As a post script to his account of the battle of Issos Arrian says that Amyntas and other commanders, including Thymondas, escaped from the field with their 8,000 troops and fled to Tripolis where they picked up the ships that had taken them from Chios, burnt the surplus they could not man and fled to Cypros and thence to Egypt.
It is always assumed that these were Greek mercenaries, yet any reading of the battle narrative leaves little chance of escape for the mercenary Greeks; they are outflanked by Alexander's wing which is specifically attested to have assaulted them in the flank after they had pushed the dislocated phalanx back; as the Persian cavalry on the seaward side fled when Darius did they would have had Parmenion to contend with to the other flank and the fleeing Persian army to out distance to their rear. They were hemmed in yet they manage to escape.
Curtius adds that they fled in the formation in which they were drawn up at the very start of the battle.
In addition, Tripolis is a good way south of the battle field, so they either pushed passed the Macedonian army and headed through the Gates of Jonah or re-traced their approach march and fled with the other Persians north to the Amanic Gates then deserted the King's remnants unmolested and marched passed Parmenion's move on Damascus and the victorious Macedonians descending into Phoenicia. These actions are not logical.
Hoplites were not trained to row triereis and this was the winter when shipping ventured out at extreme risk of wrecking, but if there were crew involved they would not have lined up with the hoplites but among the light troops.
Tripolis is a strange place to land infantry who then have to march not just to Sochoi but Thapsacus where we are told they effected a junction with Darius.
Anyone care to offer a solution to these seeming anomalies?
Issues with Issos
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Here is what I think; despite Arrian Thymondas did not pick up the mercenaries in Lycia, which had fallen to Alexander and whose coastline is not overly suited for amphibious action; Pharnabazos took them to Soli, the town in Cilicia whose pro -Persian activity is never specified but elicits a 200T fine, thence Thymondas took over the men and their ships and probably sailed to Issos before marching to Thapsacus. Meanwhile Alexander reached Tarsos and the ships moved South to safety at Tripolis, though the ships were probably Cilician rather than Phoenician since the Phoenicians deserted later.
While waiting at Sochoi Darius asked the advice of his Greek generals and it was roundly dismissed by his courtiers with warnings of Greek perfidy. Darius knew of the passes into and out of the Cilician plain and presumably posted scouts at the very least. On moving North it would make sound tactical sense to guard the Assyrian pass to prevent Alexander issuing from there while he was marching to attack his rear. He would not wish to waste too many fighting men so utilised the spare crews of the ships that had brought the Greeks stiffened by a detachment of hoplites under Thymondas, in whom his confidence may have been waning under the sniping of the purpurati. Likewise the other Greek commanders there, Amyntas is specifically said to have opposed Darius chosen strategy - the Acarnanian and the Thessalian may well have been experts in the use of light troops neither state being reknowned for its hoplites.
The reinforcement of this outpost would have been observed and reported to Alexander and one must assume misinterpreted as an offensive build-up which he dashed South to thwart (the reason for his move has sometimes been deemed unclear). Convinced the offensive was coming from the South Alexander neglected to guard against attack from the Amanic pass. This helps explain his incredulity at the reports of Darius being in his rear too, it is unfeasible that the Macedonians remained in ignorance of Passes Parmenion is said to have cleared!
Once Alexander has returned to fight Darius the Persian blocking force can flee at liesure to its ships at the now much closer Tripolis. The Cilician crews now have no homes to go to and a spot of piracy was something of a national pastime.
Now as to numbers a trireme was crewed by 170 rowers and could carry 30 or so hoplites were 7,000 of the absconders crew and 1,000 hoplites then that mans 40 or so ships if as seems likely the fleet lost 100 ships to the land campaign then there would be 60 ish to burn to prevent pursuit (important because Alexander would only have captured ships to work with, having disbanded his own fleet.
Further Amyntas' lack of success in Egypt is surely better explained by a force of only 1,000, similar to the number of Athenians trapped in the Delta in the 450's rather than one of 8,000 which proved sufficient to traverse the Persian Empire in 401.
While waiting at Sochoi Darius asked the advice of his Greek generals and it was roundly dismissed by his courtiers with warnings of Greek perfidy. Darius knew of the passes into and out of the Cilician plain and presumably posted scouts at the very least. On moving North it would make sound tactical sense to guard the Assyrian pass to prevent Alexander issuing from there while he was marching to attack his rear. He would not wish to waste too many fighting men so utilised the spare crews of the ships that had brought the Greeks stiffened by a detachment of hoplites under Thymondas, in whom his confidence may have been waning under the sniping of the purpurati. Likewise the other Greek commanders there, Amyntas is specifically said to have opposed Darius chosen strategy - the Acarnanian and the Thessalian may well have been experts in the use of light troops neither state being reknowned for its hoplites.
The reinforcement of this outpost would have been observed and reported to Alexander and one must assume misinterpreted as an offensive build-up which he dashed South to thwart (the reason for his move has sometimes been deemed unclear). Convinced the offensive was coming from the South Alexander neglected to guard against attack from the Amanic pass. This helps explain his incredulity at the reports of Darius being in his rear too, it is unfeasible that the Macedonians remained in ignorance of Passes Parmenion is said to have cleared!
Once Alexander has returned to fight Darius the Persian blocking force can flee at liesure to its ships at the now much closer Tripolis. The Cilician crews now have no homes to go to and a spot of piracy was something of a national pastime.
Now as to numbers a trireme was crewed by 170 rowers and could carry 30 or so hoplites were 7,000 of the absconders crew and 1,000 hoplites then that mans 40 or so ships if as seems likely the fleet lost 100 ships to the land campaign then there would be 60 ish to burn to prevent pursuit (important because Alexander would only have captured ships to work with, having disbanded his own fleet.
Further Amyntas' lack of success in Egypt is surely better explained by a force of only 1,000, similar to the number of Athenians trapped in the Delta in the 450's rather than one of 8,000 which proved sufficient to traverse the Persian Empire in 401.
A conundrum indeed. I had though to post on this earlier but the evidence does not make for any certain – or near to certain – conclusions.
I had always thought – and it is purely a personal view given the descriptions – that the Greeks were allowed their exit. Not a “free pass” mind; rather a happy to let them go as the Persian forces are rounded up.
Alexander attacked across the river and dived into the Persian left with his cavalry, hypaspists and Coenus’ aesthetairoi. The divisions of the pezhetairoi attempted to follow, those in the centre over entirely unsuitable terrain. They became dislocated and a breach opened. The Greek hoplites drove in and wrought what must have amounted to terror: officers were killed and phalangites died. As Alexander swung left to roll up the Persian line (and rescue his hard pressed sarisa armed phalanx), the Persian line began a collapse. The phalanx, with Alexander pressing the Persians and Greeks from the flank, opened and allowed the Greeks to exit the field as the Persian line collapsed.
At this juncture the Greeks were insinuated into the breach in the phalanx. It will have made more sense, as the battle was being won and the Persians collapsing and leaving the field, to allow the “infection” or “irritant” to depart than attempt to fight it within the phalanx. Rather as the phalanx parted for the chariots at Gaugamela.
This was not like Granicus: the Greeks were not isolated and surrounded. Here the battle was lost; the Macedonians were pressing the rout but the Greeks – stabbing, slashing and killing – needed out. Let ‘em go, close up as best as possible and continue the rout?
Further Amyntas' lack of success in Egypt is surely better explained by a force of only 1,000, similar to the number of Athenians trapped in the Delta in the 450's..
Hmmm. Interesting that. The Athenian losses in the (first) Egyptian expedition might well have amounted to some 8-9,000 (without allies). This by 458/7 and after some six years of campaigning. And Athens still managed some 10,000 hoplites for Tanagra.
A time of plenty one thinks.
I had always thought – and it is purely a personal view given the descriptions – that the Greeks were allowed their exit. Not a “free pass” mind; rather a happy to let them go as the Persian forces are rounded up.
Alexander attacked across the river and dived into the Persian left with his cavalry, hypaspists and Coenus’ aesthetairoi. The divisions of the pezhetairoi attempted to follow, those in the centre over entirely unsuitable terrain. They became dislocated and a breach opened. The Greek hoplites drove in and wrought what must have amounted to terror: officers were killed and phalangites died. As Alexander swung left to roll up the Persian line (and rescue his hard pressed sarisa armed phalanx), the Persian line began a collapse. The phalanx, with Alexander pressing the Persians and Greeks from the flank, opened and allowed the Greeks to exit the field as the Persian line collapsed.
At this juncture the Greeks were insinuated into the breach in the phalanx. It will have made more sense, as the battle was being won and the Persians collapsing and leaving the field, to allow the “infection” or “irritant” to depart than attempt to fight it within the phalanx. Rather as the phalanx parted for the chariots at Gaugamela.
This was not like Granicus: the Greeks were not isolated and surrounded. Here the battle was lost; the Macedonians were pressing the rout but the Greeks – stabbing, slashing and killing – needed out. Let ‘em go, close up as best as possible and continue the rout?
Further Amyntas' lack of success in Egypt is surely better explained by a force of only 1,000, similar to the number of Athenians trapped in the Delta in the 450's..
Hmmm. Interesting that. The Athenian losses in the (first) Egyptian expedition might well have amounted to some 8-9,000 (without allies). This by 458/7 and after some six years of campaigning. And Athens still managed some 10,000 hoplites for Tanagra.
A time of plenty one thinks.
Paralus
Ἐπὶ τοὺς πατέρας, ὦ κακαὶ κεφαλαί, τοὺς μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου τὰ ὅλα κατειργασμένους;
Wicked men, you sin against your fathers, who conquered the whole world under Philip and Alexander.
Academia.edu
Ἐπὶ τοὺς πατέρας, ὦ κακαὶ κεφαλαί, τοὺς μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου τὰ ὅλα κατειργασμένους;
Wicked men, you sin against your fathers, who conquered the whole world under Philip and Alexander.
Academia.edu
On your interpretation the Greeks, 8,000 of them which is a force almost equal to the entire phalanx would have been allowed to pass into the rear of Alexander's army, still in good order. That would be military suicide; it is not clear but it seems likely that the Persian cavalry facing Parmenion only withdrew on the flight of the centre which would mean the Greeks, had they made it to the rear of Alexander's line his goose would have been better cooked than the one that killed Hephaistion!.
Consider too that Alexander's baggage would be in his rear yet this escaped looting and as a student of Eumenes you know how influential the baggage can be.
The Greeks would also have to negotiate Jonah's Pillar in single file so could probably not have outdistanced any pursuit. Certainly not keeping their arms which they seem to have. So I reckon inhaerent military probability weighs against a central penetration of the Macedonian line.
On the Athenian expedition to Egypt your probably better informed than me it's been a good while since I indulged in the Pentacontaetia. Athens was at her zenith then and certainly disposed resources greater than those with which she took the fields of Plataia and Mykale.
Consider too that Alexander's baggage would be in his rear yet this escaped looting and as a student of Eumenes you know how influential the baggage can be.
The Greeks would also have to negotiate Jonah's Pillar in single file so could probably not have outdistanced any pursuit. Certainly not keeping their arms which they seem to have. So I reckon inhaerent military probability weighs against a central penetration of the Macedonian line.
On the Athenian expedition to Egypt your probably better informed than me it's been a good while since I indulged in the Pentacontaetia. Athens was at her zenith then and certainly disposed resources greater than those with which she took the fields of Plataia and Mykale.
Absolutely and without question. Not necessarily to the rear though, but away. All of which points up the highly unsatisfactory nature of the descriptions which remain to us – detailed though Arrian’s appears to be.agesilaos wrote:On your interpretation the Greeks, 8,000 of them which is a force almost equal to the entire phalanx would have been allowed to pass into the rear of Alexander's army, still in good order. That would be military suicide;
For instance, if we take Arrian’s description of the combatants, Alexander scares off the Persians holding the coastal mountain on his right – all 20,000 of them – with “the archers, part of the Agrianians and some of the Grecian mercenaries”. Such a force will have been seriously outnumbered by the supposed 20,000 – holding the high ground – occupying the mountain one suspects.
Then also we are told that the Greek mercenaries numbered some 30,000. I think we’d both agree this is a ridiculously inflated figure. This is the sort of figure that the Greeks have rarely put together in their own defence (Plataea, Chaeronea) let alone in the service of the King. As well, Asia Minor was largely lost to the King by the time of Issus. Darius has taken the field with an army recruited from trans-Euphrates area and what remained to him of his satrapal forces in Asia Minor. I often wonder from which part of Babylonia and its surrounds he located 30,000 mercenary Greek hoplites.
He, he. As above.agesilaos wrote:…it is not clear but it seems likely that the Persian cavalry facing Parmenion only withdrew on the flight of the centre which would mean the Greeks, had they made it to the rear of Alexander's line his goose would have been better cooked than the one that killed Hephaistion!
What is reasonably clear is that the Greeks have insinuated themselves into the phalanx near to Ptolemy’s brigade. Here they are causing some death and distress. Whilst the retailing of the encounter by Arrian would lead one to believe that Alexander only turned left to relieve the distress of his infantry centre, the reality will have been more mundane. Darius is located in his centre. Alexander will have planned to charge and break the Persian left and then roll towards the Persian centre and – a fortiori – Darius. This whether his centre was in danger or not.
To then get to Darius Alexander needs to deal with the Persian infantry in the centre: the Greek hoplites. At this juncture Arrian describes the Greeks as being “cut to pieces” via the flank assault which prises them off the Macedonian centre and the river. This is entirely plausible. At this time the Persian cavalry on the right are pressing those under Parmenio severely. They only retreat when they perceive that Darius has fled and the Greeks in the centre “had been cut up by the phalanx” and isolated or detached from them.
The descriptions of those fleeing the field serve to indicate the congestion and confusion. The heavy cavalry cannot escape due to the narrow roads and undergo a slaughter as if they were infantry. Bodies are everywhere due to the narrow ravines offering escape from the filed. In this melee the Greeks – to some 8,000 ostensibly – retreat in good order. How? When last we met them Arrian has them “detached” and hemmed in by Alexander’s phalanx:
Indeed a line later he describes as having been “cut to pieces” and isolated from the Persian right. It appears that a re-run of Granicus was in the offing but did not quite come to pass. Certainly the Macedonians will have been in no mood for a Saturday afternoon barbie with the Greeks whilst watching the test from Twickenham. Yet, somehow, we are asked to believe that some 8,000 retreated from the field in good order (at least with their armament).…they (the Macedonian infantry) extended their phalanx beyond the Persian army on the side which had been broken (the left), and attacking the Greeks on the flank, were already beginning to cut them up.
I rather suspect that the 8,000 was considerably less. The figure, as a remnant of a slaughter, looks conceivable only if one believes the 30,000 initially given. It is more than likely that it was, at most, half that in my view.
So, how did they get away? I’ve no real idea. I cannot see them departing in good order via their rear (or much elsewhere for that matter). Perhaps their number was closer to your suggestion for Amyntas?
Indeed. Although the baggage at this juncture will have been worth a pittance compared to Gabiene I’d suspect.agesilaos wrote:Consider too that Alexander's baggage would be in his rear yet this escaped looting and as a student of Eumenes you know how influential the baggage can be.
Paralus
Ἐπὶ τοὺς πατέρας, ὦ κακαὶ κεφαλαί, τοὺς μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου τὰ ὅλα κατειργασμένους;
Wicked men, you sin against your fathers, who conquered the whole world under Philip and Alexander.
Academia.edu
Ἐπὶ τοὺς πατέρας, ὦ κακαὶ κεφαλαί, τοὺς μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου τὰ ὅλα κατειργασμένους;
Wicked men, you sin against your fathers, who conquered the whole world under Philip and Alexander.
Academia.edu
Indeed the promblem is just where could they have escaped to, the Pillar of Jonah Pass was the only way ahead, the Amanic Pass or the Cilician Gates to the rear, the sea was to one flank and the Amanus mountains to the other. Nor must we forget that they head to Tripolis allthis can only make sense if they were already at the Assyrian Gates when the battle was fought. IMHO
Naturally we agree that the numbers are bogus, Engels tests his timings by calculating how long it would have taken Alexander's army to cross the Pass of the Pillar of Jonah; one can do asimilar job for Darius crossing the Amanic Pass a similar choke point. One has to make certain assumptions but it is at once clear that had Darius 30,000 mercenaries hardly any of the rest of the army could have reached the field in time!
Naturally I have mislaid the research I did or rather it has been miss laid in the sense of 'It was only some sheets of paper lying around, don't expect ME to remember where I put them; you should put them where you can find them!' Sometimes it is hard to not puree ones loved ones.
Yes the baggage would not have been as crucial as at Gabiene but it would have contained the army's mobile treasury and the plunder of Asia Minor, I wouldn't mind finding that in my bank account and contrariwise I'd not want some Greek traitor filching it.
Naturally we agree that the numbers are bogus, Engels tests his timings by calculating how long it would have taken Alexander's army to cross the Pass of the Pillar of Jonah; one can do asimilar job for Darius crossing the Amanic Pass a similar choke point. One has to make certain assumptions but it is at once clear that had Darius 30,000 mercenaries hardly any of the rest of the army could have reached the field in time!
Naturally I have mislaid the research I did or rather it has been miss laid in the sense of 'It was only some sheets of paper lying around, don't expect ME to remember where I put them; you should put them where you can find them!' Sometimes it is hard to not puree ones loved ones.
Yes the baggage would not have been as crucial as at Gabiene but it would have contained the army's mobile treasury and the plunder of Asia Minor, I wouldn't mind finding that in my bank account and contrariwise I'd not want some Greek traitor filching it.
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Re: Issues with Issos
I've just found this topic which relates to my post here http://pothos.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=6512.