Philip's invasion of Asia

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Alexias
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Philip's invasion of Asia

Post by Alexias »

The accepted chronology for Philip's invasion appears to be that in April/May of 336 BC, taking advantage of the death of the Persian King Arses, he sent an advance force of at least 10,000 men under Parmenion, Attalus and Amyntas to the Ionian coast with instructions to liberate the Greek cities. They, and the supporting fleet, appear to have effected this in cities on Lesbos and Chios, and at Ephesus, engaging in action to the south of Ephesus at Magnesia. Philip had been making alliances with cities in the north-west quarter of Asia minor (and presumably the Pixodorus affair, if it happened, was an abortive effort to negotiate further south with, maybe, Alexander getting the blame for it going wrong), so this perhaps explains why his comparatively small force didn't get quickly eliminated. His plan, followed by Alexander, was to take control of the coast in order to eliminate the threat of the Persian fleet. In October 336, Philip was about to set out with his main force to Asia when he was murdered.

I have a few questions about this:

Philip, unless he had prior knowledge of it, can't have been taking advantage of the murder of Arses and his family by Bagoas the eunuch Vizier, as it takes time to plan an expeditionary force. It is likely that the general confusion at the Persian court enabled him to decide over the preceding winter that the time was ripe for his invasion and that Arses' death was a coincidental godsend.

More importantly, though, why was Philip launching a major invasion in autumn? It might have reduced the threat of the Persian fleet by campaigning in winter and the support this could offer to a port if Philip had to beseige it. However, this seems to be a minor advantage considering he still had a Greek fleet to oppose the Persian one, when weighed against the difficulties of transporting 30,000+ men, livestock and chattels across the Hellespont in potentially bad weather, campaigning in winter, and maintaining his own lines of supply, communication, and potentially, retreat, when the Asian territory was by no means secure. Nicholas Hammond also says that Darius, when he came to the throne, failed to mobilize the Persian fleet at any time during 336. Am I missing something here?

It also seems improbable that Philip would have left his expeditionary force exposed for 6 months, a whole campaigning season. 10,000 doesn't seem a particularly large number, and not enough to beseige a large city, without enough men to control the surrounding countryside, and especially too small if a Persian relief force arrived, pincering it against the city. They were (or at least a portion of them) in fact forced to retreat inside Magnesia by Memnon with 4,000 men. Therefore this would seem to limit the expediditionary force's effectiveness to a bit of coercion and support for the democratic parties within the cities.

Added to this is the lack of response from the Persians to the invasion. Any Greek or Persian commander with half a brain must have seen that the expeditionary force's arrival was the prelude to Philip invading in force. Six months is more than long enough for the Persians to gather an answering force, so why would Philip risk losing a quarter of his fighting force by leaving them exposed all summer? Was he simply gambling that no one would take charge on the Persian side? Memnon obviously didn't have enough men to pursue his advantage and destroy them.

This leads me to wonder if the dating of Philip's death to the autumn is correct. I've no real idea of how this date was arrived at, other than that Nicholas Hammond says the wedding was arranged to coincide with the great autumn Macedonian festival at Aegae, but the alternative dating of June/July seems more probable. Robin Lane Fox seems to think a midsummer date for the festival and wedding of Philip's daughter Cleopatra to Alexander of Epirus more likely, and October the date by which Alexander's accession was secure. This would explain why the expeditionary force spent the summer in Asia unsupported. Any ideas?
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Re: Philip's invasion of Asia

Post by Taphoi »

Alexias wrote:This leads me to wonder if the dating of Philip's death to the autumn is correct. I've no real idea of how this date was arrived at, other than that Nicholas Hammond says the wedding was arranged to coincide with the great autumn Macedonian festival at Aegae, but the alternative dating of June/July seems more probable. Robin Lane Fox seems to think a midsummer date for the festival and wedding of Philip's daughter Cleopatra to Alexander of Epirus more likely, and October the date by which Alexander's accession was secure. This would explain why the expeditionary force spent the summer in Asia unsupported. Any ideas?
There is not really much doubt that Autumn of 336BC is correct (and I have argued for 27th September 336BC in the Julian Calendar). The primary evidence is the reign lengths for Alexander given by Diodorus (12 years and 7 months) and Arrian (12 years and 8 months) from different sources: you get roughly Oct 336BC on calculating back from Alexander's death on 10th June 323BC. As I have just mentioned in the Year Breaks thread, Justin places Gaugamela (1st October 331BC) within the fifth year of Alexander's reign and the fall of Thebes (September 335BC) was in the first book of Cleitarchus and therefore within the first year of Alexander's reign. Furthermore, Arrian, Indica 21.1 mentions that Nearchus set sail within the eleventh year of Alexander's reign on 20th Boedromion (about 18th September) in 325BC. Hammond originally went with Summer 336BC, but eventually concluded that there is no real evidence to support it (several sources suggest that Alexander was twenty at his accession, but they only mean that he was somewhere between 20 and 21 - the argument for an accession in Summer 336BC was largely predicated on the non sequitur that Alexander was exactly 20).
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agesilaos
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Re: Philip's invasion of Asia

Post by agesilaos »

Actually, Aristoboulos is reported by Arrian (VII 28) as having said that Alexander ‘lived thirty-two years and eight months and reigned twelve years and these same eight months.’ From which it does follow that the accession fell in the same month as Alexander’s birthday. Counting back from the last day of Daisios (when Alexander died,those eight months render Appellaios for both birth and accesssion. Unfortunately, Plutarch gives a birth date of 6 Hekatombaion (Alex 3 v) which he equates with the Macedonian month of Loios, which would be four months earlier, counting inclusively. Clearly there is a contradiction but rather than reject one of these notices it has been customary to indulge in fudging. The correct course is to accept the evidence of Aristoboulos, a contemporary and a courtier over Plutarch’s unsourced tradition. This contradicts none of the evidence for things happening in certain years of the reign.

We will leave the Theban reference, as whilst it does come in the first Book of Kleitarchos it is a non sequitur to proceed to say that means it belongs to the first year of the reign. On Aristoboulos’ evidence it does, but there is no stated evidence that each of Kleitarchos’ book dealt with one year, so it is no evidence and if the reign started in Hekatombaion in line with Plutarch (and fudging that he reign and birthday fell in the same month, as with Aristoboulos) then it would fall in the second year, Thebes having fallen during the Great Mysteries ( Arrian I x), which ran 15 – 23 Boedromion (the third month while Hekatombaion is the first).

Gaugamela is firmly in Boedromion and the fifth year, which conforms to Aristoboulos, as does Niarchos’ Boedromion (even if Arrian is wrong by a month).

So Apellaios should be the right month in 336 it ran 30 Oct to 28 Nov. Which would mean the expeditionary force was alone in Asia two whole campaigning seasons if it was sent in May, as Alexander did not cross until spring 334. There are few indicators, but Diodoros says (XVI 91) that Philip sent the Advance Force, while he awaited a response from Delphi, he then celebrated Kleopatra’s set-piece wedding.

Had he received news of Arses murder and the Revolt of Egypt, he may well have thought it worth establishing a bridgehead just before the end of the campaigning season, presumably he had arranged for Sestos or Abydos to accept his forces beforehand. Memnon’s response and the actions of Parmenion et al would largely belong to 335, while Dareios was coping with the more pressing matter of Egypt, hence the weak initial response.

10,000 Greeks would not feel too threatened in Asia, as long as they had a base, Agesilaos and Xenophon had operated in the face of strong Persian forces almost with impunity with similarly small forces and the Advance Force probably had superior cavalry in both numbers and quantity. Assuming that a base had been arranged the need to transport a large logistics train would disappear, there would be pack animals and stores in the city they landed in.
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Alexias
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Re: Philip's invasion of Asia

Post by Alexias »

Thank you both very much for these replies. I hadn't realised that the conflict with Memnon took place in 335, and thus the focus on the rebellion in Egypt makes sense then. I'm still not convinced of the logic of Philip invading in autumn though, unless perhaps he was rushed into the whole invasion by the turmoil at the Persian court.
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Re: Philip's invasion of Asia

Post by Nikas »

Leaving aside the chronology of this campaign, I wonder if it is simply a coincidence that the number of this expeditionary force should number 10,000, assuming it did without me taking the necessary initiative to go look it up :)

If it is, perhaps there is an element of symbolism involved, being the same number as Xenophon's force in the Anabasis?
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Re: Philip's invasion of Asia

Post by agesilaos »

of the top of my head I think the number is arrived at by subtracting the lower figures for Alexander's Expedition from the higher and assuming the latter include the advance force; Polyainos might give a number but I don't think so. Philip, a supreme pragmatist, would not jeopardise a military adventure for the sake of symbolism; the force would just be that part of the Macedonian Army he could muster and as many mercenaries deemed necessary (and affordable!).
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Re: Philip's invasion of Asia

Post by Paralus »

agesilaos wrote: Polyainos might give a number but I don't think so.
Indeed he does; a round figure for sure but the only source to do so (5.44.4):
Memnon with a body of four thousand troops advanced against Magnesia; and he pitched and fortified his camp at the distance of forty stades from the city, which was defended by Parmenion and Attalus with a force of ten thousand men.
I very much doubt there was any linkage to the mercenary force Xenophon was a part of (which numbered more than 11,000 off the top of my head). If there is any passing resemblance here it is in the form of a premonition: the quite remarkable and stubborn defence of a bridgehead by Lysimachus over the late summer and autumn of 302. He, along with a contingent under Cassander's philos Prepelaus, led an advance force into Antigonid Asia and fought Antigonus to a winter standstill. Having fallen back upon Heraclea he secured an alliance, supplies for the army and a warm bed by marrying Amestris, the daughter of Oxyartes and niece of King Darius (Diod.20.109.6-7) and awaited Seleucus and the cynical Ptolemy. Diodorus then remarks: Such was the situation in Asia. On another thread this might be taken as Diodorus now switching sources or the end of a book in his source. A rather simplistic view.

At the outset of the invasion the Persian court was in some turmoil. Problems with Egypt - a recurrent sore for successions - have been noted. The Persian King (and indeed his western satraps) likely did not see this as any great invasion. It had all been seen before when Agesilaos arrived, having sacrificed as a latter day Agamemnon before departure, and promptly made treaties with one or the other satrap whilst invading the "off" satrap's territory. For all the bull and panhellenic bluster, it amounted to much ado over nothing. Why was this to be anything different? Philip had dabbled in Persian affairs before (Perinthus) and the when faced with war by Athens, Byzantium, Cos, Chios, Rhodes and, not incidentally, the Great King (Diod. 16.75.1-2; 77.2-3), he withdrew. Surely the satraps could handle this too?
Last edited by Paralus on Wed Jul 11, 2012 2:56 pm, edited 3 times in total.
Paralus
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agesilaos
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Re: Philip's invasion of Asia

Post by agesilaos »

Ah, the little grey cells are not yet dead! Without wishing to belittle my Diadochic hero, his situation was militarily much stronger than Parmenion's, for him a withdrawl to the East meant a withdrawl towards neutral ground (Pontus) and even an ally, Seleukos. For Parmenion it would not just have meant moving deeper into enemy country, it would have meant compromising his strategic mission to secure a firm bridgehead. It speaks volumes for Philip's confidence in his generalship (the only one Philip had ever found, allegedly) that with restricted forces and no great freedom of manouevre he maintained a hold on the landing areas for a season more than was envisaged. Then again the Egyptians certainly provided a much greater distraction than Ptolemy (which really is a name one cannot pronounce without spitting :P ) and Dareios, as you say was not as alive to the magnitude of the threat as old Cyclops.

Also I have a hunch that the usage '10,000' for Xenophon's force belongs with English Public School rather than ancient sources where they are the Cyreans, or mercenaries of Cyrus. The same way the Light Brigade are the 600, although they were only c560 at the Charge due to illness (cholera not 'man-flu'), and when the authorities finally removed the rectal digit to honour them 1,736 approximately turned up at the free dinner claiming to have charged!
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Re: Philip's invasion of Asia

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agesilaos wrote: Without wishing to belittle my Diadochic hero, his situation was militarily much stronger than Parmenion's, for him a withdrawl to the East meant a withdrawl towards neutral ground (Pontus) and even an ally, Seleukos. For Parmenion it would not just have meant moving deeper into enemy country, it would have meant compromising his strategic mission to secure a firm bridgehead. It speaks volumes for Philip's confidence in his generalship (the only one Philip had ever found, allegedly) that with restricted forces and no great freedom of manouevre he maintained a hold on the landing areas for a season more than was envisaged. Then again the Egyptians certainly provided a much greater distraction than Ptolemy (which really is a name one cannot pronounce without spitting :P ) and Dareios, as you say was not as alive to the magnitude of the threat as old Cyclops.
The Old One Eyed seems not to have been up with the situation either. Here again a similarity with Philip's invasion though the reasons are different. Here "Cyclops" was faced by the coalition of 316. After Salamis and the near thing (storms and misadventure are a boon to the defensively minded) of 306, Antigonus could be reasonably confident that Ptolemy's commitment to the coalition extended as far as Coele-Syria; Ptolemy would not expose himself unnecessarily. The other major player was Seleucus and, after some two years of fruitless campaigning over 310-308, Antigonus would be only too well aware of this. Despite ingenious constructs to the contrary, Antigonus' "easy" response can only be based on the knowledge that Seleucus had some way to come; something further than Babylon. His plan was no different to 316: divide and destroy and he would let Demetrius deal with Cassander whilst he dealt with Lysimachus. Coele-Syria, as before, would be recaptured later. Lysimachus' harassing and dogged fighting retreat killed that off and facilitated Ipsus.

The situation for Lysimachus was similar to Parmenion in that he had to hold the line until the "main army" could be brought to the field. Unlike Parmenion, his "invasion" was necessary to remove Demetrius from Greece and allow Cassander to add a more generous portion of his forces. In the end it would be Seleucus' forces that would help to address the serious issue of numbers for Antigonus possessed the single largest armament on the field. Lysimachus had to invade, distract and keep occupied the One-Eyed until the future "Great King" brought his array to bear. In the end Lysimachus, like Parmenion, retreated toward his traveling "ally".
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Wicked men, you sin against your fathers, who conquered the whole world under Philip and Alexander.

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