AtG statue at site of Gaugamela?

[Semiramis]

I don't know that Alexander's recruiting efforts can be considered proliferation... Judging from what Arrian left us with, Alexander "recruited" from the most dangerous territories, turning the next generation ("youths just growing into manhood") of potential rebels into his own soldiers. Some rather fine socio-cultural re-engineering, if you ask me. This is only conjecture on my part, but I think this project would have worked out better in the long run than nationally-distinct units working parallel to, or beneath, Greek-speaking ones.

Proliferation, recruitment, socio-cultural engineering and hostage-taking? To ensure some good behaviour from the fathers of these beloved sons from those "dangerous territories"? Were the Greek soldiers partly serving as hostages from that other potentially rebellious territory?

Either way, once Alexander had bled Macedonian manpower to the degree he did, he had no option but to find conscripts in other places. It doesn't seem that he had any plans to stop initiating wars. Spear fodder is essential for such endeavors.

[Phoebus]

Thank you, I made it out of there no worse for wear. Unfortunately, the last few months have been kind of a whirlwind. I got to see quite a bit of Europe, but I've hardly had a chance to sit down and relax. Speaking of which, I have to go to the States for a training trip this very Sunday!

Eumenes was a real treat, and maybe we can compare notes on it some time. I also wanted to tell you that enjoyed reading your article on the Argyraspides!

Semiramis,

I don't think hostage-taking was part of the deal. Well, not in the "7,000 'allied' hoplites" sense. Just part and parcel of breaking the old societies, strengthening the position of the new status quo, etc.

I'll respond to the rest in a bit!

EDIT:
OK, now that the duty day is over, I think I can try to dig myself into a bit of trouble!

I was under the impression that the vast majority of the 40-50,000 in reinforcements that Alexander received following his crossing to Asia were non-Macedonian mercenaries. I will be completely honest with you, though--since having my external hard drive/electronic library fail, I have been bereft of a number of pertinent articles on the matter, including Bosworth's take on the matter. I do have my Arrian, Q. Curtius, etc., handy, though, and I could have sworn that less than 7,000 "new" Macedonians in all join Alexander after Granicus.

So I guess it all comes down to what Macedon's manpower was to begin with. Alexander took something over 15,000 Macedonians with him with that initial force, plus the reinforcements received between 331-330 (6,000 foot, 500 cavalry), plus however many Antipater was keeping as a standing force for himself. Again, I'm clueless and "unarmed" at the moment regarding a lot of these subjects.

Could it be less a case of "bleeding" Macedon's manpower and more a case of "stretching it" from one side of the world to the other? Can anyone else illuminate me?

[Nikas]

Nothing really to do with mollifying Athens; more retaining and usurping her supposed reputation as a cornerstone of the “Greek resistance” to the filthy despotic and effete Persians. Ditto Sparta.

The propaganda of a righteous war of retribution – a necessary cloak for Macedonian imperial aims and lebensraum in the east – was as important to Philip’s military / political programme as was a Persian threat in the Aegean to imperial Athenian democrats over a century earlier. Philip needed an instrument – a political and social instrument – that would provide the scaffolding to keep the Greeks “in line”. Such an instrument would provide the forum for the Greeks to indulge their favourite pastime – outside of war – of claim, counter claim, arbitrate and sanction. And such a symmachia needed a palatable and believable aim. All with the Macedonian king as sole arbiter and interpreter of said symmachia and aim, of course.

It then will have put the lie to such high minded Macedonian philhellenism should Philip have raised Athens post Chaeronea. Neither will it have helped had he done similar to Sparta. Other matters – those checks and balances – buttressed his policy toward Sparta as the not so subtle apportioning of Spartan territory such as Dentheliatis, the east Parnon foreland, Belminatis, Thyreatis and Sciritis show. Sparta was to remain proudly isolated and a thorn in the ambitions of Achaea, Argos and other Peloponnesian pugs. A recipe fraught with employment opportunities for the synhedrion of the new “League”.

For the Greeks it was always a workable and malleable mirage. Antigonus Monophthalmus would retread the League tyre. Antigonus could hardly have utilised the dead Persian Empire as his unifying theme - it no longer existed. From the remove of Celaenae, and needing the "gangway to Greece" (Athens), he picked the perfect flag to fly: the autonomy of the Greeks.

The irony of the Spartan Agesilaos pictured as some early fourth century Kimon most likely was lost on its author Xenophon. Then again, possibly not. Fancy an exiled Athenian creating a Spartan king in the (“foreign policy”) image of Kimon? Patriot (to his polis), righteous prosecutor of Persia, dreamer of panhellenic dreams and, always, an avid imperialist.

That Agesilaos was no Kimon is indicated by his willingness to negotiate truces or treaties whilst spending great energy in achieving little. Not for Agesilaos any resounding Eurymedon or grand campaign to drive out the Persian despot.

While I agree that it did not hamper his efforts immediately to have Athens onside rather than not, Philip certainly did show great magnaminity vis-a-vis Athens and the repeated insults of the orators and the war he had just successfully concluded. A garrison on the Acropolis would not have been that far of a stretch, or a little mine-time for Demosthenes and Hyperdides, especially in the aftermath of Chaeronia where the population was expecting a full sack. Why, he may have even still be seen as moderate, and Macedonia could have ensured a little more active participation from those scheming Athenians. Sparta, an anachronism of a power, could have been left to her Peloponessian neighbours for a little overdue justice, a la Thebes and her Boetian "confederates" a little later, and he would not have even sacrificed a soldier in the event. Philip had more than enough military might to force a settlement were it necessary (and it may not have been for their generous ally) and he may have even had access to a few more allied soldiers without a Spartan "threat" to watch at home, a more true panhellenic charge?
I believe there is no legitimate reason as of yet to actually discount a very apparent and perhaps simplest of motives to Philip. He may have actually had a genuine personal desire to be the panhellenic champion that Greece could have showered her admiration upon. Thoughts of another potential Greek redeemer Jason of Pherae ringing in his head? This does not necessarily need be contrary to any goals of his personal, or Macedonian dreams of imperial aggrandizement. In fact, one could suggest that his realization of this dream could have directly led to his actions in forcing Athens and Thebes onto the plain of Chaeronia. This desire certainly would override what surely would have been a smarter strategic decision in light of future events. Antigonus and the rest may not have needed the tried and tested "freedom of the Greeks" harkening back to Spartan and Athenian claims and counter-claims in the Peloponessian War, had a more permanent and lasting settlement been established, as the Romans later convincingly showed, although who knows what could have been had Philip survived. As for Agesilaus, it might be fair to say that Philip may not have had much more in mind, as it was left for the ever-aggrandizing and ever-reaching Alexander to push the limits...