Elephants at Gaugamela?

[kurnigandy1]

I advance the motion that the elephants are a case of misidentification. Ptolemy not once mentions the elephants at anytime during the battle. I do not have Arrian in front of me right now, so forgive me if I am a bit off here. At the beginning of the battle we learn from Ptolemy that the Comp. cavalry was directly opposite Darius' royal squadron- so close in fact they could see the apples on their spears. If the elephants were posted in front of Darius' royal squadron I cannot believe that Ptolemy would have found a reason to omit them.

During Alexander's persuit of Darius (first time) Ptolemy takes us away from the battle. Then we learn of Parmenio's plea for help and Alexander has to wheel around after cutting off the chase. After the route of the Persian right wing (Alexander's left) Alexander resumes the chase for Darius. It was during the brief stop at the river Lycus (may be misspelled) that we learn from Ptolemy that Parmenio took possession of the baggage train, the camels, and the "elephants." What's this, a second set of elephants?

Tarn believed that Callisthenes was in part responsible for the muddled account of Gaugamela. In deed it must have been from Callisthenes that Aristobulus gained his information. It is important to note that neither one of the them was present at the battle. Hence the confusion over Alexander's baggage train and the raid of said baggage (wherever it was).

It must have been during Parmenio's "rounding up" of Darius' baggage train that the Persian dispositions fell into Parmenio's hands. At some point they were given to Callisthenes who passed them along to Aristobulus, or for all that we know Callisthenes could have mentioned the Perisan forces to him [Aristobulus] over dinner one night. Regardless of how, it is to Aristoblus we can thank for the garbled account, the elephants are just more evidence of this.

There were elephants at Gaugamela, but not "war" elephants.

[Paralus]

I advance the motion that the elephants are a case of misidentification. Ptolemy not once mentions the elephants at anytime during the battle.

I agree with you: that is because they were not there. I don’t know though that one can “misidentify” a pachyderm though!

At the beginning of the battle we learn from Ptolemy that the Comp. cavalry was directly opposite Darius' royal squadron- so close in fact they could see the apples on their spears. If the elephants were posted in front of Darius' royal squadron I cannot believe that Ptolemy would have found a reason to omit them.

We need to keep in mind the fiction of the heroic Alexander / Darius confrontation. This is a recurrent motif in near eastern warfare and an heroic topos foisted upon us by the Alexander-centric source tradition. The reality was, I fear, somewhat different.

Alexander, if he started in front of Darius’ position in the Persian centre, will have been at a considerable remove. The description of the melophoroi with their pomegranates is a neat little detail to liven the description but was hardly likely to be visible from where the advance began. Alexander is advancing to his right with his front line echeloned back away to his left. He has moved a considerable distance to his right by the time the Scythian cavalry “rode along the line, and came into conflict with the front men of Alexander’s array” (Alexander’s “thrown forward right wing”). These units (along with the selected Bactrians) are on Darius’ far left. It is then that Darius orders the drift checked and the chariots launched against “Alexander himself”. These 100 chariots too are on the left wing.

The elephants will still have been visible had they been there though.

It was during the brief stop at the river Lycus (may be misspelled) that we learn from Ptolemy that Parmenio took possession of the baggage train, the camels, and the "elephants." What's this, a second set of elephants?

We need not surmise that the elephants were that far behind. Arrian describes Parmenio as being “in pursuit of his own quarry”. The distance from the generally identified battle site and the Lycus is some 30 kilometres. That’s a long way behind for a forward army camp. Further, Arrian’s statement that Alexander rested at the Lycus and “Parmenion went on to take possession of” what has to have been the camp would indicate that it was even further! Darius had waited for Alexander’s approach from the Tigris for this battle. It seems a bit difficult to reconcile a camp some 30 or more kilometres behind the battlefield. It is likely a little confused and they are the same elephants – simply, in the end, not used in the battle.

During Alexander's persuit of Darius (first time) Ptolemy takes us away from the battle. Then we learn of Parmenio's plea for help and Alexander has to wheel around after cutting off the chase. After the route of the Persian right wing (Alexander's left) Alexander resumes the chase for Darius.

Ah yes, the famously dilatory Parmenion who so frustrates his heroic king. That a message could reach Alexander from the left wing presupposes he could be found. In the clouds of dust described in the source tradition this, one would have to suggest, will have been impossible. More to the point is that Alexander is clearly re-running Issos. At that battle he swung left so as to both close on Darius and secure his infantry and the victory. Darius is no more valuable a quarry at Gaugamela than he was at Issos and Alexander clearly did not leave the issue undecided there for the pleasures of the chase. It beggars belief that he left the field here – ostensibly to chase a fleeing Darius – whilst his centre-left infantry and left wing are under the fully expected furious assault. His planned drift to the right has absolutely ensured its collapse via the overlap it now faces were it not to be relieved in some way.

Much more likely is that he straightened for the assault and, having “broken through”, rolled to the left just as at Issos. In this he has taken the Companions, Agrianes, hypaspists and some (if not all in the end) of Coenus’ aesthetairoi. Once Bessus withdraws from the battle on Alexander’s right the mercenary cavalry of Menidas joins in what is a classic envelopment. Here is where the great battle takes place.

The Persians, Indians and others around the Great King find themselves under furious assault. Every extra minute that continues is another minute the Companions, hypaspists and others kill their way toward the centre whilst drawing the noose around the Persians. Arrian then describes what is clearly more than simply some stray troops of fleeing cavalry who seemingly blundered into a frustrated king suffering from “pursuitus interruptus”. This battle sees “conventional cavalry tactics” utterly forgotten as “it was every man for himself, struggling to break through as if in that alone lay his hope of life”. Desperate fighting ensued with “each man fighting for mere survival without any further thought of victory or defeat”. That Darius escaped during this desperate struggle to avoid envelopment is most likely. The Macedonian king will have been most upset that the first “chase” of Darius (to his centre) had been avoided and that he had to remain and secure the victory. The chase resumed following that.

It is here that Hephaestion, Menidas and Coenus are wounded. Diodorus adds Perdiccas and both he and Curtius describe these as “officers” and “generals” (and “higher commanders”) respectively. Arrian gives them no title but it is clear that Coenus is most unlikely to have ridden off and left his battalion still engaged on the field.

There were elephants at Gaugamela, but not "war" elephants.

“Spectator” elephants perhaps?

[Phoebus]

Ah yes, the famously dilatory Parmenion who so frustrates his heroic king. That a message could reach Alexander from the left wing presupposes he could be found. In the clouds of dust described in the source tradition this, one would have to suggest, will have been impossible.

Oh, I don't know.

A messenger riding from Parmenion to Alexander would "simply" have to count off six Taxeis of Pezhetairoi, and veer left after reaching the Hypaspists--preferably at a point between them and the Paeonians and mercenaries holding off the extreme right, so as not to be exposed to the melee itself. At that point, it's a matter of fiding the Companion Cavalry--itself hardly an impossible feat. Finding the Basiliki Ile? Yes, difficult. Also not impossible.

Dangerous? Absolutely. But it would have been a message worth delivering, and I don't think it speaks ill of the old marshall at all.

It beggars belief that he left the field here – ostensibly to chase a fleeing Darius – whilst his centre-left infantry and left wing are under the fully expected furious assault. His planned drift to the right has absolutely ensured its collapse via the overlap it now faces were it not to be relieved in some way.

For myself, I don't think he was counting on a gap developing in the center-left, nor did he anticipate Parmenion to collapse. Alexander clearly counted on his Paeonians and mercenaries to hold the line against superior numbers, and I don't see why he would have expected any less of his Thessalians, etc., on the other end.

I might be daftly incorrect, but I had assumed that, when Alexander's force marched, the entire force did so in the oblique, and that both flanks were overlapped--hence the whole right wing not taking part in the assault.

[Paralus]

A messenger riding from Parmenion to Alexander would "simply" have to count off six Taxeis of Pezhetairoi, and veer left after reaching the Hypaspists--preferably at a point between them and the Paeonians and mercenaries holding off the extreme right, so as not to be exposed to the melee itself. At that point, it's a matter of fiding the Companion Cavalry--itself hardly an impossible feat. Finding the Basiliki Ile? Yes, difficult. Also not impossible.

Dangerous? Absolutely. But it would have been a message worth delivering, and I don't think it speaks ill of the old marshall at all....

That depends on just when you think the message – if historical – was delivered. The tradition most followed has it that Alexander is recalled from his pursuit of Darius by the message. That is, Alexander has abandoned the field in his pursuit. That a messenger from the Macedonian left would reach him is, to say the least, impossible.

Given that the Macedonian centre-left (Simmias, Craterus, the Thessalians et al) is rooted to the spot, it beggars belief that such a brilliant strategist would depart the field in search of one at the expense of his still battling army. Had he done so the man, then, was an obvious dolt. He may well have returned to a scene of slaughter and the remnants of his infantry.

For myself, I don't think he was counting on a gap developing in the center-left, nor did he anticipate Parmenion to collapse. Alexander clearly counted on his Paeonians and mercenaries to hold the line against superior numbers, and I don't see why he would have expected any less of his Thessalians, etc., on the other end.

One never accounts for all. The fact remains that the man’s plan, from what we can reconstruct from the source material, was to counter Darius’ dispositions by accommodating his challenge of the 100 chariots on left wing (of the Persian array) by crabbing (in an oblique) to the right and “loading” his right wing (“thrown forward”) with “light” infantry (the “old mercenaries”, half the Agrianes, et al). This is precisely why Alexander posted the other half of the Agrianes and Balacrus’ javelin men in front of the Companion Cavalry: it led the Macedonian line and, in the end, faced the chariots. Were it destroyed or seriously upset by the chariots so too the “phalanx” as Arrian describes Darius’ plan. Darius was well aware that the Macedonian cruise missile was the Companion cavalry and its satellite link: the hypaspists. These had killed his chances at Issos and this was what Alexander planned at Gaugamela.

I might be daftly incorrect, but I had assumed that, when Alexander's force marched, the entire force did so in the oblique, and that both flanks were overlapped--hence the whole right wing not taking part in the assault.

You and I need to talk.

Yes the whole line moved in an oblique. This is assumed from the descriptions we’re given. If you believe Curtius it was in a “rhomboid” or offset oblong fashion. The description of the battle in Arrian contradicts this almost entirely. Curtius’ descriptions of the dispositions are ridiculous – he has the hypaspists as a “reserve” formation and that is not to mention the Agrianes riding to Alexander's support.

My view has always been that Alexander drew up the phalanx units in echelon to the left (hypaspists and the six taxeis). He led the “battle line” with the royal ile and the Companions. To the left the Thessalians (2.200 strong) plus the Greek cavalry round out the “battle line”. The rest are wings. For this discussion we can ignore the left – for the time being.

The right – where it was all planned to happen – was well and truly stacked. This is where the brilliance of the conqueror is on display. He is outgunned in cavalry - seriously. Not only that, these blokes are armoured and so are some of their horses. Several days of reconnoitring produce a plan. Darius has prepared a defensive position. He has stacked his left wing with picked cavalry contingents and 100 scythe-chariots. He has done this because this is where Alexander belted him at Issos.

How does Alexander respond? He deploys refused to the left and leads with his right – he himself leads the battle line. “Thrown forward and at an oblique” is the right wing (the nub here is “oblique”. I would totally agree with Marsden that this means near parallel with the Persian line and at an oblique to the Macedonian line). This wing is made up of the Paeonians, the scouts and Menidas’ mercenary cavalry totalling some 1,400. So much Darius sees.

Alexander advances to his right. The more he advances in that direction the more his left is exposed. The Scythian cavalry make contact with Alexander’s forward units whilst riding “along the Macedonian front”. The rightward drift eventually leads Darius to seriously check it with the Bactrian cavalry detachment in the van of his left and the Scythians. Alexander orders Menidas to “wheel and attack them”. The battle on the right is now on. As Darius commits other cavalry units to the attempted envelopment of Alexander’s right Alexander sends Aretes to counter. As the advance continues and more Persian units are committed to Alexander’s right, Darius wonders why his envelopment is not proceeding. He has little idea that Alexander has, behind his cavalry, some 7,400 light infantry (the “old mercenaries” and Agrianes, et al).

[Paralus insertion: The message from Parmenio arrives “Left heavily engaged as planned and in danger of collapse”] Alexander “with all the heavy infantry in this sector” (the hypaspists and parts if not all of Coenus’ brigade) charged the Persian line. The breakthrough was fairly quick and Alexander rolled to his left: to Darius and the Persian centre. As this happened and the deadly advance moved the Persian right, held if not defeated, saw the damage and, under Bessus, retired.

Meanwhile Alexander and his hypaspists killed their way towards Darius and the cavalry of the right – Menidas – joined them along with the rest of the Agrianes. A killing corral was in the offing for the Persians.

I must write up this battle one day…..

[Phoebus]

That depends on just when you think the message – if historical – was delivered. The tradition most followed has it that Alexander is recalled from his pursuit of Darius by the message.

I can't reconcile with this idea. I obviously can't concretely state when the message was sent (or when it arrived), but I highly doubt that Alexander's right held off the Persian left, scattered the Persian center, and somehow came back to scatter the Persian right. I think it's far more likely that he held the left, dealt a death-blow to the center, and, receiving Parmenion's message (probably sent relatively shortly after the Phalanx split and the left was isolated, which, along with the dire pressure on the Macedonian left, would have been an alarming turn) turned to face the Persian right and prevent a rout of his own army.

You and I need to talk.

I like this, because this is when I learn!

Yes the whole line moved in an oblique. This is assumed from the descriptions we’re given. ... How does Alexander respond? He deploys refused to the left and leads with his right – he himself leads the battle line. “Thrown forward and at an oblique” is the right wing (the nub here is “oblique”. I would totally agree with Marsden that this means near parallel with the Persian line and at an oblique to the Macedonian line).

I agree.

Alexander advances to his right. The more he advances in that direction the more his left is exposed.

Again, agreed. I just don't think he ever got to a point where his right wing wasn't exposed. IMHO, Alexander was trading off positives and negatives. He was moving to the right because he was going to attack with his right, hence the need to prevent as much envelopment as possible. He was going to defend with his left, hence the need to refuse it as much as possible. By moving to the right, he forced Dareius to over-extend his left, forcing a gap in the center and weakening the assault on the Macedonian right. By refusing the left while moving his whole force to the right, he was delaying the Persian impact on the left while allowing Parmenion the opportunity to conduct a somewhat flexible defense (meaning, as the army moved right, Parmenion could cede ground as needed).

Even the best plans don't survive contact with the enemy. A gap formed in between the Taxeis of the Phalanx, which forced Parmenion to, in the words of modern Paratroopers, “hold what he had”.

[Paralus insertion: The message from Parmenio arrives “Left heavily engaged as planned andin danger of collapse”] Alexander “with all the heavy infantry in this sector” (the hypaspists and parts if not all of Coenus’ brigade) charged the Persian line. The breakthrough was fairly quick and Alexander rolled to his left: to Darius and the Persian centre. As this happened and the deadly advance moved the Persian right, held if not defeated, saw the damage and, under Bessus, retired.

I think the message could have arrived at any time between what you propose and during the actual assault on the Persian center/Dareius. Delivered in the earlier proposed time, it reconciles with the more reckless Alexander: he is in the cusp of winning Asia; he has see his enemy do his worst and it is now his turn to see if the Persians can hold off his fury. Delivered during the actual assault, Alexander’s actions still reconcile with the needs of battle: there is no better way to shore up the left (without ceding the initiative and allowing Bessus another chance) than to punch through the Persian center and ride to Parmenion’s aid.

I must write up this battle one day…..

You'll have at least one reader!

[Paralus]

That depends on just when you think the message – if historical – was delivered. The tradition most followed has it that Alexander is recalled from his pursuit of Darius by the message.

I can't reconcile with this idea. I obviously can't concretely state when the message was sent (or when it arrived), but I highly doubt that Alexander's right held off the Persian left, scattered the Persian center, and somehow came back to scatter the Persian right. I think it's far more likely that he held the left, dealt a death-blow to the center, and, receiving Parmenion's message (probably sent relatively shortly after the Phalanx split and the left was isolated, which, along with the dire pressure on the Macedonian left, would have been an alarming turn) turned to face the Persian right and prevent a rout of his own army. .

No one can concretely state when the message was sent. Fact is that the Macedonian line – from where Parmenio is stationed with his agema of horse from Pharsalus – to Alexander will have been at least some two kilometres. My view is that message could only reach him before he charged the Persian line; after this all hell had broken loose. It goes without saying that a messenger from Parmenio will not have found Alexander had he set off after a fleeing Darius – as Diodorus notes.

Alexander advances to his right. The more he advances in that direction the more his left is exposed.

Again, agreed. I just don't think he ever got to a point where his right wing wasn't exposed. IMHO, Alexander was trading off positives and negatives. He was moving to the right because he was going to attack with his right, hence the need to prevent as much envelopment as possible. He was going to defend with his left, hence the need to refuse it as much as possible. By moving to the right, he forced Dareius to over-extend his left, forcing a gap in the center and weakening the assault on the Macedonian right […] Even the best plans don't survive contact with the enemy. A gap formed in between the Taxeis of the Phalanx, which forced Parmenion to, in the words of modern Paratroopers, “hold what he had”.

That last is correct: Simmias summed that up (pardon the alliteration) as his brigade (and the forces to his left) struggled to hold ground much less advance.

Yes Alexander was always going to attack with his right. The basic plan and its execution was that visited upon Darius at Issos: crash through with the right and roll left. Envelopment was the process and slaughter was the product.

What needs to be understood is that Alexander was nowhere near Darius’ centre when he charged (this is why the confused Curtius and disoriented Diodorus have to place Darius on the left of his array to construct a king v Great King scenario). The advance – at a decent remove – began with Alexander here but as he advanced he crabbed right. Darius’ 100 chariots are placed on his left wing; before Alexander leaves the “prepared ground” Darius launches them at “Alexander himself”. The chariots are on the left of the Persian array, Alexander – a fortiori – is now facing Darius’ left wing. This is confirmed by the description of the Scythians riding along the front of the leading Macedonian troops (Menidas’ cavalry). Alexander’s “charge” was not ever at the Persian centre unless he crossed his own infantry advance to do so. He charged the somewhat centre of left and rolled left.

Meanwhile, as Arrian clearly describes, the “thrown forward” right wing was dealing with Darius’ attempted envelopment. Aretes and Menidas, although suffering badly, “sustained their assaults” and the Persians found – to their discomfort I’d imagine – the light infantry of the “old mercenaries” and others stacked behind the cavalry troops. The right definitely held its own.

All of this means, naturally, that Alexander’s left was now overlapped. He will have known this as this was the plan from the beginning. Hence any thought that the king was to depart the field, in a gambler’s rush of blood, before his left was secured is, to me, inconceivable. Alexander was always heading towards Darius in the centre. After his left was secure he headed off after him.