Agesilaos wrote:
I do not want to get bogged down in whether the opening stages are a ‘skirmish’ since all that is happening here is that we are defining things differently, Xenophon defines it according to the numbers engaged , I to whether the main battle lines are engaged, to my mind you can have 10,000 men chucking pointed sticks at each other in loose order and it is still just a skirmish, a mighty big one but still a skirmish, one the main battle line troops deploy and engage it becomes a battle;
By such a definition Roman Legions apparently only ever ‘skirmished’, as did Persian infantry – both of whose infantry were primarily missile armed ( the Romans with pointy sticks chucked by 10,000 men in loose order!), and whose ‘main battle lines’ generally fought at a distance without ‘engaging’ at close quarters until final phases of battle.....
The crucial sentence is XVIII 24 viii
. [8] προσδεξάμενος δὲ τοὺς ἀγωνιζομένους, τούτους μὲν ἥθροιζε πάντας ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας, καὶ τοὺς πεζοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἱππέας, τοῖς δὲ πελτασταῖς καὶ τοῖς φαλαγγίταις παρήγγελλε διπλασιάζειν τὸ βάθος καὶ πυκνοῦν ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιόν.
‘Prosdexamenos’ translated here as ‘received’ is used over eighty times by Polybios and on no occasion does it imply ‘received into the ranks’ (I am only half-way through checking though so maybe it will and I am rushing to press) what it generally means is ‘receive favourably’, which makes sense here too, the ‘agwnizomenoi’ – those that had been engaged – we received favourably [despite having been driven off] by Philip and stationed both foot and horse on the right flank; nothing says they passed through the phalanx. In verse 10, where the Romans ‘receive’ their advanced force’ through the gaps between the maniples, Polybios uses ‘dexamenos’ which is closely related , it is the same without the prefix ‘pros’ but the prefix makes all the difference.
The battle/skirmish of the light troops and cavalry began ‘ahead’(or to the west) of Philip’s march line, beyond what would become the right flank of his battle line when the Romans bumped into the Macedonians securing the heights above the pass. As both sides reinforcements arrived, the fighting must have extended eastward, back toward Philip’s ultimate position and across and in front of it. On numbers alone, this fighting would eventually take place with lines of light troops 1,000 yards or more long, and the fighting must have extended back eastward as the combat grew. ( there is no mention of fighting either in the pass, or to its west). Secondly, in order to ‘support’ his lights Philip could only render assistance if he were formed to their rear ( forming somewhere to their left would not have helped in the slightest ), so Philip’s phalanx must have been to the rear of his cavalry and light troops, even if the light troops extended ( as they likely did given where the fighting began) beyond the right flank of the phalanx. It is even possible that the left of Philip’s phalanx as initially deployed went beyond the light troops, so that the phalanx was formed not directly behind the light troops, but somewhat obliquely. The fact that it was the legionaries of the left wing who joined in might also imply this - which would leave the Roman right wing and its opposite numbers in Philip's phalanx without light troops to their front. Thirdly, from his position on arrival, Philip looks down and sees the fighting going on with the Romans near their camp, down in the valley, which rapidly changes as the legionaries join the fray and drive back his troops toward the ridge line where the phalanx is deployed. All of this means that the majority ( at least) of Philip’s light troops
must have withdrawn through the phalanx, which in turn means they must have been in open order at that point. Again this was perfectly normal, for a phalanx did not change to ‘close order/pyknosis’ until the enemy were close (1-200 yards) and contact imminent. Significantly too, the macedonian light troops opponents withdraw through the maniples of the Roman battle-line, which must have stood opposite Philip's phalanx.
Lastly, for a clincher we are told that “Receiving those who were engaged with the enemy he placed them all, both foot and horse on his right wing....”[Polyb XVIII.24.8] He would hardly need to send them off to guard his right flank if they were already there, and the bulk at least can only have been in front of the phalanx.
“Another major problem with this interpretation is that the left wing coming up to the same ground found it unsuitable to deploy upon; which makes it unlikely that the right wing could occupy that same ground in open order and manoeuvre across it.
‘Pyknosein’ - to close up – only implies to the normal order, or two cubits or one yard per man so your 8,000 would cover 500 yards, the equivalent of two legions on a three foot frontage (2400/6 =400yds; in fact there is a good chance that the legions were overstrength, 2,000 hastati were detached from one legion to garrison Thebes, I think, if this applied to the allies too we would have 4000/6=666 yds, if just the Roman contingent we get 3200/6= 533 yards and some of this would be facing the Macedonian flanking force of mercenaries and cavalry).”
This doesn't seem to be entirely correct. The left wing did not find the ridge line
unsuitable to deploy on. They understandably had problems doing so ; “
in part owing to the difficulty of the ground [the ridgeline] and because they were trying to reach the combatants and were still in marching order and not in line....but gave way thrown into confusion and broken up by the elephants alone.”[Polyb XVIII.25.6-7] In fact earlier we are told some went down, attempting to link with the successful advancing right wing, while others “halted on the heights” to await their still marching comrades at the rear of the column coming up and deploying.
I find your use of ‘pyknosis/close order’ as synonymous with ‘normal’ a little confusing. The Macedonian phalanx had 3 formations. The most common was ‘normal’ or open order; “which had no special name” of four cubits/6ft per man – all the manuals say so e.g. Aelian 11.2; Asclepiodotus IV.2
When about to contact the enemy, this formation usually halved its depth and doubled the number in the frontage to form ‘close order’ or compact order [pyknosis] of 2 cubits/3 ft per man. Thus a full phalanx on a frontage of 1,024 files 16 deep occupying a frontage of 4,096 cubits/10 stades/2,048 yards had 2,048 files 8 deep in close order ‘fighting formation’.
Something the Macedonian phalanx could do due to their side-on two-handed pike stance, and smaller shields ( average 66-75 cm diameter) that earlier hoplites, with a three-quarter stance and larger aspides ( average diameter 80-90 cm) could not, was close up still further into ‘synaspismos/overlapped or locked shields formation', with each man on a 1 cubit/18 in frontage, said to have been invented by Philip II. [ Peter Connolly did some experiments which demonstrated this formation was quite practical]. This ‘locked shields’ formation was usually 4 deep, with every pike in action, with 4,096 men on the same frontage as before. It was usually used for defensive purposes, as obviously manoeuvre or movement in such a dense formation was very difficult.
Incidently, you mentioned ‘synaspismos’ sometimes being used to mean ‘pyknosis’, and this is correct for the earlier hoplite phalanx and perfectly logical. This is because in close order of 3 ft/90 cm per man, the larger hoplite aspides would be just touching/slightly overlapped, to create a ‘locked shields’ formation.
But I digress. ( who me ?) To get back to Cynoscephalae, we agree that Philip’s right wing phalanx, once it was in ‘double depth’ i.e. around 8,000 men in a 16 deep close order fighting formation occupied a frontage of roughly 500 yards, and this was equivalent to the frontage of the left wing two legions ( 1 Roman and 1 Allied ). That rules out an attack 32 deep in close order, for then there would have been a frontage of only 250 yards or so – equivalent to just 1 Legion. It also rules out an attack 8 deep in close order for that would have been on a front of 1,000 yards or so – the frontage of the whole Roman 4 Legion battle line, not just the left wing.
“The normal fighting depth of the sarissa phalanx was sixteen the mathematics of this battle show it; the phalanx has to double its depth from how it was set up on the ridge; were it sixteen deep then the resulting 32 deep block would not just leave the Romans a legion’s worth of overlap it would impede the left wing coming up. My way, gives sufficient room and accords with what Polybios and the manuals say; this is not to say that I am not adding things which are not in the sources; but, I am saying that four legions cannot appear from camp like a rabbit from a hat, it would take time, time which Polybios’ narrative actually gives them, but he has them all set up so that he can deliver Flamininus’ speech. I also add a further evolution where Philip forms ‘synaspismos’ before attacking, this is not mentioned but is the implication of his force not being able to perform ‘metabole’ or about face and Plutarch’s mention of the power of the Macedonians’ interlocked shields.”
An error here is the assumption that the usual ‘fighting formation’ in close order/pyknosis was 16 deep. The ‘manuals’ for both Hoplite and Macedonian phalanxes, battlefield topography, and references in the various sources all refute this assumption, and prove that a phalanx normally formed up in files of a variety of depths ( usually dictated by available ground), but typically 8 for hoplites and 16 for Macedonians in ‘normal’ order of 4 cubits/6 ft per man, which then ‘closed up’ to half-files in fighting formation of ‘pyknosis’ with two cubits per man. I won’t go into a digression on hoplite phalanx formations and the original Xenophon ( What’s that, do I hear a faint sound of cheers?)
The picture is complicated by the fact that by Hellenistic times, in addition to ‘closing up’ by halving the depth of the files, it could also be performed by ranks, i.e. the files stay the same depth, but close up laterally, reducing the frontage by half – and that is exactly what was done at Cynoscephalae by Philip, the reason for it being the constraints of the battle ground size, but this evolution was exceptional, even unique.
e.g. Aelian 11.6 gives us the distances involved for a full phalanx 16,384 strong closing up laterally rather than by files: “
Therefore since there 1,024 file leaders drawn up along the front of the phalanx it is evident that deployed they occupy 4,096 cubits/2,048 yds in length, that is 10 stades 96 cubits, 5 stades and 48 cubits in compact order/pyknosis and two and a half stades and 24 cubits in locked shield/synaspismos order.” Note the depth in this instance remains 16 deep.
This is the exception that proves/tests the rule, for normally a commander occupied the available frontage for his battle-line, therefore halved depth, rather than ‘shrink’ his frontage laterally and expose his flanks.
The ‘normal’ or usual depth that the Macedonian phalanx fought in was therefore 8 deep in ‘close/compact order/pyknosis’.
We can also rule out an attack in ‘synaspismos’ for a number of reasons – not least because that would involve an attack at ‘half depth’ whereas we are told they were ‘double depth’. The only source which mentions ‘synaspismos’ in connection with Cynoscephalae is Plutarch ,who confusingly ( and technically incorrectly) uses the term to refer to the phalanx’s usual close order fighting formation [ see confusion of terminology above] – he evidently thought the phalanx always fought in ‘synaspismos’.
Agesilaos has suggested this formation as implicit from Polybius’ “As it is impossible for the phalanx to turn right-about-face or to fight man-to-man.”[XVIII.26.4] This is not necessarily so, because once the phalanx lowered its pikes to horizontal and engaged the enemy, it was quite incapable of turning around, as Polybius says, regardless of what formation it was in. To do so required the pikes to be raised to the vertical – patently impossible to troops engaged with foes to their front. In practical terms, the attack must have been in close order 16 deep, since no other formation fits the known facts without difficulties.
‘Your way’ is problematic, because it would mean initial deployment would have to be 8 deep – and therefore a line of around 2,000 yards ( in the usual open order) twice as long as the Roman line and too big for the battlefield. Your solution, if I understand you correctly, is that the initial deployment was 8 deep in ‘close order’ [1,000 yards or so front], that this was doubled to 16 deep [ still on 1,000 yards frontage, but now in open order, and then ‘closed up’ to the right to ‘compact order’ ( the correct 500 yards frontage).....but then closed up again to ‘synaspismos’? ( just 250 yards frontage). That simply doesn’t work, unless you leave aside aside the improbable idea that the attack was delivered in ‘synaspismos’, when you end up the same as in my hypothesis – the attack was in ‘close order’ 16 deep, on a frontage of some 500 yards or so – on that at least we can agree ?
As to getting there by deploying in ‘close order’, then doubling depth to ‘open order’, then forming ‘close order’ again by laterally closing up, that is the ‘opposite’ of the way we are told phalanxes deployed, which was in ‘normal/open order’, (necessitated by lines having to negotiate obstacles, such as trees etc) only closing up for the charge into contact. There is also the need for a battle line to be in 'open order' so that screening light troops could withdraw/disengage before the main clash. I therefore think my hypothesis less problematic than yours !!
[ Digression: Your point about the of the Legions being oversized is well observed, with Livy’s reference to 2,000 Hastati [ XXXIII.1] ( a normal Legion at this time fielded 1,200 Hastati and was around 4,500 strong [Polyb XI.19.8]). Livy notes ‘overstrength’ legions on eight occasions between 200 an 168 B.C. for service in either Spain or Greece. The largest occurs for the year 169 BC, when the Senate apparently decreed that the two legions on the Macedonian front against Philip’s son Perseus should have 6,000 infantry and 300 cavalry [ L.XLIII.4] but this appears to be an exaggeration, for at XLIV.1.1 the figure of 5,000 is given – presumably following Polybius.
2,000 Hastati would imply a Legion of up to 6,000 ( In an overstrength Legion, which could vary a lot in size, the Hastati and Principes were increased, but not the Triarii )]
From me? But the composition of the initial Roman force may have been the cavalry from one legion and a thousand velites, ie Roman light troops, but Livy uses the neutral word 'pedites' - foot and Polybios 'euzonoi' - light foot, Polybios uses 'grosphomachoi' viz VI 21 vii
says that Philip felt compelled to go to the assistance of his forces "in spite of the fact that the greater part of his phalanx was still on the march and engaged in mounting the hills". The greater part has to be more than half one thinks. Perhaps the Megalopolitan has confused himself?
, sorry)