Book Club: Conquest and Empire

[Fiona]

Doesn't it seem like Bessus - being an Achaemenid - had a more legitimate claim to the throne than Alexander? It can't be surprising, then, that he would have supporters from the ranks of the satraps. Surely Alexander would have expected local opposition - especially in the Persian heartland - to his usurpation of the empire? Early twenties or not, can we really go along with the idea that a shrewd politician like Alexander had only envisioned rose petals and rice from that area after a bloody invasion?

He was a shrewd tactician - I'm not sure he was a shrewd politician. A shrewd politician probably wouldn't have trusted Satibarzanes, for example. Alexander always believed the best of people, and then was disappointed when they let him down. I don't think shrewd politicians do that much.
As for Bessus, yes, from his point of view, his claim was good, but not from Alexander's. He hadn't usurped the empire, he'd conquered it - so from his point of view, being an Achaemenid wasn't relevant any more.
What was he expecting? To move east, satrapy by satrapy, and take things as he found them, I think. For all he knew at Hecatomplylus, Bessus was planning to welcome him into Bactria in return for hanging onto his local power - and he probably would have done. Once Bessus had made his move, though, the situation changed, and Alexander reacted accordingly.

Simply looking at the map of Alexander's numerous wars and conquests, there can be no doubt about at least short to medium term planning on Alexander's part. He would not have been so successful otherwise. The Mediterranean, Egypt, Persia, India all contained highly organized civilizations that were already ancient by Alexander's time. They would not have become so if they were easy to conquer. As for long-term vision, one could always argue that Alexander, from a young age, had an appetite for organized violence that simply could not be sated.

Well, there can, actually - be some doubt, I mean - because I've got some. His undoubted success could just as easily have built upon rapid assimilation of information and fast action, combined with short term planning.
I don't think we see anything like medium-term planning until he gives orders for the construction of boats for the Indus, long before he gets there.

Your description of Alexander's wars of aggression, mass killings and enslavement, razing of cities, terrorizing of entire populations etc. as "adventurous", "interesting" and "exciting" reminds me of some of the popular ideas from the Romantic Nationalists. It has been argued that the popularization of this view of war through culture was what made the two world wars in the 20th century possible. Poetry, literature, paintings or even opera primed the population in Europe to accept war as something positive.

However, once the great wars had been fought, much of the cultural contribution from the soldiers in those very wars seem to paint a less glamorous picture violence and conquest. From what I can glean from his writings, Bosworth, of all the historians of Alexander that I have come across, has been most averse to glorifying violence or repression.

Indeed, yes, I have noticed this too, and in this I think he is a little unfair, as Alexander did not have the opportunity to experience the Romantic Nationalists and their subsequent de-bunking. He looks at Alexander's actions through 20th century eyes, and seems to think Alexander should have known better. This was a man who thought you could tell what was going to happen by looking at the insides of a dead animal. It may be almost impossible for us to enter the mindset of the ancient world, but I think we should try.
Fiona

[Fiona]

The war of the propaganda machine - liberation, revenge and retribution - is over. From Persepolis on (and more so the death of Darius) it became a war of liberation of the Persians from, aparrently, themselves. After that other peoples from the Persians all of whom had the old regime replaced by the new. Meet the new boss...

NIce vid, but you've lost me there! <scratches head>

Don't go too far with the "generous nature" topos: the conqueror made great play of those of the Persian nobility who “came over to his side”. This was all part of the legitimising process wherein he claims Darius cannot even command the loyalty of those close to him. After Gaugamela and Persepolis it becomes a matter of finding those – of the existing administration structure – he can trust to manage the new conquests.

I do see what you mean, and you may very well be right, but how do we know he was as calculating as that? He may have been genuinely thrilled that Persians were willing to work with him. That may have been naive, but that's just as likely as calculating, I think.
We're told that he treated Artabazus and his sons with "every mark of respect". Now, that could mean that he had his eye on the political advantages of doing so - but we don't know that it wasn't simply because he respected them.
Fiona

[Paralus]

The Great King gave a comparatively small number of gifts and bribes whilst (also from what Paralus says) the Successors eventually emptied the coffers to pay for their campaigns. Accordingly, almost all the stored wealth of the Persian king ended up being redistributed. At least, that's how I think it went ...

Given what is recorded of his wealth, the Great King was remarkably stingy when it came to handing out readies. The sorts of sums recorded are, in all honesty, pocket change for the great part and targeted for a purpose. The Spartans, or more so their rowers, seemed always to be waiting pay day. Other notations, such as Conon's Persian supplied fleet for Cnidus and money for Athens, record the spending of larger sums - again in pursuit of a targeted policy (in this case the bringing to heel of a truant ally, Sparta).

The Successors' spending fits the latter model. Just one the Diadochoi - Antigonus - is recorded as having lifted thousands from the royal treasuries - especially Cyinda where he withdrew 10,000 talents in 316 on his return from "settlement" of the upper satrapies. A good amount of this will have gone to fund the enormous ship building programme he commenced shortly afterward as he laid siege to Tyre and took the war to Ptolemy. Over these and ensuing years Antigonus not only financed his own territorial army but forces operating in the Peloponnese as well as the aforementioned navy. By 306 he was financing an invasion army of 80,000 and a fleet to go with it.

Seleucus, by 308, had the upper satrapies under his sway and reached a detente with Antigonus who, try as he might, could not replicate his campaign of 317. He too was now well supplied with the readies of war. Ptolemy lacked for little in comparison. Lysimachus, given his fractious satrapy, did not feature large until the closing decade and a half or so of the fourth century. The loser in all of this was Macedon.

Cassander, without the royal treasuries of the old Achaemenid Empire, was in no position to match the high minded hypocrisy of Antigonus and Ptolemy proclaiming the “freedom and autonomy of the Greeks”. What Cassander wanted was the “freedom” of the Greeks to support him or the “autonomy” to garrison the poleis into such support. Any money or materiel that happened along as part of that policy was most welcome.

Many (if not near all) of the manpower taken east over Alexander’s years never returned. Those who returned with Craterus followed him back to Asia to confront Perdiccas. Mercenary employment was readily attainable in the cashed-up fiefdoms of the Asian Diadochs. The “kingdoms” of the Asian Diadochoi, like America of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, became the lands of opportunity for Greco-Macedonians as soldiers, settlers and, at the top end, philoi of the Diadochoi. Here was where the money was. Cassander could in no way match what was available to the likes of Ptolemy, Seleucus and Antigonus.

It is a testament to what the Spanish Inquisition might call his “ruthless efficiency” that he survived as he did. It also indicates that the support of the Greek poleis was not as negligible as some might think.

Then again, he may not ever have got past go had he faced an Antigonus or Eumenes on home soil rather than Plody-perchon.

[Paralus]

The war of the propaganda machine - liberation, revenge and retribution - is over. From Persepolis on (and more so the death of Darius) it became a war of liberation of the Persians from, aparrently, themselves. After that other peoples from the Persians all of whom had the old regime replaced by the new. Meet the new boss...

NIce vid, but you've lost me there! <scratches head>

You need to get to the last verse... line in fact: "Meet the new boss / Same as the old boss!"

[amyntoros]

Simply looking at the map of Alexander's numerous wars and conquests, there can be no doubt about at least short to medium term planning on Alexander's part. He would not have been so successful otherwise. The Mediterranean, Egypt, Persia, India all contained highly organized civilizations that were already ancient by Alexander's time. They would not have become so if they were easy to conquer. As for long-term vision, one could always argue that Alexander, from a young age, had an appetite for organized violence that simply could not be sated.

Well, there can, actually - be some doubt, I mean - because I've got some. His undoubted success could just as easily have built upon rapid assimilation of information and fast action, combined with short term planning. I don't think we see anything like medium-term planning until he gives orders for the construction of boats for the Indus, long before he gets there.

Now I interpret some passages as early evidence of long term planning - i.e., sending home those Macedonians who had married just before leaving for Asia (Arrian 1. 24. 1-2). Although Arrian says Alexander gained as much popularity by this act among the Macedonians as by any other, what he doesn't say is that here was an Alexander-given opportunity for a goodly number of young and healthy Macedonian women to conceive babies for the next generation, something that wasn't going to happen again for a very long time. I've always had the belief that Alexander knew even then that he was not going to stop with the defeat of Darius.

Best regards,

[Semiramis]

He was a shrewd tactician - I'm not sure he was a shrewd politician. A shrewd politician probably wouldn't have trusted Satibarzanes, for example. Alexander always believed the best of people, and then was disappointed when they let him down. I don't think shrewd politicians do that much.

Alexander's treatment of the Persian nobility seems to be the act of a shrewd politician. He included some members like Darius' brother in his personal bodyguard, created alliances with Artabazus and his sons, solidified the alliance with by taking Barsine as his 'woman', adapted Persian royal wear and court protocol, treated Darius' harem as a Great King would, even publicly mourning the death of Darius' wife in the proper manner.

You're right that shrewd politicians rarely believe in the "best of people". In this context, are you equating the "best of people" with unconditional surrender to foreign invaders? If that's the case it's hard to imagine how Alexander could "always" expect that.

The Greek identity itself was helped in its formation by the idea of Greek unity and heroism against Persian domination - an idea that was already inexorably woven into the national myth by Alexander's time. Being an educated man, Alexander would have been familiar with Greek disdain for the Persian empire. He was shrewd enough to use it in his war propaganda.

Phillip never had an easy time subjugating the Greeks. Alexander was at the battle of Chaeronea where the Sacred Band of Thebes fought to the last man rather than succumb to Macedonian hegemony. Thebes, Tyre, Gaza had all fought the invader. Even after its surrender, Alexander entered Babylon with his troops fully armed, perhaps expecting some resistance. Why would he expect the Persians to be any more malleable to being subjugated than those previous to them? The capture and execution of Bessus seems another case of eliminating a challenge to Alexander's grip on power.

I don't think we see anything like medium-term planning until he gives orders for the construction of boats for the Indus, long before he gets there.

To add to Amyntoros' point, Alexander arranged for Darius III's daughters to receive a Greek education before he left for his campaigns to Central Asia. It seems that he was eventually planning on marriages and offsprings that would have been acceptable to the Persian nobility and perhaps the general populace.

Indeed, yes, I have noticed this too, and in this I think he is a little unfair, as Alexander did not have the opportunity to experience the Romantic Nationalists and their subsequent de-bunking. He looks at Alexander's actions through 20th century eyes, and seems to think Alexander should have known better. This was a man who thought you could tell what was going to happen by looking at the insides of a dead animal. It may be almost impossible for us to enter the mindset of the ancient world, but I think we should try.
Fiona

I'm not sure the Romantic Nationalists were ever de-bunked. It's just that post-Holocaust, some forms of overt racism became less publicly acceptable in most countries. One would be hard-pressed to argue that we live in a world without militarism, and I wouldn't necessarily just blame the cultures where animal sacrifice is an accepted part of religion and spirituality. There's still no end to the fun, excitement and adventure that is war. Helmand isn't too far away from Eastern Iran, is it?

You're absolutely correct in pointing out that historians suffer from the biases of their periods. To me, it seems that in mentioning the pain and suffering Alexander's conquests brought, Bosworth is consciously distancing himself those modern-day historians or fans who glorify or justify violence and repression. To me, it doesn't seem a matter of ignoring the time period Alexander was in. In contrast, I often get the feeling that the "benevolent conqueror" view of Alexander has more to do with some misguided perception of European colonialism and neo-coloniasm as beneficial, than it is to do with the man in question. Consequently this whole idea seems skewed and anachronistic.

Regarding war and conquest, I doubt there ever was a single "mindset of the ancient world". There is plenty of writing from from the Greeks that are critical the concept of the empire. The Persian Kings were seen as despots and the subjects as slaves. Herodotus, for example, put these words into the mouth of the Ethiopian King addressing Cambyses.

"The king of the Persians sent you not with these gifts because he much desired to become my sworn friend - nor is the account which ye give of yourselves true, for ye are come to search out my kingdom. Also your king is not a just man - for were he so, he had not coveted a land which is not his own, nor brought slavery on a people who never did him any wrong. Bear him this bow, and say - 'The king of the Ethiops thus advises the king of the Persians when the Persians can pull a bow of this strength thus easily, then let him come with an army of superior strength against the long-lived Ethiopians- till then, let him thank the gods that they have not put it into the heart of the sons of the Ethiops to covet countries which do not belong to them."

From memory, it is in Indica that Alexander supposedly came across an Indian sage who questioned his desire to conquer more earth. On the other end of the empire, when the Athenians were debating whether acquiesce to his orders to confer him the honour of being a god, one objector stated -

"What sort of god will he be, on departing from whose temple people will have to purify themselves?"

[Paralus]

He was a shrewd tactician - I'm not sure he was a shrewd politician. A shrewd politician probably wouldn't have trusted Satibarzanes, for example. Alexander always believed the best of people, and then was disappointed when they let him down. I don't think shrewd politicians do that much.

The picture that comes through the source material would paint an Alexander quite "shrewd" and well versed in court politics. Alexander seemed to lack nothing when it came to balancing competing individuals (and cultures). The court cannot have been a simple exercise in daily management if the details in episodes such as Callisthenes and Philotas are anywhere near the mark.

To add to Semiramis' point, I don't think we can claim that Alexander "always believed the best of people and then was disappointed when they let him down". Alexander was certainly no Pella Pollyanna. Such people "let him down" because they were Persians and, well, because they were people (to leave aside Harpalus). They were in positions of influence simply because Alexander was intelligent enough to realise that he could not change the machinery of empire overnight and that he'd soon lack for somatophylakes, generals and staff if he simply appointed Macedonians to every position. Put simply he had no choice but to utilise "senior" Persians and to hope, by so doing, to mollify the natives they would control on his behalf.

The process of wooing Persian grandees had begun in Asia Minor – when Mithrenes had surrendered Sardis – and gathered pace as the conquered territory grew. Two examples, the "suborning" of Mazaeus and Abulites (the former rewarded with Babylon and the later to keep Susa), will have been a crushing blow to what remained of Darius’ prestige or power. Darius might well have expected these two prized citadels to hold out and delay the conqueror whilst a final effort was raised from the upper satrapies. As it was, the desertion of Darius by Mazaeus and Abulites provided the hammer and nails for Bessus to nail shut Darius’ beckoning coffin.

[Fiona]

Now I interpret some passages as early evidence of long term planning - i.e., sending home those Macedonians who had married just before leaving for Asia (Arrian 1. 24. 1-2). Although Arrian says Alexander gained as much popularity by this act among the Macedonians as by any other, what he doesn't say is that here was an Alexander-given opportunity for a goodly number of young and healthy Macedonian women to conceive babies for the next generation, something that wasn't going to happen again for a very long time. I've always had the belief that Alexander knew even then that he was not going to stop with the defeat of Darius.
Best regards,

Hi amyntoros,
yes, it could be, couldn't it? We can't be certain of his motive - it might be that he simply wanted the popularity, or he was keeping some promise he had made, but it might just as well be exactly as you say. Perhaps he set out with a 'pothos' to go as far as he could, but had not, at that stage, planned it out in much detail. I suppose he couldn't, really, with so many variables.
Fiona

[Fiona]

You're right that shrewd politicians rarely believe in the "best of people". In this context, are you equating the "best of people" with unconditional surrender to foreign invaders? If that's the case it's hard to imagine how Alexander could "always" expect that.

Well, no, that is not what I meant at all. I simply mean taking people, whether friends or enemies, at face value and believing what they say. That when an enemy, for example, says he is now a friend and accepts a position under the new order, he is not going to change his mind and kill your troops the minute your back is turned. A shrewd politician, I believe, would have welcomed Satibarzanes but kept him where he could keep his eye on him. Alexander, in his optimism and his faith in people, trusted him too far.

The Greek identity itself was helped in its formation by the idea of Greek unity and heroism against Persian domination - an idea that was already inexorably woven into the national myth by Alexander's time. Being an educated man, Alexander would have been familiar with Greek disdain for the Persian empire. He was shrewd enough to use it in his war propaganda.

Yes, but I'm not saying he was daft. He knew the right things to say to get people back home alongside, for sure. Talking of being an educated man, he would surely also have known that Persians had a great respect for telling the truth, and expected it of them.

Phillip never had an easy time subjugating the Greeks. Alexander was at the battle of Chaeronea where the Sacred Band of Thebes fought to the last man rather than succumb to Macedonian hegemony. Thebes, Tyre, Gaza had all fought the invader. Even after its surrender, Alexander entered Babylon with his troops fully armed, perhaps expecting some resistance. Why would he expect the Persians to be any more malleable to being subjugated than those previous to them? The capture and execution of Bessus seems another case of eliminating a challenge to Alexander's grip on power.

Oh, quite. No argument there. I don't think he expected any malleability from people like Bessus who were still fighting. I do think he expected loyalty from those who had 'come over', and the amazing thing is that, conqueror though he was, from most of them, he got it.

To add to Amyntoros' point, Alexander arranged for Darius III's daughters to receive a Greek education before he left for his campaigns to Central Asia. It seems that he was eventually planning on marriages and offsprings that would have been acceptable to the Persian nobility and perhaps the general populace.

Yes, that's a good one, though there isn't much evidence from early in the campaign. Perhaps the further he went, the more his ideas grew and the more actual plans he was able to make.

I'm not sure the Romantic Nationalists were ever de-bunked. It's just that post-Holocaust, some forms of overt racism became less publicly acceptable in most countries. One would be hard-pressed to argue that we live in a world without militarism, and I wouldn't necessarily just blame the cultures where animal sacrifice is an accepted part of religion and spirituality. There's still no end to the fun, excitement and adventure that is war. Helmand isn't too far away from Eastern Iran, is it?

I have read this paragraph several times now without being able to fathom quite what you're on about here. I don't know if you're calling me a racist or just being sarcastic about war, but either way, my point was only about Bosworth's approach and tone.

You're absolutely correct in pointing out that historians suffer from the biases of their periods. To me, it seems that in mentioning the pain and suffering Alexander's conquests brought, Bosworth is consciously distancing himself those modern-day historians or fans who glorify or justify violence and repression. To me, it doesn't seem a matter of ignoring the time period Alexander was in. In contrast, I often get the feeling that the "benevolent conqueror" view of Alexander has more to do with some misguided perception of European colonialism and neo-coloniasm as beneficial, than it is to do with the man in question. Consequently this whole idea seems skewed and anachronistic.

Fair enough. But without 'violence and repression' there probably wouldn't be any history. And Prof. Bosworth would be out of a job. In his intro, he said "We may not go beyond the material at our disposal" yet in doing this conscious distancing, is he not doing precisely that? He is assuming his understands Alexander's mind and motives, and passing judgement upon him. He is perfectly entitled to do this, of course, but it sits uneasily with his declared aims.

Regarding war and conquest, I doubt there ever was a single "mindset of the ancient world".

Yes, OK - the phrase was used for brevity. There were as many mindsets as there were individuals, same as there are now. The point is that there are fewer people these days who think that going out and conquering other countries is a great idea, and that in Alexander's days there were rather more who did. It just seems to me a little unfair that those historians who do try to get a sense of what that might have felt like, necessarily get accused of glorifying war.
Fiona

[Fiona]

Hi Paralus, thanks for explaining about the vid - makes sense now!

The picture that comes through the source material would paint an Alexander quite "shrewd" and well versed in court politics. Alexander seemed to lack nothing when it came to balancing competing individuals (and cultures). The court cannot have been a simple exercise in daily management if the details in episodes such as Callisthenes and Philotas are anywhere near the mark.
To add to Semiramis' point, I don't think we can claim that Alexander "always believed the best of people and then was disappointed when they let him down". Alexander was certainly no Pella Pollyanna. Such people "let him down" because they were Persians and, well, because they were people (to leave aside Harpalus). They were in positions of influence simply because Alexander was intelligent enough to realise that he could not change the machinery of empire overnight and that he'd soon lack for somatophylakes, generals and staff if he simply appointed Macedonians to every position. Put simply he had no choice but to utilise "senior" Persians and to hope, by so doing, to mollify the natives they would control on his behalf.

I like your 'Pella Pollyanna', but you know, I think he was, a bit. You can't really leave aside Harpalus, because he's such a good example of it. And he wasn't the only one - there are hints (those it's less clear-cut, I admit) that both Alexander Lyncestes and Philotas both got the benefit of the doubt at least once. Still, Alexander could go to the opposite extreme and be very vengeful when he did feel let down, and I guess Pollyanna didn't do that so much. I am thinking of people like Abulites here, as well as Philotas and Cleitus and all the other people he killed or had killed.
What fascinates me is the extremes. Never plods along in the middle ground, does he? Always one extreme or the other. And like I was saying to Semiramis, it's amazing how many people didn't let him down.

The process of wooing Persian grandees had begun in Asia Minor – when Mithrenes had surrendered Sardis – and gathered pace as the conquered territory grew. Two examples, the "suborning" of Mazaeus and Abulites (the former rewarded with Babylon and the later to keep Susa), will have been a crushing blow to what remained of Darius’ prestige or power. Darius might well have expected these two prized citadels to hold out and delay the conqueror whilst a final effort was raised from the upper satrapies. As it was, the desertion of Darius by Mazaeus and Abulites provided the hammer and nails for Bessus to nail shut Darius’ beckoning coffin.

I think this is good evidence too for how the plans grew and matured, got bigger, as he went along. Mazaeus might have seemed like an extraordinary stroke of good luck at the entry to Babylon - by Zadracarta, he might have been thinking (btw did you mean Artabazus deserting Darius? Mazaeus was still back in Babylon, wasn't he?) "Well, if people like this are coming over, blimey, this is looking good. I'd better make a few nice gestures, wear some Persian gear..."

Cheers,
Fiona

[Paralus]

Mazaeus might have seemed like an extraordinary stroke of good luck at the entry to Babylon - by Zadracarta, he might have been thinking (btw did you mean Artabazus deserting Darius? Mazaeus was still back in Babylon, wasn't he?) "Well, if people like this are coming over, blimey, this is looking good. I'd better make a few nice gestures, wear some Persian gear..."

I meant Mazaeus. There's enough in the source material to indicate that Alexander and Mazaeus were in contact post Gaugamela. This will have been to come to an accommodation over the surrender of Babylon without another long siege which Alexander will have wanted to avoid. That he appeared in “battle order” outside of Babylon might indicate that he was shrewd enough to be prepared for a volte face on any agreement by Mazaeus. The surrender of Babylon was a substantial victory for Alexander just as Susa was afterwards. The significance of both are easily underestimated.

Darius, after Gaugamela, broke for Ecbatana and the hope of raising forces from the upper satrapies with his kinsman Bessus. Key to this would have been Mazaeus and Abulites forcing Alexander to pay in blood and treasure – al la Tyre - for the subjugation of the citadels of Babylon and Susa. He was hoping for the sort of resistance seen at the Persian gates. When these two “capitals” of empire fell to diplomacy, any remaining clout that Darius retained rapidly evaporated. Such will have empowered Bessus’ decision to usurp and raise the upper satrapies under himself.

[Semiramis]

Hi Fiona,

Well, no, that is not what I meant at all. I simply mean taking people, whether friends or enemies, at face value and believing what they say. That when an enemy, for example, says he is now a friend and accepts a position under the new order, he is not going to change his mind and kill your troops the minute your back is turned. A shrewd politician, I believe, would have welcomed Satibarzanes but kept him where he could keep his eye on him. Alexander, in his optimism and his faith in people, trusted him too far.

Given all the uprisings against Macedonian hagemony as soon as news of Phillip's death spread, it would be odd if Alexander confused submission that was coerced through violence and threats with freely inspired loyalty.

It's difficult to argue that Alexander himself always practiced those lofty principals you describe during his wars. The mercenaries at Massaga had agreed to a truce only to be massacred along with their families.

Yes, but I'm not saying he was daft. He knew the right things to say to get people back home alongside, for sure. Talking of being an educated man, he would surely also have known that Persians had a great respect for telling the truth, and expected it of them.

An educated man like Alexander would've been at least a little aware of the power politics and intrigues during Achaemenid times, so I somehow doubt he expected the Persians to suddenly become inept at these skills. People in general resent being invaded and occupied, and I get the feeling it's a fact both Phillip and Alexander became familiar with.

Oh, quite. No argument there. I don't think he expected any malleability from people like Bessus who were still fighting. I do think he expected loyalty from those who had 'come over', and the amazing thing is that, conqueror though he was, from most of them, he got it.

I think fear of military retribution, shrewd political moves by Alexander and self-interest all played a part in the decision of some members of the Persian elite to collaborate with Alexander. It seems from the Satrapal purge episode that once Alexander felt more secure in his hold of the empire, he killed many of his Persian allies with replaced them with little-known Macedonians dependent on Alexander for support. Those Persian nobles were no longer as useful to Alexander, so these potential challengers to his power were eliminated.

I have read this paragraph several times now without being able to fathom quite what you're on about here. I don't know if you're calling me a racist or just being sarcastic about war, but either way, my point was only about Bosworth's approach and tone.

My point in that paragraph was to challenge this perceived dichotomy between ancient and modern minds where ancients are supposedly more likely to accept wars and conquest. It is important to the discussion, as when left unchallenged, this assertion is often used to somehow justify or whitewash brutal acts. Those refusing to glorify empire and conquest are accused of placing things out of their ancient context or judging events using a modern point of view.

It's apparent from several sources that many ancients were not cheerleaders for conquest. As for moderns, wars of aggression are being waged as we write these posts. I am unconvinced that today we are somehow blessed with a smaller proportion of people who can justify or whitewash violence against other human beings.

I agree that it would probably be impossible for a modern person to understand the mindset of a person from an ancient society. But animal sacrifice is not a good example of how the ancients thought so differently, as animal sacrifice is reasonably common in the modern world too.

Yes, I was being sarcastic about war. I don't really think it is exciting and fun. No, I didn't call you a racist.

Fair enough. But without 'violence and repression' there probably wouldn't be any history. And Prof. Bosworth would be out of a job. In his intro, he said "We may not go beyond the material at our disposal" yet in doing this conscious distancing, is he not doing precisely that? He is assuming his understands Alexander's mind and motives, and passing judgement upon him. He is perfectly entitled to do this, of course, but it sits uneasily with his declared aims.

Yes, violence and repression just don't get the credit they deserve...

I can't seem to draw a link between Bosworth not glorifying war and conquest with going beyond the source material. Would you be able to expound on that?

It is simply a fact that Alexander's domination was possible through liberal use of mass slaughter, enslavement or destruction along with political methods. Why should any historian omit the mention of plights of the conquered people when they were suffering the most brutal acts known to humankind? These people were very much real and present in the time period, hence an essential part of the narrative. It's hard to accuse Bosworth of going beyond the source material when all the sources mention death, terror, enslavement. It's the way with all great conquerors. What worries me are the historians who can somehow write an account of wars and conquests without mentioning these things.

Yes, OK - the phrase was used for brevity. There were as many mindsets as there were individuals, same as there are now. The point is that there are fewer people these days who think that going out and conquering other countries is a great idea, and that in Alexander's days there were rather more who did. It just seems to me a little unfair that those historians who do try to get a sense of what that might have felt like, necessarily get accused of glorifying war.

I think I've addressed this point in the previous paragraphs.

[Fiona]

Hi Semiramis,
what can I say? You argue your points forcefully and well, but we're not going to come within shouting distance of agreement, not if we argue till the cows come home.

At least there's one thing we can agree about.
Have you seen Jared's new haircut?
http://www.terrysdiary.com/post/3949369 ... tos-mohawk
All the best,
Fiona

[Paralus]

Empire building means killing; overthrowing an empire the size of the Achaemenid Empire means much killing. I'd refer to the quote from Alexander in Fact and Fiction earlier in the thread: from the "revolt" in Sogdiana on there was constant killing. No amount of heroic glorification in the source tradition can hide the slaughter of populations that became the hallmark of the last five years of the anabasis. Semiramis has mentioned the murder of the Indian mercenaries. Arrian is at the end of his literary tether in explaining this away.

The “Indian” campaign is the salutary pointer. Alexander demanded obeisance – in advance – and any who decided otherwise were deemed something similar to Thebes in 335: they were to be annihilated as in “revolt”. Excuses that the troops punished populations for injuring the conqueror are simply that: excuses. The fact is, that during the Indian invasion and before, Alexander’s troops demonstrated a proficencyat mass slaughter. The description of the end of Porus’ army – if related anywhere near correctly – is one of extermination. None were meant to survive this cordon of death.

There is nothing heroic in that deliberately formed ring of slaughter. Extermination plain and simple.

[the_accursed]

In my opinion, for someone to be considered a good politician, his or her policies must, most of the time, have achieved the intended goals, and not done so at too great costs.

Alexander III was, judging by the actual results of his policies, a poor politician. His attempt at introducing proskynesis among the Macedonians was a failure. Wearing Persian clothes made him seem a stranger, and even a traitor, to many Macedonians. The exiles decree strained his already strained relations with Greece. Proclaiming himself a god and demanding that the Greeks should acknowledge him as such made many believe he was mad. His attempt to replace Macedonian soldiers with Persians led to mutiny. All in all, his “orientalisation” policy was at the root of many of his problems. The assassination attempts, the deaths of Philotas, Parmenion, Cleitus and Callisthenes, and Alexander III’s gradually more strained relation with his Macedonian soldiers can all be traced back, entirely or partly, to his failed policies. They were the main reason why many Romans and Greeks believed he’d been “corrupted by fortune”.

Myself, I don’t perceive Alexander III as a particularly bright person, politically or otherwise.
He could do seemingly “smart” things when he cooperated with, and took the advice of, his more able and experienced generals. But when he strayed from their advice, as seems to have been the case with his “orientalisation” policy, there’s a consistent pattern of enacting policies that didn’t work. Had Alexander III taken their political advice (such as, for instance, the advice to father a child before the campaign against Persia), then perhaps, and in spite of himself, he could have done what some of his more able – and in my opinion more intelligent – successors were later able to do: found a lasting empire.

After his death, his generals abandoned all his plans for the future, and most of them divorced their Persian wives. Another indication, in my opinion, of what they, the people who knew him best, thought of their former leader’s political judgement.