Macedonian Military Numbers

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Macedonian Military Numbers

Post by Xenophon »

agesilaos wrote:Diodoros XVIII 68 i Kassandros has 4,000 infantry from Antigonos, so unlikely to be Macedonians more likely Mercenaries, who will also have formed the garrisons of many of the cities he could call on; Polyperchon has 20,000 Macedonians, 4,000 allies, 1,000 cavalry and 65 elephants during his move on Athens just before Megalopolis. About all I can find at the moment.
Just a short note on these figures. We aren't told the number of Kassander's own troops - or even if he had any - in addition to those supplied by Antigonus.

One thing is all but certain though - Diodorus' figures for Polyperchon's army can hardly be correct. Antipater originally had some 12,000 Macedonian troops when Alexander headed east with a similar number. Thereafter, it is estimated some 2-3,000 new recruits could be called up annually, less perhaps a similar, or perhaps a little smaller, number discharged as too old or unfit. Alexander constantly drained Macedon of troops, so that Antipater was never able to field more than 12-13,000 Macedonian infantry. In fact Diodorus comments on his constant shortage of men [ XVIII.12] at the time of the Lamian war. Later rulers of Macedon could field 13,300 ( Antigonus Doson; Sellasia); 16,000 (Philip V Kynoskephalae) - and note that the theorists envisaged a maximum phalanx of this size, ; 21,000 ( Perseus at Pydna after 'scraping the barrel' with youths and old men).

I have not included the large Hellenistic Successor armies for obviously these we were not genuine 'Macedonians'.

Given that Polyperchon did not have a monopoly on Macedonian troops, a figure of 20,000 is pretty much out of the question. The actual number must have been far less - which might also explain why Polyperchon was unable to take action against Kassander.

The figures for allies and cavalry look to be of the right order of magnitude, as is the number of elephants given that the "Royal Herd" is estimated to consist of around 70 at this time.......
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

Post by agesilaos »

As with most things ‘that [are ] certain’ , it is by no means certain that Polyperchon could not raise 20,000 Macedonian troops.

It is not certain either, that Antipatros was left with 12,000 Macedonian foot, Diodoros does not say what sort of infantry remained with him; XVII 17 v just says
5 The soldiers who were left behind in Europe under the command of Antipater numbered twelve thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse.5
Bosworth, ‘The Legacy of Alexander’, makes great play of this fact, but he is intent on demonstrating how Alexander had depopulated Macedonia to fuel his eastern holocaust. It is possible that Diodoros’ source was only meaning Macedonian troops and that Antipatros would supplement them with mercenaries, rather than AB’s, ‘The conclusion seems to me unavoidable. Antipater was left with a mixed force in which the Macedonian infantry (and cavalry) under arms comprised a minority. If the proportions were similar to those in Alexander’s expeditionary force, he wold have had about 4-5,000 Macedonian infantrymen.’ pp.66-7.

If Macedonia could only raise 16,000 infantry (12,000 on expedition 4,000 with Antipatros) then it was less populous than Athens in 431, which Perikles claims (Thuk ) could field 25,000 citizen hoplites!

The matter is not certain, but it looks to me that Bosworth is over-egging his pudding. He also criticises the notion that recruitment was by year groups and that one can extrapolate from the size of Alexander’s reported reinforcements the size of these year groups, 2,500-3,000.

We might try to resolve matters empirically, http://ourworldindata.org/data/populati ... on-growth/ gives Macedonia a population density of 4.86 per km2 in the year 0 (clearly astronomers rather than historians) and Blackwell’s ‘Companion to Ancient Macedonia’, p 76, makes Philip II’s realm 43,210 Km2 which yields a population of 210,000, which is not dissimilar to that of fifth century Athens, which could raise 25,000 hoplites, already 9,000 more than Bosworth allows Macedon, yet Athenian hoplites had to meet a property requirement that Macedonian phalangites did not, making to pool of potential recruits much larger.

Even the 13,000 Diodoros says Antipatros fielded against the rebels in the Lamian war is doubted by Bosworth, who is understandably concerned with the corollary that ‘Macedonia was short of citizen soldiers’ XVIII 12 ii;
2 As soon, however, as he learned of the movement concerted against him by the Greeks, he left Sippas as general of Macedonia, giving him a sufficient army and bidding him enlist as many men as possible, while he himself, taking thirteen thousand Macedonians and six hundred horsemen (for Macedonia was short of citizen soldiers because of the number of those who had been sent to Asia as replacements for the army), set out from Macedonia to Thessaly, accompanied by the entire fleet which Alexander had sent to convoy a sum of money from the royal treasury to Macedonia, being in all one hundred and ten triremes.
Bosworth points out that Diodoros frequently uses a for x number of Macedonians, x number of mercenaries x number of cavalry and posits that the number of Macedonians has dropped out together with the mention of mercenaries. He fails to consider that 13,000 may have been small for a Macedonian levy! This would certainly be the case if the total in 334 had been 24,000.

There would be other causes for Antipatros’ troop shortage; Zopyrion had recently lost a whole army; the Odrysians were in revolt, again (Lysimachos had to fight Seuthes on his return); nor was Sippas left without a force.

Just to keep matters in chronological order in 318 Polyperchon DID have a monopoly over Macedonian resources; some Macedonian troops remained in Asia but he alone could call on the native levy, Kassandros had fled to Antigonos and the split within the kingdom was yet to arise. Could Macedonia supply 20,000 infantry in 318? I should think almost certainly.

The later Antigonids had slimmer resources to work with yet still raised appreciable forces; Doson’s force at Sellasia was hardly the full levy, but an expeditionary force; it was Philip V not Perseus who called up veterans and striplings, yet his own diagramma still exempts whole groups from being drafted, so hardly ‘scraping the barrel’; the reason being the defeat at Aous the previous year. The performance of the new recruits gives the lie to your notion that one can train phalangites overnight (Alexander seems to have allotted four years for the purpose if one considers the gap between his Asiatic training programmes being initiated and the troops joining the army). Peter Connolly only worked with, what twenty people? Not really a comparison. When someone works with 64 or more people it is will still be less than most cities would be training, judging from the honorary stele from Beroia (I think)

Perseus managed 21,000 because after Kynoskephalai Philip V put all his efforts into re-building the kingdom’s strength and promoting population growth.
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

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Xenophon wrote:Given that Polyperchon did not have a monopoly on Macedonian troops, a figure of 20,000 is pretty much out of the question.
This is a grave misunderstanding of the situation and the source(s). The actuality - which Agesilaos has pointed to - is quite the opposite. Polyperchon, on the death of Antipatros, was made regent. At this time he had no opposition in Macedonia other than Kassandros who, realising his position was weak, set about organising his philoi and bolted to Antigonos in Asia. Polyperchon took over the entire organs of 'state' and that included the kings and the royal army. He did not share this with anyone as Diodorus makes plain:
Diod. 18.48.4; 54.1-2
Antipater, who was already at the point of death, appointed as guardian of the kings and supreme commander, Polyperchon, who was almost the oldest of those who had campaigned with Alexander and was held in honour by the Macedonians.

Although Cassander had failed to gain the ruling position in Macedonia, he was not dismayed; but he determined to maintain his claim to it, holding it disgraceful that his father's office should be administered by others. Since he perceived that the favour of the Macedonians inclined to Polyperchon...
Polyperchon clearly had the favour of "the Macedonians" and a monopoly of the forces available to the kings at this time. To claim that he shared these with anyone is more than difficult to substantiate. Polyperchon was still in this position when he advanced on Attica in spring 318 at the head of that royal army. I've not considered the possibility of any bias in the source though.
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

Post by Xenophon »

Back on Aug 27 I posted what has become the first post in this thread in the “Ear, Springtime for Arrian....and Diodorus” thread and it was intended to correct a quotation by Agesilaos from Diodorus regarding Polyperchon’s army at Athens which must be erroneous.

Originally, I had not intended to participate here despite some ‘howlers’ in the posts of Agesilaos and Paralus due to the fact that military matters are, shall we say, not their strongest suit as is evident from other threads. – but no-one can be an expert in every aspect of Greek/Macedonian/Hellenistic history, I certainly am not.

Moreover, the subject of ancient army numbers, whether nominal strengths or casualties or any other aspect is fraught with difficulty, not to mention that strengths varied enormously in practise, and were invariably less than their nominal ‘paper’ strengths, sometimes drastically so, as we can gather from known strengths of Roman Legions.

The first error stems from not properly understanding the way in which Graeco-Macedonian states raised their armies, which Agesilaos and Paralus seem to have overlooked. Generally speaking, Phalanxes were raised from CITIZENS, who were typically recruited from late teens (often referred to as ‘Ephebes’) and being liable for service until their fifties – though on occasion those older and younger could be ‘called up’ [e.g. Philip V calling up 15 year-olds prior to Kynoskephalae and very likely Perseus doing much the same before the Pydna campaign]. In Macedon ( and other States ), a Phalanx going on campaign, or forming part of a field campaign army abroad was drawn from the experienced men in their prime – roughly 21 to 40 or so, whilst the young were regarded as too inexperienced and the elderly as not fit enough for the rigours of campaign and forced marches. These only served in ‘Home Defence’ for the homeland could not be left undefended, and as a rule of thumb, in practice approximately half those called up for service would go on campaign, though again there were exceptions. Because Macedon was surrounded by predatory and hostile states, a proportion of the Army sufficient to defend it had always to be present at home, thus the whole Macedonian phalanx could only take the field in defence of Macedon, as at Kynoskephalae and Pydna. Alexander took only 6 taxeis, ( excluding Guard units) some 12,000 men at most - less still if you are one of those who believe, like Berve and Brunt et al that the taxis numbered only 1500, which is probably incorrect – I have thought so since the 1970’s. See discussion here by Luke Ueda-Sarson [ http://lukeuedasarson.com/GranicusNotes.html ] who sets out the evidence for taxeis of 2,000.
Half the phalanx, the remaining 12,000, were left with Antipater to defend Macedon’s European Empire, and control subject peoples ( and half the cavalry too).
Agesilaos wrote:
POLYPERCHON Macedonian numbers
As with most things ‘that [are ] certain’ , it is by no means certain that Polyperchon could not raise 20,000 Macedonian troops.
I hope to demonstrate that it is certain, and in truth I was surprised that you and Paralus did not recognise this !
It is not certain either, that Antipatros was left with 12,000 Macedonian foot, Diodoros does not say what sort of infantry remained with him; XVII 17 v just says

The soldiers who were left behind in Europe under the command of Antipater numbered twelve thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse.
Again this is to misunderstand ancient military matters. No-one in their right mind would leave hearth, family and homeland to be ‘protected’ by mercenaries whilst the native army marched off overseas for obvious reasons – there are a number of examples of what tended to happen if mercenary troops were relied on for protection ( e.g. The Mamertines in Sicily).

Diodorus doesn’t mention mercenaries, and I think he obviously means Macedonian troops when unspecified.( Where mercenaries are present Diodorus usually mentions them separately)

We might try to resolve matters empirically, http://ourworldindata.org/data/populati ... on-growth/ gives Macedonia a population density of 4.86 per km2 in the year 0 (clearly astronomers rather than historians) and Blackwell’s ‘Companion to Ancient Macedonia’, p 76, makes Philip II’s realm 43,210 Km2 which yields a population of 210,000, which is not dissimilar to that of fifth century Athens, which could raise 25,000 hoplites, already 9,000 more than Bosworth allows Macedon, yet Athenian hoplites had to meet a property requirement that Macedonian phalangites did not, making to pool of potential recruits much larger.
I don’t think this method is valid. The size of Macedon was in constant flux, other estimates for its size at the end of Philip’s reign are 30,000km2 or a little more. Since exact borders are not known, all we can do is make a rough estimate. Other estimates for total population at this time are 1.2 million ( based on a figure of 40 odd per km2 ) give or take a couple of hundred thousand and of course not all the population were ethnic Macedonians and fewer still were citizens/Makedones.
Even the 13,000 Diodoros says Antipatros fielded against the rebels in the Lamian war is doubted by Bosworth, who is understandably concerned with the corollary that ‘Macedonia was short of citizen soldiers’ XVIII 12 ii;
I think it fair to say that Bosworth’s views on this subject are not widely accepted, and are certainly an exaggeration. We neeed consider them no further.

As soon, however, as he learned of the movement concerted against him by the Greeks, he left Sippas as general of Macedonia, giving him a sufficient army and bidding him enlist as many men as possible, while he himself, taking thirteen thousand Macedonians and six hundred horsemen (for Macedonia was short of citizen soldiers because of the number of those who had been sent to Asia as replacements for the army), set out from Macedonia to Thessaly, accompanied by the entire fleet which Alexander had sent to convoy a sum of money from the royal treasury to Macedonia, being in all one hundred and ten triremes.
Bosworth points out that Diodoros frequently uses a for x number of Macedonians, x number of mercenaries x number of cavalry and posits that the number of Macedonians has dropped out together with the mention of mercenaries. He fails to consider that 13,000 may have been small for a Macedonian levy! This would certainly be the case if the total in 334 had been 24,000.
You seem to have overlooked the fact that the bulk of the Macedonian phalanx troops were in Asia at the time. It is certainly true that Alexander drew off the bulk of new drafts, and therefore Antipater’s available manpower remained static at around 12-13,000.
There would be other causes for Antipatros’ troop shortage; Zopyrion had recently lost a whole army; the Odrysians were in revolt, again (Lysimachos had to fight Seuthes on his return); nor was Sippas left without a force.
It is perhaps likely that Zopyrion’s army included few if any actual Macedonian phalanx troops.....
Just to keep matters in chronological order in 318 Polyperchon DID have a monopoly over Macedonian resources; some Macedonian troops remained in Asia but he alone could call on the native levy, Kassandros had fled to Antigonos and the split within the kingdom was yet to arise. Could Macedonia supply 20,000 infantry in 318? I should think almost certainly.
You and Paralus have misinterpreted what I said. I didn’t mention ‘resources’, I said “ Polyperchon did not have a monopoly on Macedonian troops.” By which I meant the fact that the other Diadochi also fielded parts of the total Macedonian phalanx. In addition to what we may term the ‘Home defence force’, the field army, or expeditionary force was still largely in Asia – but I’ll go into more detail below.......
The later Antigonids had slimmer resources to work with yet still raised appreciable forces; Doson’s force at Sellasia was hardly the full levy, but an expeditionary force; it was Philip V not Perseus who called up veterans and striplings, yet his own diagramma still exempts whole groups from being drafted, so hardly ‘scraping the barrel’; the reason being the defeat at Aous the previous year.
Antigonus Doson fielded a Macedonian phalanx of 10,000 men at Sellasia in 222 BC ( plus 3,000 Guard Peltasts. Since Polyperchon, inheriting Antipater’s army, had no Guard units I shall quote only figures for the ‘ordinary’ phalanx.) I think you’ll find Philip V was indeed ‘scraping the barrel’. At all times in history certain essential groups must be exempted from conscription – it is never possible to draft every able-bodied man! Philip’s casualties were less than 2,000 in 198 BC at the Aous, [Livy XXXII.12..9] which loss would have been largely made good by next year’s normal draft before the Kynoskephalae campaign, and he wouldn’t have needed to conscript 15 year-olds and aged veterans for that reason. Rather, he was stretching every sinew to defend Macedon against the Romans, and their vastly superior potential manpower.
The performance of the new recruits gives the lie to your notion that one can train phalangites overnight (Alexander seems to have allotted four years for the purpose if one considers the gap between his Asiatic training programmes being initiated and the troops joining the army). Peter Connolly only worked with, what twenty people? Not really a comparison. When someone works with 64 or more people it is will still be less than most cities would be training, judging from the honorary stele from Beroia (I think).
As I have remarked elsewhere, you have little knowledge of military drill, either how it is done, or how long training takes.The point is that phalanx drill and handling a pike are not rocket science, and can be learnt quickly as Connolly demonstrated. Even today, drill is learned in small squads, and once basic drill is learnt, these ‘building blocks’ are then put together to achieve mass drill – which is also easily and quickly learnt. I remember in my army days a Scots ex-British army RSM wagering the other NCO’s that he would have raw recruits perform the tricky right and left forms of the Brigade of Guards at their annual Trooping the Colour, at the recruits passing out parade some two weeks hence. Given their other training commitments, the recruits had but an hour a day for drill, and that not every day, so that there was only a total of 10-12 hours drill training. The 800 recruits performed flawlessly at the passing out parade, replicating the Trooping the Colour ceremony every bit as good as Guardsmen.

It is poor logic to assume that the four (six?) years before the ‘epigoni’ joined Alexander’s army was needed to train them as a phalanx. Consider that when Philip II initiated his phalanx reforms after his brother King Perdiccas III was killed and the army largely destroyed in the summer of 359 BC, he was starting from scratch, with new weapons and drill. After training the new conscripts in the Spring of 358 [it is unlikely they were called up over the dead of Winter], Philip led his ‘New Model Army’ against the hitherto victorious Illyrians, completely destroying them, and their King Bardylis died in turn. Obviously a high pitch of training could be achieved in a few months at most.
Perseus managed 21,000 because after Kynoskephalai Philip V put all his efforts into re-building the kingdom’s strength and promoting population growth.
Indeed, there was a period of relative peace after the defeat at Kynoskephale ending the second Macedonian war in 197 BC, with its heavy casualties (8,000 dead and 5,000 prisoners according to Livy XXXIII.6.7, relying on Polybius),and Perseus’ defence of Macedonia at Pydna in 168 BC – time enough for Macedonian numbers to build up again. Perseus seems to have fielded an ‘ordinary’ phalanx of 16,000 ( plus an Agema of 2,000 and 3,000 other Guard Peltasts), though exact numbers are uncertain. The total of 21,000 or thereabouts was certainly the largest single Macedonian phalanx ever fielded, consisting as it did of a united ‘Field Army’ and ‘Home Defence Force’ and ‘Royal Guard’. This alone makes Polyperchon’s Macedonian phalanx at Athens ( i.e. ‘Field Army’ only ) being 20,000 strong extremely unlikely. But there is even more concrete evidence.

At Babylon, Alexander had a maximum of some 16,000 or so phalangites if at full strength ( 8 taxeis of 2,000 ), plus his Guard units, of whom he sent 10,000 or so veterans home to Macedon under Craterus, retaining at most 6,000 if all units were at full paper strength (unlikely), and in fact there we probably 4,000 judging by the numbers needed to fill his proposed mixed Macedonian/Persian phalanx [Arrian VII.23.3 ] . For the Lamian War which immediately followed Alexander’s death in 323 BC, Antipater had an army of some 13,000 infantry ( probably a phalanx of 12,000 plus 1,000 Macedonian archers/light troops – who were not citizens. In the absence of allies, Macedonian native light troops were needed ) He left Sippas in Macedon with perhaps at most 2,000 phalangites and orders to raise more. [Diod xviii.12.2]. This period saw the largest number of Macedonian phalangites to ever be under arms, and was still less than 30,000 in total. Many of Alexander’s phalanx in Asia will have been non-Macedonians, recruited along the way in the course of the campaign, diluting Macedonian ethnicity, as occurred in the cavalry.

When Antipater was defeated by a 25-30,000 strong Greek army, Antipater was penned up in Lamia, having sent for help. The first to come was Leonnatus, who recruited in Macedon, probably taking over Sippas’ troops. In all he was able to gather an army of 20,000, but only a few were Macedonian phalangites. Before he could join Antipater, he was defeated and killed by a larger Greek army. Antipater succeeded in joining the survivors and took command.

Next, Craterus brought over 6,000 of the ten thousand veterans from Cilicia plus 4,000 other troops enlisted in Cilicia, as well as 1,000 Persian archers and slingers and 1,500 cavalry. This swelled the three combined forces to over 40,000 heavy infantry, 3,000 archers and slingers and 5,000 cavalry( few of whom were ethnically Macedonian). The Macedonian phalanx portion will have numbered something like 20-22,000 (estimated). Antipater defeated the Greeks at Crannon in September 322 BC. In 321 BC he took probably half the army across to Asia to attend the conference at Triparadeisos in upper Syria, leaving Polyperchon with ‘a considerable army’ to fend off the Aetolians ( who had been allied to the now dead Perdiccas). The Aetolians defeated and killed Antipater’s general Polycles and “no small number of his soldiers”. Antipater returned to Macedon, having appointed Antigonus as General of the ‘Royal Army’ in Asia, with his son Kassander as ‘Chiliarch’ to Antigonus. He also left 8,500 phalangites with Antigonus to bolster the ‘Royal’ Army’s strength [Arrian Fr. XI.43 ; Diod XIX.29.3]
Antipater’s army in Macedon now contained 12-13,000 phalangites once again, or perhaps even less depending on how large Polycles’ losses had been.

That is the number that Polyperchon inherited in 319 BC on the death of Antipater, and even if Polyperchon denuded Macedon of every phalangite – unlikely in the extreme, for the reasons explained above – he had nothing like 20,000 Macedonian phalangites at Athens in 318 BC. ( as Diod XVIII.68.2 gives him). Diodorus, or rather his source, is clearly in error here, just as I said in my original post.
Last edited by Xenophon on Sun Nov 15, 2015 11:33 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

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Postby Paralus » Sat Aug 29, 2015 3:18 pm
Xenophon wrote:
Given that Polyperchon did not have a monopoly on Macedonian troops, a figure of 20,000 is pretty much out of the question.

This is a grave misunderstanding of the situation and the source(s). The actuality - which Agesilaos has pointed to - is quite the opposite.
On the contrary it is you and Agesilaos who have misunderstood the situation! [ see response to Agesilaos above, and note the figures I gave are ‘maxima’ and exclusive of Guard units.]
Polyperchon, on the death of Antipatros, was made regent. At this time he had no opposition in Macedonia other than Kassandros who, realising his position was weak, set about organising his philoi and bolted to Antigonos in Asia. Polyperchon took over the entire organs of 'state' and that included the kings and the royal army. He did not share this with anyone as Diodorus makes plain:

Diod. 18.48.4; 54.1-2
Antipater, who was already at the point of death, appointed as guardian of the kings and supreme commander, Polyperchon, who was almost the oldest of those who had campaigned with Alexander and was held in honour by the Macedonians.
Although Cassander had failed to gain the ruling position in Macedonia, he was not dismayed; but he determined to maintain his claim to it, holding it disgraceful that his father's office should be administered by others. Since he perceived that the favour of the Macedonians inclined to Polyperchon...
Polyperchon clearly had the favour of "the Macedonians" and a monopoly of the forces available to the kings at this time. To claim that he shared these with anyone is more than difficult to substantiate.
I did not say this. Both you and Agesilaos misunderstood what I wrote in an identical fashion.
I said “Polyperchon did not have a monopoly on Macedonian troops” which he obviously did not given the ‘Field Army’ still being in Asia ( see above again).
Clearly Polyperchon was still in this position when he advanced on Attica in spring 318 at the head of that royal army. I've not considered the possibility of any bias in the source though.
In that he enjoyed (briefly) a monopoly on recruiting native ‘Makedones’ for the phalanx, that is correct to a degree, but I assume you would acknowledge that thousands of Macedonian heavy infantry served at the time in the armies of Antigonus and Eumenes, for example ? [ see Diod XIX.29.3 and one of your favourite passages, XIX.40 ff !!] Clearly, as I said, Polyperchon did not have a monopoly on Macedonian troops.

The situation regarding manpower and numbers was as I said, which I have now gone to some pains to explain...... and Diodorus must be incorrect in this instance.
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

Post by agesilaos »

Please don't think that I deny your right to post what you have, I do not agree with all of it and think it you deserve a discussion, but not on the chronology thread; that is going to be hard enough going and really does need to stay focused on the chronological issues, IMHO; this does not mean that troop numbers might not be relevant at some stage but just now the digression will overwhelm the thread. I have asked Amyntoros to move your post to the Tomb III thread where the digression is already concerned with these matters, and it will not cause any distraction and can develop. I have also asked that she awaits your consent, or at least I have told her I will PM you so you know that it is not a complaint just a concern about keeping a difficult thread on track; I want to engage without be de-railed, Mike [Paralus} is already forcing me to re-run the previous discussion, which might not be a bad thing, if you recall that too was a split thread;

In any case if you could consent to the move, but ask for an indication that it has been moved to where and why (I think I asked) I''ll copy this to her, cheers
I’ll ignore the usual deprecation of others’ understanding and vaunting of your own, the tedious threnody of so many posts and accept your figures only you rob Krateros of four thousand Macedonians, :roll: viz

Diodoros XVII 16
4 About the same time Craterus also departed from Cilicia and arrived in Macedonia to reinforce Antipater and to make good the defeats that the Macedonians had suffered.63 He brought with him six thousand foot soldiers from those who had crossed into Asia with Alexander and four thousand from those who had been enlisted on the march, one thousand Persian bowmen and slingers, and fifteen hundred horsemen. 5 Entering Thessaly and freely yielding the chief command to Antipater, he shared a camp with him beside the Peneius River.64 Including those who had been under Leonnatus, there were gathered together in all more than forty thousand heavy armed infantry, three thousand bowmen and slingers, and five thousand cavalry

ἦγε δὲ πεζοὺς μὲν τῶν εἰς ἈσίανἈλεξάνδρῳ συνδιαβεβηκότων ἑξακισχιλίους, τῶν δ᾽ ἐν παρόδῳ προσειλημμένων τετρακισχιλίους,
Taken into the army during Alexander’s march rather than being from the forces of the original crossing so now your 12-13,000 is 16-17,000, and where were the kings? Philip was actually with Polyperchon on his march so the Guard ought to be there too, instant 19-20,000
QED.
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

Post by Xenophon »

Agesilaos wrote:
only you rob Krateros of four thousand Macedonians, :roll: viz

Diodoros XVII 16
4 About the same time Craterus also departed from Cilicia and arrived in Macedonia to reinforce Antipater and to make good the defeats that the Macedonians had suffered.63 He brought with him six thousand foot soldiers from those who had crossed into Asia with Alexander and four thousand from those who had been enlisted on the march, one thousand Persian bowmen and slingers, and fifteen hundred horsemen. 5 Entering Thessaly and freely yielding the chief command to Antipater, he shared a camp with him beside the Peneius River.64 Including those who had been under Leonnatus, there were gathered together in all more than forty thousand heavy armed infantry, three thousand bowmen and slingers, and five thousand cavalry

ἦγε δὲ πεζοὺς μὲν τῶν εἰς ἈσίανἈλεξάνδρῳ συνδιαβεβηκότων ἑξακισχιλίους, τῶν δ᾽ ἐν παρόδῳ προσειλημμένων τετρακισχιλίους,

Taken into the army during Alexander’s march rather than being from the forces of the original crossing so now your 12-13,000 is 16-17,000, and where were the kings? Philip was actually with Polyperchon on his march so the Guard ought to be there too, instant 19-20,000
QED.
Those 'enlisted on the march' are surely those raised by Craterus on his march through Cilicia, and Macedon. The 4,000 veteran Macedonian phalangites can be shown to have remained in Cilicia serving under Neoptolemus and Alcetas, and ultimately Eumenes ( see e.g. N G L Hammond "Alexander's veterans after his death" ). If Craterus had brought all 10,000 veterans, then Diodorus' source would have said so. To divide them and describe them in the way you have is a rather forced argument, to say the least. As for Guards, the Silver Shields were also elsewhere at this time and certainly not with Polyperchon. There is no mention in our sources of Philip Arrhidaeus having his own Guard units, or being present at Athens. ( he and Eurydike were almost certainly back in Macedon )

Like I said, even with your attempt to 'fudge' the figures you cannot get to 20,000 Macedonian phalangites present at Athens, for that would still require denuding Macedonia of defenders, and no Makedones at all left in defence of Macedon, once again displaying your failure to understand matters military. ( and apparently the meaning of the word "threnody".) That a portion were left there is certain, for later Philip and Eurydike would raise an army from them in Macedon to oppose Olympias and the Molossians.

What you have suggested is all too obviously completely wrong.
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

Post by Paralus »

Xenophon wrote: As for Guards, the Silver Shields were also elsewhere at this time and certainly not with Polyperchon.
Indeed they were not: they'd been pensioned off at Triparadeisos and sent to Susa with their commander (only to be 'reactivated' at Polyperchon's request in 318). The royal army, with the kings, then departed Triparadeisos. The kings were given somatophylakes at Triparadeisos. It is not stated but is is a safe deduction that a Macedonian guard was also arranged. Unless, of course, we are to assume that with the 'retirement' of the aged original foot guard the Macedonians felt the subsequent kings and their court could do without.
Xenophon wrote: There is no mention in our sources of Philip Arrhidaeus having his own Guard units, or being present at Athens.
The king was most certainly with the army as anyone familiar with the history and sources would know. The Royal army (on the march to Athens) in Phokis (Plut. Phok. 33.4-5):
Both the parties fell in with Polysperchon at the same time, as he was marching with the king near Pharygae, a village of Phocis lying at the foot of Mount Acrurium, which is now called Galata. Here, then, Polysperchon, after setting up the golden canopy and seating beneath it the king and his friends, as soon as Deinarchus came forward, ordered him to be seized, tortured, and put to death, and there gave audience to the Athenians.
Given that the court was with the royal army and that army was on campaign, it is a very safe bet that Macedonian guard troops accompanied the Macedonian king as was customary.
Last edited by Paralus on Mon Nov 16, 2015 8:40 pm, edited 2 times in total.
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

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Let us consider your proposal; we know that Alexander sent Krateros to Kilikia with 10,000 veterans in the process of discharge home (Diod. XVII 109 i, XVIII 4 i, Arr. ‘Ana.’, VII 12 i).

You suggest that Krateros, whose new sphere was to be Europe with Antipatros, left almost half of his troops, who had mutinied to get home, remember, to garrison a satrapy belonging to another and quite probably a Perdikkan (a Philotas, receives Kilikia at Babylon Diod. XVIII 3 I, and also appears in prison with the surviving Perdikkans at XIX 16 i), at a time when the Macedonian hegemony hung in the balance. On the whole I am against the inherent probability of this.

But there are also the 1,000 Persian bowmen and slingers, and 1,500 cavalry, these sound like local recruits if anyone does yet they are not included in these men allegedly raised on the march, hmmm. One also has to ask why did Krateros only recruit up to his original 10,000?

No source mentions any recruiting drive by Krateros and given that he seems to have finally acted in haste (Antipatros and Leonnatos had been defeated and now Perdikkas and the Royal Army were approaching his area). Where is the source reference that ‘show[s] 4,000 veteran Macedonian Phalangites remained in Kilikia. Alketas and Neoptolemos both received their troops from the Royal Army and Perdikkas and at the time in question Neoptolemos was archi-hypaspist, no one collected this mass of valuable troops it would seem.

Diodoros’ source does say he took all 10,000 of his veterans, if you accept that it further defined them as those who crossed with Alexander and those that joined him later, a perfectly natural reading of the Greek, if you wish to call it ‘forced’ you will have to supply some examples of readings that contradict this, check Hammond’s footnotes he ought to support this notion from the sources.

Paralus has dealt with you error over the Argyraspides; and where Philip III was. Whether he had his own guards is strongly suggested by IG II2 560, which you brought up yourself on the ‘Body in Tomb III’ thread. It records honours to somatophylakes of Alexander IV, probably who may well be members of the Agema rather than the so-called Seven, which would be direct evidence. Indirectly, Arrian ‘Ta Meta Alex.’ Gives some of the ‘somatophylakes’ appointed for Philip III at Triparadeisos, these are of the order of Alexander’s Seven; if he had these it is likely that he also had Hypaspists. Such are mentioned in the assault on the Camel Fort, Diod XVIII, 33, vi but the word maybe being used in its original sense of shield-bearer (they accompany ladder-bearers) or they may be the assault troops intended to mount the ladders.

Now, that’s more than three errors which puts you in breach of ‘Liston’s Law’
That's three from three obvious errors by Liston - doesn't inspire confidence in her pronouncements, does it ?
:lol: :lol: :lol:
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

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After Alexander’s death in June 323 the Macedonians of the royal army, which was then in Babylonia, served under the command of Perdiccas until he was assassinated in Egypt in 321. There was, however, a separate army, that of 10,000 Macedonian soldiers whom Alexander had sent in 324 on their homeward journey under the command of Craterus, who was himself to take military command in Macedonia. The rising iof the Greek states in the Lamian War found them still in Cilicia. When the Macedonian fleet established its supremacy at sea in 322, Craterus crossed into Europe with “6000 of those who had crossed with Alexander into Asia.” [n.13 Diod. 18.16.4. J G Droysen, Geschichte des Hellenismus 2 II I (Gotha 1878) 71, made the mistake of saying that Craterus took the 10,000 veterans (“er hatte die 10,000 Veteranen aus dem grossen makedonischen Heere”); this mistake was repeated by others, eg.Tarn CAH vi 458. It led to a further error in Droysen II.I 119.] These were a part of the 10,000. The other 4,000 stayed in or near Cilicia, and we shall resume them later. Craterus took his 6000 veterans and some other troops straight into Thessaly to join the forces of Antipater and fight the battle of Crannon in September 322.

It will be recalled that in 324 Alexander had originally planned to repatriate “those who for reasons of age or injury were unfit for battle.” Then no number is mentioned (Arr.7.8.1) Later, after the mutiny, men in this category who chose to go numbered up to 10,000 (7.12.1). Antipater was to bring out as a replacement for these men “Macedonians of those who were in their prime” (7.12.4). It is, I think, clear that Alexander intended the 10,000 veterans – or the bulk of them – to continue in military service under Craterus in Macedonia ; for otherwise the forces in Macedonia would have been reduced to a very low level. In other words Alexander sent home not 10,000 casualties but 10,000 men still able to serve but not in the condition which his form of campaigning required of first-line troops.

In 321 Craterus and Antipater crossed from Europe to Asia with and army of perhaps 30,000 infantry [n.14 Antipater and Craterus had 48,000 men at the battle of Crannon; but they had to leave a “considerable army” with Polyperchon in Macedonia, as they expected a further rising in Greece, as indeed happened (Diod. 18.38.6). So I suggest that they left 18,000 men in Macedonia and took 30,000 to Asia.] That Craterus brought his famous veterans with him is to be expected. The two generals went different ways, each with his own army, and the task of Craterus was to defeat Eumenes, a general of Perdiccas, who was now their enemy. It was to this occaision that Diodorus 18.30.4, cited above, was directed: among Craterus’ 20,000 infantry were “ the majority of Macedonians celebrated for their deeds of valour” – that was the majority of the original 10,000 veterans. It was on their expertise in phalanx fighting that he relied for victory. Thus Craterus still had some 6000 veterans under his command.[n.15 This is not to deny that there may have been among them some macedonianswho had seen service only in Europe; but their record of two defeats and one victory in the Lamian War would not have qualified them for such a reputation for valour.]

[…paragraph on textual emendation…]

Let us now turn to the fortunes of the 4,000 Alexander veterans who did not accompany Craterus to Europe in the summer of 322. We find a trace of them early in the following year, before Craterus and Antipater crossed from Europe to Asia. Since Perdiccas intended to invade Egypt with the royal army, he appointed Eumenes as his commander- in-chief in Asia Minor and ordere him to prevent such a crossing by Craterus and Antipater. He placed several notable officers under the command of Eumenes (Diod. 18.29.2); but Alcetas, who had been in command of a phalanx brigade at the battle of the Hydaspes river, and Neoptolemus, a famous commander and fighter under Alexander, refused to become his subordinates. Alcetas said that his Macedonians wanted Craterus “as their king [n.17 For the extraordinary popularity of Craterus and the Macedonians’ regard for him, almost as if he were royalty, see Suda sv. Krateros (K 2335): kata basilea.] and were ashamed to fight against Antipater” (Plut. Eum. 5.2). This suggests that they had served under Craterus, eg. In Cilicia; and their respect for Antipater suggests that they had served with Antipater before they crossed to Asia in 334. Neoptolemus said he had followed Alexander with shield and spear whereas Eumenes had done so with pen and writing-pad (Plut. Eum. 1.3). He had “a considerable force of Macedonians” (Diod.18.29.4), opened secret negotiations with Antipater, and was brought to battle by Eumenes. On his defeat the phalanx-troops of Neoptolemus were compelled to surrender and enter the service of Eumenes [n.18 Plut. Eum. 5.3. This is probably the action described in PSI XII 1284; cf. A B Bosworth GRBS 19 (1978) 227-37.] Thus Eumenes “acquired a large number of Macedonian, men of valour” (Diod.18.29.5, proslabomenos Makedonwn agathwn andrwn plethos). These men were a partand probably the larger part of the 4000 veterans left in Cilicia.
The Bosworth article can be found here

http://grbs.library.duke.edu/article/view/7411

and the whole of Hammond’s here

http://grbs.library.duke.edu/article/view/5691

On the surface this may seem reasonable, but to those familiar with the period alarm bells soon start ringing.

Hammond’s assessment of Krateros’ mission is rather naïve; one has to remember that Alexander had a year or so to live once Krateros had been dispatched homeward, had he actually been sent to replace Antipater and Alexander wanted the recruits the latter was due to provide, it is pretty inconceivable that heads would not have rolled. Bosworth is probably closer to the mark with Krateros having a supervisory commission over the construction of a new fleet in the Lebanon. This is not the worst of it for he then asserts that the 10,000 were split sine argumentum.

Now this is the death nell for the ‘rather forced argument’ for it is a quite natural interpretation of the Greek, upon which Hammond, uncharacteristically does not comment, but presumably Xenophon has the quotes that show Droysen and Tarn mistaken in their readings; Hammond’s assumption is not ‘showing ‘ anything but poor understanding of the situation in 322.

You will all note that Hammond does not mention any troops’ recruited on the march’ he too assumes the 4000 so described were veterans (his ‘some other troops’ may fit the 1,500 cavalry and 1,000 Persians but is hardly apt for a force equivalent to the 6,000 veterans).
ἦγε δὲ πεζοὺς μὲν τῶν εἰς ἈσίανἈλεξάνδρῳ συνδιαβεβηκότων ἑξακισχιλίους, τῶν δ᾽ ἐν παρόδῳ προσειλημμένων τετρακισχιλίους,
Hammond’s failure to engage does not mean that he is necessarily wrong , however, the Greek could be read to mean that the 4,000 had been brought into the army by Krateros on his march, despite that meaning he abandons nearly half of his force of tried and tested men to gather non phalanx types and leaves them without an officer; Polyperchon went with him to Europe. It certainly takes at least 10,000 with Krateros to get to the numbers at Krannon
( πεζοὶ μὲν πλείους τῶντετρακισμυρίων ἐν τοῖς βαρέσιν ὅπλοις,
A little over 40,000 heavy armed foot…
Diod. XVIII 16 i)
Still Hammond is convinced that he has found these 4,000 hapless souls later still in Kilikia. So let us say it is possible if politically and militarily unlikely.

The next section is rather otiose and flawed in its reasoning; Arrian explicitly says the men with Krateros were τοὺς ὑπὸ γήρως ἢ πηρώσεως τοῦ σώματος ἀχρείους ἐς τὰ πολέμια – ‘…those who were crippled by age or maimed in body to the extent of being unfit for war…’ there is no need to second guess Alexander’s intentions or doubt the statement of Arrian, it is clear from their performance later, however that they were not so super-annuated nor crippled, two years’ R and R in Kilikia obviously reignited their will to fight.

Now we come to a chronological faux pas, Krateros and Antipater crossed to Asia in 320 not 321 (as is shown on the Marmor Parium and proved by BCHP 3 the Diadoch Chronicle). This is important for instead of a couple of months the 4000 are now idle for over a year, Krateros does not send for them despite continued fighting and they do not go home despite their discharge and 1Talent severance bonuses. Instead they are now to be found under Neoptolemus, who has moved from Babylon to Kappadokia and on to Armenia his troops are clearly drawn from the Royal Army under Perdikkas.

Hammond’s reasons for insisting these men are the veterans are quite fatuous; they are described as ‘men of valour’. His contradicts his own reasoning here for Krateros’ men must be the 6,000 veterans because of this appellation, two defeats and a win do not permit the use of the epithet, apparently, yet what has just happened to Neoptolemos’ men so described? That’s right they have been defeated. He also seems to believe that the description could only apply to the discharged veterans even though all of the army remaining with Perdikkas had been through the same ever-victorious campaign.

Looking at the forces of Leonnatos we find further evidence that 20,000 is not outside the capacity of Macedonia for, with 13,000 phalangites at Lamia with Antipater Leonnatos increases his forces by specifically recruiting in Macedonia to 20,000 (Diod. XVIII 14 v). He is unlikely to have started with 5,000 men (Lysimachos had only 6,000 to fight an ongoing Odrysian Rising, Hellespontine Phrygia, Leonnatos’ satrapy was not on the front line) but even if we give him 10,000 he still raises another 10,000 to make 23,000 Macedonians.
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

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Paralus wrote:
Xenophon wrote:As for Guards, the Silver Shields were also elsewhere at this time and certainly not with Polyperchon.

Indeed they were not: they'd been pensioned off at Triparadeisos and sent to Susa with their commander (only to be 'reactivated' at Polyperchon's request in 318).
I don’t think ‘pensioned off’ is an apt description. They were given the task of being Antigenes garrison and safeguarding the treasury in Susiane – perhaps the most important job of all, as well as tax collecting. This task also served the purpose of removing the influence of an unruly and ill-disciplined element from the army, and perhaps the ‘cushy billet’ was something of a reward, or even bribe to the most honoured and prestigious of Alexander’s infantry. Nor is ‘re-activated’ appropriate, since they had never been ‘de-activated’. Later, they were ordered by Polyperchon in the Royal name to join Eumenes with the treasure. [Diod XVIII.58.1], which they did.
The royal army, with the kings, then departed Triparadeisos. The kings were given somatophylakes at Triparadeisos.
Yes, Philip apparently had 4 Somatophylakes [Arrian Successors 1.38], but there is no mention of any Guard unit being raised. In fact there is no mention anywhere of a guard unit for Philip.
It is not stated but is is a safe deduction that a Macedonian guard was also arranged. Unless, of course, we are to assume that with the 'retirement' of the aged original foot guard the Macedonians felt the subsequent kings and their court could do without.
I’m afraid I disagree. Not only is there no mention of a Guard unit for Philip, or in Polyperchon’s army, in our sources, but it would be embarrassing, even dangerous to have Philip with his mental affliction command his own personal elite Guard. Nor could he be given merely nominal command of such a unit, with actual command residing in, say, Polyperchon for that would be seen as him appropriating a Royal prerogative, and might also be embarrassing. In fact we don’t hear of ‘new’ Guards until Eumenes has a ‘new’ Hypaspist unit in his army in 317/316 who, as Guards, take precedence over the ‘Silver Shields’, occupying the traditional 'place of honour' on the right of the line.

Xenophon wrote:There is no mention in our sources of Philip Arrhidaeus having his own Guard units, or being present at Athens.

The king was most certainly with the army as anyone familiar with the history and sources would know. The Royal army (on the march to Athens) in Phokis (Plut. Phok. 33.4-5):


"Both the parties fell in with Polysperchon at the same time, as he was marching with the king near Pharygae, a village of Phocis lying at the foot of Mount Acrurium, which is now called Galata. Here, then, Polysperchon, after setting up the golden canopy and seating beneath it the king and his friends, as soon as Deinarchus came forward, ordered him to be seized, tortured, and put to death, and there gave audience to the Athenians."


Given that the court was with the royal army and that army was on campaign, it is a very safe bet that Macedonian guard troops accompanied the Macedonian king as was customary.
The court and Polyperchon were not in fact with the army. The army, under the command of Alexander son of Polyperchon had arrived earlier in Attica [Diod XVIII.65.3], while Polyperchon and the Kings were in Phokis, near Delphi, in central Greece some 77 miles/124 kilometres away. He later joined the army and Alexander in Attica before moving into the Peloponnese and attacking Megalopolis. Significantly the Kings are not mentioned as being with Polyperchon after Phokis and presumably returned to Macedon, for early next year in the Spring (317) Eurydike has established support for Philip in his own right ( which would clearly take time to accomplish) and removed Polyperchon as Regent, replacing him with Cassander, as well as raising a new ‘Royal’ army loyal to Philip ( until Olympias suborns them ). Still no mention of any Guard troops.


But all of this is something of a distraction. Regardless of where the Kings were, or whether they had a Bodyguard unit, such a unit can only have been recruited from within the body of Antipater’s army/available manpower, whose numbers are known ( to an extent), and described by me above.

One possible source of additional troops for Antipater I did overlook, however. In winter 320/319, some 3,000 or so of Antigonus’ Macedonian troops mutinied and rebelled under Holkias. Ultimately they came home to honourable retirement in Macedon, ( they dispersed to their homes: Polyaenus IV.6.6) but of course in an emergency and despite presumably being time expired, they increased Antipater’s potential manpower.

At the end of the day, Polyperchon still could not have had as many as 20,000 Macedonian ‘sarissaphoroi’ in Attica in 318 BC, for all the reasons I have given in detail.
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

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post by agesilaos » Mon Nov 16, 2015 4:48 pm
Let us consider your proposal; we know that Alexander sent Krateros to Kilikia with 10,000 veterans in the process of discharge home (Diod. XVII 109 i, XVIII 4 i, Arr. ‘Ana.’, VII 12 i).

You suggest that Krateros, whose new sphere was to be Europe with Antipatros, left almost half of his troops, who had mutinied to get home, remember, to garrison a satrapy belonging to another and quite probably a Perdikkan (a Philotas, receives Kilikia at Babylon Diod. XVIII 3 I, and also appears in prison with the surviving Perdikkans at XIX 16 i), at a time when the Macedonian hegemony hung in the balance. On the whole I am against the inherent probability of this.
Craterus had been delayed in Cilicia on his march home, probably because of some local trouble or rebellion. He could not denude Cilicia of troops for the same reason all the troops could not be removed from Macedon. They will have been been left to ‘mop up’ operations there, and maintain order. Most of what is now Anatolia was in ferment, and Perdikkas eventually had to come with the Royal army.
But there are also the 1,000 Persian bowmen and slingers, and 1,500 cavalry, these sound like local recruits if anyone does yet they are not included in these men allegedly raised on the march, hmmm. One also has to ask why did Krateros only recruit up to his original 10,000?
‘Persians’ are hardly local troops – not being Cilician. The men in question ‘raised on the march’ are likely to have been raised on the march though Anatolia and Macedon, just as Leonnatus had done [Diod XVIII.14.4 “...enlisted many additional Macedonian soldiers.”]. Craterus doubtless raised as many as he could, but given that others before him had recruited heavily it is not surprising that he could only raise another 4,000 or so. Rather like the old flour sack which, no matter how many times it is beaten, always gives up some flour.
No source mentions any recruiting drive by Krateros.....
Eh ? Diod XVIII.16.4 “He brought with him six thousand foot soldiers from those who had crossed with Alexander and four thousand from those who had been enlisted on the march.....” Craterus has clearly recruited 4,000 men on his way to reinforce Antipater, probably mostly in Macedon.
.... and given that he seems to have finally acted in haste (Antipatros and Leonnatos had been defeated and now Perdikkas and the Royal Army were approaching his area). Where is the source reference that ‘show[s] 4,000 veteran Macedonian Phalangites remained in Kilikia.
See above....
Alketas and Neoptolemos both received their troops from the Royal Army and Perdikkas and at the time in question Neoptolemos was archi-hypaspist, no one collected this mass of valuable troops it would seem.
Perdiccas had only some 4-6,000 Macedonian infantry plus the 3,000 Hypaspists. He was hardly in any position to supply Alketas and Neoptolemus with Macedonian troops, both of whom had substantial armies including Macedonian infantry [Diod XVIII.29.4 Neoptolemus “had a considerable number of Macedonians...” likely including these veterans. These can only realistically be the balance of Craterus’ veterans, as Hammond argues pointing out that this explains why Neoptolemus could persuade Craterus that Eumenes Macedonians would desert back to their former commander [Plut. Eumenes 7.2 ]
Diodoros’ source does say he took all 10,000 of his veterans, if you accept that it further defined them as those who crossed with Alexander and those that joined him later, a perfectly natural reading of the Greek, if you wish to call it ‘forced’ you will have to supply some examples of readings that contradict this, check Hammond’s footnotes he ought to support this notion from the sources.
I guess you don't have Hammond's article. If you are interested, I would be happy to send you a copy. It is avaiable online.....

Alexander III can hardly be said to have “... and four thousand from those who had been enlisted on the march” His Macedonian reinforcements were all enlisted in Macedon, then sent to join him, not “enlisted on the march.”.
Paralus has dealt with you error over the Argyraspides; and where Philip III was.
I think you’d better read it again, and what I have written above. We are never told the Kings set foot in Attica, but seem to have got no further south than Phokis. No error there then. Paralus agrees with with me about the whereabouts of the ‘Silver Shields’, so there is no error there either. See above for Philip Arrhidaeus’ whereabouts.
Whether he had his own guards is strongly suggested by IG II2 560, which you brought up yourself on the ‘Body in Tomb III’ thread. It records honours to somatophylakes of Alexander IV, probably who may well be members of the Agema rather than the so-called Seven, which would be direct evidence.....
Assuming the traditional 7 Somatophylakes, Philip Arrhidaios had 4, leaving 3 for the young Alexander. Whence came this “Agema’ you refer to?
...Indirectly, Arrian ‘Ta Meta Alex.’ Gives some of the ‘somatophylakes’ appointed for Philip III at Triparadeisos, these are of the order of Alexander’s Seven; if he had these it is likely that he also had Hypaspists. Such are mentioned in the assault on the Camel Fort, Diod XVIII, 33, vi but the word maybe being used in its original sense of shield-bearer (they accompany ladder-bearers) or they may be the assault troops intended to mount the ladders.
The Hypaspists referred to, whether literal shield-bearers or a real Guard unit, are part of Perdikkas’ Egyptian campaign against Ptolemy. No such men are referred to with Philip III, or with Antipater. As we are all aware, a demonstrable unit of Hypaspists next appears in Eumenes army against Antigonus in 317/316, second in precedence only to the ‘Silver Shields’ ( the original Hypaspists).
Now, that’s more than three errors which puts you in breach of ‘Liston’s Law’

That's three from three obvious errors by Liston - doesn't inspire confidence in her pronouncements, does it ?
As I have demonstrated, I have made no errors here. You on the other hand....... :)

It would seem you are hoist on your own petard, your invention you call ‘Liston’s Law’ :lol: :lol:

I see that while this response was in preparation, Agesilaos has posted again and I’ll respond to that in due course....
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

Post by Paralus »

Xenophon wrote:I don’t think ‘pensioned off’ is an apt description. They were given the task of being Antigenes garrison and safeguarding the treasury in Susiane – perhaps the most important job of all, as well as tax collecting.
The Silver Shields were retired from the royal army to satrapal duty. 'Pensioned off' is an entirely apt description. No matter how important one wishes to make satrapal duty or bank vault guarding, the guard unit of Alexander (and his father before him) was no longer required for the royal army. Just as Kleitos was no longer required in Marakanda. The Silver Shields were no longer the Macedonian royal guard and so their whereabouts are irrelevant.
Xenophon wrote:
Paralus wrote:It is not stated but is is a safe deduction that a Macedonian guard was also arranged. Unless, of course, we are to assume that with the 'retirement' of the aged original foot guard the Macedonians felt the subsequent kings and their court could do without.
I’m afraid I disagree. Not only is there no mention of a Guard unit for Philip, or in Polyperchon’s army, in our sources, but it would be embarrassing, even dangerous to have Philip with his mental affliction command his own personal elite Guard. Nor could he be given merely nominal command of such a unit, with actual command residing in, say, Polyperchon for that would be seen as him appropriating a Royal prerogative, and might also be embarrassing. In fact we don’t hear of ‘new’ Guards until Eumenes has a ‘new’ Hypaspist unit in his army in 317/316 who take precedence second only to the ‘Silver Shields’.
A couple of errors there. If we accept your reasoning that Polyperchon exercising actual command, as regent, is "appropriating a Royal prerogative" as well as being "embarrassing", then one wonders at the sheer effrontery of Perdikkas when he, as regent, took the Royal army into Kappadokia with the kings where he was clearly in command of the lot. More embarrassingly for the kings, Perdikkas then took it to Egypt where he must have actually commanded the Silver Shields. The sources are plain that the kings accompanied the royal army and their regent on these campaigns.

We most certainly hear of hypaspists prior to Eumenes' 3,000 alongside the Silver Shields in 317: Antigonos, in 318, places the bravest of his hypaspists on ships (Polyain. 4.6.8); after Kretopolis, Alketas retires with his hypaspists and pages (Diod. 18.45.3). We then find Eumenes has his own as well as the Silver Shields. We might also note that these players all have a cavalry guard (agema) and pages as well. It would seem that all the generals might have hypaspists, pages and a cavalry agema but neither Philip III nor his regent, Polyperchon. We do know that Alexander IV had syntrophoi (Diod. 19.52.4) and Philip III had somatophylakes. I find your reasoning unpersuasive. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. On the whole, it is far more likely that Macedonian royal tradition was followed as the evidence which we do have indicates.
Xenophon wrote:The court and Polyperchon were not in fact with the army. The army, under the command of Alexander son of Polyperchon had arrived earlier in Attica [Diod XVIII.65.3], while Polyperchon and the Kings were in Phokis, near Delphi, in central Greece some 77 miles/124 kilometres away. He later joined the army and Alexander in Attica before moving into the Peloponnese and attacking Megalopolis.
An army arrived with Alexander. What is abundantly clear is that the regent and the court were marching through Phokis. To where? Diodorus tells us that Nikanor knew Polyperchon was coming to Athens with his army (18.64.1). Clearly, this what Polyperchon was doing, with the king and court in tow (Philip had his philoi with him). Given the situation in Athens (the embassies reaching he and the king - 18.64.3), Polyperchon sends Alexander on with a part of this army. Polyperchon then arrives after having dealt with Phokion and in all he has the number of troops under discussion (20,000). There is no reason for Polyperchon and the court to be marching near some small town in Phokis other than the fact that they were on their way to Athens.
Last edited by Paralus on Wed Nov 18, 2015 9:02 pm, edited 2 times in total.
Paralus
Ἐπὶ τοὺς πατέρας, ὦ κακαὶ κεφαλαί, τοὺς μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου τὰ ὅλα κατειργασμένους;
Wicked men, you sin against your fathers, who conquered the whole world under Philip and Alexander.

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agesilaos
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

Post by agesilaos »

That the Macedonians with Neoptolemos were NOT the putative rump of Krateros’ returning veterans can be shown quite clearly from Plut. Eum 6 ii
6 1 Craterus and Antipater, then, after getting this answer, were taking deliberate counsel about the whole situation, when Neoptolemus came to them after his flight, told them about the battle he had lost, and urged them to come to his aid, both of them if possible, but at any rate Craterus; for the Macedonians longed for him exceedingly, and if they should only see his cap and hear his voice, they would come to him with a rush, arms and all. 2 And indeed the name of Craterus was really great among them, and after the death of Alexander most of them had longed for him as their commander. They remembered that he had many times incurred the strong displeasure of Alexander himself in their behalf, by opposing his gradually increasing desire to adopt Persian customs, and by defending the manners of their country, which, thanks to the spread of luxury and pomp, were already being treated with contempt
.

Since the veterans had Krateros as a commander, before Alexander had died they could not be these men, they must be from the Royal Army as stated above. Hammond really gets his logic in a twist trying to demonstrate that Neoptolemos’ troops were the alleged 4,000; he thinks this passage demonstrates a link to Krateros only possible to those under his immediate command, forgetting that Perdikkas’ army sans any of the 10,000 condemned Eumenes to death in absentia out of grief for Krateros whose appeal was much wider for the reasons Plutarch gives above. He even misquotes 5.ii which does not read that Alketas’ Macedonians ‘wanted Craterus for their king’ but that they would ‘welcome him with goodwill [eunoia]’.

Hammond has imported the notion of them wanting him as king from the Suda, which he quotes in the ‘supporting’ footnote. Kappa 2335 reads
The Macedonian, who was very large to look at and not far from royal bulk, and stood out by the splendour of his apparel,[1] and in all his dress was attired in the manner of Alexander, except for the diadem, and [was] to his associates the sort of man, with [his] reasonableness and with the addition of solemnity, to seem extremely amicable and plausible by the attractiveness of his words, when they compared [him] with the small size of Antipatros's body and his mean nature,[2] and additionally his aloofness and his savagery towards his subjects. [Accordingly] they revered Krateros in the manner of a king, and conferring praises upon him -- appropriately, given that he was the most daring of commanders and had the greatest understanding of military deeds -- they held him unquestionably second in esteem after Alexander. So on this point there was even a movement in the whole army, which openly revered Krateros like a king. Every one of them thought it wrong that both men had been appointed to an equal division, and they were totally unwilling to obey Antipatros. And Eumenes,[3] during the war, finding the prostrate body of Krateros with breath still in it, is said to have leapt down from his horse and bewailed him, calling to witness Krateros's courage and understanding and the extreme kindliness of his disposition and the unaffectedness of his friendship towards himself, inasmuch as he had no love of wealth and was a companion to upright justice. 'This man is indeed "strongest",'[4] [he said,] 'whose deeds of virtue find a concord of praises even among his opponents.'[5] And he tended his body with honour and with fitting magnificence. While, therefore, these things, too, bring good repute to Krateros, he is also believed to have been most wise and most gentle and most reliable in sharing friendship, since in fact he acquired comradeship by nature and practised it
The occasion of the alleged desire to crown him is defined by the contrast with Antipatros and ought therefore to be placed when Krateros led all 10,000 veterans to the Old Rope’s aid; Antipatros never seems to come out well in comparisons, he is shamed by Eumenes’ razzia later.

Alexander III can hardly be said to have “... and four thousand from those who had been enlisted on the march” His Macedonian reinforcements were all enlisted in Macedon, then sent to join him, not “enlisted on the march.”.

Unfortunately the Greek does not mean anything so specific, it only means that they ‘became part of the army’, ie were entered into its actual ranks rather than on its nominal rolls.

Rebellion in Kilikia, Asia in ferment??!! I find none of this in Arrian ‘TMA’, Diodoros or Plutarch, please reference.
Craterus has clearly recruited 4,000 men on his way to reinforce Antipater, probably mostly in Macedon.
So that’s an extra 4000 Macedonians! :lol: Perdikkas seems to have had c.15,000 Macedonian foot see Hammond in the article cited and Billows ‘Kings and Colonists’ p184ff. And since Neoptolemos’ troops are patently from his army he necessarily had sufficient troops.

I will leave Paralus to argue his points.

Somatophylax has many meanings outside the Seven as a casual reading of Arrian Anabasis will demonstrate; this is more so when the source is Greek, as the Attic inscription is. The notion of a 3/4 split somatophylate is fatally flawed and should be revised as argued on the Tomb III thread.
Liston’s Law is your benchmark, I merely coined the title, so you are still wrong on all points in fact; being right is rather more than denying one is wrong. I await the evidence for Asia Minor in tumult. :wink:
When you think about, it free-choice is the only possible option.
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Paralus
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

Post by Paralus »

Xenophon wrote:Perdiccas had only some 4-6,000 Macedonian infantry plus the 3,000 Hypaspists. He was hardly in any position to supply Alketas and Neoptolemus with Macedonian troops, both of whom had substantial armies including Macedonian infantry [Diod XVIII.29.4 Neoptolemus “had a considerable number of Macedonians...” likely including these veterans. These can only realistically be the balance of Craterus’ veterans, as Hammond argues pointing out that this explains why Neoptolemus could persuade Craterus that Eumenes Macedonians would desert back to their former commander [Plut. Eumenes 7.2 ]
Yet, as has been pointed out, Neoptolemos was given these Macedonians in Arnemia before the royal army left for Kilikia and Psidia (Plut. Eum. 4.1-2):
However, Perdiccas felt confident of carrying out his projects by himself, and thought that the country they had left behind them needed an efficient and faithful guardian, and therefore sent Eumenes back from Cilicia, ostensibly to his own satrapy, but really to reduce to obedience the adjacent country of Armenia, which had been thrown into confusion by Neoptolemus. Accordingly, although Neoptolemus was a victim of ostentation and empty pride, Eumenes tried to constrain him by personal intercourse; then, finding that the Macedonian men-at‑war were conceited and bold, he raised a force of cavalry as a counterpoise to them...
That cavalry force was a large 6,300 and so the "Macedonian men-at‑war" were a considerable number. Unless we suppose Krateros sent his 4,000 to Armenia, these are not any of his forces.

Hammond's argument is strained or forced. He translates Diod.18.30.4 as follows:
(Craterus) had in all 20,000 infantrymen, among whom were the majority of Macedonians celebrated for their deeds of valour, and it was in these that he had especially his hopes of victory.
Hammond's logic is that troops so described ("celebrated for their valour" and similar) are Alexander's veterans; those of the homeland cannot be so described. If we apply his logic then what his translation claims is that Krateros had with him the majority of those Macedonians famed for their valour. In other words, the majority of the veterans of Alexander. Now, Hammond has made the point that the Argyraspides are elsewhere at this time and so these veterans of Alexander must also be added. If, as Hammond claims, the veterans with Krateros here number 6,000, they cannot be a majority of Krateros' original 10,000 and the Argyraspides (13,000). Any way it is looked at, the passage cannot be made to say that with Krateros were "the majority of the 10,000 Macedonians Krateros originally had that were famed for their valour".

The less said about the misleading translation of Plutarch that the Macedonians wanted Krateros as their king and the so called "sons of the hypaspists" the better.
Paralus
Ἐπὶ τοὺς πατέρας, ὦ κακαὶ κεφαλαί, τοὺς μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου τὰ ὅλα κατειργασμένους;
Wicked men, you sin against your fathers, who conquered the whole world under Philip and Alexander.

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