Why didn't Alexander attack Carthage?

[Phoebus]

To be fair also, even if Engels' theory is correct it doesn't change the events and I have a difficult time comprehending the trek through Gedrosia as a "victory" of any kind as Aleksandros has stated.

That goes without saying!

Clearly the crossing was a tragedy in terms of the loss of life; any "victory" was erased when coordination and support between the army and the navy were lost.

Paralus,

I’d only add that I still see the crossing as unnecessary.

Well, prior to reading Engels, I would have agreed with you 100%. Now, I will admit that Engels' work is many ways theoretical, butit does strike me as convincing. If the logistical considerations Alexander faced are anything like what he proposes, then the seemingly most suicidal route would have actually been the most direct and the one least likely to throw adversity their way. That's assuming the fleet kept up, of course--and it didn't.

That Alexander split the army shows, to me, that he knew what lay ahead and was well aware of the enormous difficulty of the undertaking, he might easily have “pacified” the delta, garrisoned it and returned the same way he sent Craterus.

I think what Engels was driving at was that the lands Alexander returned through could not subsist a force of that size again so soon. Krateros marched back with a far smaller force--and thus was less of a drain on those lands. If you meant pacifying the area and "hanging out" (so to speak) until new harvests had been brought in... I've got nothing.

Assuming the state of the troops was not such that they wouldn't hear of it, I would say that would have been the most prudent course. Perhaps the mutiny was so bad that they wouldn't hear of it? Maybe they were paranoid about Alexander using that "down time" to send "feeler expeditions" further east (and perhaps induce some neighbors into attacking, heh heh)? All conjecture, obviously.

In the end, the fleet largely took care of itself. As I say, a commander’s first duty is to his troops. Undertaking this march so as to score a “glorious” victory that had eluded others is a gross negligence of that duty.

Agreed, but again I think the "glory" was merely the "spin" on what was a necessary hardship.

The 6,000 are active service numbers based upon a re-reading of Diodorus’ figures. Others will have been at home but not in active service. Given the reserves sent east (almost none of whom, including the original army of the Hellespont, ever came home for good), Antipater was severely limited in what numbers he could raise given the gravest threat to Macedonian power since the coalition at Chaeronea.

It appears I have some re-reading to do!

DOUBLE EDIT: I'm assuming you're referring to Book XVII, passage LXV, which is the only instance I see of specifically 6,000 Macedonians and mercenaries. If so, I'm confused. The troops listed here are not what Alexander left Antipater; they are what the old general is sending to his king. I could see how it could be argued that the troops listed here would have shrunk Antipater's existing force (though one could also argue that he was sending his king recruits, and keeping the existing force for himself), but I'm not sure how that implies he had a smaller force than the one Diodorus lists earlier in Book XVII.

Incidentally, I'm sure I'm loved by the good folks at Harvard University Press. Every time I deploy, I always manage to forget to bring my Arrian, Diodorus, Curtius, etc. along, which inevitably leads me to re-purchase them all over again.

I'm seriously thinking about investing in a membership to one of those online libraries, like Questia or some such...