Tactike theoriai – manuals or philosophy

[agesilaos]

The amendment to Xenophon’s ‘Hellenika’ was suggested in Geschichte des griechischen Kriegswesens (Wilhelm Rustow and Hermann Köchly, Aarau, 1852), none of the manuscripts have it ; this is still ‘modern’ but equally ‘of long standing’.

The original in all the manuscripts is VII 5 xxiii

καὶ μὴν τοὺς ἱππέας οἱ μὲν πολέμιοι ἀντιπαρετάξαντο ὥσπερ ὁπλιτῶν φάλαγγα βάθος ἐφεξῆς καὶ ἔρημον πεζῶν ἁμίππων:
and the enemy cavalry were ranged against him like a phalanx of hoplites in deep ranks and without supporting foot within the formation…

So it is the depth of their deployment and the lack of supporting light infantry which attracts Xenophon’s comment he goes on to contrast Epameinondas’ deployment VII 5 xxiv

ὁ δ᾽ Ἐπαμεινώνδας αὖ καὶ τοῦ ἱππικοῦ ἔμβολον ἰσχυρὸν ἐποιήσατο, καὶ ἁμίππους πεζοὺς συνέταξεν αὐτοῖς
Epameinondas formed his cavalry in a strong wedge (embolon) and stationed supporting light infantry (hammippoi) among them.

I can only suppose that Rustow and/or Kochly noticed that the two clauses ought to contrast, and that they discounted the possibility that ‘embolon’ here actually means a wedge rather than ‘a deep column’ as it had at Leuktra when applied to the Theban foot. This is not an arbitrary position as the contrast is made clear by the exclusion and inclusion of ‘hammippoi’ in the respective formations and their researches would have told them that the actual cavalry wedge was invented by Philip II (as stated in the Taktikeis which they appended to this tome), simply allowing the Theban cavalry to be in a wedge supplies the contrast between the rectangular Peloponnesian formation and his triangular one. This may be wrong, but it is difficult to see what other motivation the amendment would have. Such an old book might be online free, I will search over the weekend, Chris of the Gaugamela diorama is a native German speaker and will unravel the compound nouns and anti-posited verbs for us I am sure.

You are mistaken about the decades in the ‘Cavalry Commander’ and those in the ‘Kyrou Paedia’. The officers in the former are included in their command so that the pempadarchs command five men including themselves and the dekadarchs ten men including themselves and one pempadarch, which does lead to a ten by ten formation. We should expect this as each tribe was supposed to contribute 1,000 hoplites and 100 cavalry; they may generally have fought five deep but they paraded in ten files of ten, the work does stress looking good on parade at the various State Festivals. The ‘Lochos’ of the ‘Kyrou Paedia’, as you correctly pointed out is described as 25 strong and consisting of two dekadarchia so each decade is twelve strong and the officer are exclusive of the ranks (the 25th being the lochagos).

[Paralus]

A 'long standing' conjecture' ? I thought you said it was 'modern', meaning recent ? So Marincola is suggesting the emendation is not an alternate textual version? I take your point about 'pezhetairoi' and 'asthetairoi'....one translator makes an emendment and others blindly follow it. This may be the case here indeed.

As Indeed it is. Agesilaos has posted the source of the emendation (Ruestow & Koechly) which I've checked having just arrived home. I cannot tell you the reason for it only that Pritchett follows it and translates as "more than six rows deep". On that, it has noting to do with files: Xenophon describes the cavalry as in "many deep ranks deep" or near enough. The cavalry were arranged in deep ranks and resembled a hoplite phalanx rather than a cavalry deployment. Marincola's note is that all the manuscripts use the same word. There is no paleographical or textual reason for altering it: the text reads fine as it is. This contrasts with some fifty or so emendations which he accepts for one or another reason.

[agesilaos]

I had no doubt that you would not accept any culpability but then you have to go on with an accusation of ‘special pleading’ ecce homo.

But since I have a thick old hide I’ll waste no time bickering over that and address the point you think you have made, though I very much doubt it will meet with any great success.

Oh really? Let us look at a relevant situation where we have two different words that mean much the same. In Aelian 31.1 we have 'parembole' to describe the rear half-file 'interjecting' between the files by closing up. At 31.3 we have 'entaxis'/insertion to describe troops moving up alongside the files in exactly the same way - only this time it is light infantry infiltrating the files. Two different words to describe essentially the same thing, with a minor difference.

The differences are quite important, the one is the much vaunted insertion of half files, the other, ‘entaxis’ the insertion of whole files or even double files of light infantry, something with which we never hear in the histories, in fact the word is confined to Aelian’s and Arrian’s (26 vi) Taktikeis, which both distinguish it from ‘parembole’, otherwise I can find only a non-military use in Ptolemy’s ‘Geography’ II 1 vii. The logic of your argument would allow these terms to be interchangeable which they clearly are not.

Let us look at the facts:

1. Xenophon simply never uses the word 'parembole'

2. He uses 'paragon' and its variations many times, which means 'bring up by the side' (of), leading by, and deploying from column into line.'He simply prefers to say, "leading up by the side"/paragon rather than "interject"/parembole, or even "entaxis" insert. All these words describe troops moving up in file into the intervals between existing files.

3. All translations of the relevant part of the "Cyropaedia' ( see my diagram) that I can find agree this meaning ( except Agesilaos )

Well there is one fact there, Xenophon certainly never uses ‘parembole’. ‘Leading up by the side’ and ‘interjection’ are simply not synonyms, as is demonstrated by Polybios, nor do ‘All these words describe troops moving up in file into the intervals between existing files.’

Only a chapter away from the reference to the ‘cavalry like a phalanx’ Xenophon describes Epameinondas’ strengthening of his left wing VII 5 xxii

[22] For as soon as he had arrived at the mountain, and when his battle line had been extended to its full length, he grounded arms at the foot of the heights, so that he seemed like one who was encamping. And by so doing he caused among most of the enemy a relaxation of their mental readiness for fighting, and likewise a relaxation of their readiness as regards their array for battle. It was not until he had moved1 along successive companius to the wing where he was stationed, and had wheeled them into line thus strengthening the mass formation of this wing,2 that he gave the order to take up arms and led the advance; and his troops followed. Now as soon as the enemy saw them unexpectedly approaching, no one among them was able to keep quiet, but some began running to their posts, others forming into line, others bridling horses, and others putting on breast-plates, while all were like men who were about to suffer, rather txan to inflict, harm.
1 362 B.C.
2 The entire army, marching in a long column of even width, with Epaminondas at the head, “right-faced” upon reaching the desired position, thus forming a long battle-line, of even, but slight, depth, with Epaminondas on the left wing. He wished, however, to increase the depth of this wing. He accordingly caused successive companies, from the centre and the right wing, to “left face” again and march along behind the line to the left wing, thus gradually increasing its depth.
Trans Carleton Brownson

[22] καὶ γὰρ δὴ ὡς πρὸς τῷ ὄρει ἐγένετο, ἐπεὶ ἐξετάθη αὐτῷ ἡ φάλαγξ, ὑπὸ τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς ἔθετο τὰ ὅπλα, ὥστε εἰκάσθη στρατοπεδευομένῳ. τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσας ἔλυσε μὲν τῶν πλείστων πολεμίων τὴν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πρὸς μάχην παρασκευήν, ἔλυσε δὲ τὴν ἐν ταῖς συντάξεσιν. ἐπεί γε μὴν παραγαγὼν τοὺς ἐπὶ κέρως πορευομένους λόχους εἰς μέτωπον ἰσχυρὸν ἐποιήσατο τὸ περὶ ἑαυτὸν ἔμβολον, τότε δὴ ἀναλαβεῖν παραγγείλας τὰ ὅπλα ἡγεῖτο: οἱ δ᾽ ἠκολούθουν. οἱ δὲ πολέμιοι ὡς εἶδον παρὰ δόξαν ἐπιόντας, οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν ἐδύνατο, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν ἔθεον εἰς τὰς τάξεις, οἱ δὲ παρετάττοντο, οἱ δὲ ἵππους ἐχαλίνουν, οἱ δὲ θώρακας ἐνεδύοντο, πάντες δὲ πεισομένοις τι μᾶλλον ἢ ποιήσουσιν ἐῴκεσαν.

This is done by paragoge, care to explain how this can possibly mean by half file insertion? Especially as the units are clearly described as moving by lochos, translated here as company. Looks like the son of Gryllos understands ‘paragogein’ in exactly the same way I do.

On the translations I posted the one from Perseus by Walter Miller which conforms to my interpretation II 3 xxi

And once he saw another captain leading his1 company up from the river left about in single file and ordering when he thought it was proper, the second division and then the third and the fourth to advance to the front; and when the lieutenants were in a row in front, he ordered each division to march up in double file. Thus the sergeants came to stand on the front line. Again, when he thought proper, he ordered the divisions to line up four abreast; in this formation, then, the corporals in their turn came to stand four abreast in each division; and when they arrived at the doors of the tent, he commanded them to fall into single file again, and in this order he led the first division into the tent; the second he ordered to fall in line behind the first and follow, and, giving orders in like manner to the third and fourth, he led them inside. And when he had thus led them all in, he gave them their places at dinner in the order in which they came in. Pleased with him for his gentleness of discipline and for his painstaking, Cyrus invited this company also with its captain to dinner

So much for the Fact(s).

Your next lengthy paragraph is again completely wrong. The fact that the 'pempadarch'/platoon sergeant fought alongside his 'Spartiate' officer in the front rank does not make for a 'leaky wall' any more than it would today. The four Spartan 'morai' would have numbered around 4,780, drawn up 6 deep for battle, or a frontage of 800 or so shields/yards - so we are all but agreed. The 4,000 or so Thebans, 25 deep in close order in their column would have numbered some 160 shields/yards, concentrated against the part of the line where Kleombrotos stood. That Mora would have had a frontage of 192 or so shields, plus perhaps another 25 shields/yards for the Hippeis. This would be consistent with Epaminondas' tactic of 'cutting off the snake's head'. On this much at least we agree. There is no rout, as I have previously demonstrated - how could there be if the Spartiates all fell "with their wounds to their front"??
( a 'topos' meaning no-one ran and was struck down from behind).

No sources or argumentation only assertion and incidentally doubling the Theban numbers too. The only statement of Theban strength is the 6,000 in the worthless account of Diodoros. Despite that it may not be far from the mark; Thebes had provided 2,000 hoplites to the Federal Army in the late fifth century and populations seem to be on the decline in the Fourth although Sparta is a very special case and should be discounted as the factors affecting the dwindling numbers of homoioi did not apply elsewhere. At the Nemea ten Athenian Tribes supply 6,000, Korinth 3,000 and Boeotia less Orchomenos, 5,000 as opposed to 8,000, 5,000 and Boeotia a putative 10,000 (according to Federal rules, but the Athenians ought to be 10,000 too). It has to be said that the situation was rather different too but one would expect a full levy from Korinth and the Spartan allies of whom the Sikyonians supply 1,500 as opposed to 3,000 and the Tegaians 1,200 against 1,500 (working from the fact that they faced four of the ten Athenian tribes (600 per tribe 16 deep = 150 files times eight is 1200). Xen Hell. IV 16ff. Making 4,000 for the left wing embolon in 371 somewhat hopeful.

[agesilaos]

To continue answering ‘minor points’

To adopt such a black and white position as you suggest would be folly. We do not discard all of Thucydides because he is demonstrably wrong about Mantinea. The fact that a source gets one, or even a few things wrong, is no reason to assume everything in that source is wrong.

More ‘strawmen’, not trusting something is different from dismissing it as wrong, but synonyms do seem to be a weak point lol. Once a source is questionable then one has to be careful about what one accepts and why (and that does actually mean all the sources as they are all fallible), the most suspect reason to accept an otherwise uncorroborated statement would be simply because it supports a personal theory and similarly it is the worst of practices to dismiss those that do not support a view whilst accepting those that do.

And just what "tactical innovation" would that be ?

That would be massing the best troops in depth on the left to face the enemy’s best troops, co-ordination with the cavalry, and the oblique advance protecting his weaker right. As for bias, I chose to be ‘Agesilaos’ not ‘Pelopidas’, I just don’t let my personal feelings obscure the facts (too much!).

Only the 'files in open order' hypothesis explains what happened at Nemea.

‘Only’ is such an unforgiving claim; just off the top of my head it is possible that the battle did not fill the plain, other than defended passes most hoplite battles were fought with at least one open flank and here there must have been two since the Spartan right marched at least 275yds to its right, and the Thebans about 100 to theirs, based on the Spartans being 12 deep and on a 3ft frontage and their allies 8 deep. Giving a line of 1590ys, the allies have 19000 hoplites 16 deep so 1190 yds without the Boeotians who add 100yds 50 deep or 200yds 25 deep; their line is still shorter, had the Boeotians lined up 16 deep their 312 yards would only leave the allies short by 90 yards or so, still a decisive shortfall as will be seen.

There is no reason why the Spartans themselves need not have formed up 8 deep (adding 250 yards to their line) or even six deep since their plan was, clearly, to deliberately out flank the allied left, which would add 500 yards.

We are told that the Spartans only faced six of the Athenian taxeis; crunch the numbers and this is 225 files making the Spartan overlap 275 yards if 12 deep, 525 if 8 deep and 775 yards if six deep. Taking the smallest overlap and working back on the allied side there were 150 files of Athenians left and another 812 of the other allies excepting the Boeotians which gives a line of 962 files facing the 1090yards of the Spartan allies, we know that the Boeotians outflanked the Spartan left so their frontage must be greater than the 128 yards the Spartan line has over the allied, so a depth of 25 and an overlap of 70 yards.

The salient factor in the battle, however is the brushy terrain, or more probably standing crops. We are told that the Spartans did not observe the Allied advance but only learned of it when they raised the Paian (a major factor in their defeat, otherwise they may have struck the Spartans unprepared). I would suggest that he Spartan camp may have been 400 yards or so outside a thick belt of cultivation; they had advanced when they sacrificed with the enemy 200 yards (1 stade) away, and presumably visible, (how else would they know they were a stade away?). Battle was now joined and the Spartans plunged into the crops after the fleeing Athenians and having routed them moved onto a facing 90 degrees to their original. As they move forward they hear the Argives returning and the Polemarch prepares to line up opposing them until advice from the ranks makes him halt in the cover and allow the enemy to pass exposing their unshielded flank which he strikes. I cannot see this being possible unless the Argives could not see the Spartans, similarly as the Spartans swept into the flank of each returning mob of allies.

So, whilst the son of Gryllos blames the Boeotians for going deep and leading off to the right, the defeat is actually more to do with the Spartan manoeuvre, and, it has to be said their willingness to sacrifice their allies! From then on it was Spartan training against disordered militia. The situation is similar to that at Naseby, when the Royalist cavalry once successful went after the baggage whilst the newly trained Parliamentarian horse under Cromwell, defeated their opposite numbers but remained on the battlefield to play the decisive role. So the disparity in training and, quite probably levels of officering played a factor, preventing the victorious allies being able to maintain their formation, or even regain it after their pursuit.

Adopting a depth of sixteen did shorten the line, but equally the allies broke the Spartan allies without much trouble; the trouble was they ended up hardly facing the Spartans at all.

Neither flank can have been ‘anchored’ as both armies had space to march to the right. It comes down to how open you decide the flanks were; the terrain seems to have been unsuitable for cavalry, as neither force appears in the account of the battle, nor is the allied horse found covering their retreat nor exploiting their success, similarly for the Spartans. Naturally I would say that the larger frontage necessitated by the ‘parembole hypothesis’, 3,324 yards out of maybe 3,500 seems a bit tight especially when one considers that the ground was clearly thick with vegetation, unlikely both by the shore and foothills. The sea level was also higher by 90cms according to the Paleogeographic study of the Gulf of Corinth. (link to be edited in). It is difficult to say how much this would have affected things, so I’ll ignore it.

[agesilaos]

Just a note on the 'ef hex/ephexes' emendation Clarendon's commentary by Underhill 1908 available here openlibrary.org/works/OL687222W/Hellenica, seems to confirm that the reason for the change was to supply a contrast.

[Xenophon]

Just a note on the 'ef hex/ephexes' emendation Clarendon's commentary by Underhill 1908 available here openlibrary.org/works/OL687222W/Hellenica, seems to confirm that the reason for the change was to supply a contrast.

It is pleasing that by co-operation between us we have resolved a minor textual emendation error,due mostly to Agesilaos' diligence in tracking down its source, even if it removes one small piece of passing corroborative evidence !!

Of course this does not affect the issues here of file/half-file deployment for hoplites, given the specific positive evidence in Xenophon's works and other evidence.

[Xenophon]

Agesilaos wrote:

There is something amiss with the idea that the Spartan army remained for weeks in Boeotia threatening Thebes. Xenophon supplies some facts;

1) A messenger was sent to Sparta after the bodies had been recovered under a truce and he arrived during the last day of the Gymnopaedia and there was a days delay while the news was communicated VI 4 xvi.
2) The Thebans sent both to Athens and Jason of Pherai who was in Phokis VI 4 xxi
3) That the Spartans sneaked away from Leuktra as soon as Jason had established a further Truce, VI 4 xxv
4) The troops sent from Sparta met the defeated at Aegosthena near Megara, VI 4 xxvi

An excellent idea of Agesilaos, to make at least a rough estimate of how long the Lacedaemonian army likely remained in Boeotia, still threatening Thebes.

Before doing so, we need to make a few minor corrections.

2) The desperate Thebans firstly sent to Athens, where they were spurned. Only subsequent to their embassy's return did they send to Jason,([XH VI.4.20] "The Thebans now sent in all haste to their ally Jason...") who was evidently not in Phocis, but north of it, or perhaps in the border districts[XH VI.4.21] "... in fact he took his mercenary force and his bodyguard of cavalry and, although the Phocians were engaged in a bitter warfare against him, proceeded by land through their country into Boeotia, appearing in many of their towns before it was reported to them that he was on the march. At any rate, before they could gather troops together ...”

Had he been in central Phocis, for example, then all the cities would have long since been mobilised.

3) The Spartans did not "sneak away", they simply took the standard precautions when breaking off from an enemy - see my earlier comments on Gallipoli, Col Munro at Ticonderoga etc. To do otherwise would have been military folly.

We can add a few more facts from Googlemaps;

1) The distance from Sparta to Megara is 75 miles

I make the distance Sparta to Aegosthena, just south of the Cithaeron range, using an ancient Greece overlay on Google Earth to be about 140 to 150 miles/225 to 240 kilometres aprox.

2) That from Leuktra to Megara is 58 miles

Similarly I make Leuktra to Aegosthena in the territory of Megara 12-15 miles/19-24 km aprox, via the Cithaeron pass which we are told the Lacedaemonians took.

The distance from Thebes to Athens is 43 miles/70 km aprox. A messenger on horseback, without relays of horses ( no Persian Royal Road here ! ) could expect to cover 20-30 miles per day. A specially trained horse perhaps 50 miles or more a day.

Thus the messenger had to travel 128 miles, let us say a two day trip. The force under Archidamos has to cover 75 miles which could be covered in two days but we would be safer to allow three and add a day for the gathering of the troops, so six days.

The defeated Spartans had to travel 58 miles or two days’ march. It would seem that they ‘threatened Thebes’ from behind their palisade for a full four days! Time enough for Jason’s lightning march across Phokis and a day’s negotiation.

We can now refine Agesilaos’ estimates somewhat. First the embassy to Athens. In view of the urgency, we may allow perhaps just one day to get the 43 miles to Athens. The messenger was immediately rebuffed by the Athenian Council (XH VI.4.19) and left. His return journey on a tired horse we may allow 2 days for. A messenger was then despatched to Jason for which we should allow at least 2 days to cross Phocis, some 75 miles or more roughly. He then undertook a forced march across Phocis back to Thebes, which would have taken something like 3 days, assuming no time taken to prepare for the march. He then negotiated a truce between Boeotians and Lacedaemonians which probably took at least two days. So the minimum time the Lacedaemonians remained in their camp was 10 days, or more likely a little longer.

Meanwhile, a messenger went to Sparta, about 150-160 miles via the safer central route down the Peloponnese ( avoiding dangerous Argos and the shorter coastal route) – 3 to 4 days, plus a day or two to mobilise and prepare the army. Archidamus then marched by the central route, picking up Tegean and Mantinean allies on the way, and assuming forced march rates, could have reached Aegosthena, (roughly 140 -150 miles) in 4 or 5 days – which again comes to about 10 days minimum. There, the two Lacedaemonian armies rendezvoused, the encamped army having marched 12-15 miles over the range by night.

One should also note that the Spartans sneaked away without their allies for whom they have to wait at Megara VI 4 xxvi.

[/quote]

I fear Agesilaos has rather misread Xenophon. The Polemarchs ordered that “....all troops should have their baggage packed..” and it was the whole army which headed off on their night march, which would have seen them at Aegosthena some 12-15 miles over the mountains next morning. The allies for whom Archidamus waited were other Peloponnesian allies who weren’t picked up on the forced march, and were following on (XH VI.4.18). Once the whole army was together, Archidamus returned via Corinth, where he disbanded the allies for that season, and returned home.

And what of Epaminondas and the Boeotian army during this ten days or more ? They did not dare attack the Lacedaemonians until Jason arrived, and evidently felt they could not do so without his help. Nor did they surround the Spartan camp, or interdict their lines of communications, for messengers came and went and probably supplies too. They may have retired to Thebes, but more probably stayed in their camp at Leuktra, in their “Mexican stand-off” with the Lakedaemonians for the next 10 days minimum,or more likely a little longer. They clearly dared not take any offensive action, beyond guarding the route to Thebes, a wholly defensive act. Once Jason’s truce was in place, they took no further action whatever, but went home.

Clearly Leuktra was a classic “indecisive” battle in a military sense, despite the efforts of some historians to paint it otherwise, with both armies back home, and the 'status quo' unchanged.

And next season ? Anti-Spartan factions took control of some of the Arcadian cities, and asserted their independence. Naturally they appealed for help to Thebes. King Agesilaos took the field, and campaigned well into the following mid-winter, grimly hoping Epaminondas and his Boeotians would answer Arcadian pleas and give him a chance to avenge Leuktra. The Thebans timidly waited until Agesilaos returned home before poking their noses into the Peoloponnese.....evidently they didn't think they had won a 'decisive victory'.

[Paralus]

An excellent idea of Agesilaos, to make at least a rough estimate of how long the Lacedaemonian army likely remained in Boeotia, still threatening Thebes.

The forum name is clearly well chosen: read one Xenophon, read 'em all. This - "the Lacedaemonian army likely remained in Boeotia, still threatening Thebes" - is something of a religious mantra. The argument is based solely on a description of the Theban forces who are painted as being thoroughly incontinent at the prospect of their defeated foe. Secondly we are treated to the picture of these same incontinent Thebans sending "desperately" to both Athens and Jason of Pherai for aid against these encamped and resolute Spartans. One wonders just how these timid creatures managed to win Leuktra and give the Spartans a caning in the process!

Unsaid is the fact that the Spartans - utterly defeated as the realists amongst them recognised - sat squat within their encampment and moved not one inch whilst "threatening" Thebes. Unmentioned by Xenophon of Brisvegas is the fact that these Thebans were outnumbered somewhat severely. The only figures we have for the armies are 11,000 for the Spartans and 6,000 for the Boeotians (Plut. Pel. 20.1; Diod. 15.52.2). These two sources have already been marginalised as 'pro-Theban' (and if that is so, Xenophon reads as "sir the dog ate my hoplites") but there is nothing in those figures to really question. Spartan armies sent to Boeotia in the immediate years prior this campaign number 18,000 or so (Diod. 15.32.1; 34.1). As for Thebes, this was a full citizen levy and those Boeotian allies still with her.

Which brings us to the next point. Agesilaos had played his hand well. In the discussions over the peace between Sparta and the Athenian Confederacy, Agesilaos had neatly isolated Thebes. After Athens renounced war and agreed, Thebes was utterly alone; her former ally (along with her confederacy) now on the sidelines. Agesilaos and Sparta expected that this would be a decimation of the hated Thebes. As it turned out, Thebes won and, in the process, dealt the Spartan core of the army a fearful belting. The surprise of the 'backs against the wall' victory is palpable.The Theban command, in receipt of a request for a truce to collect the dead, can only have expected that the Spartans will have sent to Sparta for aid / advice as well. Their first thought is to send to Athens - that flighty, erstwhile ally - to restore the former alliance. Athens, only too well aware that a dominant Thebes was not a welcome prospect, declined any interest. Their second was to send to Jason to ask for alliance against the Spartans. If there were to be further campaigning - especially with expected reinforcements from the Peloponnese, alliances were crucial: Thebes could not carry such a war alone (Philip did no such thing either decades later).

As for Thebes' supposed craven indolence in waiting "until Agesilaos returned home before poking their noses into the Peoloponnese" this, as Xenophon of Brisvegas would say, is to utterly ignore the military and political realities. Thebes, having just fought a battle for its existence, was in no position to invade the Peloponnese. Such an invasion could never take place until Thebes had an ironclad alliance in place that would supply the necessary manpower. As just explained, she did not possess that manpower on her own. That would be the purview of Epameinondas in the aftermath.

Whatever else might be said, the disasters that enveloped Sparta over the following few years can all be laid at the door of Leuktra. There could be no decent land alliance and grand campaign against Sparta without it. This was no mora defeated by Iphikrates' peltasts nor was it Shpacteria. This was a comprehensive and catestrophic defeat of homoioi arms in pitched battle. It was, for Sparta, the Titanic's iceberg: the SS Lakadaemonia ,while still afloat, was on severely limited time and its allied passengers were inevitably abandoning ship.

[agesilaos]

Paralus has dealt with the Rhetorical flourishes, so I can concentrate on the actual argument in a spirit of co-operative enquiry. First I have to confess to a massive cock up, the distance from Sparti to Aigosthena is 203 km which is 126 miles ( I use the ‘Get Directions’ app on Google maps set to pedestrian to get these distances) let’s just set some down
1) Thisvi – Aliki 16km/10miles (Thisbae – Kreusis)
2) Aliki – Leuktry 21km /13 miles
3) Leuktry - Athens 76 km/47 miles
4) Leuktry – Sparti 239 km/148 miles
5) Sparti – Aigosthena 203 km/126 miles
6) Sparti – Marathonas 260 km/162 miles
The one missing distance is from Kreusis to Aigosthena and with good reason. There is no pass available to move to Aigosthena from Aliki (nor Paralia Livadostratas, which is where some maps locate Kreusis but this lacks any route to Thisvi whence Kleombrotos moved on Kreusis). Xenophon tells us that the Spartans returned to Kreusis (VI 4 xxv). As both Kreusis and Aigosthena are ports 13 miles apart by sea. Kleombrotos had captured twelve triereis and these may have been used to ferry the army to Aigosthena.

Twelve ships could only carry 600 men, though, which on my figures would make three trips (4 morai at 600 plus 300 hippeis minus 1,000 battle losses) with 50 men per ship. The round trip @ 5mph would take about five hours, so the Spartan contingent could be shipped out in a day (two if you want larger numbers), the allies would have to wait or trust the truce and march.

Another factor to consider in whether the whole army decamped at nightfall or just the Lakedaimonians, is the length of time it would take for extracastrementation and the length of the marching column.

1) Spartans alone @ 1700 on a four cubit interval and four abreast (they were retracing a mountainous route unlikely to allow a wider frontage) 850 metres. Allowing a march rate of 2mph (we are told they moved off in the dark, in fear and by a difficult road; Xenophon seems to make this the road to Aigosthena from Kreusis but there is no such road), the tail would be 16 minutes from the head of the column and the whole could reach Kreusis by daybreak
2) If they were 4,400, 2.2 km the length of the column is now 41 minutes.
3) The whole army, assuming 9,000 would stretch for 4.5 km and be 1 and a half hours long
4) None of these include servants who might double the lengths

I remain to be convinced that when Xenophon describes Archidamus as waiting for all the allies to assemble he means those due to join the new expedition. The relevant states all lay en route viz

And the Tegeans served with him zealously; for the followers of Stasippus were still alive, who were favourable to the Lacedaemonians and had no slight power in their own state. Likewise the Mantineans from their villages1 supported him2 stoutly; for they chanced to be under an aristocratic government. Furthermore, the Corinthians, Sicyonians, Phliasians, and Achaeans followed him with all zeal, and other states also sent out soldiers. And the Tegeans served with him zealously; for the followers of Stasippus were still alive, who were favourable to the Lacedaemonians and had no slight power in their own state. Likewise the Mantineans from their villages supported him stoutly; for they chanced to be under an aristocratic government. Furthermore, the Corinthians, Sicyonians, Phliasians, and Achaeans followed him with all zeal, and other states also sent out soldiers. IV 4 xviii

The passage concerning the sending of an embassy to Jason reads

But to Jason, who was their ally, the Thebans sent in haste, urging him to come to their aid; for they were debating among themselves how the future would turn out.
πρὸς μέντοι Ἰάσονα, σύμμαχον ὄντα, ἔπεμπον σπουδῇ οἱ Θηβαῖοι, κελεύοντες βοηθεῖν, διαλογιζόμενοι πῇ τὸ μέλλον ἀποβήσοιτο.

The word you have as ‘Now’ is μέντοι which means ‘indeed, however or to be sure’, which, since they sent to him in all haste would make both embassies leave at the same time.

This makes the mission to Athens less important to the timings; two days to get to Jason seems fine but if his forced march only proceeds at 25 miles a day he is hardly busting a gut, assuming you still believe an average march was 21 miles. I would think two days again would be nearer the mark, he has a small professional force and he traversed Phokis before they could muster (I agree he must have been on the border). I see no reason for the Truce not to have been concluded in a day, neither side was strong enough to be keen on renewed fighting.

Pausanias IX 14 i has

After the battle Epaminondas for a while, having proclaimed that the other Peloponnesians should depart home, kept the Lacedaemonians cooped up in Leuctra. But when reports came that the Spartans in the city were marching to a man to the help of their countrymen at Leuctra, Epaminondas allowed his enemy to depart under a truce, saying that it would be better for the Boeotians to shift the war from Boeotia to Lacedaemon.

It may be that the allies were no longer present when the Truce was settled. That the orders to be prepared to march were given by the polemarchs at dinner and were changed at short notice may point to the Spartans alone being involved, the allies would be unlikely to dine with their masters, I think and I am sure the camps were separate (though that may be a dream).

There may only be five days before the Spartans withdrew, then and one for them to either be shipped to Aigosthena or march along a coastal track. Can the six days fit with the relief expedition.

The messenger bearing the sad tidings has 148 miles to travel, two and a half days at 60 miles per day, unlike the Theban he would be able to exchange mounts as he would have been a Spartan officer. The mustering of the army need not have taken longer than a day; the Spartan troops were already gathered for the Gymnopaedia, messengers would be sent to the allies to muster en route as soon as the decision to move had been taken, the army could move on the morning of the fourth day after the battle and march the 126 miles to Aigosthena in three days; the Spartan army had marched the 160 miles to Marathon in that time and this was a similar emergency.

…given the specific positive evidence in Xenophon's works and other evidence.

Almost slipped through; as has been stated repeatedly Xenophon provides no evidence for ‘half-file deployment’, as you have stated he never uses the word for this, ‘parembole’. That you cannot accept that ‘paragogein’ means something different does not make it evidence of anything 9other than the believe that Faith can change a language.)

[Xenophon]

Well here I am, over a page behind, and being 'double teamed' by Paralus and Agesilaos ( as usual). More tens of thousands of words to try and respond to.....Still, as Agesilaos said; a bad opinion held by a majority is still a bad opinion, and all the verbosity in the world will not make it good. Moreover neither of these allies has so far put up a convincing case for an alternative to the system of a hoplite phalanx forming files generally, but closing up to half-files to fight, apparent from the works of Xenophon. ( sigh! Once more unto the breach dear friends.....)

It is clear that the Spartan army did little 'threatening' at all whilst a runner was sent to the ehpors. Equally clear is that the Spartans could not trust in those allies present with them who, as Xenophon notes, were having discourse with the Thebans. They could not fight and they could not leave hoping that the allies would stand by them. Thus, on conclusion of the truce, the Spartans decamp as soon as it is dark - allies or not - and head home shields between legs.

I don't think this is correct, certainly if you are referring to the immediate aftermath of Leuktra. I cannot find a reference to any of the Spartan allies "having discourse with the Thebans." It will be remembered that many of the surviving Spartans were in favour of renewing the battle, but XH VI.4.15 goes on to say : "....perceiving that the allies were one and all without heart for fighting, while some of them were not even displeased at what had taken place...." and the Spartans then formally conceded the battle by asking for the return of their dead. No mention of any discourse with the Thebans, and despite their demoralisation caused by the death of Kleombrotus and so many Spartiatae, the allies and mercenaries remained disciplined and under orders.

Furthermore, your military naivete is showing again if you think having an intact Lacedaemonian army outnumbering yours camped on your doorstep some 10 miles from Thebes isn't "threatening". Its mere existence is a threat, even if it was licking some severe wounds. Some might think that made the beast all the more dangerous. The Boeotarchs wouldn't agree with you, as their immediate attempts to summon allies shows.

Whence comes this idea of the two of you that the Lacedaemonians somehow separated from their allies and mercenaries ?

Oh, and its a bit rich accusing me of making 'rhetorical flourishes when you use expressions such as "and head home shields between legs"

The ancient Xenophon's account of Leuktra is most unsatisfying. For the greater part it is a list of excuses for the catastrophic defeat in the field of Spartan arms. These excuses range from the drinking of Kleombrodos - who had to be talked into fighting - and his officers; the baggage handlers being forced (by the Spartans!!) to add "mass" to the Theban army (!); the weakness of the Spartan cavalry; the disposition of the Spartan infantry resulting "in the phalanx being not more than twelve men deep" whilst the Thebans were at least fifty deep and, finally, sheer outrageous fortune. Eveything went in Thebes' favour and everything against Sparta. Xenophon could not bring himself to describe the military innovation which destroyed the Spartan myth nor even to name the two Thebans involved. Far better to excuse than to expound.

I do not consider Xenophon's account a "list of excuses". That the hitherto invincible Spartiates/Homioi were defeated, and with such heavy casualties, required some explaining. Furthermore, without it we would have pretty much only secondary tales based on Theban propaganda. Xenophon seeks to explain the "why" of the astonishing defeat and expounds on this, and his account makes considerable sense. As he rightly says; "But in the battle, at any rate, everything turned out badly for the Lacedaemonians, while for the other side everything went prosperously, even to the gifts of fortune/luck."

The weakness of the Spartan cavalry, and their being driven back through their own phalanx, thus disordering it, was a factor. So was the attempt to outflank the Theban column, which went wrong. So was the mortal wounding of Kleombrotus. The depth of twelve was not a factor - indeed Xenophon expounds what should have happened to the Theban column when it was outflanked in his Cyropaedia. The point about the civilians being driven back to the camp by the Lacedaemonian allies and peltasts is valid too, for skulking among them were "others who did not want to fight" i.e. deserting soldiers, now forced back into the ranks. The 'military innovation' credited to Epaminondas - the massed column and oblique attack was not an innovation at all - both had been seen on Greek battlefields before.

The real innovation was the deliberate attempt to "cut off the head of the snake" [Polyainos II.3.15]. Rather than fight a conventional battle, a deliberate assault on the Spartan command group was to be attempted, to which end the Thebans unusually posted themselves on the left. This tactic worked brilliantly, thanks to some fortunate elements such as the disordering of the Spartan phalanx, and Pelopidas' initiative in attacking before the Spartans could complete their outflanking manouevre.

As to Xenophon not naming Epaminondas and Pelopidas, it is unlikely that his Spartan sources knew of them. Epaminondas was officially just one of the seven Boeotarchs in command, and Pelopidas merely the junior commander of the "Hieros Lochos". ( Xenophon doesn't mention the junior commander of the "Hippeis" either, nor the commanders of the four Spartan "Morai", save those who fell.)

Agesilaos had isolated Thebes on the battlefield: no allies outside of the Boeotian confederation. He expected the Spartan army to crush them. In the event, the Spartan army itself was crushed and the blame, inevitably, must fall on Kleombrotos the wine drinker and Theban lover who had to be convinced to fight.

More correctly, no allies among the signatories to the "King's Peace" - Jason of Pherae in Thessaly is specifically called an (existing) ally of Thebes [XH VI.4.20].
The Lacedaemonian army was not "crushed" - it suffered less than a 1,000 casualties overall, a light "butcher's bill" for a major battle. It continued as a dangerous 'threat-in-being', and its demoralisation could only be temporary.It could and did recover.
And who else could be held responsible for the defeat, other than Kleombrotus ? Though I'll grant you that some of the blame must lie with Agesilaos. Kleombrotus' weakness as a commander was known, and in addition, according to Plutarch 'Agesilaos' 28, it was he who insisted on not recalling Kleombrotus from Phocis.

[Xenophon]

I had no doubt that you would not accept any culpability but then you have to go on with an accusation of ‘special pleading’ ecce homo.

Is Pilate's "behold the man" meant to refer to you or me ??

But since I have a thick old hide I’ll waste no time bickering over that and address the point you think you have made, though I very much doubt it will meet with any great success.

You don't need a thick old hide....I may disagree with your arguments, and oppose them, but you should have noticed by now that I never attack the person.

Oh really? Let us look at a relevant situation where we have two different words that mean much the same. In Aelian 31.1 we have 'parembole' to describe the rear half-file 'interjecting' between the files by closing up. At 31.3 we have 'entaxis'/insertion to describe troops moving up alongside the files in exactly the same way - only this time it is light infantry infiltrating the files. Two different words to describe essentially the same thing, with a minor difference.

The differences are quite important, the one is the much vaunted insertion of half files, the other, ‘entaxis’ the insertion of whole files or even double files of light infantry, something with which we never hear in the histories, in fact the word is confined to Aelian’s and Arrian’s (26 vi) Taktikeis, which both distinguish it from ‘parembole’, otherwise I can find only a non-military use in Ptolemy’s ‘Geography’ II 1 vii. The logic of your argument would allow these terms to be interchangeable which they clearly are not.

Your obsession with insisting that only 'parembole'/interjection can be used to describe a half-file closing up is beginning to smack of wilful blindness. I have explained matters a number of times. Xenophon chooses to use 'paragon'/leading up beside to describe the 'pempadarch' leading up the half-file. He also uses this word to describe leading up the 'lochoi' beside one another, and then the files, yet you don't cavil with Xenophon's meaning those two instances in the same passage.( see my earlier diagram on page 1). Xenophon is consistent with the terminology he chooses to use. Furthermore you are in a minority of one when it comes to translation of this passage.

I do NOT, as I have repeatedly said, regard these terms as synonyms. They can be different ways to describe a similar action though - all languages have a number of ways to describe a particular thing.The meaning of 'paragon'/leading up by the side or beside, and its variants in the context of [XC II.3.21] is perfectly clear and most assuredly not as per your assertions.

Ironically, in a different context, 'paragon' can also mean : "leading astray, misleading, false argument, quibble....." which I fear applies to the denial of its other meaning in the context of the 'dinner drill'.

Let us look at the facts:

1. Xenophon simply never uses the word 'parembole'

2. He uses 'paragon' and its variations many times, which means 'bring up by the side' (of), leading by, and deploying from column into line.'He simply prefers to say, "leading up by the side"/paragon rather than "interject"/parembole, or even "entaxis" insert. All these words describe troops moving up in file into the intervals between existing files.

3. All translations of the relevant part of the "Cyropaedia' ( see my diagram) that I can find agree this meaning ( except Agesilaos )

Well there is one fact there, Xenophon certainly never uses ‘parembole’. ‘Leading up by the side’ and ‘interjection’ are simply not synonyms, as is demonstrated by Polybios, nor do ‘All these words describe troops moving up in file into the intervals between existing files.’

All three facts are perfectly correct. I have never suggested that the expressions were synonyms - that is a 'straw man' you have set up. What I said was that in context, all these expressions could be applied to files or half-files moving up between, or alongside others. ( I have been at pains to emphasise context throughout)

This is done by paragoge, care to explain how this can possibly mean by half file insertion? Especially as the units are clearly described as moving by lochos, translated here as company. Looks like the son of Gryllos understands ‘paragogein’ in exactly the same way I do.

Aaaa...rr...gh!
For the last time, I have never said that 'paragon' is limited to half-file insertion, but it can be used to describe the leading up of lochoi, or files, or half-files ( for the 'n'th time, see my diagram back on page 1 ) Lochoi can be led up beside one another/paragoge, and indeed Xenophon uses the word in just this way in the 'dinner drill' as well [XC II.3.21]. He also uses the same expression to describe the 'pempadarchs' leading up half-files.

Nor do I think the son of Gryllus would agree your limited meaning of the word.

On the translations I posted the one from Perseus by Walter Miller which conforms to my interpretation II 3 xxi

And once he saw another captain leading his1 company up from the river left about in single file and ordering when he thought it was proper, the second division and then the third and the fourth to advance to the front; and when the lieutenants were in a row in front, he ordered each division to march up in double file. Thus the sergeants came to stand on the front line. Again, when he thought proper, he ordered the divisions to line up four abreast; in this formation, then, the corporals in their turn came to stand four abreast in each division;

Fortunately for you, this is not the translation you used for your diagram, for this one is incorrect!! At no point does the Greek say "four abreast". You used a correct translation back on page 1 for your diagram:

In the final expansion we have
ὁπότε δ᾽ αὖ ἐδόκει αὐτῷ καιρὸς εἶναι, παρήγγειλεν εἰς τέτταρας τὸν λόχον: οὕτω δὴ οἱ πεμπάδαρχοι αὖ παρῆγον εἰς τέτταρας:
then, when he reckoned the space sufficient, he ordered each lochos to form four [files]:and in this [formation] the pempadarchs came by the flank to form four [files];

"led up by the side to form fours" as we both used is correct.

So much for the Fact(s).

...indeed! Mine, it seems, are quite correct.

Your next lengthy paragraph is again completely wrong. The fact that the 'pempadarch'/platoon sergeant fought alongside his 'Spartiate' officer in the front rank does not make for a 'leaky wall' any more than it would today. The four Spartan 'morai' would have numbered around 4,780, drawn up 6 deep for battle, or a frontage of 800 or so shields/yards - so we are all but agreed. The 4,000 or so Thebans, 25 deep in close order in their column would have numbered some 160 shields/yards, concentrated against the part of the line where Kleombrotos stood. That Mora would have had a frontage of 192 or so shields, plus perhaps another 25 shields/yards for the Hippeis. This would be consistent with Epaminondas' tactic of 'cutting off the snake's head'. On this much at least we agree. There is no rout, as I have previously demonstrated - how could there be if the Spartiates all fell "with their wounds to their front"??
( a 'topos' meaning no-one ran and was struck down from behind).

No sources or argumentation only assertion and incidentally doubling the Theban numbers too. The only statement of Theban strength is the 6,000 in the worthless account of Diodoros. Despite that it may not be far from the mark; Thebes had provided 2,000 hoplites to the Federal Army in the late fifth century and populations seem to be on the decline in the Fourth although Sparta is a very special case and should be discounted as the factors affecting the dwindling numbers of homoioi did not apply elsewhere. At the Nemea ten Athenian Tribes supply 6,000, Korinth 3,000 and Boeotia less Orchomenos, 5,000 as opposed to 8,000, 5,000 and Boeotia a putative 10,000 (according to Federal rules, but the Athenians ought to be 10,000 too). It has to be said that the situation was rather different too but one would expect a full levy from Korinth and the Spartan allies of whom the Sikyonians supply 1,500 as opposed to 3,000 and the Tegaians 1,200 against 1,500 (working from the fact that they faced four of the ten Athenian tribes (600 per tribe 16 deep = 150 files times eight is 1200). Xen Hell. IV 16ff. Making 4,000 for the left wing embolon in 371 somewhat hopeful.

[/quote]

This was in part for brevity, in part to avoid diving off into yet another digression, and partly because I thought you would be familiar with the reasoning behind the estimated numbers, which are not just mine. We are simply not given numbers in our primary sources, and about the only thing secondary sources agree on is that the Boeotians were outnumbered.
We must therefore resort to estimates. In her 'hour of peril' we should expect Thebes to put up a 'maximum effort'. At
the Nemea the Boeotians, less Orchomenus, had fielded some 5,000 hoplites [XH IV.2.17] and at the last major battle between the two - Koroneia in 394 BC, some 23 years before - an estimated 6,000 under 6 Boeotarchs. [Diod XV.53.2] It looks, then, as if a 'Boeotarchy' ( yes, I just made that term up, for convenience ! ), like an Athenian 'Taxis' normally numbered about a thousand hoplites, but like the 'Taxis' could be considerably more if the 'senior' age groups were called up, as here [Diod XV.52.2.]. I'd agree with you that Diodorus' 6,000 Theban hoplites who march from the city is certainly possible and plausible.

At Leuktra the six Boeotarchs were joined by a seventh ( Bachkylidas; Diod XV.53.3; Paus IX.13.3) recalled from guarding a pass. The most conservative estimate for the Boeotian army would therefore be 7,000 hoplites. Three of these 'Boeotarchies' would likely have come from the other three Federal units of the league, leaving the remaining four from Thebes itself, thus conservatively at least 4,000 Theban hoplites, and maybe 6,000.[Frontinus gives 4,000 Boeotians, which may reflect the actual Theban numbers]

Whilst on the subject of numbers we might as well have a stab at guessing Lakedaimonian numbers too. There were four 'Morai' present, numbering some 4,480 hoplites plus probably the 300 'Hippeis'.( I don't propose to digress into why the 'Mora' were this number here) and some 4-500 cavalry. There were also mercenaries, Phokian peltasts, some Arcadians [Paus VIII.6.2] and troops including cavalry from Phlious and Heraklea. If these made up the customary "levy of the allies" i.e. two thirds, then we have something under 5,000 Spartans, some 3,000 allies plus mercenaries. This is consistent with Plutarch's totals of 10,000 plus 1,000 cavalry for the Lakedaemonian army, and them outnumbering the Boeotians ( 7-9,000 plus light troops and perhaps 700 cavalry ).

[agesilaos]

‘All these words describe troops moving up in file into the intervals between existing files.’

And yet

I have never suggested that the expressions were synonyms

I had always thought that words describing the same movement were synonyms; but just how similar are they?


Judge for yourselves

Insertion of files

PAREMBOLE.jpg (70.95 KiB) Viewed 6486 times

moving onto the side

PARAGOGE.jpg (98.01 KiB) Viewed 6486 times

Not particularly similar; it is only Xenophon's fantasy organisation that makes them seem possibly similar; where there are only two subunits (dekades) then clearly one will move passed the next one, but this leaves two sub-unit abreast ready for the next evolution and they

Epameinondas, having conscripted for the battle all Thebans of military age and the other Boeotians who were willing and qualified, led forth from Thebes his army, numbering in all not more than six thousand. Diodoros XV 51 ii

Not solely a Theban levy then, but an army total of 6,000. Again, that there were twice the number of Spartans is crucial in your attempt to minimize the proportionate casualties but it is a digression to establish this, against the evidence of Xenophon it has to be said.

Even if you want to add 2,000 old codgers and striplings they are irrelevant as only the left wing embolon fought and that was composed of the best troops in the army, so they would have been with the unengaged centre and right.

There is no direct statement that the allies encamped separately but cf VI 4 xxiv

With such words, then, he endeavoured to dissuade the Thebans from making the final venture; to the Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, he pointed out what manner of thing a defeated army was, and what an army victorious. “And if you wish,” he said, “to forget the disaster which has befallen you, I advise you first to recover your breath and rest yourselves, and then, after you have become stronger, go into battle against men who are unconquered. But now,” he said, “be well assured that even among your allies there are those who are holding converse1 with the enemy about a treaty of friendship with them; by all means, then, try to obtain a truce. And I am myself eager for this,” he said, “out of a desire to save you, both because of my father's friendship with you and because I am your diplomatic agent.”

It is hard to see how the allies could be treating with the enemy and the Spartans not notice if they were all in one camp.

[Paralus]

Moreover neither of these allies has so far put up a convincing case for an alternative to the system of a hoplite phalanx forming files generally, but closing up to half-files to fight, apparent from the works of Xenophon. ( sigh! Once more unto the breach dear friends.....)

I've proposed a 'system'. In the absence of anyone proposing an alternative system, the 'system' is 'proved'. That the 'system' is, though, based on evidence in dispute.

I don't think this is correct, certainly if you are referring to the immediate aftermath of Leuktra. I cannot find a reference to any of the Spartan allies "having discourse with the Thebans."

Then you need to read the text of Xenophon a little closer (6.4.24 - Jason of Pherae):

And know too that some of your allies are at this moment discussing treaties of friendship with your enemies.

It will be remembered that many of the surviving Spartans were in favour of renewing the battle, but XH VI.4.15 goes on to say : "....perceiving that the allies were one and all without heart for fighting, while some of them were not even displeased at what had taken place...." and the Spartans then formally conceded the battle by asking for the return of their dead. No mention of any discourse with the Thebans, and despite their demoralisation caused by the death of Kleombrotus and so many Spartiatae, the allies and mercenaries remained disciplined and under orders.

Oh dear. See above regarding the "discourse". "Many" of the surviving Spartans? I believe it is actually "some". But let's not quibble because the "many" were quickly silenced by the surviving polemarchs who saw that "nearly a thousand of the Spartans had died, which included about four hundred homoioi..."

Furthermore, your military naivete is showing again if you think having an intact Lacedaemonian army outnumbering yours camped on your doorstep some 10 miles from Thebes isn't "threatening". Its mere existence is a threat, even if it was licking some severe wounds. Some might think that made the beast all the more dangerous. The Boeotarchs wouldn't agree with you, as their immediate attempts to summon allies shows.

Yet again - to your convenience or, perhaps, naivete - you ignore the wider political picture. Thebes, shorn of all allies, had just fought and, surprisingly, won a battle for survival. This was no offensive campaign; it was a battle of defense against a numerically superior invader. Your entire view is that the initiative was constantly with the Thebans; that they should always be doing something. This is absolutely incorrect. It was a defensive battle in the face of an invading army well in excess of Thebes' numbers. More in terms of Artemesion or Marathon.

I do not consider Xenophon's account a "list of excuses". That the hitherto invincible Spartiates/Homioi were defeated, and with such heavy casualties, required some explaining. Furthermore, without it we would have pretty much only secondary tales based on Theban propaganda. Xenophon seeks to explain the "why" of the astonishing defeat and expounds on this, and his account makes considerable sense. As he rightly says; "But in the battle, at any rate, everything turned out badly for the Lacedaemonians, while for the other side everything went prosperously, even to the gifts of fortune/luck."

Oh dear II. Of course it is a list of excuses. It is, as I wrote, "the Thebans ate my hoplites miss". In a purely military or tactical sense, Xenophon is utterly uninterested in the reasons for the Spartan catastrophe. He is far more interested in the wine consumption of Kleombrotos and his officers and the turns of outrageous fortune that so sunk his heroes rather than the tactics that won the battle. Yes Xenophon 'explains' the 'why' and that explanation is little more than excuses. He does not care to closely examine the seminal battle of his time and his account shows this. His information is utterly Spartan and his text littered with "they say". Agesialos' hatred of Thebes is also Xenophon's. Compare, for example, Xenophon's description of Agesilaos' actions and victorious maneuvers at Koroneia where he is duly interested in how the king achieved his victory over the hated Thebans.

The point about the civilians being driven back to the camp by the Lacedaemonian allies and peltasts is valid too, for skulking among them were "others who did not want to fight" i.e. deserting soldiers, now forced back into the ranks.

Oh dear III. Polyaenus (2.3.3) says that the Thespians left after Epameinondas told those who did not wish to fight to leave. They apparently left with the camp followers and were forced back by the Spartans. Clearly these 'deserters' pressed into the Theban "mass", were crucial to the Spartan defeat. Really...

As to Xenophon not naming Epaminondas and Pelopidas, it is unlikely that his Spartan sources knew of them. Epaminondas was officially just one of the seven Boeotarchs in command, and Pelopidas merely the junior commander of the "Hieros Lochos". ( Xenophon doesn't mention the junior commander of the "Hippeis" either, nor the commanders of the four Spartan "Morai", save those who fell.)

Oh dear IV. This, really, is simply not credible, not to mention 'special pleading'. The assertion that Xenophon, writing a history of his time, did not know of these men because his Spartan sources didn't know of them is absolutely ridiculous. Xenophon well knew them: they were not only the leading men of Thebes but also the hated enemy of his hero Agesilaos. Ancient Biographers wrote accounts of these men yet Xenophon is unaware because his "Spartan sources" are unlikely to have known of them??!! Xenophon deigns only to introduce Pelopidas as the filthy Thebean mediser at 7.1.33-37. Now, I wonder why that might be? I'm afraid, Xenophon of Brisvegas, that your partisan stripes are well on show!!

More correctly, no allies among the signatories to the "King's Peace" - Jason of Pherae in Thessaly is specifically called an (existing) ally of Thebes [XH VI.4.20].

Exactly what I wrote: Agesilaos, through the peace process, had isolated Thebes. Her allies (aside from those she still wanted to sign for - the Boeotian towns) were all signatories. That Jason was outside this agreement is eminently possible but debatable. He was not at Leuktra.

[Xenophon]

To continue answering ‘minor points’

To adopt such a black and white position as you suggest would be folly. We do not discard all of Thucydides because he is demonstrably wrong about Mantinea. The fact that a source gets one, or even a few things wrong, is no reason to assume everything in that source is wrong.

More ‘strawmen’, not trusting something is different from dismissing it as wrong, but synonyms do seem to be a weak point lol. Once a source is questionable then one has to be careful about what one accepts and why (and that does actually mean all the sources as they are all fallible), the most suspect reason to accept an otherwise uncorroborated statement would be simply because it supports a personal theory and similarly it is the worst of practices to dismiss those that do not support a view whilst accepting those that do

.

What you actually said was :

but if you want to discard that part of ‘Lak.Pol’ why trust any of it?

If you don't 'trust' that what we are being told is correct, then one must presumably disbelieve it, and think it incorrect. Furthermore you imply that if part is to be discarded, then one should discard all.

Stating the obvious - that all source material is fallible - does not get you off the hook for what you said and implied.In fact, that is the corollary of what I said.

the most suspect reason to accept an otherwise uncorroborated statement would be simply because it supports a personal theory and similarly it is the worst of practices to dismiss those that do not support a view whilst accepting those that do

With which I'd heartily agree. Something tells me you may have given up a hostage to future fortune here, and that I may well be quoting this back to you !!

And just what "tactical innovation" would that be ?

That would be massing the best troops in depth on the left to face the enemy’s best troops, co-ordination with the cavalry, and the oblique advance protecting his weaker right. As for bias, I chose to be ‘Agesilaos’ not ‘Pelopidas’, I just don’t let my personal feelings obscure the facts (too much!).

As I said previously a couple of posts ago, a massed column, and an attack 'obliquely' by one wing leading were not tactical innovations I think 'co-ordination' with the cavalry is to credit Epaminondas with something that he couldn't possibly predict and which occurred fortuitously.

Only the 'files in open order' hypothesis explains what happened at Nemea.

‘Only’ is such an unforgiving claim;

On second thoughts, you are right. A poor choice of words. What I should have said is that this is the most plausible explanation for the deployments at Nemea. But perhaps on third thoughts "only" may well be the most appropriate for I know of no other explanation that fits all the facts.

just off the top of my head it is possible that the battle did not fill the plain, other than defended passes most hoplite battles were fought with at least one open flank and here there must have been two since the Spartan right marched at least 275yds to its right, and the Thebans about 100 to theirs, based on the Spartans being 12 deep and on a 3ft frontage and their allies 8 deep. Giving a line of 1590ys, the allies have 19000 hoplites 16 deep so 1190 yds without the Boeotians who add 100yds 50 deep or 200yds 25 deep; their line is still shorter, had the Boeotians lined up 16 deep their 312 yards would only leave the allies short by 90 yards or so, still a decisive shortfall as will be seen.

This just won't do. On these figures the phalanxes only 'front' roughly half the plain. Your assertion that most hoplite battles were fought with at least one open flank had me "splorting" my tea when I read it! No sane commander in history would accept battle with one or both flanks 'hanging' if it could possibly be avoided. Your assertion arises because of the incorrect assumption, which results in frontages only half as long as they should be. With a wide open flank, and a flat alluvial plain and a 3-1 superiority in cavalry, even the stupidest military dunce would know what to do to win. Nor would a sane Spartan commander have accepted battle under such circumstances.

Doesn't the fact that there was only a few hundred yards at most available for 'flanking' by the respective right flanks suggest that the plain was filled ?

There is no reason why the Spartans themselves need not have formed up 8 deep (adding 250 yards to their line) or even six deep since their plan was, clearly, to deliberately out flank the allied left, which would add 500 yards.

We are told that the Spartans only faced six of the Athenian taxeis; crunch the numbers and this is 225 files making the Spartan overlap 275 yards if 12 deep, 525 if 8 deep and 775 yards if six deep. Taking the smallest overlap and working back on the allied side there were 150 files of Athenians left and another 812 of the other allies excepting the Boeotians which gives a line of 962 files facing the 1090yards of the Spartan allies, we know that the Boeotians outflanked the Spartan left so their frontage must be greater than the 128 yards the Spartan line has over the allied, so a depth of 25 and an overlap of 70 yards.

I don't agree your calculations. Xenophon tells us 6,000 Lakedaemonians were present, probably 5 full 'Morai', ( one was at Orchomenus at the time) which assuming 35 age-classes called up, as at Leuktra, gives 5,600 hoplites, plus the 300 'Hippeis' which is consistently close to Xenophon's number, and these occupy a frontage of about 1,000 yards ( they were most likely 12 deep in open order, 6 in close for reasons I gave earlier). The six Athenian Taxeis, numbering some 600 each and 16 deep in open order , 8 in close, occupy 450 yards or so. So a Spartan overlap of about 550 yards.
That left the remaining four Taxeis on a frontage of 300 yards facing an unknown number of Tegeates ( whom Xenophon overlooks)

The salient factor in the battle, however is the brushy terrain, or more probably standing crops. We are told that the Spartans did not observe the Allied advance but only learned of it when they raised the Paian (a major factor in their defeat, otherwise they may have struck the Spartans unprepared). I would suggest that he Spartan camp may have been 400 yards or so outside a thick belt of cultivation; they had advanced when they sacrificed with the enemy 200 yards (1 stade) away, and presumably visible, (how else would they know they were a stade away?). Battle was now joined and the Spartans plunged into the crops after the fleeing Athenians and having routed them moved onto a facing 90 degrees to their original. As they move forward they hear the Argives returning and the Polemarch prepares to line up opposing them until advice from the ranks makes him halt in the cover and allow the enemy to pass exposing their unshielded flank which he strikes. I cannot see this being possible unless the Argives could not see the Spartans, similarly as the Spartans swept into the flank of each returning mob of allies.

I would agree most of this, save that the returning allies need not have been oblivious of the Spartan presence. It is hard to hide a 6,000 strong army, even in head-high standing corn. Seeing their retreat being cut off, and their left wing routed, they may have panicked and sought to return to their 'own side' as quickly as possible.

So, whilst the son of Gryllos blames the Boeotians for going deep and leading off to the right, the defeat is actually more to do with the Spartan manoeuvre, and, it has to be said their willingness to sacrifice their allies! From then on it was Spartan training against disordered militia. The situation is similar to that at Naseby, when the Royalist cavalry once successful went after the baggage whilst the newly trained Parliamentarian horse under Cromwell, defeated their opposite numbers but remained on the battlefield to play the decisive role. So the disparity in training and, quite probably levels of officering played a factor, preventing the victorious allies being able to maintain their formation, or even regain it after their pursuit.

I would agree most of this as well.

Adopting a depth of sixteen did shorten the line, but equally the allies broke the Spartan allies without much trouble; the trouble was they ended up hardly facing the Spartans at all.

But why adopt 16 deep, if not to fill the plain ? Especially as 8 deep was the general 'norm'.

Neither flank can have been ‘anchored’ as both armies had space to march to the right. It comes down to how open you decide the flanks were; the terrain seems to have been unsuitable for cavalry, as neither force appears in the account of the battle, nor is the allied horse found covering their retreat nor exploiting their success, similarly for the Spartans

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Whoah ! That's a bit glib! "the terrain seems to have been unsuitable for cavalry" is no explanation. It was a flat plain with some 1,500 yards or more width for the cavalry on the basis of your hypothesis, and on your own suggestion covered in standing head-high crops, where cavalry had the advantage of seeing and infantry did not. Compare the French cavalry in similar circumstances at Quatre Bras and Waterloo. It was perfect for cavalry !!

I would say that both sides cavalry were in the rear, because the phalanxes filled the plain, and that they became embroiled in each side's retreat. That at least is a plausible explanation - perhaps the only one !

Naturally I would say that the larger frontage necessitated by the ‘parembole hypothesis’, 3,324 yards out of maybe 3,500 seems a bit tight especially when one considers that the ground was clearly thick with vegetation, unlikely both by the shore and foothills. The sea level was also higher by 90cms according to the Paleogeographic study of the Gulf of Corinth. (link to be edited in). It is difficult to say how much this would have affected things, so I’ll ignore it.

Ah!....naughty! 'Parembole' in the sense of 'interjection' is a Hellenistic manual term, and evidently anachronistic in Xenophon's time, for Xenophon does not use the word at all. Instead he uses 'paragoge'/marching up by the side. So let us stick with contemporary usage for Xenophon's time if we must invent a term and call it the 'paragoge hypothesis' !

Of course it's a bit tight - that was the idea, to fill the width of the battlefield ! We must allow some latitude in measurements though. The numbers are paper strengths and actual numbers will have been less, and depending on exactly where the battle took place, the width at present varies from 3,900 yards to 4,400 yards max ( measured from Google Earth), and as you pointed out, will have been somewhat less due to higher sea levels then.

But back to the alternatives. The biggest concern of any hoplite phalanx commander was to accept battle only with secure flanks - to do otherwise was to invite disaster. Your deployment measures don't explain :

1. Why the allies doubled their phalanx depth to 16, halving the length of the battle line and exposing their flank(s), when in your scenario they have sufficient troops to fill the battlefield with an 8 deep phalanx.

2. Why the cavalry, particularly the Allied cavalry which outnumbered the Lakedaemonians 3-to-1, didn't make use of all that open space beyond the flank, or play any significant part in the battle.

3. Why the drift/overlap of each side's right wing was only a few hundred yards in each case, on a battlefield with so much open space.

4. Why the respective commanders accepted battle under such adverse conditions.

All the above falls into place once it is accepted that the phalanx line was actually twice as long as you assume, and in 'open' order, filling the width of the battlefield ( which incidently also solves the problem of the thick vegetation/crops - your hoplites, moving shield to shield, would have to push the crops down like a combine harvester !! ). On balance of probability, the file/open order phalanx closing up to half-files is the more probable scenario, and better explains the facts.

And the Nemea is but one example. Over the last forty years, whenever I have been able to glean reasonable information about a battle and its location, I have tested this hypothesis of Anderson, Connolly and myself, and in EVERY instance ( so far! ) it has held good, just like the Nemea. I have yet to find a battlefield that would not accommodate an 'open order' phalanx.

[agesilaos]

If you don't 'trust' that what we are being told is correct, then one must presumably disbelieve it, and think it incorrect. Furthermore you imply that if part is to be discarded, then one should discard all.

No, if you don’t trust it you neither believe nor disbelieve it; to use the specific example I was thinking of; you believe that enomotiai could form six or twelve deep (according to you because of half-file insertion this reflects close and open order, though Xenophon says nothing about intervals) BUT you reject his clear statement that a mora consisted of sixteen enomotiai of thirty six men, yet the reasoning is seemingly beyond our comprehension since you consistently refuse to supply it. I accept both statements from a source that ought to be in the know and with no contradictory evidence that is credible.

You will have to name the many battles where the left flank was massed in column and the right refused just saying it is not good enough. Ascribing co-ordination with the horse may be too far but given the total absence of any comment on Theban plans by Xenophon and Diodoros’ fictive farrago it is hard to say, I would only observe that at Mantinea it is a co-ordinated attack by horse and foot that is launched.

Instead of splurting your tea it would be more germane to list the battles where we know that the armies anchored both flanks; unlikely to be forthcoming as the state of the evidence is woeful as regards numbers and none too hot with regard to locations.

But why adopt 16 deep, if not to fill the plain? Especially as 8 deep was the general 'norm'.

Good question, but you won’t like the answer which lies in the power of depth, in which the Thebans clearly believed (Xenophon’s 100 deep Egyptians against which ever ridiculous number he chose is a case of post factum denial); the acknowledged experts also went deeper than the norm – six against four, in your model twelve against eight in mine; one would expect the Spartans to understand these things.

Glib? Well the allied army certainly did not fill the plain and they had the advantage in cavalry yet hid it behind their shorter line?

Ah!....naughty! 'Parembole' in the sense of 'interjection' is a Hellenistic manual term, and evidently anachronistic in Xenophon's time, for Xenophon does not use the word at all. Instead he uses 'paragoge'/marching up by the side. So let us stick with contemporary usage for Xenophon's time if we must invent a term and call it the 'paragoge hypothesis' !

Ah! The wedding of wishful thinking and circular argument. ‘Parembole’ is used by Aeschines, a younger contemporary of Xenophon so the word is not anachronistic, it is simply not the word Xenophon chose to use. I have illustrated how the manoeuvres differ so let’s stop pretending they are even remotely similar.

I am surprised you have not pointed out that Aelian’s ‘paragoge’ is not the same as mine and must be different from Xenophon’s. In the Taktike (careful might get back to the Subject, dammit!) it is a lateral march with the officers on one or both flanks. It is hard to see how this usage could arise from insertion but it is quite clearly very close to stage two in my diagram, the ‘metapon’ provides the flank during the lateral movement (which could go left or right, of course).

Marathon was fought on a plain with open flanks it would seem and it is difficult for a theory that posits a fighting depth of four as the norm to accommodate Herodotos clear statement that the centre of the Athenian line was ‘of few ranks and weak’ whereas ‘the wings were strong in numbers’

τότε δὲ τασσομένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῷ Μαραθῶνι ἐγίνετο τοιόνδε τι: τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐξισούμενον τῷ Μηδικῷ στρατοπέδῳ, τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ μέσον ἐγίνετο ἐπὶ τάξιας ὀλίγας, καὶ ταύτῃ ἦν ἀσθενέστατον τὸ στρατόπεδον, τὸ δὲ κέρας ἑκάτερον ἔρρωτο πλήθεϊ.
VI 111 iii
As the Athenians were marshalled at Marathon, it happened that their line of battle was as long as the line of the Medes. The centre, where the line was weakest, was only a few ranks deep, but each wing was strong in numbers.
Trans A D Godle

y

Greek not only has a word for two it has specific dual verb forms, since you reckon four as the norm there is little choice but to assign a depth of three in your model ; in mine four would be half strength; Plutarch’s assertion, Aristides 5 iii, that two tribes held the centre, leaving four on each flank works on both models; yours would yield , on depths of 6 and 3, 2000 Athenian files and a further 160 odd Plataian files; as the frontages were equal this would lead to a Persian strength of 21,600 infantry. On the same basis but using depths of 8 and 4 we arrive at 1125 + 500 =1625 files for a Persian strength of 16,250. VI 95 ii gives 600 triereis for the Persian fleet which would have 102,000 rowers and 18,000 marines @30 per ship, these numbers are not credible; this fleet was island hopping without army support and would die of thirst before it had travelled two days.

If we work backwards and assume that the crews beefed up the marines there would be 200 troops per ship making my fleet 80 strong and yours 108, neither of which are impossible. We might suggest that Herodotos conjured his figure for the fleet by dividing a guestimate of the Persian army and dividing by the number of marines. Neither method is to far from 18,000 so this meander ends without reaching the sea, other than to restate that there does not seem room for a thin centre in your theory and that lower figures are probably to be preferred as we still have to allow for the cavalry; which, like that at Nemea was conspicuously absent.

Ancient cavalry is not comparable to Napoleonic horse, not only did the Greeks lack saddles and stirrups but their horses were smaller, more like our ponies and not really effective against hoplites (they did not have the xysta of the later Macedonians, and could carry fewer javelins and throw them with less force than foot skirmishers, who were themselves not considered the equal of a hoplite (despite Demosthenes’ failure in Aetolia and victory at Sphakteria!).

I’ll get back to the tag end queries.

We ought to shift some of this onto the main forum, I think, certainly Leuktra and the Nemea could get their own threads and de-clutter this one (despite being all for organic growth this thread might bear some planting out!)