Did Alexander command the PHALANX at Chaeronea?

[Paralus]

[So, Pelopidas and Epameinondas may have freaked out with the extensive use of cavalry by Philip and Alexander, but that was their undoing eventually.As was the Spartans' persistence in wearing heavy armor, until they were defeated by soldiers that wore lighter armors.This logic does not rule out Alexander being on horse or leading the cavalry.

G'day Efstathios.

First of all, logic has little to do with it. You have made me think though. Although I think that Alexander was not on horse, it may well be that -- as a classic infantry battle -- the descriptions of Chaeronea that have come down to us are classic Greek descriptions. That is, descriptions that don't necessarily take much account of the cavalry?

The problem remains the sources. None of them place Alexander on horse back. None of them place Philip on horse back either. The funny thing GÇô as I continually repeat GÇô is the rather easy acceptance of the King on foot but the precocious prince must be on horse. Why is that? (I think we all really know).

Epaminondas was the Greek statesman of the fourth century (Theban imperialistic ambitions aside). Too, he was no mean general. Pelopidas was a battlefield commander not bettered until Alexander. Had either the resources that Macedon supplied Alexander, who knows? I believe that both had a good understanding of the capabilities of a decent cavalry (Boeotia being one of the few areas of Greece to field decent cavalry). Again, it may not have been reported too well. It is certain, though, that the Macedonian echeloned advance and massed wing attack were derived directly from the playbooks of Pelopidas and Epaminondas.

The Spartans' problems had little to do with their "heavy amour" and much to do with their domestic and foreign policies. Ill equipped from the start to adopt and take over the Athenian Empire they never the less did exactly that. Expending manpower and money it didn't have GÇô and relying on Persia for the latter GÇô was a recipe for the disaster that followed. It was, though, its domestic policies that ensured its demise. The oliganthropy entrenched by the Lycurgan system ensured the certain decline of available Homoioi and the accrual of land (and "money") into the hands of the women. By the time Kleombrotus lead the Peloponnesian forces to Leuktra (371), Spartans were little more than a minority in their own city.

All of which is not to say that their tactics had not atrophied over time. They indeed had. Worse, they had ensured that intelligent adversaries in Thebes had GÇô due to the implacable hatred of one man, Agesilaos GÇô learned every tactical manoeuvre in the Spartan playbook (Agesilaos was lucky to hold the field on his way back from Ionia in 395). Come 371, Epaminondas and Pelopidas needed only to ensure the defeat of the seven hundred or so homioi on the Spartan right. Misson accomplished. That left some eight hundred back in Sparta. This from some 8,000 a century earlier.

Such a sad end. Deserved though it may have been

[Efstathios]

Hi Paralus.

When i wrote my latest reply, i began to write another one after some reseacrh on the net.But then the internet connection at work went down, so i didnt try it again.I found this http://omega.cohums.ohio-state.edu/mail ... 2/0223.php page.Look at paragraph 6 and 7.

It seems that Gaebel was one the first maybe to say that Alexander led infantry.(Sorry i dont remember if this book has been mentioned in this post previously).While the popular oppinion was originally created by Hammond.He speculated that Alexander was in head of the cavalry forces, and since then people have adopted that idea like it was initially written in the sources.It seemed so natural.And still seems natural for Alexander to have been in charge of the cavalry.

While it is a speculation only of Hammond, yet it is the most logical speculation.Why?

I think Hammond thought of many possible parameters.For example in Chaeronea there was cavalry.I think we all agree to that.In the Macedonian side we have Philip and Alexander, and the Generals.Philip decided that most of his Generals would go with Alexander because it was his first big battle.Wouldn't it be more logical to say that the cavalry would be where the most of the Generals were, and Alexander too?

It's a practical matter.On the one hand there is Philip with one or two Generals, and on the other hand there is Alexander with most of the Generals.They could manage and coordinate the cavalry better along with other infantry forces.And because Alexander was a very skillful rider and went along good with horses and horseback riding tactics, then we can say that he may have had the command of the cavalry under the supervision of the Generals.This is the logic.That the cavalry would be where most of the Generals were, mainly for practical reasons because Philip had laready had a command of a big infantry force with only a few Generals to back him up, and because Alexander was there too.

We dont know if indeed Philip thought that Alexander was doing an excellent job leading cavalry.We dont know the insights of Alexander's military education and training.But we speculate that Philip though of his son as a great cavalry commander.

And of course i dont want to diminish Philip's capabilities of leading many forces toghether with the aid of only one or two Generals.But as i said it was for practical reasons, since it was a large and tough battle.

Then, we dont know exactly how many Generals and commanders Philip had with him and how many Alexander had.But Philip was in head of the elite forces anyway, so i think he would be concentrated on that.And since the cavalry was one of the main and important forces of the Macedonians i think he chose his son for it's command, supervised by most of his Generals who were also there with Alexander.Logic.

There are more things that would suggest that Alexander led the cavalry, but not concrete proof.

As for Sparta.Of course, Sparta's loss of power over the years was not solely due to the heavy armor.I only said it as an example.One of the reasons that the Spartans had a hard time with the Thebeans during the battles was because the Thebeans were using light armors mainly and were more flexible.And then of course there are the tactics e.t.c.

Pelopidas was a good Commander, but Philip was the one who understood the full potential of the cavalry and made more extensive use of it.

[Efstathios]

P.s. Another argument in favor of Alexander commanding the cavalry:

When Philip commanded his forces to retreat to trick the Athenians e.t.c ,Alexander saw this and used the opening to charge in and attack the allied forces by the flank.And then philip turned back and attacked them too.I used the word "charge" because in this situation that would be the most appropriate.Only with a quick charge, and possibly a cavalry charge Alexander would have been able to reach the right wing in time, and take advantage of the opening that his father left to be taken advantage of.Consider that if Alexander had led infantry it would be very difficult to command the infantry to turn and go to the right wing while they were already engaged in battle.It would be a massacre.Infantry is not fast enough for these kind of tactics.But if they were mounted, then it would be easy to just turn and charge.These kind of charges are being made with a cavalry force not with infantry.

How do you like that?

[Paralus]

How do you like that?

I like it well! I quite like the piece you've linked to. Fascinating what one might find on the internet eh?

I think the fellow dismisses Xenophon far too easily though. In fact It is a little difficult to see just which side of the fence he's on there (though that may be my stuffed head and throat the diameter of a fish's bum). Although often a moralising and occasionally pretentious git, Xenophon will have had a fair understanding of Greek cavalry warfare and tactics. I think his reasoning is sound (even if it reflects standard Greek attitudes) in that should a phalanx of hoplites stand their ground and keep their formation, it is the horsemen who will suffer.

I fail utterly (although I am no horseman) to see how Alexander or any other cavalryman could possibly keep on horseback wielding a sarissa (as the article quotes Markle). Seven to ten feet, maybe. I'd be betting seven or eight as the average (leverage will have played a decisive part). Too, if we are correct in the assumption that the Alexander Mosaic is copied from a contemporary painting, then the lance (xyston) that Alexander is depicted as wielding appears to be of that length.

To the point. The "revisionist" (wasn't aware that's what I wasGǪ) idea of Alexander commanding infantry:

This idea stands in sharp contrast to Alexander's famous cavalry exploits, glorified in art and literature, during the Persian campaigns. While it is true that no ancient source explicitly associates cavalry with Alexander at Chaeronea, he is usually thought of as commanding the Macedonian Companion Cavalry on that day.

Precisely. It is the image GÇô firmly embedded in the minds of those who study Alexander GÇô forged on the plains of Asia, which may have done the initial "revising" of the source material. None of which material puts Alexander on horseback.

On balance, I think G. is too eager to accept the revisionist reconstruction, and he knows all too well the paucity of our ancient accounts of the battle. Philip certainly had cavalry with him, precisely because he knew that the plains of Boeotia were ideal for cavalry operations (as Mardonius had concluded in 480 B.C)GǪ

There may be a "paucity of accounts", in fact there is, but none of those accounts mention Alexander in command of the cavalry. At root here is the fact that this was Philip's battle and the tactics used were of Philip's crafting. Philip indeed brought cavalry, as did the allies. It is interesting that Philip rested his troops and camped GÇô all the while assessing the enemy position. This position GÇô as Hammond describes GÇô was an extremely well chosen defensive one, leading the king to surmise that the Allied line would be static and invite attack. I would think it was here that Philip decided the infantry would win this and altered plans accordingly.

While your idea of the gaps being opened in the Allied line by Philip's echeloned approach and feigned right wing retreat, pulling the Athenians forward and left, being attacked by the cavalry makes sense (I too had considered this) the description GÇô particularly Diodorus (relying on Diyllus who Hammond perceives as wanting to justify Athens) does not exactly fit a cavalry charge. It does, though, fit an infantry charge of sorts. The cavalry may well have ensured the isolation of the Sacred Band, but it will have been the Macedonian phalanx that will have annihilated it.

Much slaughter took place among the Athenian commanded left (some 1,000 dead and 2,000 taken prisoner). It is here GÇô rounding and corralling the prisoners GÇô that cavalry will have played a part. Philip GÇô once the issue was decided GÇô ordered no pursuit of those fleeing the field. Such pursuit will have been performed by the cavalry. It is likely that it was then employed to entrap the Boeotian and Thebean right where the Macedonian phalanx:

succeeded in rupturing the solid front of the enemy line and striking down many he bore heavily on the troops opposite him. [4] As the same success was won by his companions, gaps in the front were constantly opened. Corpses piled up, until finally Alexander forced his way through the line and put his opponents to flight.

It is interesting to read Polyaenus (1) 4.2.2:

At Chaeronea Philip, being in formation facing the Athenians, gave way and retired. The Athenian commander, Stratocles shouted "We must not stop pressing the enemy hard until we drive them into Macedonia", and he did not slacken the pursuit. Philip, saying "Athenians do not know how to win", was retiring step by step, keeping his phalanx contracted and being protected in side the weapons (sarissae). After a little, on gaining higher ground, exhorting his troops, he reversed direction and charged powerfully at the Athenians, and by his brilliant fighting won the victory.

In my view, Alexander GÇô phalanx in tow GÇô charged in similar fashion at the extending and disjointing allied line and GÇô sarissa in hand GÇô "bore heavily on the troops opposite him".

[Efstathios]

I'll have to study the battle carefully and i'll get back to this.As i percieve it, and if we accept that the incident with Philip leaving an opening and Alexander charging happened as described, then i cant see any other option rather than Alexander leading cavalry.

Because he would have to run from the one wing of a large battlefield to the other.And while footmen are engaged in combat they cannot just turn their backs to the enemy uppon command.They would have been stabbed in the back.So cavalry all the way.But as i said i have to see the details carefully.

Plus Alexander was not only in charge of the cavalry but of other forces too along with the Generals.So the Sacred Band could have been crushed by a Phallanx in conjuction with the cavalry.

[amyntoros]

It seems that Gaebel was one the first maybe to say that Alexander led infantry.(Sorry i dont remember if this book has been mentioned in this post previously).

Hi Efstathios,

I began this thread with quotes from Gaebel's book, but it's understandable not to remember - I'm having a little difficulty myself recalling everything that's been written here so far. (Thank you for the link, btw.)

And while footmen are engaged in combat they cannot just turn their backs to the enemy upon command. They would have been stabbed in the back.

You wrote this, I believe, to explain why Alexander would have commanded the cavalry and not infantry, but similar reasoning applies to the Thebans. Logically, Theban soldiers would have been struck in the back if Alexander broke the allied line in the middle with a cavalry charge and then turned to take the Thebans from the rear.

If it had been a direct cavalry charge and the Thebans stood their ground then I doubt the charge would have lasted long, let alone been effective. The first horses would likely have been struck down by the Theban's spears (and that's if the horses didn't shy away from a closed phalanx) and the horses and riders following would have collided with them. But, if the Theban line DID turn away from the horses and break at the sight of a direct cavalry charge, then once again the backs of their bodies would have been exposed to Macedonian weapons.

Justin 9.3 says of the Greek army that they fell with wounds in front, and covered the places which they had been charged by their leaders to defend, with their dead bodies. Plutarch, Pelopidas 16.5 says the 300 members of the Sacred Band all lay dead together, implying that they stood their ground. Neither description sounds like the result of a cavalry charge where most men are killed when fleeing or simply trying to get out of the way. In those circumstances, there would always be wounds in the back.

Best regards,

[Paralus]

This may never be resolved. Where is theaccursed and his time machine when you need it? The more one looks at what we have in the way of sources, the more those sources reflect an infantry engagement of the near traditional Greek style (aside from PhilipGÇÖs tactics). Plutarch:

Pelopidas 18.5
. . .It is likely, therefore, that this band was called sacred on this account; as Plato calls a lover a divine friend. It is stated that it was never beaten till the battle at Chaeronea: and when Philip, after the fight, took a view of the slain, and came to the place where the three hundred that fought his phalanx lay dead together, he wondered, and understanding that it was the band of lovers, he shed tears and said, "Perish any man who suspects that these men either did or suffered anything that was base."

That is fairly straightforward. Read it again: GÇ£where the three hundred fought his phalanxGÇ¥; not fought his GÇ£Companion CavalryGÇ¥.

In none of the accounts that we have do we see GÇ£turningGÇ¥ mentioned. That is an interpolation by modern day historians. Hammond himself has Alexander GÇ£swingingGÇ¥ to left (if I remember correctly) and the companion cavalry turning left and right. Fact is, none of that is in the sources. Diodorus (16.86.4) baldly states

the same success was won by his companions; gaps in the front were constantly opened. Corpses piled up, until finally Alexander forced his way through the line and put his opponents to flight.

In such battles, corpses generally donGÇÖt pile up in front of charging cavalry. Again, the description fits nicely with Alexander leading the phalanx. He and his companions opened gaps in the GÇ£frontGÇ¥ piling corpses upon corpses until they forced a way well into the hoplite phalanx and put it to flight. All of which seems to have left the Sacred Band GÇô like LeonidasGÇÖ Spartans some 140 years before GÇô isolated. Were any turning to have occurred, this is where it will have happened.

[marcus]

In such battles, corpses generally donGÇÖt pile up in front of charging cavalry. Again, the description fits nicely with Alexander leading the phalanx. He and his companions opened gaps in the GÇ£frontGÇ¥ piling corpses upon corpses until they forced a way well into the hoplite phalanx and put it to flight. All of which seems to have left the Sacred Band GÇô like LeonidasGÇÖ Spartans some 140 years before GÇô isolated. Were any turning to have occurred, this is where it will have happened.

I haven't really had the time to immerse myself into this conversation, but I think it's worth drawing a parallel with later warfare, particularly the Napoleonic wars (about which I've been reading quite a lot recently).

Cavalry will not charge a static group of spears (or, in the case of the Napoleonics, a hedge of bayonets, which comes to the same thing). For a start, the horses will refuse - they ain't stupid; and for a second, the horses will just get spitted, and the riders will never get close enough to use their own weapons. That's why the formation of infantry squares was so effective - the enemy needed artillery to break them; or they needed the square to be broken by other retreating (or whatever) infantry. (The Scots formed schiltroms for the same reason in the 13/14th century Wars of Independence, and those could only be broken up by archers.)

Therefore, if Alexander were leading a cavalry 'brigade' at Chaeronea, then it is extremely unlikely that the Sacred Band's wounds would all have been in front - I think anyway that that is Justin's flowery way of saying that they fought bravely to the last man, rather than that they didn't get cut down from behind at all - because there is no way that the cavalry would have broken through on a frontal charge (unless the Sacred Band had not stood up to the charge, but broken, which by all accounts they didn't).

Just food for thought.

ATB

[kennyxx]

Marcus hail

Im happy your reading Napoleonic Wars I hope when you finish Maybe you will agree that Napoleon was pretty overrateted and made more blunders than can be attributed to a great Commander.

As you wisely say its no good cavalry charging head on against rank and file as was rediculously Succesfull in the Lord Of The Rings battles. The have to hit and run get into gaps or hit from tthe rear. Looking Th the sorces and the battle descriptions its quite Clear that in the beggining the Cavalry were situated behing the Infantry sections. But only speculation later in the Battle the cavalry could be used to get behind the Thebans. As at Issus Alexander mooved Cavalry unitts across to the Left to Reinfofce Parmenios forces. We cant say one way or another but we cant assume one on the Best Cavalry forces throughout military history, Just sat back eating Sandwiches and watching the show.

Kenny

[Paralus]

Time to revitalize this old thread. Fiona’s remark about Heckel and his “dislike” of Hephaestion prompted it. You see Heckel has a view, which I in large part share, that the progression of the Macedonian noble was from the paides basilikos to the agema of the hypaspists (or Royal hypaspists). It is from there, having “paid their dues” and learned the rigors of infantry battle, that they progressed to the companion cavalry. He makes a strong case but decides that, like the Spartan agoge, the king’s sons are exempt.

There is good evidence that Philip fought on foot with his pezhetairoi or guard on occasion. He seemed to have no quibbles about doing so. At Chaeronea Alexander was just eighteen – precisely the age that Heckel observes the Macedonian noble will have “filled out” enough to fight on foot as the king’s royal hypaspist guards.

Re-reading much of this thread and other material, I continually come back to the view that this is precisely what Alexander was doing here. The Macedonian Companion cavalry will in no way have managed to charge and break a solid infantry line of Greek hoplites – much less the best of the day, the Sacred Band. This has necessitated the view that Philip broke the lines by leading the Athenians forward and to their left. Although the literary evidence is sketchy, our best sources – Diodorus and Plutarch – give absolutely no indication that this was a cavalry operation. What they do indicate is that it was an infantry action.

I came across an article by Paul A Rahe of Cornell University whilst doing some background reading on the use of the sarissa and the Silver Shields and have been meaning to post something for a while (too lazy to search for the thread). Amongst other discussions, Rahe makes the point of Chaeronea far better than I do:

All in all, however, it seems unlikely that the Macedonian cavalry played a decisive role in the struggle. It is, of course, possible that N.G.L. Hammond is right in supposing that Alexander exploited with the cavalry a gap opened up between the Sacred Band and the main body of Athenian and Theban hoplites by the maneuver attributed to Philip by Polyaenus (4.2.2), but it is not likely. None of the sources has anything to say about such a breach in the Greek lines,22 and, when Plutarch (Alex. 9) speaks of the role played by Alexander in the struggle, he claims that Alexander was able "to break into" the Sacred Band itself.

In describing the same event, Diodorus ( 16.86.3-4) uses language unmistakably suggestive of a long, hard-fought infantry clash. Alexander, he reports, was "the first to break the solidity of the enemy formation, and, striking down many, he wore out those drawn up opposite him. Those standing by him did the same and were repeatedly opening up gaps in the formation. With the corpses piling up, the leading men about Alexander forced their way through and put the enemy to flight." This, of course, explains why Philip, in surveying the battlefield after the event, found the three hundred members of the Sacred Band "all mixed up together among their weapons opposite the sarissae they had encountered in the struggle."

I have a PDF of the article if any are interested.

[Kit]

Hi all,

Just to look at this issue from a different perspective for a moment-

If we all accept that Phillip fought on foot at the battle, which would have placed him in significant danger if things went badly, would a 'prudent' and 'pragmatic' man like him have also placed his son & heir in the same position?

Putting Alexander on horseback would have given him a much greater opportunity to respond quickly to changes in battle, either in support of his father, or to safeguard himself (and the Argead line) if things did not go to plan.

I like to think that Phillip was the type of man to cover all the bases!?

Regards,

[amyntoros]

If we all accept that Phillip fought on foot at the battle, which would have placed him in significant danger if things went badly, would a 'prudent' and 'pragmatic' man like him have also placed his son & heir in the same position?

Putting Alexander on horseback would have given him a much greater opportunity to respond quickly to changes in battle, either in support of his father, or to safeguard himself (and the Argead line) if things did not go to plan.

On the other hand, you might ask if Philip would have mollycoddled the son he had seemingly chosen as his heir. Would he have put Alexander in a position where he could be "safeguarded" and "protected" or would he have put him in charge of a division where Alexander could prove himself as a warrior and a commander in the thick of hand to hand combat? After all, Alexander would have needed to do that not only for Philip, but for all the Macedonians he was destined (by this point in time) to rule in the future. Charonea was an example of a traditional hoplite battle and the innovations of the use of cavalry were still just that - innovations, to be refined further by Alexander after he took the throne. And the vast majority of the Macedonian armed forces were still foot soldiers.

I think that it would have been much more important to Philip that Alexander impressed him in this battle than that he should be kept out of significant danger. And Alexander, we know, wouldn't have wanted that either. I believe he would have, by necessity, first proved himself in (and to) the infantry and then as a cavalry commander.

Best regards,

[Kit]

I certainly don't think that putting Alexander in charge of the Cavalry could be termed 'mollycodling him', but I do think it would have given him the best position to respond to the changing battlefield position, which would also have served him well in the eyes of the Macedonians as Phillip's 'heir'. Whilst we cannot prove he led the Cavalry at Charonea in person we cannot disprove it either and given his later tactics I for one see no reason to reject the more 'traditional' role attributed to him in the battle.

Why cannot Charonea have been the first of the 'new' type of battles in which cavalry played the decisive role, as it would later in Alexander's campaigns?

[Paralus]

Why cannot Charonea have been the first of the 'new' type of battles in which cavalry played the decisive role, as it would later in Alexander's campaigns?

Because none of what comes down to us via our sources describes a cavalry battle. I'm on record earlier in this thread as suggesting that it is viewed this way because this is precisely the image that comes to mind of Alexander on the battlefields of Asia. For the most part, battlefields suited to cavalry.

What we have described is an infantry battle. In fact it is a classic Greek infantry recount where cavalry, when present, is barely mentioned. In this battle it is not mentioned.

I don’t think that placing Alexander on horseback was placing him anywhere “safer” than Philip himself. The reports are unclear but what is clear is that the Greeks took up a strong defensive position. There is no cavalry described in the tactics: they are holding the field from the Cephissus to the Chaeronea acropolis in an unbroken line. There is no room – as in Asian battles – for extravagant flanking movements or flank assaults by heavy cavalry. If Alexander is commanding the cavalry, he is facing this unbroken line at its strongest: the Boeotian and Theban levies. It will be his responsibility, under the plans drawn up by his father the day before, to break that line.

Polyaenus, who tells us that Philip feigned a retreat, indicates a gap was created in the allied Greek lines. I have come to the conclusion that this was rather unlikely. The only real description of the battle we have (above) indicates nothing of the sort, Too, it will have been terribly difficult for a phalanx to allow itself to be “pushed” back and not have things turn somewhat serious. If only for the fact that it would be highly likely that the phalanx line, itself, might become disjointed (Gaugamela/Issus). All in all, a very difficult thing to pull off.

More likely, Philip led, with the left refused, to the right and became involved in a heavy engagement where his wing was hard pushed. Thus these lines from Diodorus (16.86.1-4):

When battle was joined, there was a bitter struggle for a long time, and many fell on both sides as long as the prospect for victory offered by the contest was uncertain… Then the king himself, since he was bearing the brunt of the fighting…

Sounds an awful lot to me like a particularly grim infantry encounter, typical of climactic Greek battles. Whilst this was going on Alexander, if he was in command of the horse, was at some predetermined time, to charge and split the Greek lines. An extremely dangerous and difficult assignment charging a fence of spears. Retiring cavalry, from such a charge should it fail (as it almost certainly would), are very vulnerable to javelin fire and hoplite spears.

Again, as Rahe states, this is not Diodorus’ description (16.86.3-4):

(Alexander was) the first to break the solidity of the enemy formation, and, striking down many, he wore out those drawn up opposite him. Those standing by him did the same and were repeatedly opening up gaps in the formation. With the corpses piling up, the leading men about Alexander forced their way through and put the enemy to flight.

Sounds very much, to me, like an infantry encounter.

[jan]

Thanks, Amyntoros, for presenting all the various sources as you did. For me, the comments made by Justin are the most useful, as he states something that makes sense to me now. If you ever get a chance to see the movie Flags of Our Fathers, note the scene in which the Indian moves amongst the wounded. That scene prompted a trip back to Charonea for me, and thanks to your help, I now understand why. The Athenians died with wounds on the front Justin states. That is pertinent to me. I will just let this rest for now, but you have helped considerably.