qualify my words by referring to the particular context. Your attack is thus totally false.

...and the note of triumphalism is premature, as we shall see LOL!

Hipparchos (The Cavalry Commander) IV 9(in Loeb, 10 on Perseus)
καὶ τὸ μέτωπον δὲ οὕτως ηκμύνοιεν ἂν τῆς τάξεως ἀταράκτως οἱ πεμπάδαρχοι παράγοντες, ὁπότε τούτου καιρὸς εἴη.
Thus, too, the half file-leaders will wheel and extend the line without confusion, whenever there is occasion to do so. Bowerstock.


More literally (I too do not translate 'paragein' as 'wheel' which seems to be a translator's fall back for any military manouevre! See Cynoskephalai thread.)

"And the front-rank in this way may be lengthened (ηκμύνοιεν )without confusion, by the pempadarchoi performing 'paragoge', whenever it is required".


In my interpretation the front IS extended by 'paragoge' see the diagram you label wrong; in your version it remains constant. I await a forced explanation, or an admission of error. I won't be taking bets on which though.

Once again, you haven’t thought this through. The units making up a hoplite phalanx could NOT extend their frontage, because of fellow units to their left and right – yet another reason your reconstruction is wrong. Not to mention that the object of bringing up the half-files was to form a ‘close order’ shield wall or to put it another way, ‘densify’ the phalanx, and certainly not extend its front.

Cavalry are the exact opposite, because they fight in ‘open’ or loose order, to give them room to negotiate obstacles and throw javelins [see e.g. ‘Cav. Cder’ III. 11 where lines of cavalry pass through one another]
Again, one must not take this paragraph in isolation, but read the whole. It was the practise to ‘open’ out wherever possible:
IV.3 “If you are riding along narrow roads, the order must be given to form column; but when you find yourself on broad roads, the order must be given to every regiment to extend front. When you reach open ground, all the regiments must be in line of battle. Incidentally these changes of order are good for practice, and help the men to get over the ground more pleasantly by varying the march with cavalry manoeuvres.”

....then Xenophon tells us how this was done.....

IV.9 “Accordingly, for this purpose, too, that the order to advance may be given by word of mouth, it is well to post file leaders/dekadarchs, and half file-leaders/pempadarchs behind them, so that each may pass the word to as few men as possible. Thus, too, the half file-leaders/pempadarchs will move up by the side/paragontes and extend the line without confusion, whenever there is occasion to do so.”

The cavalry front is extended because the formation wishes to get into, or retain, an ‘open’ formation – the opposite to hoplites - but does so in exactly the same way, with the rear half-file moving up alongside/paragontes the front half-file .

No ‘forced’ explanation, just the obvious meaning of what Xenophon wrote. No ‘error’ either, other than yours in thinking that the ‘dinner drill’ extended the frontage of the enomotia.

[agesilaos]

LOL! So now you have Xenophon’s horsemen performing ‘parembole’ and him calling it ‘paragoge’ despite the fact that Polybios is clear the two are not the same.

A main problem here is that you insist hoplites could only move in ‘the order that has no specific name’, on a six foot frontage and would then have to close to 3ft to fight. I say they can move on the battlefield just as well on a three foot frontage; even in your model they move at this density for the final stade/200 yards.

But let’s shelve the re-hashing and look at something new to whit, Hellenika VI 2 xxi,

καθ᾽ ἑτέρας πύλας ἐπιτίθενται ἁθρόοι τοῖς ἐσχάτοις: 21] οἱ δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ὀκτὼ τεταγμένοι, ἀσθενὲς νομίσαντες τὸ ἄκρον τῆς φάλαγγος ἔχειν, ἀναστρέφειν ἐπειρῶντο.
meanwhile others sallied out by the other gates and in mass formation attacked those who were at the extreme end of the line. [21] These latter, who were drawn up only eight deep, thinking that the outer end of the phalanx was too weak, undertook to swing it around upon itself.

There are several issues here with the translation, ἁθρόοι, does not mean ‘a mass formation’ but just ‘a mass’ the Corcyrans sallied as a crowd not in an Epidamondian ‘embolon’. I am grateful to Christopher Matthews for the next point, in discussing Xenophon’s alleged four deep formation at the Cilician parade, he notes that there is no indication that depth is actually meant and that the Greek couls equally means ‘they drew up by fours’ ie each enomotia in four files, this would be eight deep were the enomotiai 32 strong.

Here, we are similarly dealing with mercenaries, Mnasippos had no Spartan troops, so we can shelve Xenophon’s suggestion that the ‘only eight ‘contrasts with the norm of twelve, which the Spartans alone seem to have adopted. It also hardly makes sense to say that hoplites deployed eight deep were in a weak formation, this is the normal depth in my world and twice that in yours and your cohorts. Were they eight deep in open order, as you wish then they ought to insert their half-files and assume fighting depth and density according to your theory. They instead perform an anastrophe. Were this a simple (?) counter-march it is hard to see the purpose, it is more likely that alternate files counter-march to the rear of those halting to deepen the line and make it stronger, the files would presumably close-up after doubling their depth, just like the Macedonian phalanx at Kynoskephalai. The initial formation must actually be formed ‘by eights’ rather than ‘eight deep’; this would lead to a four deep line which was considered too weak to face the sallying mass, which scuppers lines normally fighting four deep, but then we never hear of that only Xenophon’s parade ‘depth’ Matthews interpretation of which is supported by this passage.

Mnasippos, had ranged his men four deep to cover the gates (we are told earlier that he thought the city as good as taken and was playing silly buggers with his mercenaries VI 2 xvi ff), one might recall the Diodoros passage too.

This is a clincher (note the triumphalism, like my favourite emperor I love a Triumph!). This is an actual battle, not a parade, or a fictional dinner drill and any interpretation disproves the theory you have espoused. And England have, despite their captain’s best efforts finally won a Test!!!

I am not addressing Leuktra on this thread.

[Paralus]

A torrent of missives which I've not the time to address over a roast pork roll at the desk outside of a quick coupe of points.

After Leuktra, the Thebans had agreed a truce for burial of the dead, but on Jason’s arrival, wanted to attack, presumably in breach of it, and Jason had to negotiate a second truce.

It actually states 'taking up' (collecting / recovery) of the dead from the actual field. You write as if these battlefield truces for the taking up of the dead were some type of binding long term arrangement. Nothing at all supposes that such battlefield truces lasted any longer than necessary to accomplish the task for which they are granted: recovery of the dead. The Spartans, defeated, asked the victor – in possession of the field and, so, the dead – for the 'regulation' courtesy of a truce to take up their dead and were granted same. They were not granted a truce of some indefinite length for anything other than that.

....as they had proven by wanting to break the initial truce with the Lakedaemonians, and urging Jason to attack with them. This necessitated Jason to negotiate a second truce. No wonder the Lakedaemonians took security precautions.
One may be reasonably certain a truce will be observed, but only a fool acts that way. In a military situation, nobody can be trusted.

See above on the supposed indefinite length of a truce to recover the dead. A truce to recover the dead is just that, not an agreement which has somehow settled matters between belligerents to be observed for some indefinite period.

No, it is Paralus who needs to read Xenophon a little closer.This allegation which Xenophon puts into the mouth of Jason has already been dealt with ( see my previous post). Xenophon does NOT say it actually occurred, it is merely something which Jason might be expected to say, and the Spartans evidently did not give it credence – we hear of no steps taken by them, for example, in any source.

What is not written by Xenophon is "this is what Jason might be expected to say". He reports this as the counsel offered to the Spartans after he'd refused assistance to the Thebans. Noteworthy is the fact that this refusal, reported in exactly the same manner as the counsel to the Spartans, is accepted by you without caveat: "they wished to fight a decisive battle but Jason talked them out of it;" (same post; cf post 31/7 where the part regarding Spartan allies is dismissed as 'untrue' "Again, if it were true..."). 'Sauce for the goose...' Perhaps we should lay aside the entirety of the words attributed to Jason by Xenophon; that "which Jason might be expected to say"?

I would suggest Xenophon’s account of Leuktra was written not long after the battle. Only later did Epaminondas and Pelopidas become prominent and reknowned and mythologised for their parts. Certainly, when some 9 years later, Epaminondas fights second Mantinea (362 BC), Xenophon gives due prominence and fulsome praise to him. If he supposedly ‘hated’ Thebans and (allegedly)deliberately ignored the leaders at Leuktra ( where Epaminondas was NOT commander-in-chief, nor even ‘primus inter pares’), why does he do the opposite when describing Mantinea ? (see below) [...] It has already been pointed out that Xenophon’s account of Leuctra was clearly almost contemporary with the event; there were no biographer’s accounts extant at that time.

Excuse the long and co-joined quote: I certainly would not like to appear as taking anything "out of context". Two things here. Firstly what is a suggestion (that Xenophon's account of the battle was written "not long after the battle") has become, within paragraphs, a pointed out fact. Secondly, there is absolutely no argument presented for this, simply a suggestion which has become 'clear'. Suggestions are fine though an argument backing the suggestion might be good. Such would be more incumbent upon that which is now 'clear' and "pointed out".

At Hell. 6.2.18-21 Xenophon (of Athens) says that the Spartan Mnasippos attempted the same manoeuvre at Corcyra. Here, unlike Agesilaos, it failed. Xenophon writes that Mnasippos was successful at his end of the Spartan battle line, stating that “after he had formed the troops in line, Mnasippus himself turned to flight those of the enemy who were in front of the gates”. There is no indication, yet again, of any close down before battle was engaged. Further, Xenophon goes on to note that although Mnasippos was successful at his end of the battle line, the other end was not so fortunate. He then decided to aid by means of anastrophe. At this stage of the battle Xenophon clearly states that “the Spartans, who were arrayed eight deep” feared that the end of their line would not withstand the charge of the enemy’s “massed formation” attacking it. Clearly the Spartans are fighting eight deep here; there seems no other explanation. Perhaps we are to assume that they closed down from sixteen deep?

You’ve left out a word here, it should read “arrayed only 8 deep”, presumably as opposed to the 12 deep common at this period, and since 12 deep was ‘open order’ then so must “only 8 deep” here.

I do not see what difference the word "only" makes. It is absolutely clear in Xenophon's account that the Spartans were engaged in battle when the anastrophe was attempted. Mnasippos has just driven the Corcyreans back at his end of the line and realises, mid battle, the other end is in dire straits. He attempts the anastrophe to deepen (strengthen) that part of his line now that he thinks his own end is successful. On this text we simply have only two options: the Spartans went into battle in (our) Xenophon’s 'marching order' or they were engaged in battle eight deep. It is quite obviously the latter and so Xenophon (as I've said of the rest of our sources) is reporting the depth at which the Spartans engaged.

The translation offered is the Landmark wherein the word "only" does not appear as there is no reason for it to do so in the Greek. You have been strident in defending your integrity on this thread; perhaps you might desist from attacking my own. As this word, for some reason, is most pertinent to your argument and thus the passage, the accusation that here I have left out a word strongly implies that I have done so to a purpose. That is utterly rejected. In any case "only" - in or out - has no bearing on the passage.

I do not agree with Agesilaos that the Spartans deployed four deep or that the redeployment was by alternate files. The anastrophe is attempted after Mnasoppos drives the enemy back to the city and is performed by his successful (so far) troops. As the Spartan feels he has won here, he redeploys his troops. This will be an indeterminate number of troops from Mnasippos’ end of the line. At this point, Xenophon describes the engaged Spartan line as eight deep.

[agesilaos]

Let me start by saying that both of you are right! The Landmark does indeed omit ‘only’ which Carleton Brownson supplies. ‘ou de’ can mean ‘but’ including the sense of ‘only’ which is how Brownson renders it, though as I have said since eight was normal depth, either for fighting in our model or just prior to closing down in Xenophon’s that ‘only’ seems odd. ‘ou de’ can also just be used as a conjunctive phrase, linking parts of a narrative which we generally don’t translate as it lacks the temporal force of a ‘then’ or ‘next’ and does not mean ‘and’, this passage has many ‘ou de’ in this linking function which is why the Landmark omits it.

Paralus, you are a bit, confused I’ll quote the two translations and the Greek for clarity;

Carleton Brownson, Loeb 1918
[19] And when some captains replied that it was not easy to keep men obedient unless they were given provisions, he struck one of them with a staff and another with the spike of his spear. So it was, then, that when his forces issued from the city with him they were all dispirited and hostile to him — a situation that is by no means conducive to fighting. [20]
Now after he had formed the troops in line, Mnasippus himself turned to flight those of the enemy who were in front of the gates, and pursued them. When, however, these came near the wall, they turned about, and from the tombstones threw spears and javelins upon the Lacedaemonians; meanwhile1 others sallied out by the other gates and in mass formation attacked those who were at the extreme end of the line.
[21] These latter, who were drawn up only eight deep, thinking that the outer end of the phalanx was too weak, undertook to swing it around upon itself.1 But as soon as they began the backward movement, the enemy fell upon them, in the belief that they were in flight, and they did not go on and swing forward; furthermore, those who were next to them also began to flee.

[22] As for Mnasippus, while he was unable to aid the troops which were hard pressed, because the enemy was attacking him in front, he was left with an ever smaller number of men.
1 The ἀναστροφή involved two movements, (1) a facing about, followed by a march to the rear, and (2) a turning of the line until it stood behind the adjacent troops, thus doubling the depth of the phalanx. In this case the enemy's attack prevented the accomplishment of the second movement.

Xenophon Gryllou

[19] ἀποκριναμένων δέ τινων λοχαγῶν ὅτι οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἴη μὴ διδόντας τἀπιτήδεια πειθομένους παρέχειν, τὸν μέν τινα βακτηρίᾳ, τὸν δὲ τῷ στύρακι ἐπάταξεν. οὕτω μὲν δὴ ἀθύμως ἔχοντες καὶ μισοῦντες αὐτὸν συνεξῆλθον πάντες: ὅπερ ἥκιστα εἰς μάχην συμφέρει.
[20] ὁ δ᾽ ἐπεὶ παρετάξατο, αὐτὸς μὲν τοὺς κατὰ τὰς πύλας τῶν πολεμίων τρεψάμενος ἐπεδίωκεν. οἱ δ᾽ ἐπεὶ ἐγγὺς τοῦ τείχους ἐγένοντο, ἀνεστρέφοντό τε καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μνημάτων ἔβαλλον καὶ ἠκόντιζον: ἄλλοι δ᾽ ἐκδραμόντες καθ᾽ ἑτέρας πύλας ἐπιτίθενται ἁθρόοι τοῖς ἐσχάτοις:
[21] οἱ δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ὀκτὼ τεταγμένοι, ἀσθενὲς νομίσαντες τὸ ἄκρον τῆς φάλαγγος ἔχειν, ἀναστρέφειν ἐπειρῶντο. ὡς δ᾽ ἤρξαντο ἐπαναχωρεῖν, οἱ μὲν πολέμιοι ὡς φεύγουσιν ἐπέθεντο, οἱ δ᾽ οὐκέτι ἐπανέστρεψαν: καὶ οἱ ἐχόμενοι δ᾽ αὐτῶν εἰς φυγὴν ὥρμων.
[22] ὁ δὲ Μνάσιππος τοῖς μὲν πιεζομένοις οὐκ ἐδύνατο βοηθεῖν διὰ τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ καταντικρὺ προσκειμένους, ἀεὶ δ᾽ ἐλείπετο σὺν ἐλάττοσι.

And the Landmark

19] but when some company commanders answered Mnasippos that it was not easy to furnish obedient men when they had not been given their provisions. Mnasippos struck one of them with a staff and another with the butt of his spear. Because of this, his men marched out dispirited and hating him: a state of affairs that is least helpful when men are going out to battle.
[20] When he had deployed the men for battle, Mnasippos himself routed and pursued the Corcyraeans who had been stationed opposite the city gates. When these men came near their city walls, however, they faced about and from the tombstones threw spears and javelins at their pursuers. Other Corcyraeans ran out from the different gates of the city and made an attack in mass formation on the end of the enemy’s line. [21] The Spartans were arrayed eight deep, but they thought that the end of the line was too weak to hold the charge, so they attempted to wheel around to support it. But when they began their backward movement, the Corcyraeans thought they were fleeing and attacked them so the Spartans could not complete the maneuver. Then the troops next to those attempting the wheel-around movement turned to flee.
[22]Mnasippos could not bring help to those being pressed because of the attack of the enemy troops directly opposite him, and meanwhile the losses continued to mount.

So, it is not Mnasippos’ troops who attempt the ‘anastrophe’ but those who were ‘eight deep’ at the opposite end of the line, the mass which had ‘surged out of the other city gates’, mistakes the manoeuvre (curse the Landmark American English) for a retreat and pounces before they can adjust and they are routed taking the adjacent troops along with them, they would not want their flank turned. Mnasippos and the formerly victorious wing are pinned by the troops skirmishing in the graveyard and cannot intervene.

It is, then, the extreme left wing (probably) which attempts an ‘anastrophe’ having judged their formation ‘weak’ ἀσθενὲς νομίσαντες , when it was ‘eight deep’ ἐπ᾽ ὀκτὼ τεταγμένοι ; as deep as the Athenians deemed functional at Delion when facing Theban hoplites deployed in depth and in formation, twice as deep some would have it, and yet this is ‘weak’, the only explanation that does not posit a copyist’s error is that the interpretation of ἐπ᾽ ὀκτὼ τεταγμένοι is in error. My interpretation is possible from the Greek and makes sense of why the wing felt ‘weak’, I have assumed a strength of thirty-two but twenty-four would be a possible, leaving them three-deep, which is weak if you fight eight deep not so much if you think it was normally four deep and they would have to be in close order as there can be no half-file of one and a half men.

As I said on the Kynoskephalai thread, I personally, do not see troops hanging about a combat area in the extreme marching interval, and these men were close enough to the city to be caught manoeuvring by a force at the gates, or those troops counter-marching decided to convert the order to an ‘advance to the rear PDQ’ when they realised the Corcyraeans were charging, Xenophon tells us they were dispirited and had no interest in fighting for Mnasippos.

I suggest that the anastrophe was by alternate files since it is clear that the enemy covered the frontage of the Spartan mercenaries and it seemed that the alternative of the extreme left moving behind its neighbours would be shortening the line and inviting an overlap; I imagine that they would ‘close to the left’ and the units on their right would move to maintain the front, the Corcyraeans were massed at the gates rather than forming a continuous line. However given the decision to manoeuvre so close to the enemy maybe I am giving them too much credit !!

[Paralus]

So, it is not Mnasippos’ troops who attempt the ‘anastrophe’ but those who were ‘eight deep’ at the opposite end of the line, the mass which had ‘surged out of the other city gates’, mistakes the manoeuvre (curse the Landmark American English) for a retreat and pounces before they can adjust and they are routed taking the adjacent troops along with them, they would not want their flank turned. Mnasippos and the formerly victorious wing are pinned by the troops skirmishing in the graveyard and cannot intervene.

Yes, that is correct. My misread. It doesn't vitiate the argument though as Xenophon baldly describes these hoplites as in battle order eight deep and they are currently engaged. It can't do to have one part of the line 'closed up' and the other 'open' (not that I'm suggesting that's what you mean) as the entire force is put into order at 2.20 and Mnasippos engages the enemy.

I don't for the life of me understand how you see an interpretation of ἐπ᾽ ὀκτὼ τεταγμένοι supporting four deep being made into eight. The natural reading is that the line was eight deep and it was in contact.

[agesilaos]

You have misunderstood me; what I am saying is that since the line is described as 'weak' it cannot have been eight deep but if we instead translated as 'formed by eights', ie the basic unit was in eight files, it would make sense as that would yield lines of depths shallower than eight, I agree they are in fighting order, although not engaged beforethe sally hits them while manoeuvring. They will be over-watching the city gate, clearly quite casually and not expecting a sally in such strength. it must be the thinness of their line that makes them feel it is weak and that just does not work if they were the same depth as most reported hoplite lines. It follows that 'ep okto' does not mean 'eight deep' here but 'by eights' just as the Cilician parade formed up 'by fours' rather than four-deep. Any possibility of the four deep norm is exploded by this passage, however 'neat' it might seem and with it the equation of depth with interval.

[Paralus]

That's possible I suppose though I still see the 'natural' reading as the line being engaged and eight deep. Yes, the entire line is not engaged (hence the attempted anastrophe) but it is all in battle order and eight deep. Just why the Spartans thought it was week is a matter of debate. The concentration of force of the Corcyreans attacking from another gate is one possible reason. Another is the lamentable state of Mnasippos' force: all had not fronted and the line was not at regular strength. Although it was in battle order eight deep the possibility exists that parts were not because of this. That which was attempted to aid that which was not??

[agesilaos]

That's not how i read it ; the troops who were 'ep okto' percieved themselves to be too weak and so began an anastrophe to deepen their line but were caught before the manouevre was complete and routed (or maybe it was an indecisive draw ). The whole line had formed but the only opposition was in front of the main gate where Mnasippos was momentarily successful in driving them back to the cemetary where they turned at bay. He may have set the other troops as a cordon 'ep okto' the sally from the other gates was a surprise and judging from the speed of the attack, probably by peltasts or the like; Mnasippos was confronted and tied down by lights, hoplites did not carry javelins nor would throwing a dory meet with much success, I fancy. My guess would be that Mnasippos' men went into the graveyard after their opponents and were thus out of formation when the rest of the force was collapsing, had he been in open ground a few javelins would not have prevented re-deployment. Xenophon leaves much out. It is clear that the Corcyraeans only came into hand to hand combat with Mnasippos once the rest of his army had abandoned his command and the Corcyraeans had regrouped into a 'mass formation' this is not just ἁθρόοι but 'ἁθρόοι telos' telos being a 'formation'.

There were enough survivors to man all sixty triereis in the expedition (VI 2 iii), at least Xenophon does not report any being left behind at VI 2 xxvi. The size of the force was less than 1,500 mercenaries (VI 2 v, the 'not less than' there is reversed by the note that Mnasippos had already dismissed some of them xvi)he probably lost about a third of his men mainly from the group with him that fought on. Oops rambling again...

[Paralus]

Here he is being pro-Theban and anti-Spartan :
[ V.4.1] “The Lacedaemonians, namely, who had sworn that they would leave the states independent, after seizing possession of the Acropolis of Thebes were punished by the very men, unaided, who had been thus wronged, although before that time they had not been conquered by any single one of all the peoples that ever existed; while as for those among the Theban citizens who had led them into the Acropolis and had wanted the state to be in subjection to the Lacedaemonians in order that they might rule despotically themselves, just seven of the exiles were enough to destroy the government of these men. How all this came to pass I will proceed to relate.”

This is an important passage though not for the reasons obove. This is an observation by Xenophon which illuminates his ‘moral’ or religious thinking. I said on the “Leuktra” side thread that whilst Xenophon is strongly pro-Spartan this does not mean that he does not criticise Spartan individuals. Individual Spartans let the admirer down and are responsible for the otherwise immoral or ‘illegal’ acts of the Spartan state. In this case the above is a ‘preface’ to Xenophon’s account of the Theban reclamation of the Kadmeia and much more. The ambitious Phoibidas had seized control of the Theban acropolis whilst the cities were to be autonomous under the King’s Peace. For Xenophon, this was not a ‘correct’ act (though he conveniently has no issues with Sparta’s high handed remaking of bothMantinea and Phleious under the same koine eirene) even though he makes no comment on the cynical actions of his hero Agesilaos who duly has the action approved on a cost/benefit basis to Sparta.

This passage – this ‘preface’ – serves as Xenophon’s ‘moral thread’ which underscores everything that he’s about to narrate. Immediately that is the reclamation of the Kadmeia and the liberation of Thebes but it goes further. The liberation of Thebes is but the first step in the divine punishment of Sparta. As Xenophon notes, that punishment would be administered (on behalf of the gods) by the very people she’d wronged: the Thebans. This ‘moral thread’ runs right through to Leuktra where, at 6.3.2-3, Xenophon notes the precipitous decision to again violate the latest version of the King’s Peace by not recalling Kleomrotos’ army from the field and issuing a demand upon Thebes to ‘free’ the Boeotians. Xenophon notes “it seems the divinity was leading them on”. Leading them onto what exactly? In the immediate, to defeat at Leuktra.

Our Xenophon has (16/7) told us that the son of Gryllos does explain the Spartan defeat, summarising “as he rightly says; ‘But in the battle, at any rate, everything turned out badly for the Lacedaemonians, while for the other side everything went prosperously, even to the gifts of fortune/luck.’”. Xenophon does indeed say that “whatever was the case, everything went against the Spartans, while for their opponents everything went right, even what happened by fortune (τύχη)” during the battle. What has not been stated is that this is actually the summary statement of a passage (6.4.7-8) detailing all the divine portents that were recorded by the Thebans and those in the locale. In stark difference to the divinity leading the Spartans on, these portents were entirely favourable for Thebes. The gods who, at 5.4.1, “are not indifferent to the impious and those who do wicked things”, clearly had it in for Sparta as Xenophon’s summary statement encapsulates (above). It is the ‘divinity’ that brings Sparta down on the battlefield and anything and everything will go against her – even tyche. This, for Xenophon, is the root cause of Spartan failure at Leuktra not Theban tactics.

On those tactics, we are only told that the Theban troops were marshalled fifty men deep. There is absolutely no mention of the refused centre-left ordered to avoid contact and oblique attack aimed solely at the Spartans. These are simply passed over in the list of misfortunes visited upon the Spartans by the ‘divinity’. Tellingly, given that we are informed of these by our other sources, this can still be teased from Xenophon’s account. There is no clear mention anywhere in Xenophon’s account of the allies ever being engaged in battle. The entire battle is one of Spartans against the Thebans. There is no explicit mention either of allied deaths – the only deaths spoken of being those of the Spartans. The reason being that the Spartan right and the Theban left, as a result of the refused line and oblique attack, were the crisis of the battle. It is likely little of any great note happened elsewhere.

Finally, what has escaped the notice of our Xenophon is the import of the words of the son of Gryllos which he has quoted: “and indeed they [the Spartans] were punished by the men who had been wronged, and by them alone, even though before this time the Spartans had never been conquered by anyone”. This does not mean the reclamation of the Kadmeia nor defeat at Leuktra but is written in the full knowledge of what transpired later: the invasions and razing of Lakonia, the liberation of Messenia and relegation of Sparta to a local player no longer possessing the resources to dominate the Peloponnese let alone Greece.

As well, as he completes his narration of Leuktra and Jason’s role in the truce, Xenophon describes Jason as departing via Phocis and destroying the walls of Herakleia continuing onto narrate Jason’s activity and death. Xenophon then relates the upheavals in Thessaly ending with the note that Tisiphonos became the ruler and “remained so up to the time that this narrative (the Hellenika) was written” (6.4.37). Tisiphonos ruled in Pherai between the years 357-353. Between 5.4.1 and this passage (and another short excursus on Jason 6.1.18-19) nestles Xenophon’s battle of Leuktra. It is then unlikely in the extreme that Xenophon’s account of the battle is “clearly almost contemporary with the event”. It is, near certainly, written many years hence; in the 350s as the evidence indicates. That Xenophon, writing at this time, does not mention Epaminondas or Pelopidas has very little to do with his Spartan sources being unaware of them. Xenophon was clearly aware of them.

[agesilaos]

Will people please post about Leuktra on the Leuktra thread; if you consider it inadequately formatted copy and paste it and format it yourself an administrator can then delete my attempt but that is the place to discuss the battle, thanks